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PREFACE 
Trie days when economic development was viewed simply as a process 
or establishing industries are gone- Agricultural and rural development 
axe now universally recognised as fundamental requirements of the economic 
growth procec7 v-irhcui: which the development of other sectors, and of the 
e-oncnvy as a whole, are unlikely to be successful-
Despite considerable progress in the urban industrial sectors, 
Kenya is still an overwhelmingly rural country. The jobs and incomes ox 
the vast majority cf Kenya's population are rural ana, even though urban 
populations are growing at a rapid rate the current low proportion of the 
total population that is urban &nd the current high rate of growth of the 
tcrax papulation ensure that the absolute numbers of rural people will 
be expanding inexorably for the forseeabie future It is unthinkable 
that this vast rural population should not significantly contribute to the 
economic growth of the country, or that the benefits of growth should 
pass them by 
Just as the problems cf employment ana migration or the problems 
of welfare and income distribution cannot be solved without significant 
and sustained progress in the rurax areas, neither can the problems cf 
preserving a balance of international payments or, indeed, of sustaining 
industrial growth- The country's exports and foreign exchange earnings 
overwhelmingly emanate from the agricultural sector,, and Kenya's industries 
have substantia.: supply linkages with the agricultural sector- The 
strengthening of these linkages is a particularly vita*, aspect cf the country's 
development 
in dealing with what is perhaps the most severe ictg-term economic 
problem of all, that of burgeoning population growth, there is now 
considerable c . nsensus on the evidence that it is particularly hard to reduce 
birth rates, despite growing pressure on limited resources-., without 
widespread participation in the processes of economic and social development 
and widely perceived improvements in standards of living Again, it is crucial 
that these '.naiges reach the vast mass or rural people, 
The paradox is that despite broad recognition of the supreme 
importance of rural and agricultural development and numerous policy 
statements according it the highest priority, country after country is 
facing severe problems with the agricultural and rural sectors - It is 
viii IDS/OP 12 
not just Kenya that has difficulty accelerating and maintaining the pace 
of rural development - Seemingly intractable problems in this area 
virtually characterise the developing countries of the third world-
Formulating and implementing development projects and programmes in the 
rural sector appear to be uniquely difficult- Ministries of agriculture 
seem to be chronically incapable of spending the money allocated to them 
by economic planners and by ministries of finance- There are constant 
problems with creating and sustaining an administrative structure that is 
functional at the grass roots level and that relates specific programmes 
and Investments to locally diagnosed development capacity. Severe 
distributional problems arise such that government efforts are open to 
the criticism that they not only fail to reach those who need them most, 
but that the consequences of these efforts are frequently to worsen 
inequities by subsidising the better off at the expense of the poor. All 
these problems cure easy TO ICQCO gnisej but their recognition does not imply 
a ready solution. Solutions on paper and in the abstract, furthermore, lack 
credibility until they have been carried to the point of trial and 
implementation on the ground 
The fundamental logic of the Special Rural Development Programme 
(SRDP) is precisely in this area of trying out and testing strategies and 
programmes that might become the basis for a well conceived development 
thrust in the rural areas» The logic was not primarily one of pushing the 
development of the areas that were chosen, it was rather one of experimenting 
in those areas, so that the entire national effort could proceed on a 
better footing, with better conceived procedures, strategies and programmes. 
To the extent that SRDP is experimental, the most important output 
of the entire programme is the knowledge gained from it- It is in 
this context that the current evaluation should be seen. There are numerous 
ways In which useful knowledge can be gained from such a programme and 
become incorporated into the institutional memory and the procedures of a 
government, There Is often a process of accumulating project and programme 
experience within particular agencies, for instance, and individuals can 
certainly gain expertise from their participation In them. In view 
of the very broad and rather rushed nature of the current evaluation, we 
would certainly hope that all the lessons of the SRDP are not contained 
within these pages. We would, however, assert the importance of the task 
we have undertaken. An experiment, to repeat, is only as valuable as the 
knowledge gained irCm it, but in this most difficult area of development, 
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an area where enormous investments are anticipated and planned over the 
next few years, knowledge en the basis of experience and experiment is 
an extremely valuable commodity. 
It is most appropriate that the Institute for Development Studies 
undertake an evaluation of SRDP. While some of the Institute's activities 
are strictly academic in nature, its principal mandate as an indigenous 
social science research organisation Is applied and policy oriented research. 
One of the Institute's foremost research areas over many years, furthermore, 
has been that of rural development- Because of an acute awareness of 
the critical role that rural development will play in any solution to the 
country's overall development problems, and an equal awareness of the 
limitations of abstract theorising on the topic, the Institute was integrally 
involved in the initial conception of SRDP- It is these kinds of considerations 
that once again provide the motivation for the current evaluation. 
The Institute is most interested in research and evaluation work 
when it sheds light on an area that we regard as having major significance 
for the country's development, but such work is particularly fruitful 
when it relates in a concrete fashion to specific programmes and policy 
options of Government. In the case of this evaluation, the request came 
from Government, there has been close cooperation with Government at every 
phase of the study, and the seriousness with which Government is treating 
it is already evidenced in the way in which advanced sections are being 
used in decision-making with regard to a number of ongoing and pending 
activities. 
The Kenya Government is now initiating a whole new approach to 
development planning, particularly in the rural areas, that will start 
at the district level, The rationale is that district plans will be 
based on local diagnosis and related to local development capacity. 
The initiative, in considerable part, grows out of the SRDP experience, and 
certainly this experience can be fruitfully drawn upon in formulating 
the procedures and the project components of district plans. The building 
up of development plans In a decentralised way from the districts is 
going to Involve a great deal of fresh thinking and experimentation if 
it is to be successful. It is hoped that some of the material in this 
Report will contribute to this thinking. 
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This document is the work of a large number of people and is 
undoubtedly lacking in uniformity of styje or evenness of coverage. 
For each of the authors, the evaluation has been an undertaking in addition 
to his or her usual work. The result is undoubtedly variable. Some aspects 
of this study are based on detailed and careful investigation and thought, 
others will be found to be preliminary impressions. The document is addressed 
to the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Kenya, and also to those within 
the operating ministries who have responsibilities for the types of projects 
that are being evaluated. It is our intention that the evaluation be used 
to make decisions not merely about the existing SRDP projects, but also about 
the complete range of projects and development efforts that are related to 
them. 
The way in which this study was conducted was that each member 
of the evaluation team undertook to work on particular sectoral areas 
(e.g. crop development, roads, training programmes) in late 1974 and early 
1975. Field work was then conducted with teams going out for short periods 
to the various SRlf reas and complementary discussions held with the 
relevant Government :sr-sonnel in Nairobi. Over the next months the 
analysis and initi o; write-up of the various sections took place. This 
resulted in a series of SRDP working papers which were given wide distribution 
within Government, the University and other agencies. These papers t'""3n 
became the basis f. a series of seminars where attempts were made in 
particular to elicit the views of those with planning and programme 
responsibilities 3 - '-he area being discussed. There has been no effort to 
maintain confidentiality - rather the reverse. It is hoped that the open 
fashion in which discussions and debates have proceeded have both improved 
the substantive content of the Report and have increased awareness and 
understanding of the issues involved. They have also contributed to the 
intra-Government consideration of these issues prior to the completion 
of the final Report. 
There have been a number of unforeseen delays in finalising the 
whole Report. Perhaps these delays are liable given the large number 
of people involved. It is hoped that early access by Government to each 
section as it has been completed has mitigated any problems caused by 
these delays. The authors of the Report have worked long and hard, and 
have, in turn, enormously appreciated the research environment provided 
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by Government for the evaluation- We on our side have learned a great 
deal from the experience and we hope that this Report will make a 
contribution to understanding and to accelerating rural development In the 
country. 
Peter M. Hopcraft 
Acting Director 
Institute for Development Studies 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
From the very beginning of SRDP, the Institute for Development Studies 
at the University of Nairobi has worked in conjunction with various operating 
ministries and parastatal agencies in a consultancy and research capacity to 
help this Programme realise its mission. I.D.S• has, therefore, not only 
undertaken its own independent research within the SRDP areas, but has also 
undertaken specifically requested research to enable the Government to evaluate 
alternative policy measures in the area of rural development. The first 
overall SRDP evaluation was undertaken by I.D.S. in 1972, two years after the 
Programme was officially launched. That Report contains a well presented 
summary of the history of SRDP and its objectives and principles, so that 
this material need not be repeated here.1 SRDP was designed to evolve an 
effective strategy for bringing about rural development in Kenya. In pursuit 
of this goal, six areas were chosen to represent different yet typical human 
and environmental characteristics of Kenya. These are South Kwale in Kwale 
District at the Coast, North Tetu in Nyeri District, Mbere in Embu District, 
Vihiga in Kakamega District , Kapenguria in West Pokot District and Migori/' 
Kihancha in South Nyanza. A series of pilot projects was selected to comprise 
an integrated experimental programme which would be subjected to research and 
evaluation to ascertain its replicability in other parts of the country. The 
overall objective was to raise the productivity, the incomes and the level 
of welfare of the rural population. A list of the projects ascribed to the 
Programme in the six SRDP areas is contained in an appendix to the final chapter 
of this Report. 
At the level of Government policy, the results of SRDP experimentation 
were expected to guidsthe Ministry of Finance and Planning in formulating 
district development plans, a major aspect of efforts to decentralise development 
administration. It is partly in this pursuit and partly because it was originally 
planned that SRDP would expire at the end of financial year 1975/76, that the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning requested I.D.S. to carry out a second overall 
evaluation. The evaluation was carried out along terms of reference mutually 
agreed upon by I.D.S. and the Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
1. To establish: 
1. See An Overall Evaluation of the SRDP, Occasional Paper No. 8, Institute 
for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1972. 
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a- What proportion of funds already spent has been or. normal 
day-to-day administration and what proportion on project 
anc programme development; 
b. What proportion cf funds already spent has been allocated 
to normal (ordinary) on-going projects and programmes; 
c, What proportion of funds already spent has been allocated 
to 'special' projects and programmes and what is 'special' ; 
and 
d- The proportion of funds in stock currently committed for 
future expenditure on SRDP-
2. To examine and establish as far as possible the rationale for the pattern 
of expenditure described in (1) in the light of SRDP principles and objectives 
and those recommendations of the 1972 I-D.S. Evaluation which were officially 
adopted. 
3. To make a brief project and programme appraisal with respect to quantifiable 
or non-quantifiable: 
a- Direct or production costs; 
b. Feed back or consequential costs; and 
c. Differential benefits (direct and feedback), emphasising personal, 
sectoral and geographical distribution and testing for inter-area trans-
ferability of possible net gains, 
u To assess the usefulness of SjsDF in intensifying rural development from the 
points cf view cf: 
a. Experience gained from SRDP experimentation on several 
problems related to the initial principles and objectives; 
b- The mobilisation and utilisation of local resources; and 
c. The feasibility of replicating the experience gained (if any) 
in the countrywide district planning exercise -
5. To make as specific as possible a set of recommendations for the progressive 
integration of SRDP projects and programmes with the normal sector programmes 
of the operating ministries and with the district plans. 
ORGANISATION OF THE EVALUATION 
On the basis of the terms of reference, a number of tasks were 
identified, and nineteen people were invited to participate in the evaluation 
from the I.D.S. staff and the staff of some of the teaching departments of 
1 - 3 
IDS/OP 12 
the University. Because of the nature of the tasks, the team included 
economists, agricultural economists, sociologists, social anthropologists, 
educationists, public administration specialists and geographers. Most 
had previous familiarity with the SRDP. At several evaluation review 
sessions, details of the nature of the tasks were worked out and a strategy 
was drawn up. The structure of the evaluation can be seen from the table 
of contents of this Report. The evaluation proceeded along functional lines 
according to the performance of community activities that appear to be 
included in the process of social and economic development. 
STRATEGY 
Within the given time limitation, each researcher could not have 
visited each of the six SRDP areas. Therefore, it was decided that each 
would visit at least three of the areas to collect the field data needed to 
supplement information obtained from the central Government ministries , non-
governmental agencies and the material on SRDP available at I.D.S. Two 
groups were formed. Each group included a member to represent the disciplines 
needed to evaluate each functional aspect upon which the SRDP impinged. One 
group visited Migori, Kapenguria and Vihiga which were nearer to each other 
than any other combination of three SRDP areas. The other group visited Kwale, 
Tetu and Mbere. The field work commenced in the last week of November 1974. 
At the request of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, certain 
areas of the Programme were to be investigated in greater depth than others. 
These were: 
functional literacy; 
livestock development and marketing, plus group ranching in 
Kapenguria; 
crop development, especially tobacco nurseries and the crop 
production credit scheme in Migori; 
small-scale credit programme, family planning and labour-intensive 
roads programmes in Vihiga; 
farmer training in Tetu; 
crop development and group ranching in Mbere; and 
tree crops nurseries in Kwale. 
SRDP SEMINARS 
The final Report is very much a result of teamwork among the evaluators 
and cooperation between I.D.S. and the various government ai. ". lonor agencies 
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associated with SRDP, One form in which the cooperation has been formally 
effected is the SRDP seminars. 
On January 6, 1975, the Ministry of Finance and Planning organised 
an SRDP review seminar at the Kenya Institute of Administration. I.D.S. was 
invited to attend, and this provided a chance for the evaluators to exchange 
id.as with personnel charged with the field implementation of SRDP. Further-
more,_a number of seminars were held at I.D.S. to discuss draft versions of 
the papers that comprise this Report. Personnel from the operating ministries 
were invited to these seminars, and the draft papers were subjected to rigorous 
evaluation. Very often these discussions led to further research and substan-
tive revisions. All this is considered to have enhanced the Report, both from 
the point of view of content and from the point of view of disseminating 
findings and recommendations to those responsible for the relevant policies 
and programmes. 
ORGANISATION OF THE REPORT 
The remaining chapters in this Report are divided into four sections, 
the first dealing with approaches to increased production, the second with 
development of productive infrastructure, the third with social development 
and the last with the framework for development. Chapters Two through Eight 
in Part I are concerned with the development of crop production in the SRDP 
areas and with two topics of particular importance in the field of agricultural 
development. These are rural credit, which is discussed using the example 
of the Smallholders' iaize Credit Scheme in Vihiga, and agricultural extension 
and farmer training, which are discussed in a separate chapter. Two chapters 
follow on livestock development and group and cooperative ranching. Finally, 
Part I ends with a discussion of rural industrialisation, concentrating mainly 
on the Rural Industrial Development Programme which covers some of the SRDP 
areas, and a short appendix on the use of pesticides. 
In the second part of the Report, the rural road construction 
activities which have taken place as a part of SRDP are discussed with emphasis 
on the development of successful labour-intensive construction methods and 
the system of grants-in-aid by which the Ministry of Works has financed the 
construction. This is followed by a short chapter on water development 
Kiiicn we hope will stimulate further research on this very important topic. 
The section ends with a discussion of the process of land adjudication which 
is going on now in the SRDP areas. 
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Part III begins with a chapter on the Women's Programme which includes 
an overall assessment of the contributions and weaknesses of the Programme, 
and general recommendations and specific suggestions for each SRDP area. Next 
follows a discussion of the Functional Literacy Programme which includes 
sections on teaching methods, course content and administration as well as a 
number of suggestions for improving the Programme. Then there is a discussion 
of the intensive family planning programme in Vihiga/Hamisi and its implications 
for the potential success of family planning efforts elsewhere in the country. 
Finally, there is a chapter on rural cooperatives which represents only a 
preliminary investigation that we would like to see followed up with 
substantive research. 
The last section includes an analysis of SRDP administration with 
special emphasis on the experimental aspects, Programming and Implementation 
Management (PIM) and the Project Committees, the Field Staff Management 
System (F.S.M.S.), SRDP as a grants-in-aid mechanism and the Linkman system. 
The implications of past experience for future SRDP administration and for 
district development planning are also pointed out. Finally, in a short ov 
view chapter, some of the most significant of the findings discussed in this 
Report are brought together. 
The Report ends with a list of contributors. 
Considerable attention has been given to the distribution of this 
Report, particularly since it was discovered that the 1972 Evaluation had not 
been widely circulated in the field. Since the conclusions and recommendations 
for each topic covered are included at the end of each chapter, we feel that 
the chapters can be read separately and individual chapters will appeal to 
different audiences who may not be as concerned with the other parts of the 
Report. Therefore we have decided that in addition to distributing copies of 
the full Report, we shall make available copies of individual chapters which 
we hope will be widely circulated among Government officers and others with 
relevant interests in the field. In this way we hope to disseminate these 
research, findings as widely as possible. 
FART I; APPROACHES TO INCREASED PRODUCTION 
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CROP DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIGORI/KIHANCHA SRDP 
INTRODUCTION 
The xhree divisions within the Migori/Kihancha SRDP area - Migcri, 
Kihan'ha and Ma-calder - present different conditions for crop development-
Migori has good soils 3 adequate rainfall and an agriculturalist population., 
but crop development In the area was relatively neglected compared with 
other high potential areas in Kenya before the advent of SRDP. Kihancha 
has similar natural conditions,, but the population ^'predominantly Kurias) is 
historically oriented more towards pastoralism. Of the three divisions, 
agriculture here was least developed before SRDP. The upper region of 
Macalder division is of medium agricultural potentials and the lower region 
Is marginal. This division is rather thinly populated. 
The following crop projects are quoted in the SRDP project list 
of January 1974: hybrid maize, tobacco, cotton, groundnuts, rice (rain 
watered), fruit nurseries and beans. In fact, the rice project was never 
started because no seeds were re eived, a~d the nurseries meant for fruit 
have not received much attention and at present are used mainly as tobacco 
nurseries. This means that the actual projects are: hybrid maize, tobacco, 
cotton, groundnuts and beans (soya, Mexican M14-2 and local varieties), and 
it is planned to introduce sunflower in 1975. 
Another four projects play a supporting role in crop development: 
the stockist input scheme, the extension service, including the Agricultural 
Service Centres and extension directed towards groups and Village Committees, 
the crop production credit scheme and a crop storage project- Finally, the 
development" of rural access roads supports crop production by facilitating 
communication, input supply and marketing-
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considered an experimental prcje. 
B:A.T. set up a sma^l rarm ana ae office with its own staff 
at Oyani in the SRDP area, which has oeen directed for about one year by 
an expatriate leaf development manager Initially, implementation of the 
project suffered serious setbacks- The original farmers who had adopted 
tobacco were about 200, but their number had dropped to 46 by early 1974. 
However, new, more successful arrangements were made for extension, 
marketing and payment to farmer, u. id7-. a:,d the number of farmers 
growing tobacco ]umped to over 401 
Objectives 
The Ministry of Agriculture stated that its basic objectives 
for this experimental tobacco project are: 
1, To improve the farmers' incomes; and 
2, To reduce tobacco imports by substituting local production. 
B.A.T., as a private multinational corporation, probably aims to find new, 3 reliable markets and to obtain raw materials as cheaply as possible. 
The objective of raising farmers' incomes must be considered 
primary, because if the farmers do not see their incomes improving they 
will not grow tobacco and none of the-other objectives will be met. The 
opportunities for income generation through tobacco growing in Migori/ 
Kihancha must be analysed in comparison with opportunities presented by 
alternative crops which could be grown in the same area. 
Profitability of 'Tobacco Growing 
It has not been possible to compare income from tobacco growing 
with all the other income generating opportunities available to farmers in 
Migori/Kihancha. Rather, income from tobacco is compared with that gained 
2. See the chapter on "Agricultural Extension and Farmer Training". 
3- New activities in Kenya most likely represent a transfer of 
interests from other countries such as Uganda, Tanzania and Rhodesia. 
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from cultivation of the other major crops recommended by the Ministry of 
Agriculture for the areas designated as suitable for tobacco growing by 
B.A.T. The gross margins per hectare of the various crops are compared 
In Table 2, given average production levels. Then the labour inputs are 
compared in Table 3, and finally the gross margins per manday In Table 4.4 
Table 2 Gross margins per hectare for recommended crops in Migori/Kihancha (shs.). 
Tobacco 
fire cured 1,68 5/-
flue cured 2,285/-
Hybr-id maize 1,315/-
Groundnuts 1,420/-
Soya beans 969/-
Local beans 586/-
Sunflower 780/-
Table 3. Labour input per hectare for recommended crops (man-days). 
Tobacco 
fire cured 446 
flue cured 482 
Hybrid maize 108 
Groundnuts 215 
Soya beans 83 
Local beans 83 
Sunflower 93 
Table Gross margins per manday for recommended crops (shs.). 
Tobacco 
fire cured 3/78 
flue cured 4/75 
Hybrid maize 12/20 
Groundnuts 6/60 
Soya beans 11/70 
Local beans 7/10 
Sunflower 8/40 
The labour input for tobacco is high; as shown in Table 3, and 
Table 4 reveals that the labour productivity for tobacco growing is very 
low compared with other recommended crops. During peak seasons the cost of 
hired labour is shs 6/- per manday, so that a farmer growing and curing 
tobacco at average production levels using labour hired at this rate would 
lose money. Tobacco growing is not as unprofitable as all this, however, 
because much of the work, such as barn construction and curing, can be 
done outside the seasonal periods of peak demand for labour. 
4. For more detailed information and comparisons of the economics 
of the various crops, see the tables at -r.d : " chapter. 
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Finally, the hidden costs of tobacco growing must be taken into 
account. Tobacco is a very heavy feeder which uses up the nutrients in the 
soil. Because of this, land used for tobacco growing must be allowed to 
rest some seasons by using it for pasture or for light feeding crops. Also, 
for hygieni: reasons, some crops cannot be grown on the same land before 
or after tobacco, or even on land near where tobacc is grown. Another 
hidden cost is that of risk. Tobacco suffers heavily during the hail storms 
which sometimes occur in Migori/Kihancha. According to the agricultural 
officers interviewed, every third or fourth crop may be damaged by hail 
storms. These factors add considerably to the cost of tobacco growing. 
One might well ask, given the low level of profitability, why 
farmers are interested in growing tobacco in Migori/Kihancha. One important 
-xplana-r.cnis that at present tobacco is the only crop in the area for 
which all inputs are provided on credit. Another explanation is that 
yields vary by a wide margin above the average if several favourable 
factors coincide. Out of about forty growers, one or two have achieved 
extraordinarily high yields, giving the impression that tobacco is 
extremely profitable. 
Conclusions Concerning the Profitability of Tobacco Growing 
1 Tobacco is a crop with relatively low labour productivity, although 
some of the labour requirements can be filled during seasonal periods of 
low opportunity costs for labour. If tobacco were to be grown by most 
farmers in the area it would mean a concentration of the labour force 
on a crop with low labour productivity compared with other recommended 
crops. 
2. Tobacco growing might be recommended only to those households which 
have a large family labour force and a limited amount of land. 
3. Tobacco cannot be grown as profitably as other crops if labour has 
to be hired during the seasonal peaks of labour demand. 
4. Since tobacco is a very heavy feeder, it either depletes the soil or 
needs large quantities of fertiliser. If chemical fertilisers are used, 
this reduces the import-substituting effect of tobacco growing. 
5. Besides requiring specific crop rotation patterns, tobacco production 
requires fire wood for curing the leaves at a rate of one hectare trees 
to four hectares tobacco. This means that if a large number of farmers 
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grow tobacco a ra&]or part of the agricultural economy would have to centre 
around tobacco growing, which is clearly not justified given the 
relative profitability of different crops-
6. However, since tobacco seems to grow well in the selected areas of 
Migori/Kihancha and farmers are ready to adopt it. its limited potential 
for income generation could be improved by an appropriate price policy 
which would involve raising the prices ofrered to farmers by B.A.T-
Tobacco Nurseries 
Originally a nursery was established in the SRDP area by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in order to suppxy farmers with seedlings, and a 
separate nursery was established by B.A-I. at Oyani- The Ministry of 
Agriculture's nursery was temporarily discontinued due to administrative 
problems. The Crops Officer (Homa Bay) wrote the responsible AAC that 
there were no funds to pay the nursery labourers so they had to be 
released, and though this explanation was incorrect,, by the time the 
matter was sorted out the nursery was spoiled. Later the nursery was 
started again with financing from SRLP crop development ana demonstration 
votes- To stimulate adoption, the seedlings produced were given to 
farmers free. 
More recently, the extension programme has been reorganised 
(See the chapter on "Agricultural Extension ard Farmer Training".), and 
the new farmers groups have each selected a central location for their 
own nurseries. The SRDP financed Ministry of Agriculture nursery is only 
being kept temporarily to supply farmers with seedlings until their own 
nurseries are adequately developed- Once farmers are producing their own 
seedlings rather than having them supplied free by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the tobacco project will be established on a more realistic 
and self-generating basis. 
Curing 
The present policy of B.A.T in South Nyanza and Kisii is 
that farmers cure the leaves themselves In an initial stage, farmers use 
the fire curing method, which requires a curing barn that costs about 
shs. 2,000/- and which produces low quality tobacco. In a later stage, 
the "better farmers" (according to B.A.T. ) should change to flue curing, 
which requires a barn that costs about shs 4,000/- but produces high 
quality tobacco. 
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B-A-T. gives credit for all the materials needed to construct the 
barns3 and it seems that farmers would not be willing to construct the barns 
if they had to provide the materials themselves- However, in Migori 
Division extension was reorganised and the Ministry of Agriculture staff 
succeeded in constructing about 400 Darns between December i974 and February 
1975- This was achieved through an excellent extension organisation which 
is unique to the Migori SRDP area. 
In addition to curing barns, farmers ai^o require wood fuel for 
the curing process- In an excellent example of co-ordinated planning 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and tee Ministry of Natura_ Resources, 
the afforestation project in the Migori Kinancha SRDP area has been planned 
to provide wood fuel for the tobacco project. ever, the heavy long-
term Government investment in the afforestation project is one more factor 
which lowers the actual profitability of tobacco growing m the area 
compared to that of other crops which ao not require wood fuel, and this 
additional cost is one more argument in favour of raising the price offered 
to farmers for tobacco. 
Co-operatives 
Originally, cc-operatives were formed to supply ;_edic and market 
the tobacco rv out sh. local informants seem in agreement that the 
performance of the co-operatives was very poor- The repayment rate for 
credit extended was xow, and payment for the delivered crop was very late. 
For these reasons, the majority of the farmers who had adopted tobacco 
had stopped growing it Coinciding with the re-organisation of the 
extension service B.A.T . took over the provision of credit and the 
marketing of the tobacco crop Farmers are paid for their crops on the 
day of delivery, with repayment for credit deducted. The farmers, Ministry 
of Agriculture and SRDF staff agreed that these arrangements are satisfactory. 
There was a general consensus that in this case a private firm with an 
interest in the tobacco crop could organise credit provision^ marketing 
and payment to farmers more efficiently than a co-operative- However, 
certain difficulties remain if the responsibility for development of a crop 
is transferred to a private firm,, and these difficulties will be discussed 
in the following section. 
2 - 9 IDS/OP 12 
Co-ordination between the Ministry of Agriculture and B.A.T. 
Although both the Ministry of Agriculture and B.A.T. wish to 
promote the production of tobacco, their interests do nor necessarily 
coincide. The private firm is on_y interested in tobacco production The 
firm will recognise the importance of rood crops i. • : farmers are generally 
only willing to grow a cash crop such as tobacco when tneir basic food 
needs are met. Several important conflicts of interest oetween B.A.T. and 
the Ministry of Agriculture could emerge in the case of competing cash 
crops. Important questions arise from the differences of opinion expressed 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and the B.A.T personnel who were interviewed: 
Should the crop rotation patterns for the area be directed primarily towards 
tobacco? Should B.A.T. select the areas where tobacco is grown? Should the 
extension staff give priority attention to tobacco? Should B-A.T. select the 
farmers (or give criteria for selection) who are to grow tobacco? Should 
B.A.T. devise the extension strategies for tobacco diffusion.-
These questions can be answered clearly Tobacco does not show 
sufficient advantages in the Migor- 'Kihancha area compared with other 
recommended crops to justify priority treatment- Specialisation in tobacco 
growing in the long run would bring the disadvantages of high risks from crop 
failure, increased susceptibility to disease and over-dependency on foreign 
purchasing firms and markets. 
It is not sufficient to Leave the decision entirely up to the 
farmers themselves, since one crop can be promoted very effectively even if 
a number of better alternatives exist In this case for example, there is 
better extension machinery for tobacco since B-A T- has put highly 
qualified and experienced expatriate experts in charge of their own private 
extension activities. Providing the farmers with all cash inputs on credit 
is a further strong incentive for adopting a crop, and B A.T. is doing 
just this. Guaranteed marketing and payment on delivery is still 
another activating factor for adoption of a crop, and B.A.T. is doing 
this too 
Tobacco cultivation will contribute to the diversification of the 
economy and will improve the incomes of those households which have 
abundant family labour and limited land. To guarantee this limited, but 
useful role for tobacco cultivation. It is extremely important that the 
overall agricultural development strategy remain fully under the control 
of the Government - B-A.T- seems to be able to provide credit, marketing 
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and payment services efficiently, but farmer recruiting criteria, extension 
methods, allocation of extension staff and setting of crop priorities are 
the sole responsibility of the Kenya Government-
Recommendations 
1. The development of tobacco production should oe continued subject to the 
limitations and conditions set out beiow-
2. The prices for flue and fire cured tobacco should be raised substantially 
to increase the productivity of labour required for tobacco production. 
3. Tobacco development should be carefully integrated Into the crop 
diversification programme of the Ministry of Agriculture. It should not 
have priority over other recommended crops since the productivity of labour 
required for tobacco production is low at present. 
4. Seedlings grown as part of SRDP projects should be given to farmers on 
credit, net free* 
5. Encouraging groups of farmers to start their own nurseries should have 
priority over continuing SRDP nurseries. 
6. B.A.T should continue to provide credit, marketing and payment to 
farmers. 
7. The co-ordination of fuel wood production under the Forest Department 
with the expansion of tobacco production must be guaranteed after the 
termination of SRDP. 
8. The Ministry of Agriculture must have exclusive responsibility for 
decisions concerning crop rotation patterns, allocation of extension staff, 
selection criteria for farmers to grow tobacco and areas in which it 
should be grown, and extension strategies. 
COTTON 
Cotton was grown _n the area refere the advent of SRBF, but in 
1973/74 an SRDP project called the 'Crop FroaustSon Credit Scheme' was 
initiated to encourage cotton production- The objectives of this project are 
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to generate income among farmers in the lower, drier sections of the SRDP 
area, mainly in Macalder Division, and to increase production of a raw 
material important to the Kenyan econom". 
Farmers are encouraged to grow cotton by means of demonstration 
plots and loans which are administered through a cooperative. The cooperative 
pays directly for fertiliser, labour for weeding and other inputs up to the 
total amount allowed each farmer. Then the farmer is obliged to market his 
output through the cooperative and the loan isreccv-rod from sales. 
This scheme had not been sufficiently implemented in 1971 to 
permit an evaluation, because the Authorisation to Incur Expenditure (A.I.E.) 
necessary to disburse funds for the project was only issued in July. By 
that time, much of the land and labour meant to be used for cotton production 
had been devoted to subsistence crops. The 1974 target had been 600 
hectares of cotton, but only 22B were planted. SRDP had allocated shs. 
30,000 to the project, but because of the delayed A.I.E. only shs. 5,000 
had been disbursed by the cooperative. About shs. 10,000 were still in the 
bank, and shs. 15,000 had been diverted to the purchase of new nets for the 
local fishermen's cooperative.^ 
For 197 5, shs. 60,000 were requested and again the aim was to 
plant 600 hectares. Since the limited expansion in 1974 was due to the 
inability to disburse most of the funds earmarked for the project., We 
recommend that the cotton production scheme be continued long enough to 
receive a fair trial. Its potential value is particularly great since there 
are few alternatives for agricultural development in the dry marginal areas. 
We further recommend that the name be changed from 'Crop Production Credit 
Scheme' to 'Cotton Production Credit Scheme'. 
GROUNDNUTS 
Groundnuts have been grown in the area for some time, but an 
SRDP project to encourage their cultivation was begun in 1973. The 
objectives were to provide a cash and food crop to farmers and to increase 
5. It may well be justifiable to divert funds which cannot be used 
to other productive projects rather than just leaving them in the bank. 
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Diffusion of groundnut cultivation was considered rather slew 
because of the high cost of certified seed;, about shs 80/- per acre. For 
this reason, seed was purchased out of SRDP funds from the Maize and Produce 
Board godewn a: Hcma Bay ana given to farmers 
It was not possible to ascertain exactly how much seed was 
purchased, but according to tne AAO's files about 520 acres of groundnuts 
were planted In 1973, presumably about half with seed from SRDP ana about 
half with seed purchased by farmers in the local markets. None of the SRDP 
seed purchased from the Maize and Produce Board grew, probably because it 
was too old. The seed purchased locally was fine., 
After this setback the project was informally dropped. The AAO 
explained that he had no reliable seed source and the farmers preferred to 
purchase seed locally. The extension service is carrying out its normal 
activities with reference to groundnuts, but In general groundnut production 
is considered self-gen era ting. According to theAAO's report for Migori 
and Macalder Divisions, about 1,200 acres were under groundnuts in 1974, 
as compared to 620 acres in 197 3. 
SOYA AND OTHER BEANS 
Bean production played a very minor role during the early 
years of the SRDP, nut in 197m- a major effort was made to encourage farmers 
to grow Mexican 142 and some local varieties, especially Red Haricot. 
During the short rains of 1974 about 100 new farmers adopted Mexican 142 
and about 2 5 grew local varieties as a cash crop. 
A soya bean project was started In Migori and in Kisii in 1974. 
To our knowledge soya beans are not grown commercially anywhere else in 
Kenya. (In 1973 the Maize and Produce Board marketed only tfefrt^n bags.) 
Soya bean production has been encouraged m order to provide farmers with 
a cash crop which will raise their incomes, to increase the national 
supply of oilseed and to provide an Inexpensive source of protein. 
Experimentation has been carried out with soya beans at the Nyanza 
Agricultural Research Station In Kisii for some tame, and the representative 
of the Station considers--this a high potential crop for lower Kisii and 
many parts of South Nyanza.- The Station has developed a special variety for 
2 - 13 IDS/OP 12 
this area, 'Belgian Congo', but unfortunately it is not available at 
present, though it is being bulked by some Kisn farmers. Another variety, 
'Hill', produced by the Ahero Irrigation Research Station,, is being used. 
I.D.S. researchers introduced soya b-ear. extension methods to 
agricultural and SRDP officers in Migori and these went on to implement 
a successful project among farmers. Yields were considered good at three to 
six bags per acre, rather evenly distributed. 
Table 5. Soya bean dissemination in Migori Division. 
Farmers Estimated Estimated 
Acreage Yields in Bags 
Long Rains 1974 22 5 30 
Short Rains 1974 310 102 400 
Long Rains 197 5 (target) 2000 
Source: AA0 Migori and authors' survey. 
Output was excellent during the short rains of 1974, when maize 
and some local bean varieties suffered from insufficient rain. Farmers 
consider soya beans a profitable crop because labour input is low and 
maturing time is only three months. However, yields could probably be 
improved considerably, by up to 500 per cent, if 'Belgi.r Congo' seed were 
available. There are also indications that soya beans could be grown 
successfully in the lower and dryer areas of Macaider Division during the 
long rains. 
We recommend that this project be continued ana that seed bulkin;-
be carried out in Migori under the supervision of the AA0. 
SUPPORTING PROGRAMMES FOR CROP DEVELOPMENT 
One project planned to support crop production is the 
Agricultural Service Centres which will be set up as part of the extension 
service in 1975, Various field officers will be stationed in the Centres 
and agricultural inputs such as spray and spraying materials will be 
stored there for distribution. 
We recommend that the Centres be set up as part of a group or 
Agricultural Village Committee extension system so that they are likely 
to be used by large numbers of farmers rather than only a few of the most 
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advanced., In this way farmers can come ro the Centres when they particularly 
need Inputs or services, rather than waiting for an extension officer to come 
to them at a time when their needs might not be as great. 
A project involving crop storage demonstrations was begun In 
1974. Grain stores were constructed, partly financed by SRDP, but construction 
costs were high, particularly for the corrugated iron roofs. The aim of this 
project Is to show farmers how they can store large amounts of grain with 
r Juced losses to sell at a time when seasonal prices are high. Since it 
appears that the grain stores which have been constructed may be too expensive 
to be widely replicated, we recommend a small project to develop a more 
appropriate grain storage prototype. 
Among other projects which support crop production but are 
discussed elsewhere in this Report, the stockist input credit scheme is 
described in connection with hybrid maize development in Migori. The 
important role of the extension service is analysed in the section: 
^Agricultural Extension and Farmers Training';' The Crop Production Credit 
Scheme is mentioned as part of cotton development in Migori, and rural 
access roads, which have facilitated better communications, access to inputs 
and marketing, are discussed in a separate chapter. 
COMPOSITION OF CROPS 
In Migori Division four important crops are being promoted by 
SRDP: hybrid maize, tobacco, soya beans and groundnuts. The best choice of 
which crops to grow depends on the circumstances of each particular farmer, 
especially on the relative magnitude of his cash., labour and land 
constraints. In the Migori/Kihancha area at the present time land is usually 
not a limiting factor, so the two factors which must De considered are labour 
and cash. When labour is scarce, it might be more profitable to produce a 
crop which requires little labour than ancrt ^ r which has a higher gross 
profit margin but which requires mc^e labour. For example, the average 
gross profit margin of groundnuts Is shs- 1,420 per hectare and for soya 
beans it is shs- 969. However, if a farmer has only IOC mandays to devote 
to a crop, he could cultivate two and a half acres of soya beans, giving him 
an income of shs. 970, while with the same number of mandays he could 
cultivate only one acre of groundnuts, giving him an income of shs. 570. 
if cash, rather than xaoour, is the constraining factor 
different choices would he made- For example,, if a farmer has only shs. 150 
for cash inputs he could afford to grow one half nectare of hybrid maize,, 
giving him an income cf about shs. 660, or three acres of local maize,, 
giving him an Income of about shs, 1,380. 
m the following tames we identify two groups of farmers, those 
who primarily grow hybrid maize and those who primarily grow tooacco. In 
considering what to cultivate as a second crop each farmer- will consider 
whether his cash ana labour constraints are high or low- Appropriate 
choices are Indicated in the tao_es-
labxe 6 Second :rops for farmers whose major crop is hybrid maize. 
High Labour Low Labour 
Constraint Constraint 
High Cash Constraint soya or other groundnuts 
beans 
Low Cash Constraint more hybrid tobacco 
ma iz e 
Tabie 7. Second crops for farmers whose major crop is tobacco, 
high Labour Low Labour 
Constraint Constraint 
High Cash Constraint Soya or other groundnuts 
oeans, iccai maize 
Low Cash Constraint -yorid maize more tobacco 
TECHNOLOGY ALTERNATIVES TO EASE LABOUR CONSTRAINTS 
The agricultural officers and farmers who were interviewed 
generally agreed that labour Is the major constraint on _rop production in 
the high potential areas of Migori, especially for the preparation of land 
and weeding, labour could be made more productive by the use of ox-drawn 
equipment or tractors. 
Local draught animals and cx-drawn equipment could be use more 
fully, and new ox-drawn equipment, such as interrow cultivators, could be 
introduced- Farmers are reluctant to acquire more oxen because of the danger 
of cattle theft, but this should not be a constraint on improved cultivation 
because the draught animals they already own could be utilised much more 
fully than they are at present 
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The value of using tractors to ease labour bottlenecks 
is more questionable Tractors, spare parts and petroleum must all be 
imported: and tractor hire services are too expensive for many small farmer-s-
in addition., tractors can be used for soil preparation but not for weeding. 
Yet in Migori there are a number of farmers with medium-size holdings of 
to 1G0 acres who consider tractors economic and would purchase tractors 
if there were a service and repair facility in Migori town. At present 
tractors must be taken about 65 kilometers to Kisii or 190 kilometers to 
Kisumu even for minor repairs- SRBP personnel might investigate whether 
existing repair shops in Migori could he upgraded by provision of training 
and credit ro serve as tractor repair stations However, the encouragement 
of traitor ..u^tivation should receive much less emphasis than the use of 
ox-drawn equipment -
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
l As shown by the very rapid expansion of hybrid maize production, 
effective extension and adequate seed supply, provision of inputs and 
suitable marketing arrangements can increase crop production and make it 
seir-sustaining, in many cases without the provision of credit. If these 
requirements can be met through private firms, the risk of failure due to 
administrative difficulties is reduced ana limited overnment financial and 
manpower resources can be releasee early from one project and used for others. 
2- Since labour seems to be the major constraint on further- crop expansion, 
we recommend the dissemination of ox-drawn cultivation techniques using 
the txen already available in the area, especially for soil preparation and 
weeding. Possibilities for using animal draught power tor transport should 
also be explored 
3. To reduce dependence on costly imported synthetic fertilisers, the use of 
locauly available materials to enrich the soil, such as composts., green 
manure and cattle manure, should he encouraged. 
The extension approach used in Migori and Macaider Divisions was found 
to be extremely successful, and should he considered a prototype for 
replication Details on this approach are given in the section of this 
Report. ^Agricultural Extension and Farmers Training/' 
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1- The development of hybrid maize production has been highly successful. 
This project is now self-generating and needs no further special attention 
from SRDP. 
2. Tobacco production Is progressing efficiently with credit, marketing 
and repayment organised by B.A.T. However, the Ministry of Agriculture must 
control the development of this crop carefully so that it fits in with the 
optimal overall crop diversification pattern for the area. Tobacco can ce 
important but it should not be a dominant crop. 
The present B.A.T. policy of financing all cash inputs on credit 
makes this crop more attractive than others, even when in many cases other-
crops should be preferred. 
At present the prices offered by B.A.T, for- fire cured and flue 
cured tobacco are too low to justify wide expansion of production -
3. Soya beans, which are particularly attractive as an oil crop and a cheap 
source of protein, have been grown successfully In Migori and Kihancha 
Divisions during the short rains. They should also be tried during the 
long rains, especially in the lower, drier parts of Macalder Division. In 
general this crop seens to merit further' expansion, 
A five-acre plot at Migori, owned by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and not in use at present, should be used for bulking seeds of the 
'Belgian Congo' variety. The hired labour, tractor ploughing and fertiliser-
necessary for this project could be financed for £320 a year. 
TABLES ON THE ECONOMICS OF VARIOUS CROPS 
The information given in most of the tables which follow was 
obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture. The data represent national 
averages rather than averages for Migori, and in general yields and 
profits in Migori are a bit higher than the national averages. All 
calculations are for one crop and one hectare, but not necessarily on 
an annual basis. These data are only rough indicators, and minor 
statistical differences among various crops are not necessarily 
s ignifleant, 
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Table 10, Economics of groundnuts production. 
Production level 
low average high 
1. yield in 80 kg. bags/hectare 8 9 15 
2, output @ 180/- per bag-1- 1,080/-- 1,620/- 2,700/-
3. 2 seed 80 kg./hectare 180/- 180/- 180/-
4. fertiliser - - -
5. sprays and dusts - - -
6. other costs (including transport) 10/- 20/- 30/-
7. total variable costs (3 to 6) 199/- 200/- 210/-
8. gross margin per hectare (2 minus ) 890/-- 1,420/- 2,490/-
9. labour mandays/hectare (average production level) 
seed bed preparation 35 
planting 30 
weeding 90 
harvesting 60 
total mandays 215 
10. gross margin per manday (8:9) (average) 6/60 
Remark: Groundnuts can be grown during long and short rain seasons 
without overlapping. Groundnuts are light feeders and leguminous. 
1. Produce price to the farmer as quoted in Maize and Produce Board 
price list for 17th August, 1974. 
2. Not certified seeds, taken from farmer's own crop. 
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that number of cattle which is consistent with the long run carrying 
capacity of the land, the distribution of water so that the range can 
be evenly utilised without excessive walking and without pulverising the 
areas around the water points, and the strict enforcement of rotational 
grazing so that each piece of land is given adequate time to regenerate 
prior to being used again. Without the establishment of organisational 
mechanisms which can achieve and enforce controlled and rotational grazing, 
the provision of infrastructural investments in water points (especially 
isolated water points) and even disease control could merely worsen 
overstocking rather than yielding economic returns. If this is the result, 
far from these investments improving the productivity of the range 
areas, they would accelerate the process of their destruction. 
10-6 5 IDS/OP 12 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
West Pokot District 
1. Some progress has been made in the Kongelai Group Ranch in enforcing 
respect for external ranch boundaries and acceptance of a two-paddock 
rotational grazing system. 
2. A two-paddock system is probably inadequate. At best it should be 
regarded as an interim measure in the transition towards a four-paddock 
system. 
3. A systematic attempt should be made to monitor long-term trends in 
the condition of grazing in this and other pastoral areas. 
4. No evidence of a general increase in 'commercial attitudes' towards 
cattle was found among the pastoral Pokot. 
5. A very solid wall of opposition to the idea of destocking was encountered. 
The reasons were partly economic (divergence between private and 
social interest) and partly social or cultural. Accordingly Government 
plans for a conversion to commercialised ranching and well managed 
range resources are highly optimistic. 
6. There was no apparent support for the imposition of a ceiling against 
excessive individual holdings of cattle on communally owned land. 
7. There was equal resistance to destocking of the sheep and goat 
population. 
8. The effects on conservation of the practice of leaving goats behind in 
the reserved paddock should be investigated by the District Range 
Officer. 
9. A close re-examination of group ranch boundaries, in relation to the 
distribution of hill slopes and customary cattle movements, and to 
the distribution of cultivated areas, is called for. 
More direct intervention to provide marketing outlets should be 
attempted in order to maximise the offtake of cattle as well as to 
increase cash earnings in the area. The L.M.D. should work In much 
closer cooperation with the D.R.O. in support of the destocking efforts 
of the latter. Either the L.M.D. should act as a far more aggressive buying 
and marketing agency, particularly in the more remote pastoral areas such 
as West Pokot, or a specialist agency for this purpose should be considered. 
10. 
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11. The. suggestion that the Kenya Meat Commission expand its meat canning 
component utilising the lean meat of traditional cattle from 
pastoral areas might be taken up. 
12. The proposals for expanding agricultural production and modern 
beekeeping in the area are highly optimistic. They represent 
theoretical possibilities rather than anything like actual probable 
achievement. 
13. The financial proposals for the Kongelai Group Ranch are based on 
completely unrealistic expectations of rates of offtake. 
14. Change in the area will not come quickly, and attempts to improve the 
quality of life in the area should not await progression to commercialised 
ranching. The SRDP has so far had little impact on the welfare of the 
people in the area. 
Kwale District 
15. Further investigation should be made in Mwereni to find out whether 
partial reduction of the bush could reduce tse-tse to a tolerable 
level. Bush clearance in a range area is problematic, and generally 
a losing battle., 
16. Alternatively the possibility of concentrating the scheme within more 
manageable areas might be investigated. 
17. The problem of tse-tse control and treatment should be evaluated in 
economic as well as physical terms. 
18. There appear to be serious organisational and legal problems associated 
with the group ranch plus central herd model. Land ownership needs 
to be separated from herd ownership if confusion is to be avoided. 
In the Mwereni case a switch to cooperative society ownership of the 
herd should be made even at this late stage. 
19. The central herd proposal is seen by officials especially as a tax or 
revenue-raising device to provide the funds required for water and 
other investments. There are problems in securing motivation for the 
efficient maintenance of the enterprise if revenues derived do not, 
over and above thiSjprovide adequate incentives in the form of 
dividends to participants. 
20. Exactly who will benefit from water investments made at Mwereni and the 
related equity aspects need to be examined. 
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21. The rates of return posited for the project appear again to be 
theoretical calculations with little relation to probable realities. 
22. The possibilities for expanding milk production in the eastern areas 
need more careful investigation in view of the coastal market for 
milk. 
Mbere District 
23. The group ranching programme in Mbere was effectively nullified when 
the area was adjudicated on an individual basis during 1970-73, in 
view of the R.M.D. policy of operating only on the basis of group 
titles. 
24. The present programme has been effectively transformed into a goat 
ranching programme located in the perimeter areas, with problems 
of poor pasture, lack of water, tse-tse fly infestation and predators. 
25. The Ena River piped water scheme stops well short of the new ranching areas. 
26. Project proposals need to be spelled out in some detail if potential 
members are to be attracted to them. This is frequently not done, 
as in the case of Muchonoke Group Ranch. Closer consultations with 
the potential members are needed from the beginning. The current 
perimeter area proposals need more specification and required investments 
need to be costed. 
27. The R.M.D. approach of offering only two alternative models, group 
and cooperative ranching, is excessively restrictive and unsuited to 
intermediate areas such as Mbere. Intermediate models, designed to 
make the most of potential economies of scale and advantages of 
cooperation which exist in a particular area should be tried out 
on an experimental basis. In Mbere the focus of attention should 
revert to the better endowed, populated area, exploring the 
possibilities of implementing such intermediate solutions. 
28. The one operative ranching scheme in the area, Ngaru Mihiriga 
Ranch, though having many positive aspects, has recently run into 
serious managerial and organisational problems. 
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General Findings and Recommendations 
29„ The quality of project formulation and preparation within the ranching 
sector requires considerable improvement,. The R.M.D- as a whole should 
consider how to provide an input of economic analysis into its project 
appraisal' and ranching schemes. The Agricultural Planning Division 
In Nairobi must be capable of operating In the field and should be 
able to send project teams combining a cross-section of relevant 
°<-rerience to field locations to discuss projects with local officers 
and investigate local opinion at an early stage. Project reports 
should be written up in a systematic way from the outset to pinpoint 
relevant aspects and key is :es and should be maintained up-to-date 
as each project evolves. 
30. More careful evaluation of costs and benefits from water Investments 
must be made. Planning procedures for livestock schemes need to be 
reversed, with water issues in general coming first rather than last. 
31. In the absence of adequate organisation and worxing arrangements for 
a group ranch, infrastructural Investments in water and disease control 
may accelerate deterioration of the grazing resource and thus yield 
no lasting benefit. Effect!/'5 grazing controls must accompany these 
investments. Water points should be distributed so that grazing 
resources are utilised as evenly as possible. 
32. Given the extent of the overstocking problem, an attempt should be 
made to monitor changes in the balance of livestock to resources within 
the pastoral subsistence areas and the long-term trend in the state 
of grazing. This trend has become a matter of extreme urgency and 
is being given inadequate attention in the livestock development 
programme as a whole 
33. The group ranches, based on individual ownership of livestock, but 
group ownership of land, incorporate a basic conflict between the 
private stock owner's interest in maximising the number of catt.2 
he owns and trie group interest, which is to restrict the numbers of cattle 
in a way that will maximise the productivity of the land unit over time. 
There is little evidence as yet that the internal mechanisms of the 
group ranches can impose the group over the individual interest. Until 
this situation is reversed,there is little prospect that group ranching 
can solve the problems of overstocking and range degradation0 
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34. There is a tendency by the R.M.D. to assume the existence of economies 
of scale and thus to attempt to establish the largest possible size 
of group or cooperative ranch. In many cases^however, divisibility 
in water supply, rotational possibilities and the like clearly exist, 
and smaller units are feasible. In contrast, the R.M.D. has paid 
little attention to diseconomies of scale, in the form of managerial 
and organisational problems associated with large size. 
35. The experience with enclosure in South Baringo merits close 
examination with a view to possible replication in other suitable areas, 
and as part of a more flexible approach to the promotion of ranching. 
36. A realistic evaluation of the benefits arising out of the substantial 
disbursements of public funds for infrastructural investment, for all 
types of ranches, whether group, cooperative or company, should be 
closely scrutinised. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
RURAL INDUSTRY 
2-42 IDS/OP 12 
BACKGROUND TO THE R.I.P.P. 
The expansion of small-scale and rural industry Is a major element 
in Kenya's current Development Plan. (4-) The Kenya Government's resolve in 
this regard has no doubt been strengthened by the stress laid on rural industry 
in the I.L.O. Mission Report which put forward a 'new' industrial strategy 
composed of two main elements, the export of processed agricultural products, 
and the development of small-scale and rural Industry of which the former also 
largely implies rural-located industry. (3) 
The two vehicles for the promotion of small-scale industry in Kenya 
(apart from loans schemes) are the industrial estates programme under Kenya 
Industrial Estates Limited (K.I.E.) itself a subsidiary of I.C.D.C.; and the 
Rural Industrial Development Programme (R.I.D.P.), which is managed by K.I.E., 
but operate outside the main towns. 
The industrial estates programme was started in 1966. The present 
contents of the programme are given in the Plan:-
Initially the programme envisaged five industrial estates to be 
located at Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu, Mombasa and Eldoret. However, 
only two, Nairobi and Nakuru, have so far been completed. The 
other three will be put Into operation in this Plan period. In 
addition two more estates will be established at Nyeri and 
Kakamega .... Industrial estates in growth-potential towns such 
as Kisii, Kericho and Embu will be considered for the next phase. 
(4, p.295) 
The R.I.D.P. had its origins, like the Special Rural Development 
Programme, in the 1966 Kericho Conference, However the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry did not join with the other Ministries in promoting the Integrated 
programme, and the R.I.D.P. was removed and reformulated as a sectoral programme 
to be administered by Kenya Industrial Estates, already charged with the urban 
programme for industrial estates promoting small-scale industry. The R.I.D.P. 
was launched in late 1971, and might be said to have been operational from 
January 1973. During this time it has been run on similar principles to the 
SRDP of experimentation, research and evaluation, and the objective of 
replicability. The programme has benefited principally from Danish technical 
and financial assistance (with Norwegian financing in Embu) under a Government 
agreement between the Kenyan and Danish Governments for 1972-77. In Vihiga-
Hamisi Divisions of Kakamega District, one of the six SRDP areas, a largely 
separate experimental programme for the promotion of rural business has been 
run by an American organisation, Partners for Productivity (P.F.PJ as part of 
the SRDP effort in the area. 
1 1 - 2 
IDS/OP 12 
The Development Plan outlines its proposals for the R.I.D.P. as 
follows:-
Under this programme centres will be established throughout the 
country at district headquarters. Fourteen such centres have had 
preliminary surveys. Four have already been established; at Nyeri, 
Kakamega, Machakos and Embu, and are already operational. It is 
planned to have 23 such centres established by 1978 .... Each 
centre will cost approximately K£90,000. Facilities will include 
an administrative block, classrooms for training courses, and 
repair workshops. (.4-, p.297) 
This paper presents an anlysis of rural Industry in general, and specifically 
of the detailed activities of three out of the four existing centres. It is 
argued that they are not an appropriate form as they stand for the promotion 
of craft industry, with which they largely deal, or somewhat larger'moderate-
sized' rural industry. Accordingly their duplication in so many centres -
arrangements for setting up identical centres at Voi and Malindi are far 
advanced - would be unwise, without a major change in their structure. 
The investment involved is substantial, as can be seen from Table 1 giving 
the detailed Development Plan proposal. 
Table 1. Proposed R.I.D.P. development expenditures, 1974-78 (K£r000). 
Centres 1973-4 1974-5 1975-6 1976-7 1977-8 Total 
Capital expenditures 
1. Kisii, Malindi, Voi 170 100 - - - 270 
2. Meru, Siaya, Kericho, 
Murang'a - 200 160 - - 360 
3. Naivasha, Busia, Bungoma, 
Kitui - - 200 160 - 360 
4. Homa Bay, Kwale, Kapsabet, 
Garissa - 200 160 360 
5. Kabarnet, Nyahururu, 
Kerugoya, Kajiado - - - - 300 300 
Sub-total, Capital 
Expenditures 170 300 360 360 460 1650 
Operating Expenditures 30 60 70 90 100 350 
Total Expenditure 200 360 430 450 560 2000 
Source: Development Plan, Table 12-6, p.298. 
It can now be seen that there are potential areas of overlap in the 
future between the two programmes. There are proposals for future K.I.E. 
estates at Nyeri, Kakamega and Embu, three of the existing R.I.D.P. centres. 
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As we shall see presently, the latter centres have been forced to occupy 
themselves with craft industry, and have been extremely unsuccessful so far 
in promoting or establishing 'modern' small-scale industries of a moderate 
size. The same would surely hold for Kisii and Kericho. If this is so, the 
prospects for the more ambitious industrial estate cannot be good. In any 
case It will be argued that the estate form is desirable for craft industry 
but unsuitable for the moderate-sized industry presently forthcoming, and 
that the development of 'growth poles' in major townships outside Nairobi and 
Mombasa will not happen without a positive policy of direction of industrial 
location which is at the moment absent. 
The R.I.D.P. Evaluation Reports 
Two conferences have been held since the beginning of the R.I.D.P. 
to evaluate the results of this experimental programme. The two conference 
reports afford a fairly comprehensive account of the experience of the 
programme and of the thinking and ideas this has generated among the various 
agencies involved. (8 and 9) Although thinking has evolved further since 
April 1974, the reports provide a useful starting point for discussion of the 
programme. 
The reports appear to suffer however, from two related deficiencies: 
(a) nowhere is there a very clear statement of which product lines have been 
successfully developed and which products and activities appear likely to be 
capable of promotion in the future (though some of these products may be 
deduced from the reports); and (b) nowhere is a clear distinction made between 
what has been described variously as 'household industry' , 'dwarf industry' or 
'craft industry',on the one hand, and 'modern small industry' on the other. 
The standard work on the subject defines small industry as all establishments 
employing less than 100 workers, and cottage industry as establishments 
employing less than 10 workers. (13) The lack of clarity on these two points 
is of some importance, because it necessarily affects the promotional 
strategy to be adopted, as we shall indicate. 
The Importance of Craft Industry in the Rural Economy 
The 1970 Report by the K.I.E. on the Rural Industries Development 
Programme did specify three likely categories of industry for the rural areas: 
first, agro-related industries such as processing, second, ancillary and 
feeder industries developed in relation to a particular large-scale industry 
which happens to be situated in the area, and thirdly, industries and services 
based on the consumption pattern in the areas. (5) When we come to look at 
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this consumption pattern, we are led directly to various types of craft 
Industry. 
Other research on consumption patterns and needs of households 
in rural areas in East Africa has underlined the low purchasing power of 
rural residents. The most striking finding of a household survey of 
consumer durables, carried out throughout the rural areas of Tanzania Cand 
some parts of Kenya), was the extreme paucity of the goods possessed. A 
large proportion of households lacked a bed, table or chairs, and owned 
perhaps one or two stools. (10) There were very great differences between 
districts, due to differences in the development of cash crops and the level 
of purchasing power, and even in the rich areas there were great inter-
household variations. While the position in Kenya may be better on the whole, 
the quantity and quality of possessions in a large proportion of households 
is probably much poorer than is generallly acknowledged. 
These results serve to underline the low purchasing power in the 
rural areas, and the sorts of commodities likely to be in demand at these 
income levels. Secondly, they underline what the needs are: increasing 
the availability and reducing the price of such mass consumption goods may 
increase welfare more than the factory production of sophisticated consumer 
goods produced for an urban elite, even if ordinary cost-benefit calculations 
suggest higher profitability for the latter. 
An inventory of goods in common usage in the rural areas suggests 
as craft industries masonry and brick/cement block production for the rural 
house itself; doors, steel windows, furniture; various metal goods such as 
charcoal-burners, lamps, basins and containers; mats and other very simple 
household equipment; and clothing and footwear for members of the household. 
The craft industries supplying these would be masonry, carpentry, metal-
working, tailoring and shoe-making. In addition there would be the production 
and repair of agricultural tools, and repairwork of other types, most 
importantly motor and bicycle repair. 
While these trades do not give the impression of modern economic 
development, they are in fact of extreme importance in the rural economy 
and in the lives of the great mass of Kenyans, as the I.L.O. Mission to 
Kenya recently pointed out in emphasising the importance of Kenya's * informal 
sector'. The 1972 SIDA Report estimated the number of informal sector 
small-scale 'industrialists' in Kenya at 20,000 to 25,000, and the numbers 
engaged in the' sector as 60,000 to 70,000. (14) While this sector may not 
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be the most dynamic in terms of innovativeness, or constructive in terms of 
long-term economic transformation, it is possible to say without attempting 
a sophisticated rate of return analysis that the benefits should be very 
substantial if a significant improvement in the effectiveness of the sector 
can be obtained without very large costs. It is worth underlining the fact 
that most industry at present in the rural areas'is of this very simple type 
by referring to a rough survey of local industry carried out by the Embu 
R.I.D.C. soon after its establishment. The survey is summarised in Table 2. 
This survey is certainly incomplete, but probably gives a fair picture of 
the current activities which it is the task of the R.I.D.Cs to develop, 
whether in a township such as Embu or minor centre such as Runyenjes. The 
simplicity of the existing rural industries is further emphasised by the kind 
of products made by the 29 sheetmetal workers covered by the survey: water 
tanks and containers (by 23 workers), charcoal braziers (21 workers), wash 
basins (12), buckets (11), bicycle repair (9), steel windows (7), watering 
cans (2), dustbins (2), water heaters (l) , panel beating (1), brooders (l), 
ox-carts (l), pipe-chairs (l) and gates (1). 
Table 2. Local manufacturing and repair activities in the Embu area, number 
of establishments. (Establishments are 
undertaken.) 
listed twice if two activities are 
& Shaurivako, Inear town) Manyatt a Runyenjes Other Total 
Sawmilling 3 0 1 0 1 5 
Woodworking 21 2 3 8 15 49 
Sheet metal working 10 11 2 3 8 34 
Bicycle repair 2 0 1 2 9 
Panel beating 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Garages 11 0 1 2 1 15 
Leather work (shoes 
and bags) 6 0 2 4 16 
Posho mills 0 0 1 2 6 9 
Tailoring 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Dry cleaning 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Mattress making 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Masonry 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Concrete blocks 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 58 13 13 24 39 147 
Much of the R.I.D.P. in Kenya so far has in fact been concerned 
with just this kind of small-scale craft industry. Table 3 shows that in 
three of the Rural Industrial Development Centres reporting in September 1973 , 
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only 36 out of 206 clients providing information, that is 17.5 per cent, 
employed 10 or more persons, while about 66 per cent employed less than 
six. (8) The most common (modal) number of employees was three to five 
persons. Thus the bulk of the businesses dealt with were in fact what 
have been called 'dwarf' industries. Table 4 confirms that most business 
lines at R.I.D.C.s In 1973 were 'craft' industries - artisan industries 
based on particular crafts or trades - principally furniture-making, metal-
working (especially sheet-metal work) and motor repair. These accounted in 
1973 for about 63 per cent of the total number of clients on which information 
was available, but since many in the unknown category are likely to be in the 
same trades, the total may well be as high as 80 per cent. (9, Table 3.22) 
Table 3. Number of intensive and extensive clients at three R.I.D.C.s, by 
number of employees , September 1973. 
Number of employees Total Firms not 
Centre None 1 2 3-5 6-9 10+ reporting reporting 
Kakamega 0 0 7 34 16 16 73 0 
Nyeri 12 4 18 33 12 19 98 71 
Machakos 3 10 5 9 7 1 ^ 5 28 
Total 15 14 30 76 35 36 206 99 
Source: (8). 
Table 4. Clients distributed by business line, 1973 
Embu Kak. Mach. Nyeri Total 
Business line no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
Furniture 20 20 33 39 37 44 56 26 146 30 
Sheet-metal work 22 21 3 4 3 4 25 12 53 11 
Other metal working 2 2 4 5 11 13 5 2 22 5 
Auto/bicycle mechanic 21 20 16 19 15 18 29 14 81 17 
Tools and machines 0 0 3 4 2 2 0 0 5 1 
Sawmill 6 6 3 4 1 1 31 14 41 8 
Posho mill 8 8 1 1 1 1 18 8 28 6 
Other + unknown 24 23 20 24 14 17 51 24 109 22 
Total 103 100 83 100 84 100 215 100 485 100 
Source : (9), Table 3 .22 . 
We may conclude: (l) that the large mass of rural entrepreneurs 
(outside agriculture and commerce) already in existence in the rural areas, 
and likely to be looking for assistance, will be in these craft industries; 
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(2) that the rural areas probably have a comparative advantage in these lines, 
catering for local consumption, based on a 'dispersed market pull' and that 
these lines can probably be pushed successfully right across the rural areas; 
(3) that the problem of establishing modern small industry, i.e. small 
factory industry, in rural areas is likely to be more difficult since the 
entrepreneurs will be less easy to find, and the business lines will be more 
difficult to identify; and (4) that the best approach for the promotion of 
craft industry and of small factory industry may not be the same, and might 
be quite different. 
It seems essential, therefore, to keep a firm distinction between 
the two categories, even if there is, of course, some mobility between the 
two. It is also important to guard against 'grandiose' ideas regarding the 
type of rural industry with which the agencies involved will for the most 
part be dealing; and to avoid minimising the importance in terms of both 
income and employment of the informal sector, something which has in recent 
years been recognised in Kenya as being very substantial. Most of this 
evaluation will concentrate on craft industry, without implying in any way 
that its long-run significance will match factory production. 
The Estate Approach versus the Extension Approach 
The distinction made above is very relevant when we come to consider 
one of the main issues raised in the two conference reports, whether to 
concentrate on an estate approach, patterned along the lines of the urban 
industrial estates, or an extension approach. Up until now R.I.D.P. personnel 
have consistently favoured an extension service, where assistance is given 
to the entrepreneur in his own workshop. This is essentially a mobile form 
of assistance. The K.I.E., under whose umbrella R.I.D.P. in fact falls, 
clearly favours something more along the lines of its traditional estate 
policy, and there are signs of some mild friction between the two. 
We shall argue that both approaches, pursued in their pure form, 
can be shown to be unrewarding and that a system of workshop clusters, combining 
elements of estate and extension, should be adopted. 
PERFORMANCE OF THE RURAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRES 
In order to evaluate the performance of the existing R.I.D.C.s we 
can split up their potential contribution to rural enterprise as follows: 
(1) servicing of local craft and small industries through the provision of 
special machinery; (2) provision of local repair facilities; (3) training and 
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skill improvement; (4) provision of capital through common facilities or cash 
loans; (5) supply of materials under bulk purchase; (6) bookkeeping and manage-
ment advice; and (7) product development. Some of these services have been 
available at the Centres' workshops only, some at the clients' workshops as 
part of a more explicit extension approach, and some both at the Centres and 
away from them. 
Both in respect to activities at the Centres and to extension 
activities, criticism may be made regarding the excessive costliness of the 
Centres, particularly in relation to employment created. The total cost per 
Centre has been estimated as 1.1 million shillings. Clearly this would 
require a substantial flow of output, on a factory scale, to justify itself. 
Taking the Programme as a whole, extension service as well as centre workshops, 
61 R.I.D.P. employees (only two of which were in the head office) served 205 
clients in 1973. The cost per job created has been estimated at Shs 7,450/-. 
To warrant such overheads and reduce the cost per job created, the clients 
served would either need to be substantial businessmen, and the effect of the 
service on their business substantial, or the numbers of small enterprises 
served would need to be very large. As we shall see presently, the number 
of moderate—sized businesses served by the estates has been very small, and 
there are good reasons why this might have been expected. The initial invest-
ment in the centres thus probably represented a euphemistic view of the sort 
of industry which the centres would find themselves serving. 
The Provision of Machinery Services 
Apart from overheads associated with buildings and personnel, the 
purchase of machinery and equipment has contributed greatly to the high cost 
of the R.I.D.C.s, and there is evidence that some of this equipment has been 
greatly underutilised. For example, out of the 17 machines at the Embu Centre 
listed in Table 5, only a few were used very much: the welding equipment 
(91 out of 153 jobs in the metal workshop), the multi-roller swaging machine 
(16 jobs), the universal centre lathe C33 jobs) and the hand power tools. 
Most of the clients' jobs involved only small, very cheap equipment, especially 
welding equipment and power tools. Much expensive machinery lay idle. Four 
machines which cost Shs 41,824/- when purchased (present values are much higher) 
were used twelve times in ten months. These figures partly reflect the 
particular requirements of the clients using the Centre most regularly and 
are not therefore an accurate guide to demands of all potential - craft-industry 
users, or to requirements if the nature of Centre activities were to be altered. 
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Table 5. Intensity of the use of metalworking machines at Embu R.I.D.C. 
Metal workshop Historical 
cost (shs) 
No. of times 
used Cover 10 
months) 
Main Common 
Facilities 
Workshop 
No.of times 
used (over 12 
months) 
Electric welder n.a. 
Handpower tools n.a. 
Gas welding machine 1,683/-
Multi-roller swaging 
machine 4,085/-
Handlever shear n.a. 
Corrugated roller 
machine 12 ,350/-
Bending roller" 19,950/-
Pedal guillotine 9,524/-
Sheetmetal folder n.a. 
Universal pipe bender n.a. 
Notching machine n.a. 
72 
21 
19 
16 
11 
4 
3 
2 
0 
0 
Universal 
centre lathe 3 
Universal 
grinding machine 10 
Hacksaw 6 
Drilling machine 3 
Handlever shear 1 
Corrugated roller 
machine 10 
Total 53 
Total 153 
A_ 2" bending roller had to_be bought in addition, as the large model 
/identical to that at Nyeri/ was found to be no use for the type of jobs 
common at the Centre. 
They do, however, suggest a degree of misapprehension as to the kind of 
enterprises that would be catered for, and the type of machinery which their 
requirements could sustain. 
By and large the woodworking machines were much more intensively 
used, partly because the number of clients is much greater, this itself 
reflecting the much greater importance of the furniture trade in catering 
for local consumption expenditure. The equipment, however, is less 
expensive and more divisible and in general more 'appropriate'. 
As already noted, the high overhead costs of staff, buildings and 
machinery could only be justified by servicing a substantial clientele and 
output. Table 6 shows the number of clients using the metal and wood workshops 
at Nyeri R.I.D.C. In metalworking just three clients accounted for 179 out 
of 222 jobs (tasks for which a separate job card was issued), 80 per cent of 
the total. These were essentially 'resident' clients. Since it is not the 
purpose of the Centres to provide expensive facilities for such clients, we 
can ignore these particular jobs. Secondly, it is likely that clients using 
the machines only once or twice In ten months would either be using the machines 
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for a. repair job or for an odd job, rather than using the facilities 
to assist their regular business. This covers another 15 clients, leaving 
at most five clients, perhaps only two, whose regular business outside the 
Centre can be said to have been assisted by the Centre facilities. In wood-
working three out of twenty clients using the centre over a six-month period 
appeared to have been residential or semi-residential, and another eight 
used the centre for odd jobs: a maximum of nine clients appeared to have 
been serviced according to the goals set for the facilities. 
Table 7 gives data for the Embu Centre which show that the situation 
in the metalworking shop there was similar. Only 20 clients used the workshop 
at all over a 15-16 month period and out of these, 5 clients, all of whom 
stayed for some months at the centre itself, account for three-quarters of 
jobs (91 out of 124). The position at Machakos R.I.D.C. was similar: in 
metalworking, 4 out of 16 clients (covering all clients since inception of the 
Centre) accounted for 63 per cent of jobs; in woodworking 5 out of 30 clients 
accounted also for 63 per cent of jobs. 
An Interesting exception to the pattern is shown in Table 7 for 
the woodworking shop at Embu. Excluding the resident or semi-resident clients, 
and those who used the facilities very rarely (less than 5 times in 15.5 months), 
19 clients used the facilities 228 times, an average of 12 times each, compared 
with 5 clients at Nyeri with 35 jobs. Since market demand and the number of 
Interested artisans is most likely much greater in Nyeri, this result probably 
reflects the unfortunate location of the Nyeri Centre at some considerable 
distance from the town. The location decision at Nyeri does not reflect much 
understanding of the businesses being served, particularly the fact that the 
workshops largely retail their own products and require proximity to potential 
customers. In this regard the Machakos R.I.D.C. is also poorly located, despite 
the wide choice of suitable sites available nearer to the town centre. 
We can say, therefore, that the existing R.I.D.C.s have failed to 
provide the use of machinery and equipment to a large number of rural craft 
industries. Given this failure, two alternatives suggest themselves. One is 
the extension approach of taking service facilities to the client: an approach 
most strongly pursued and well-documented at Machakos. The other is to bring 
the clients to the Centres in much larger numbers, something which would require 
redesign and reorganisation of the Centres. This second approach is the basis 
of the system of workshop clusters recommended in this Evaluation Report. 
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Provision of Local Repair Facilities 
Even if the Centre were not servicing local industry through 
regular use of its machinery and equipment, it might be important in providing 
facilities for occasional repairs which, though occasional, might be crucial 
to the businesses concerned. In rural areas very far from the manufacturing 
centre in Nairobi, breakdowns may cause very great Inconvenience and cost, 
so that the provision of this service might be of significance. The Nyeri 
Centre keeps a separate repair shop, the largest, housing the most substantial 
equipment, and keeps a separate record. Table 8 shows the number of clients 
using the machinery for repair jobs over a 19-month period. 
Clearly the number of jobs carried out is extremely low. The repair 
facility might be valuable even if used only once by a client; but, given that 
alternative private commercial repair facilities exist in Nyeri, most of the 
one or two-time users could not be considered as finding the repair facility 
particularly useful. In general we can say that only four or five clients 
Table 8. Number of clients using the repair workshop at Nyeri R.I.D.C. 
No. of clients No. of clients 
using workshop" 
10 and under 20 times 4 
5 " " 10 " 1"* 
3 or 4 times 5 
1 or 2 times 37 
TOTAL 47 
Data cover nineteen-month period from June 1973 to December 1974. 
This was a secondary school. 
over the nineteen-month period have found the R.I.D.C. especially useful as 
a repair facility serving their businesses on a regular basis (one of these 
is a resident client). Even if regular, the service may not be a major one 
or, for the Centre, remunerative: one client was mainly re-welding broken 
hacksaw blades. If there is scope for some kind of machinery repair (service 
or maintenance) in the rural areas, and there may well be, the proper approach 
would appear to be extension, offering repair or service of machines on the site 
rather than at the Centre; but this has not been an element in the extension 
approach used, and this potential need has not been i'"""^' 
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Training and Skill Improvement 
All the Centres have classrooms and are thus well equipped to 
organise courses. On the whole these do not appear to have been much used, 
though this is not true at Embu where about nine courses were held during 
1974 (often for just one or two days) in woodworking especially, welding, use 
of spraying equipment and bookkeeping. This itself suggests that scope 
exists for this service. The variable level of craftsmanship and product 
quality in woodworking especially, which is a major difficulty for example 
in securing contracts from Government and other institutions, also indicates 
the need. At Machakos only two courses were held in 1974, with only 16 
students in all, this reflecting to some extent the emphasis on the field 
extension approach at the Centre. Although skill-improvement has not been 
an explicit ingredient of this approach, nevertheless quite a lot of on-site 
training has been done. Some economists have argued that, within the field 
of education, the highest economic returns are likely to be in adult education, 
particularly within peasant agriculture. (See 2, p,.101») This would certainly 
indicate that the returns to further education and training of people engaged 
in rural non-farming activities might be worth investigating. Whether this 
is best carried out at rural enterprise premises or at the R.I.D.C. is un-
certain, given the costs of travelling. 
The Provision of Capital 
Since lack of capital appears to be an important constraint on the 
development of craft enterprises as well as medium enterprises, it is worth 
looking at the role played by the R.I.D.C.s in extending credit. In particular 
it will be useful to examine how loans have been distributed as between craft 
and medium industry, and secondly how loans to craft industry have been 
allocated. 
Table 9 shows the loans which have been distributed by Machakos 
R.I.D.C., excluding materials given on credit. The most obvious comment is 
how small the number of loans is: thirteen in all, and only eight excluding 
tool and material loans. Thus only a small fraction of Centre clients obtained 
loans (a few others obtained loans from other sources), and a negligible 
number in relation to the number of entrepreneurs in the area. Thus, the 
R.I.D.C. was not able to make any significant impact on the problem of lack 
of capital experienced by most craft-entrepreneurs in the area. The question 
of equity may also be raised: while the mean value of machinery and equipment 
possessed by the clients serviced was about Shs 3,000/-, which is certainly 
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Table 9 Loans made by the Machakos R- I.D.C. 
Client Type of Ca) (h) (c) Cb/a) (c/a) 
enterprise Value of own Amount of Total amount 
capital in loan of loan 
machinery and excluding 
equipment generator 
(Kshs) (.Kshs) (Kshs) C%) (%) 
1 Sawmilling 10,500 16,000 45,000 150 429 
2 Ox-carts 2 ,500 7 ,000 27 ,000 280 1080 
3 Woodworking 1,900 12,000 30,000 
4 Bicycle repair 3,700 7 ,000 25 ,000 
5 Woodworking 1,000 16 ,500 29,500 1650 2950 
6 Ox-carts 1,000 5,000 18 ,000 500 1800 
7 Metalworking 3,910 21,000 21,000 
8 Wood and 
metalworking 9,600 19 ,04 D 19,040 
Tool Loans 
9 Woodworking Nil Cusing Centre) 2,3 55 2,355 CO CO 
10 it 1,000 750 750 
11 it 1,400 790 790 
12 Leather 
products Nil (new business) 3,000 3 ,000 00 00 
Raw material 
loan 
r-
13 Woodworking - 3 ,000 3 ,000 - -
TOTAL 36 ,510 113,435 225,435 - -
Average 
Loan 
17 ,340 Average, 26,820 
exol. tool 
loans 
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larger than for a great many entrepreneurs in the area, the average value of 
the loans given, excluding tool loans, was Shs 27,000, ranging up to 3,000 
per cent of that of the client's own equipment. If the same funds had been 
used for tool loans of Shs 1,000 each, 225 clients could have been assisted 
rather than 13. Though the Machakos Centre has given only four tool loans, 
it is considered by the other Centres to be leading the way in this regard, 
so that it may be assumed that the position elsewhere is no better. It may 
be noticed also that no loans were granted for the improvement of premises, 
though many entrepreneurs lack these altogether. Furthermore, about 50 per 
cent -of the total lent was for 6 generators to provide power, 5 of the 6 
in rural areas; it is difficult to say whether the adverse distributional 
effects on other rural entrepreneurs caused by the increased competitiveness 
of these 'power-driven' craft-businesses will be outweighed by the long-run 
advantage given to rural production over urban. This should clearly be seen 
as an experiment, and the results monitored. As a final observation, note 
that in Machakos loans have been aimed at upgrading craft-entrepreneurs, 
particularly in woodworking, rather than assisting varied medium-scale 
enterprises. 
R.I.D.C. loans must be repaid over six years, except for tool loans, 
but only interest need be paid during the first year. Tool loans must be re-
paid directly. Because of the one-year moratorium on ordinary loans, it Is 
too soon to assess whether there will be repayment problems. On the other 
hand if there is a failure at this stage to pay interest, it might be presumed 
that there will be even greater difficulty in obtaining repayment of the 
capital. Table 10 gives some indication of the portent in the case of Machakos. 
Though the sample is small, and the scheme in its initial stage, a repayment 
rate of, say, 50 per cent is indicated for large loans, which is not particularly 
good. The rate for small (tool) loans does not appear much worse. It would 
appear that loan repayment might develop into a problem. If, as suggested 
presently, a mini-estate approach can help to reduce this, it would be some-
thing in its favour. 
Table 11 shows the size distribution of loans given through the 
Nyeri R.I.D.C. Although the opportunities for granting loans are considerably 
greater than at Machakos, the number of loans made is still quite small. 
The mean value of loans given was Shs 30 ,000/-,'approximately, and the mode 
Shs 25,000/-. No tool loans were given at all. Similarly the Embu R.I.D.C. 
had granted only seven loans, of which two were tool loans, by January 31, 1975, 
the total amount granted being Shs 160,000/-. 
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Table 10. Loans made by Machakos R.I.D.C.: Amount unpaid as percentage of 
that due up to December 1974" 
Large loans (interest only due) Small loans (interest and loan 
repayment due) 
Loan 1 
2 
3 
4 
100 
83 
50 
0 
Loan 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
100 
83 
50 
20 
0 
Table 11. Loans distributed though the Nyeri R.I.D.C., May 1973 to 
December 1974. 
Amount of loan 
(Kshs) 
No. of loans 
0 and under 5000 
5000 and under 10,000 
0 
2 
10,000 " " 20,000 4 
20,000 " " 30,000 12 
30,000 " " 40,000 2 
40,000 " " 50,000 5 
50,000 " " 60,000 3 
60,000 " " 70,000 1 
Total value of loans = 870,920/- 29 
Supply of Materials under Bulk Purchase; 
The main material stocked and distributed by the Centres is wood. 
The Centres have a revolving fund for the purchase of wood which is, however, 
quite small. The primary objective of the service is to provide for the proper 
seasoning of the wood. Wood is not delivered to clients except at Embu in 
town, so that the biggest users, at Nyeri especially, are resident clients 
whom the Centres were not designed to serve. For non-residents the supply 
of Nyeri R.I.D.C. can scarcely be a convenience, given the possibility of 
buying closer at hand in Nyeri town. At Machakos the supply of wood at the 
Centre has been much more heavily utilised by local artisans, partly because 
short-term credit has been extended for its purchase. 
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Very little material for metalworking has been stocked, although 
the distribution of iron bars for making steel windows and of metal drums 
for making water containers has been significant at Embu. Out of 77 sales 
at Nyeri, 50 were only for solder and half the remainder for hacksaw blades. 
The system of providing materials purchased in bulk has not been 
very heavily used so far, but in spite of this, bulk purchase of materials 
was rated as one of the most important forms of assistance offered by the 
R.I.D.C.s in the 1974 evaluation report. In fact, the Centres lack the capacity 
to deliver materials to extension clients residing outside the townships, except 
for very small items such as solder. If the artisans were more closely 
concentrated around the Centres, advantages of convenience would be gained 
and a higher level of sales could generate economies of scale which would 
give the Centres a price advantage over local suppliers. Further, the 
enthusiasm for short-term credit among the clients at Machakos no doubt reflects 
their shortage of capital, Including working capital, and indicates the scope 
for expanding the bulk purchase scheme if credit can be provided. 
Bookkeeping and Management Advice 
Advice on management and bookkeeping has generally been given as 
part of an extension approach, visiting clients at their places of business. 
This approach has been followed most extensively at the Machakos R.I.D.C. 
where the experience has been well documented and evaluated. 
Of about 100 clients in Machakos, some 12 received fairly intensive 
assistance, amounting to 20 to 30 hours, in bookkeeping and price calculation. 
These efforts were clearly unsuccessful in five cases, and no results were 
reported in another three; partial results appear to have been obtained in 
no more than three or four cases out of twelve. This should not be surprising 
since evidence elsewhere has pointed to a very low success rate in converting 
craft industrialists to bookkeeping. 
Management advice offered in the form of extension assistance may 
be inappropriate for craft Industry as compared to somewhat larger 
enterprises for which more sophisticated project planning is needed. 
The offering of advice on lay-out of the workshop, for instance, and similar 
'professional' advice is certainly more appropriate to factory lay-outs 
than to rural artisan establishments employing three or four people. 
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More generally, the technical and economic advice which in practise 
the R.I.D.C.s are likely to be able to dispense as part of an extension service 
is probably quite limited, given the heterogeneous nature of the craft 
enterprises themselves and the limited expertise likely to be available to 
the R.I.D.C.s. 
The failure of this form of assistance was acknowledged at the 1974 
RIDP evaluation conference. 
Assistance with Product Development 
Another Important aspect of the extension approach at the Machakos 
R.I.D.C. has been the attempt to introduce clients to profitable new product 
lines. This was done as a matter of routine at Machakos, in accordance with 
a 'standard working plan' (SWP), under which at least two new products had 
to be introduced to all 'Intensive' clients. In addition, specimens of the 
clients' two main products were supposed to be made under technical supervision 
in order to improve quality and at least one jig or tool was to be introduced. 
Together with bookkeeping, the element of the working plan which 
appears to have been taken most seriously by the extension officers in Machakos 
appears to have been the 'pushing' of the two new products. Unfortunately 
product development had not reached a stage, apparently, where clients could 
be introduced to profitable new lines. The products proposed to clients, with 
the number of clients recommended the product, have been as follows: 
Wood Products: maize sheller (18 clients), wheelbarrow (15), folding 
chair (7), folding table (4), African chair (4), water cart (2), 
deck chair (2), plough rims (l), safari chair (l), hand planter (1), 
toy trains (1), concrete box (1) 
Metal Products: coin box (1) 
Other Products: soil cement and sand blocks (1) 
The reason for the reluctance of clients to accept these products, except in 
order to please centre officials, is clear: they could not sell them. The files 
indicate that the following clients appeared to be successful in finding 
market outlets: 
Wheelbarrow (1), folding chair (1),folding table (1). 
In addition some clients produced samples for the R.I.D.C. itself: water 
cart (2),folding chair (2), deck chair (1). What is peculiar is why the 
centre should have persisted in its efforts to convert more and more clients 
to the maize sheller and wheelbarrow, particularly the former, when there 
were no sales. This could hardly have impressed clients with the financial 
know-how of the Centre. 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE EXTENSION APPROACH 
The main emphasis in the Rural Industrial Development Programme so 
far has been on extension with the hope that in this way it would be possible 
to reach a large number of entrepreneurs and thus spread the benefits of the 
Programme more widely and equitably. All the Centres have followed this 
approach, but it has been taken furthest at Machakos. Here, a particularly 
great effort was made to reach clients In small centres,located very far from 
the main township, so that of 33 'intensive' clients mentioned in one report, 
16 were located more than HO kilometres from Machakos, and 3 were more than 
140 kilometres away. 
A major problem associated with this approach is transport costs. 
Mileage costs raise the cost of one hour of technician/client contact to 
extremely high levels,1 which may not be justifiable when dealing with very 
small-scale craft enterprises unless the advice and assistance communicated 
results in much more fundamental changes than has been the case so far. In 
addition, there is always a danger that vehicles will be misused, raising costs 
further, 
The transport factor affects the main purpose of the extension approach, 
to reach large numbers of clients. The 1973 R.I.D.C. evaluation report says 
"that a really systematic planning of the extension services has not been possible 
due to lack of transport facilities, especially transport of small machines, 
tools and materials". 
R.I.D.P. clients are divided into 'intensive and 'extensive' clients, 
the former being eligible for more contact hours and much closer support. For 
intensive clients a standard working plan is prepared, including as routine 
some proposals for product development and/or skill improvement, and instruction 
in bookkeeping and management. However it can be seen from the preceding tables 
that the number of intensive clients is quite small. This is not offset by 
assistance more widely distributed to extensive clients: up to April 1974, 
progress with the extensive clients had in general not gone beyond their registra-
tion. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the extension approach is effective 
in practice in reaching a large number of clients. 
Even with regard to the intensive clients, the extension approach 
is now generally regarded as a failure by R.I.D.P. staff. As of February 
1974, 131 out of 205 clients, or 64 per cent, were considered to have made no 
1" p- Kongstad estimates these at about Shs 150 to 200 per hour in a 
recent ^ detailed analysis of the impact of transport costs on the cost of the 
extension service. 
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progress as a result of extension. The Machakos Centre staff have produced 
a comprehensive evaluation of their extension experience which concludes: 
...It must be considered a reality that R.I.D.P. is not able 
to raise the general level of the entrepreneurs and their 
employees.... It is difficult to measure any improvement of 
the employment situation etc. over a relatively short period 
when work is done with already established entrepreneurs.... 
They are satisfied with" their^preseht situation,^are too 61d 
to be receptive, etc. 
... Any advanced (established) client considers the presence 
of the technician as a disturbance.... (1) 
However, it is not clear that the failure of the extension approach 
was due to lack of responsiveness among clients so much as the lack of concrete 
advantages being offered. Up until the 1974 conference at any rate, it was 
not clear precisely what the extension consisted of,or should consist of. 
We have already seen that advice on product development was not very sound, 
while that on bookkeeping could excusably be viewed as superfluous. We have 
seen that bulk purchase supply of materials appears to fulfil a felt need. 
The viability of this for a scattered client extension system is, however, 
dubious, and it is rather curious that the 1974 R.I.D.P. conference report 
puts this at the top (as "undoubtedly feasible") among forms of extension 
assistance. The Centres lacked the capacity to deliver materials to clients 
residing outside the townships, except for small items such as solder. 
There is evidence of some uncertainty among R.I.D.P. officers about 
which forms of assistance to emphasise." In Hyeri it was reported for the last 
quarter of 1973 that it had been possible to carry out less that 15 per cent 
of the assistance planned and specified in the clients' SWPs. The fact that, 
whereas all Centres obtained Volkswagen vans in September - October 1973, 
these "had not started operations after six months", also suggests uncertainty 
regarding the assistance to be offered. 
Probably the main reason for the lack of receptiveness to extension 
is that it fails to recognise the most important need of the artisans: capital. 
This need is readily apparent from a scrutiny of clients' files which indicate 
that their main interest is usually for financial assistance. Moreover a check 
of clients using the Machakos Centre showed a considerable proportion lacked 
proper premises and were working under 'shades' as protection against sun and 
rain: in these circumstances other forms of assistance appear secondary. Lack 
of sufficient tools is a general problem, however low the cost of these. Access 
to power, related to the problem of premises, is a crucial constraint. The 
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extenslon approach has done little or nothing regarding this capital constraint 
and indeed its costliness has absorbed funds that might otherwise have been 
available. 
THE WORKSHOP CLUSTER APPROACH: A PROPOSAL 
Up until now, the strategy of the R.I.D.P. has been to establish 
local Centres, comprising relatively expensive buildings and central work-
shops,to act as 'bases' for extension • -efforts to scattered local artisans. 
This extension programme has however proved to have only a minimal impact 
and to be excessively costly. At the same time the Centres themselves have 
not been geared to servicing many clients on their premises or functioning 
adequately as industrial estates. To varying extents they have been taken 
over by three or four clients who have enjoyed relatively lavish facilities 
at subsidised rates. 
What seems to be required is an intermediate solution somewhere 
between the estate approach and the extension approach. This would provide 
very simple workshops at central sites for large numbers of artisans who would 
have use of specialised machinery and equipment as common facilities. These 
would in effect be 'workshop clusters' rather than industrial estates. Unlike 
the latter which cater for any number of heterogeneous activities conducted 
independently, they would concentrate on a limited range of craft industries 
in which the artisans receive considerable assistance and supervision through 
the Centre. 
In addition, unlike industrial estates which concentrate manufacturing 
in major townships, the proposal would be for a system of major and minor 
workshop clusters which would be based on the existing and potential distribu-
tion of craft Industrial activity in Kenya and would encourage the dispersal 
of rural industry. Major clusters in townships might comprise 30 or 4-0 work-
shop units and minor clusters in rural centres only 5 or 10 units. The primary 
ingredient would be the provision of lockable premises. Some, but not all, 
minor clusters would have a generator. 
Craft industries in Kenya are concentrated in the townships and minor 
centres, but are also more widely distributed within the rural areas themselves. 
An indication of how this would affect a system of workshop clusters is given 
in Table 12, taken from the Kenya Development Plan, specifying potential urban 
and rural growth centres in the Districts in which the R.I.D.P. '-is already1 
active. This demonstrates that the proposal would afford a quite widely-spread 
network of facilities and not an over-centralised system. 
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Table 12. Potential growth centres in the four Districts with R. I.D.C.s. 
District Number of 
urban centres 
Number of 
rural centres 
Total 
Kakamega 2 9 11 
Nyeri 2 5 7 
Embu 1 3 4 
Machakos 2 9 11 
Total 7 26 33 
The so-called 'Kisumu Model' of development which has been widely-
discussed in K.I.E. and R.I.D.P. is for a regional system comprising a nucleus 
estate plus satellite R.I,D. Centres operating as a decentralised organisation. 
This could be modified to make the nucleus industrial estate a regional 
centre at which would be based a more diversified staff (still small) of 
advisors who would oversee not only major/minor cluster operations but consult 
on medium-scale industry possibilities in the region. The R.I.D.C.s would 
not be single centres but the suggested network of major workshop clusters, 
under local managers, and minor clusters. A bulk-purchase system might be 
operated on a regional basis with a main store at the nucleus estate and sub-
stores at mini-estates (major clusters) withaview to economising storage and 
raw material transportation costs. The system should operate to minimise staff 
overheads. This assistance, and the extension service generally would thus be 
administered through the system of scattered major and minor clusters, hopefully 
in a much more fruitful and economical manner than hitherto. 
It is important to underline that the workshop-clusters would cater 
for craft industry of different types and not act as industrial estates of 
moderate-sized establishments. Provision for expansion of craft enterprises 
could be made by the allocation of two or three of the adjacent standard-sized 
units. This will also permit the offer of larger premises to more established 
businesses or larger cooperative groups. The quality of the facilities offered 
should be within the capacity to pay of relatively low-income artisans. 
Specifically the buildings and equipment should be such that the monthly 
depreciation should be covered by the rent or rate of depreciation which such 
artisans can afford. 
It is worth giving some order of magnitude to this. Suppose the 
loan must be paid off over 10 years at 8 per cent interest and that on top 
of machinery loans and land rentals the client can afford to pay at the rate 
of Shs 600 per annum, or Shs 50 per month. The cost of the premises should 
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not exceed Shs 3,333. At a 5 per cent interest rate this cost could go up 
to Shs 4,000. Against this the prototype shed being built experimentally 
at Embu as 'appropriate' technology is estimated to cost Shs 25,000. Ten 
sheds built at Kakamega cost approximately Shs 50,000 each. What suggests 
itself is some standardised pre-fabricated unit which can be produced cheaply 
and readily assembled in any location, perhaps to form different sized sheds 
out of standardised pieces. 
Advanced proposals do exist at Machakos for sheds of flexible 
construction at an estimated cost of Shs 4,500, very close to our figure. 
This proposal has not yet been taken up at other Centres which operate 
independently in this regard. Even at Machakos there is still a reluctance 
to take over direct responsibility for the construction of sheds and operation 
of the estate. The Machakos design could however provide the model for 
general adoption. 
THE OPERATION OF THE WORKSHOP CLUSTER SYSTEM AND ITS ADVANTAGES 
The system of workshop clusters would facilitate much more direct 
assistance to artisan industries and would have a number of advantages. 
The Creation of Employment 
By boosting labour-intensive activities using 'appropriate1 technology, 
and Increasing their ability to compete with urban factory production, 
considerable employment may be generated without the necessity of subsidising 
inefficient small establishments. As an indication of the potential in this 
respect it is worth referring to the example of the National Small Industries 
Corporation workshops in Dar-es-Salaam which formed the basis of initial 
efforts at craft industry promotion In Tanzania. These consisted of about 
100 simple cubicles, made with mbati sheets, arranged in what we would call 
a 'major cluster' and rented out to artisans for about Shs 30 per month. 
Central facilities were provided for woodworking, to be paid for as they were 
used. These compact workshops, occupying a relatively small piece of waste 
land, housed some 400 artisans, the size, in terms of employment, of a substan-
tial factory. Although only a portion of this can be considered as net employ-
ment creation, the new employment created by a national programme along the 
lines suggested, and the increased incomes accruing to all those assisted, 
would be very substantial. 
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The Provision of Premises 
Kristensen may be right in his suggestion in the conference reports 
that the rate of capital accumulation among many artisans could be higher. 
But taking preferences as given, premises and lack.of tools appear quite 
critical among artisans. These things, and the lack of capital generally, 
are named repeatedly as serious handicaps, as Indicated in Table 13. In 
Dar-es-Salaam, at least, where the premises offered were rudimentary, and no 
tools or machinery were supplied apart from the central saw facilities, the 
queue for admission to premises was huge: the 100 units could have been filled 
several times over. The reluctance of tenants to leave the R.I.D.C. workshops 
Table 13. Clients distributed by recorded problems, all Centres, 1973. 
Problems % of clients Problems % of clients 
mentioning mentioning 
Plots and premises 13 Lack of electricity 6 
Raw materials 15 Bookkeeping 5 
Production methods 10 Marketing and sales 5 
Lack of skilled manpower 3 Unknown problems 12 
Lack of tools and machinery 32 _ ^ . _ ,. . . J Total no. of clients' 
problems recorded 100%(N=882) 
(admittedly more lavish), about which the R.I.D.P. management complains bitterly, 
is perhaps an indication of a similar situation in Kenya. One of the obvious 
advantages of supplying capital by provision of premises is that of a 
readily repossessable loan: in contrast cash loans have distinct drawbacks 
as East African experience readily shows. The workshop-cluster system should 
facilitate loans-in-kind for equipment and materials. Failure to repay should 
mean eventual eviction from the workshop, which would be an important sanction. 
The Provision of Common Facilities 
The competitive advantage of factory production may be reduced by 
the provision of one or two large pieces of machinery as a common facility 
for the individual artisan-units. In Nyeri it was noted that a "characteristic 
feature" was the clients' coming in from outside to have work done in the 
Centre. It Is rather Interesting to note that when one such entrepreneur 
earned Shs 30 for a job carried out In the Centre for Shs 15 there was 
considerable Indignation, and his access to the facilities subsequently 
restricted: this would have been better seen with relief as an indication 
of positive returns from such machinery. 
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In rural areas small clusters could be built around the crucial 
common facility of a generator to provide power. As already mentioned, the 
practice of offering loans for generators to particular individuals in 
small centres should be discontinued in favour of establishing power as a 
common facility to serve simultaneously a group of people and a variety of 
rural non-farming activities. 
Bulk Purchase of Materials and the Provision of Storage 
The bulk-purchase scheme at Machakos, although quite limited, was 
described by the Centre as "the best thing here". The system of workshop 
clusters should permit considerable increase in the scope for bulk-purchase 
activities. The case for these is two-fold. Because of the lack of a well 
established craft industry, demand for materials tends to be insufficient 
for satisfactory supply through local dealers: expansion of the sector under 
the Programme would expand supply and demand for materials simultaneously. 
Outside clients could continue to purchase materials from the Centres, which 
would now be much more widely distributed. Secondly, artisans at present 
have to purchase materials at retail prices, and in up-country centres at 
high retail prices. Bulk purchase should permit supply at wholesale prices 
and thus more effective competition with factory production. Finally, in 
metal-working there is the particular problem that a principal raw material 
is scrap metal of various types , which is more plentiful in the towns, particularly 
Nairobi. Collection of bulk supplies of such scrap through the R.I.D.P. would 
be a significant form of assistance. 
An important element in the bulk purchase system would be storage 
facilities distributed in an optimal way throughout the system. This should 
mean not only cheap and speedy delivery, but also a wide range of choice of 
materials. Storage could initially be at mini-estates or main clusters only, 
with clients at smaller clusters and outside clients travelling to make 
purchases: once the system is in full swing a more ambitious system of 
delivery might be organised on a commercial basis. 
In general, were private entrepreneurs performing this supply 
function adequately, it would be better to leave this activity to ordinary 
commercial channels. Because rural industries are dispersed, disorganised 
and undercapitalised, the private distribution sector has not been attracted 
to cater for their needs and in any case is itself poorly organised in the 
rural areas. The success of the limited arrangements made so far for bulk 
purchase through the R.I.D.P. is indicative of a gap being filled. Lack of 
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working capital to purchase materials appears to be a major constraint on 
the viability and growth of a majority of small establishments, moreover, 
and the R.I.D.C.s can play an important role here. After an organised system 
of workshop clusters is established, consuming materials on a much larger 
scale, the supply of these will be more economic and attractive to private 
commercial distributors. 
This is one point where the Programme's stated priority of finding 
new products and new activities to promote is in conflict with the need to 
establish a substantial foundation in terms of staple activities which would 
permit the Programme to reap economies of scale. The search for new activities 
should be In addition to and not at the expense of immediately feasible goals. 
Training and Skill-improvement 
Training and extension services are likely to be very much easier 
if artisans are brought together in workshop clusters. Referring to a Machakos 
client, for instance, it is said that:-
This is one of the few cases where we have been able to change 
the attitude of a person, and it is fully because we have had 
the person 'under pressure' (that is, at the Centre) for several 
months. 
This suggests that extension may only work where clients are organised in 
workshop clusters. Even though training courses can be organised for 
non-resident clients, considerable reluctance to release employees for 
training has been noted among clients. This would be much more readily 
organised where apprentices and other employees could be released for training 
on the spot'-for occasional afternoons and for specific jobs. An interesting 
phenomenon remarked in the N.S.I.C. estate in Dar-es-Salaam was the informal 
(and rather inefficient) system of apprenticeship operating among the tenants*, 
an obvious opportunity exists to strengthen this informal on-the-job system 
as an alternative to 'technical school' training. This could also be used 
to 'graft' Village Polytechnic leavers into ongoing small enterprises. 
Product Development 
The identification and promotion of new products Is potentially 
of vital importance in fostering the growth of rural industry in Kenya. 
This appears to be particularly true of firms engaged in metalworking. Such 
firms tend to be much less remunerative than woodworking establishments, and 
success in increasing the number and technical competence of metalworking 
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seems clearly to require an effective programme of product development, often 
reinforced by technical assistance. Both activities would be facilitated 
greatly by the establishment of workshop clusters. 
There appear to be two types of products which have been designed 
and developed at the R.I.D.C.s. First are products suitable for particular 
circumstances and situations in Kenya: these fall under the heading of 
'appropriate technology'. 
The Centres, particularly the embryonic product development group 
at Machakos, have explored a wide range of possibilities under this heading, 
and a few specimens have been constructed. Ideas include a donkey-cart (as 
used in West Africa), a bicycle-cart, a wooden wheelbarrow (particularly for 
road work), school chairs (based on a Sudanese model), wooden toys, a rotating 
hand planter (based on an American model), a maize-sheller (from Tanzania), a 
kerosene-driven incubator, a soil-cement block press (from Ghana), housing 
components, a Kumasi pump and a windmill/pump. Low cost farm equipment is 
considered more fully below. 
The second category of products are modifications or copies of 
ordinary manufactured goods at present imported, but capable of being produced 
locally at much lower prices. Work in this direction has gone on particularly 
at Embu R.I.D.C. A bench-saw constructed by artisans at Embu has been sold 
commercially through Gilfillan and Co. at substantially below the imported 
price, and is a superior product in that it can do two operations (crosscut 
and rip). Tools such as a G—clamp and flat bar clamp have been produced at 
the Centre at a fraction of the import price and appear to be superior to the 
old-fashioned British designs still imported. It is claimed that the whole 
range of woodworking machinery could be made much more cheaply in Kenya than 
the imported models: a handsaw and a beltsander, for example, at a fraction of 
the price in Nairobi. 
The possibilities for competing effectively with imported Items 
appear to arise partly out of conservatism in the import trade. Old-fashioned 
models continue to be imported, and the tendency is to rely on traditional 
suppliers from a limited number of countries although alternative sources of 
supply might be less expensive. 
Despite the attractiveness of both categories of products, little 
actual production has been achieved so far. A major constraint has been the 
absence of production capacity which would permit a guaranteed supply 
sufficient to meet the needs of local wholesalers. This lack of production 
capacity could be alleviated by a system of workshop clusters. Managers 
11 - 29 
IDS/'OP 12 
at the R.I.D.C.s could allocate orders to groups of clients and supervise 
to some extent the quality and homogeneity of the work. It would also be 
possible to organise specialisation among artisans, who might produce 
different component parts of a product, but this would, initially at least, 
require a large management input by the Centres. Without increased production 
capacity, efforts at product development seem doomed to continue to yield 
no tangible commercial results, and as previous efforts run to waste in this 
way, the incentive for further product development is diminished. 
Further, in the case of experimental appropriate technology products, 
development at the R.I.D.C.s can only be successful in collaboration with the 
appropriate ministries (for example, the Ministry of Works for wheelbarrows, 
the Ministry of Agriculture for agricultural equipment and the Ministry of 
Water Development for windmills and water pumps). Such collaboration has 
not yet been initiated. 
Finally, product development has so far been allocated relatively 
little financial support. Finances for R.I.D.C.s have mostly been diverted 
to supervising a handful of resident clients or to the extension service. 
The proposal for a fully fledged product development group to be based at 
Machakos has not been acted upon, though an informal committee exists among 
the Centres for the exchange of ideas. It appears essential that a product 
development group, embracing all the Centres, be allocated the necessary 
financial support and staffed with competent engineers who are inventive and 
particularly interested in appropriate technology. 
One last consideration in the search for new products is that the 
development of production capacity would perhaps be best facilitated by 
concentrating, at least initially, on a few products in order to establish 
a substantial foundation of production. The search for new activities should 
be in addition to, and not at the expense of immediately realisable goals. 
The Special Need for Low-cost Farm Implements: There appears to be a particular 
need for concentrated efforts to identify, adapt and promote local manufacture 
of appropriate low-cost farm implements. To be successful, such efforts will 
have to be coordinated with a testing programme and farmer training and 
extension activities organised by the Ministry of Agriculture (and by the 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement in settlement areas). In as much as the 
Ministry of Agriculture is currently finalising arrangements for an FAO/UNDP 
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Agricultural Equipment Project that will focus on simple tools and implements 
suited to the needs of small-scale farmers, It appears that this type of 
coordinated effort is now a realistic possibility. 
Up to the present time very little attention has been given In 
Kenya to identifying and promoting the use or local manufacture of low-
cost farm tools and implements suited to the needs of the country's small-
scale farmers. Research and development work related to intermediate 
technology was supposed to have been one of the two main activities of the 
Agri-Service Station in Mbere, but in practice the work of the Station 
has been concentrated almost entirely on providing a subsidised tractor 
hire service. Toward the middle of 1974-, two local farmers were hired as 
day labourers to train oxen, but there is nothing innovative about this 
activity. The Ministry of Agriculture appears to have provided very little 
support for this work on intermediate technology. This has been influenced 
by many factors which need not be reviewed here. It should be emphasised, 
however, that it is a formidable undertaking to identify, test and promote 
wide use of improved farm equipment. It was, therefore, probably unrealistic 
to expect the Agri-Service Station and the Mbere SRDP to carry out useful 
work In testing and promoting the use of this type of improved farm equip-
ment without the support of a national programme such as the one that is 
only now being developed. 
The failure to promote expanded use of low-cost farm equipment 
and local manufacture of such products is most unfortunate. Particularly 
with the sharp increase in fuel prices and in the cost of imported tractors, 
tractor-drawn equipment, and spare parts, only a small fraction of the 
country's farmers have sufficient cash income to be able to rely on tractor 
hire service. A heavily subsidised service such as has been provided by the 
Agri-Service Station at Siakago has enabled a limited number of farmers to 
expand their cultivated area, but it would not be possible to replicate 
this type of service so as to benefit a large percentage of farm .households. 
Even if Government were able to make budget allocations sufficient for that 
purpose, It would be an inappropriate use of limited resources. 
Although many farmers are using their own or hired oxen to supple" 
ment manual labour, the resource represented by the livestock available In 
rural areas is being grossly underutilised. With very few exceptions, only one 
animal-drawn implement, the 'Victory' mouldboard plough, is available. In 
general, oxen are used only for primary tillage, although in some instances 
the mouldboard plough is also used for Inter-row cultivation, an operation for 
which it is not at all suited. It also seem likely, though this has not yet 
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been demonstrated conclusively, that the traditional method of training and 
controlling oxen is much less efficient than the so-called Indian method. 
With the Indian method, a pair of oxen are guided by reins connected to a 
nylon rope (or metal ring) inserted through a hole in the nose. This 
technique makes it possible to control the animals more accurately, and it 
is also claimed that because oxen controlled in this way pull a plough at 
a steady pace, it is possible to get as much work output in a day from a 
pair of oxen as with a team of four using only yoke chains. 
A steadily growing demand for a widening range of simple farm 
equipment would have a very favourable impact on rural industrial development 
as well as contributing to increased farm productivity. Much of this equip-
ment could be manufactured with reasonable efficiency by small- or medium-
scale workshops in rural centres, and gradual expansion of such production 
could make a significant contribution to increasing the technical and entre-
preneurial skills available in the country's metalworking industry. Increased 
competence in metalworking would facilitate expanded local production of 
consumer goods as well as farm inputs, and it would also contribute to the 
development of an indigenous capability for production and adaptation of 
machine tools. Increasing the size and technical competence of the capital 
goods sector is a key factor in making it possible to adapt imported 
technologies to Kenya's resource endowment which differs so drastically from 
conditions prevailing in technology-exporting countries. 
As already noted, it is no easy task to realise the potential 
benefits from expanded use and local manufacture of appropriate items of 
farm equipment. First of all, effective demand for such equipment is 
restricted by the limited cash income of the majority of farm households. 
However, a notable advantage of emphasis on this type of innovation is that 
it can be expected to lead to increases in farm productivity and output 
so that the purchasing power constraint is gradually eased as ±_rmers are 
able to expand their output of export crops or of products to satisfy the 
increasing domestic commercial demand. (The availability of subsidised 
tractor hire service will, of course, tend to undermine the growth of 
effective demand for the simple, less costly type of equipment.) 
Secondly, a fairly difficult search operation is involved in 
identifying new items of farm equipment adapted to the needs of farmers 
in various regions. Moreover, the most significant increase in productivity 
will often result from the simultaneous introduction of equipment and 
tillage innovations, e.g. a shift from mixed cropping based on broadcast 
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seeding to planting a suitable mixture of crops in alternate rows so as to 
facilitate the use of an inter-row weeder-cultivator. The need for devising 
appropriate equipment and tillage innovations appears to be especially great 
in Kenya's semi-arid 'medium potential1 areas. There is general agreement 
among experts on dryland farming that the mouldboard plough is poorly adapted 
to a situation in which moisture conservation is a primary consideration, 
but local research is needed to determine which of several alternatives - e.g. 
use of ridging ploughs for a ridge and furrow system or minimum cultivation 
techniques using a combination of a chisel plough or sub-soil or shoe implement 
and sweeps for weed control - is best suited to the soils and topography in 
different parts of Kenya's medium potential areas. 
Third, equipment innovations are difficult to introduce to farmers. 
The requirements for demonstrations and acceptance trials and for training 
programmes are fairly demanding and require prior training of the trainers. 
Fourth, even simple equipment represents a fairly large cash outlay for a 
small farmer so that the availability of credit is likely to be a more 
serious constraint than with a very divisible innovation such as hybrid 
maize seed and its associated inputs. 
Finally, there are difficult problems, referred to earlier, to be 
overcome on the manufacturing side to ensure that growing demand leads to an 
expansion of local manufacture. The technical skills available in Kenya's 
small-scale metalworking firms are still at a low level and the range of tools 
and equipment available is distinctly limited. Experience in Japan, Taiwan, 
India and other countries that have achieved a considerable development of 
small-scale, rural-based industries demonstrates the importance of technical 
skills such as designing jigs and dies and of specialisation among different 
firms. 
The Agricultural Equipment Project and the programme for intensified 
research on problems of dryland farming, which the Ministry of Agriculture 
proposes to initiate this year with FAO/UNDP support and other external 
assistance, should provide a stronger research base for promoting expanded 
use of a wider and better adapted range of farm equipment. However, adoption 
by farmers of new types of equipment is likely to be very limited unless steps 
are taken to train extension specialists in the use of such equipment so that 
demonstrations can be carried out and training provided at selected F.T.C.s 
and other locations, e.g. Village Polytechnics, to create a nucleus of farmers 
capable of diffusing knowledge of the new technologies and providing contract 
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services for a variety of cultural operations. Finally, there is a need to 
strengthen the capacity of the R.I.D.P. to provide practical technical 
assistance to encourage efficient local manufacture of farm equipment; and 
the establishment of workshop clusters or 'mini estates' as proposed here 
should make it easier to provide such assistance and also to encourage 
specialisation among small-scale firms engaged in the manufacture of components 
or particular items of equipment. A number of the somewhat more sophisticated 
items of farm equipment are probably better suited to manufacture by the 
'moderate-sized' establishments discussed later in this chapter. Furthermore, 
certain components which can be produced more efficiently by large-scale 
firms using expensive equipment or sophisticated processes should perhaps be 
imported or manufactured in Nairobi or another large industrial area. Experience 
and technical expertise are too limited to provide definite answers to such 
questions at this time. 
Marketing and Publicity 
An important potential form of assistance to clients at the Centres 
is assistance in marketing. Even without specific assistance, experience in 
Dar-es-Salaam showed that the concentration of large numbers of artisans in 
itself attracts traders and customers to the site. If the major workshop 
clusters were better located In population centres (as the existing ramshackle 
informal-sector premises invariably already are), the volume of direct sales 
to consumers might be greatly increased. Finally, a network of major and minor 
workshop clusters, by offering visible evidence of the existence of the R.I.D.C.s, 
could provide useful publicity of a general kind attracting various types of 
entrepreneurs to seek assistance. 
An important market for craft industry, particularly furniture, in 
the rural areas, is the demand from institutions: public authorities, hospitals, 
schools and the like. With production capacity concentrated in workshop 
clusters at the Centres, the R.I.D.C. management should be able to go much 
further in acting as intermediaries in obtaining such orders for distribution 
among resident artisans. Small-scale craft entrepreneurs have also been 
handicapped in obtaining and handling such orders by the postponed repayment 
practices of most public authorities and institutions, a practice which has also 
affected the entrepreneurs' capacity to repay materials loans. A remedy for 
this situation would be for such institutions to place orders with the R.I.D.C. 
management rather than individual entrepreneurs, the former carrying the burden 
of credit. This would have the additional advantage of the R.I.D.C.s being able 
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to distribute larger orders among several units, offering some supervision of 
the production. 
There !s of course a danger in institutions allocating orders to 
the R.I.D.C.s that such patronage may promote inefficiency. Management 
(and the institutions) should ensure that only competitive prices are offered 
to artisans for such orders. 
COMPARISON WITH EXISTING PROPOSALS 
The system of workshop clusters proposed here is in some respects 
similar to ideas being discussed among R.I.D.P. staff for site-and-service 
schemes (also called mini-R. I.D. C. s) and industrial promotion areas. These 
ideas include the notion of workshops built in rural centres around a generator 
and other common facilities. However, they have not been fully clarified, 
and it is uncertain how much support they would receive, particularly financial 
backing and support within the K.I.E. They appear inconsistent with the 
proposals in the 1974-78 Development Plan for opening conventional R.I.D.C.s 
at Vol and Malindi. 
Further, although staff at the Centres have recognised the need for 
some sort of workshop sheds adjacent to the existing facilities, they appear 
to be highly uncertain what form these structures should take. An architect 
has been called In to make plans, but a variety of designs are being considered 
rather than one cheap standardised model, and some existing proposals would 
cost much more to build than could be recovered from the rents which low-income 
artisans would be able to pay. 
There remains, therefore, a gulf between the Centre proposals and 
the shanty-town craft-industry areas which already exist in these townships, 
whereas the aim should be to rehouse a substantial proportion of such artisans. 
This might bring the work of the Centres still nearer to the reality of the 
local economy. For example, one Centre stated it could not make beds (a staple 
item of demand in the rural economy) in competition with the local product 
being made with old tyres and sold at Shs 40: clearly if the current producers 
were transferred to the Centre's workshop cluster the Centre would in effect 
be producing these and ways might be found to improve the product, increase 
production or, through marketing, sales. 
As yet, there is no widespread commitment to building workshop 
clusters and no agreement on the design of sheds. No minor clusters have been 
built in rural areas, despite a two-year-old proposal, for example, for a 
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cluster at Manyatta in Machakos. Although findings strongly critical of the 
extension approach were published in April 1974 (9) and funds for extension 
are now running low, this is the approach the Centres continue to follow. 
The 1974 report itself, after criticising extension, fails to recommend an 
alternative modified estate approach since this is deemed "impossible to 
administer". (9, p.86) The report suggests that in order to promote the field 
extension service "the centres might be started with only an office building 
with two or three rooms and a garage. The staff would then be forced out 
2 
m the field...." (9, p.74) Similarly, the previous practise of offering 
clients only a limited stay at the Centre workshops was to be reenforced by 
issuing contracts in advance to ensure that no one would stay longer than six 3 
months. The conclusion is that in future the Centre workshops should not 
be used for resident clients at all. 
The points made in the 1974 report are summarised in the following 
paragraph. The contrasts with the proposal for workshop clusters made in this 
SRDP Report could not be more clear. 
It has been impossible to administer this kind of assistance 
(provision of a workshop at the centre), when tried. This might be 
because no contract has been made with the client in advance, but 
more likely it is a weakness with the assistance form as such. In 
the future the centre workshops should not be used as client work-
shops. And no stay at the centre should be permitted without signing 
a contract for the stay. The proposed sheds attached to the centre 
must also be used in a deliberate way, and not just as cheap premises 
for a few lucky entrepreneurs. The workshops should be rented out 
on a temporary basis with no leases exceeding e.g. one year. If this 
is not done from the very beginning, the centre might easily be 
reduced to a mini-industrial estate, and the extension services 
rendered outside the centre will be reduced accordingly. (9, p.86) 
DIVERSIFICATION OF WORKSHOP ACTIVITIES 
The trades presently assisted by the R.I.D.C.s are extremely circum-
scribed, being almost entirely limited to wood and metalworking. If the 
Centres were sited more appropriately within townships, it should be possible 
to diversify considerably into motor repair work, masonry and construction, 
2. It is not intended to criticise here the commendable desire to reduce 
unnecessary overheads. 
3. Surprise is expressed at the reluctance of entrepreneurs to come to 
the workshops under these terms. Yet it would seem unwise for them to leave 
permanent premises of their own, however rudimentary, for such a short-term 
arrangement. 
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tailoring, gheemaking, and more specialised activities such as plumbing, 
electrical work or the manufacture of components and tools. Motor repair 
probably ranks with woodworking among the most highly remunerative rural 
trades. The Embu R.I.D.C. has already successfully provided facilities for 
a motor car spray shop. However, thought would need to be given to the most 
appropriate layout of the Centres for facilitating such diversification. 
SUGGESTIONS REGARDING MODERATE-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
The craft industry establishments which have been discussed usually 
employ less than ten persons, and generally only three or four. In comparison, 
establishments of, say, 20 to 50 employees to which we now wish to refer will 
be called moderate-sized establishments within the general category of small 
industry. The brief treatment of moderate-sized industry in this Report, and 
the concentration on craft industry, should not be taken as reflecting the 
view that the moderate-sized establishments are any less important. 
The R.I.D.C.s have come up with a number of project proposals for 
moderate-sized establishments. At Embu, for example, proposals exist for 
raw material based industries: sawmilling (4 establishments), sisal decortica-
tion (2), animal feed (3), milling (1), stone-crushing (1), tannery (1) and 
honey refining (2). Proposals for local consumer industries include: dry-
cleaning (3), garments (.2), soap-making (1), leather goods (l), printing (l) 
and bakery (1). Miscellaneous industries Include: garages (2), tyre retreading 
(1), electrical motor rewinding (l), blockmaking (l) , paper bag making (.1) 
and nailmaking (1). Most of these are only under investigation at present and 
loans have so far been approved only for one sawmill, a tailoring establishment, 
a shirt-making establishment, a salt unit and a furniture establishment. The 
Centres have in general found it very difficult to find viable projects and as 
a consequence, despite the foregoing list, there are very few moderate-sized 
projects actually being operated In the four areas. Such limited assistance 
as has been given has been in the form of loans, a function already covered by 
I.C.D.C. 
It is not clear what form of assistance is currently proposed for 
these establishments. The 1974 conference report states paradoxically that 
while estate assistance is "too costly for general use" it should be utilised 
for the promotion of new industries "demanding intensive assistance in their 
initial phases". It adds that "the estate should be seen as giving a very high 
support preferably to basic industries needed in the region". (.9, p. 74) In 
fact, it is for just these enterprises that the extension approach, including 
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project planning and business consultancy, should be most relevant as well as 
economically feasible, and given the greater heterogeneity of these enterprises, 
the advantages of centralisation are less obvious, Many are likely to be raw 
material oriented industries with dispersed locations, such as saw-mills, posho 
mills, sugar processers, tanneries and canning plants, which would not be 
suitable for an estate approach. 
Two fundamental reasons may underline the lack of progress made 
by the R.I.D.CoS in respect of moderate-sized industry. While there is some 
scope for further expansion of processing industries based on local products, 
many of the more obvious possibilities for such processing have long ago been 
taken up. Secondly, there is no policy of countering the centrifugal tendencies 
concentrating industry in Nairobi and Mombasa or of directing larger industries, 
through licensing, to provide some core to the proposed secondary industrial 
centres. Without such a policy, there is little or no hope of these centres 
attracting core industries (except those exploiting a local material) and there-
fore of developing ancillary and feeder industries around these. 
Generally speaking, one would not expect a locally based R.I.D.C. 
manager or engineer to be in a position to offer significant consultancy 
services for the wide range of types of enterprise involved here, or to be in 
a position to Indicate which industries should be allocated to or 'persuaded 
into' the area. This is not to say that R.I.D.C. staff would not be capable 
of making project suggestions and acting together as an intelligence network 
for transmitting proposals from local business for new projects. One possibility 
would be for the Provincial Trade Officer to be located, together with one or 
two consultants at most, at the regional industrial estate, with the task of 
coordinating the intelligence and advice network for the region. 
COOPERATION WITH VILLAGE POLYTECHNICS 
At present there has been little or no coordination of the R.I.D.P. 
with the activities of the Village Polytechnics, and yet their activities 
relate to the same trades to a great extent. In a 1974 evaluation report, 
the courses offered at Village Polytechnics were listed as follows: leatherwork 
including shoe-making, blacksmithing, tinsmithing/metalwork, fitting and 
welding, electrical, these last two relevant for motor repair which was another 
very popular course, masonry, plumbing, carpentry, tailoring, bicycle repair 
and a few others. (5) 
There would be important economies of scale in locating Village 
Polytechnics at major clusters or locating new workshop clusters at existing 
Village Polytechnics. The Village Polytechnics tend to be located in the 
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same places which have been found suitable for workshop clusters. Major 
advantages of locating these two types of institutions together would be:— 
1. Some degree^ of sharing machines, tools and personnel would 
be possible, as well as economies in the use of administrative staff. At 
present Village Polytechnics are suffering from a serious shortage of tools 
and teachers. 
2. Polytechnic leavers would be trained within the atmosphere of 
the informal sector, would know what to expect in the 'real world', and 
would absorb more notions of entrepreneur ship than they< coiiild obtain in the 
schoolroom. 
3. By and large Polytechnic leavers at present have inadequate 
skills and managerial experience to start on their own. For this reason, 
they should not be given priority In the allocation of sheds. However, they 
could much more easily graduate from the Village Polytechnic to positions of 
apprenticeship or assistance to established artisans, either at the Centre 
at which their polytechnic is located or at other associated workshop clusters 
located further away. 
4. The attachment of Village Polytechnics will help promote R.I.D.C.s 
as 'growth poles' and publicise them as centres for technical advice and 
business consultancy. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE R.I.D.P. TO DISTRICT PLANNING AND TO A POSSIBLE SMALL 
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
The proposed regional system based on the 'Kisumu-model' , with one 
industrial estate and two or three rural centres, needs to be modified. The 
most sensible arrangement would seem to be one regional centre and a system 
of district centres (major workshop clusters) and subsidiary or minor clusters. 
The regional centre would provide some coordination, consultancy services and 
storage facilities at the Provincial level, while the system of clusters would 
be integrated with district planning. This system would be financially autonomous 
from the regional centre to permit closer integration with district level 
operations, though it would purchase raw materials and other supplies from 
the regional centre. This suggestion differs from*' the-conference proposal 
for the regional estate to^be the basic unit and administrative focal point, 
which would tie in less well with district efforts. The R.I.D.P.'s lack of 
financial independence under the K.I.E. up to the present time appears to have 
slowed the programme to a considerable extent. 
The precise form and scope of the Small Business Development Corpora-
tion proposed in the 1974-78 Development Plan is uncertain. The first require-
ment is for the S.B.D.C. (or whatever institution emerges) to recognise that 
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a substantial part of its programme will relate to craft industry, and that 
the approach here will be somewhat different from that for 'moderate-sized' 
enterprises. Secondly, if the system of major and minor workshop clusters 
proposed here is adopted, with the greatly increased organisational input 
that this Implies, it would seem unwise to attempt to incorporate the 
promotion of trading establishments into the same organisation,, Separate 
arrangements should therefore be made for assistance to commerce. More 
homogeneity exists in fact between craft and other small-scale industry in 
the rural areas and urban industry of the same type, than between small 
industry and commerce. Indeed, Nairobi has the greatest concentration of 
artisans and craft industry in the country. Thus if the S.B.D.C., or Small 
Industry Development Corporation (S.I.D.C.), is to be set up as an umbrella 
organisation, it should comprise two divisions, an Urban Small Industry 
Division incorporating the regional Industrial estates, and a Rural Small 
Industry Division, 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The detailed activities of the four existing R.I.D.C.s were assessed 
on the basis of the following potential contributions: 
1. Servicing of craft and moderate-sized industry, 
2. Offer of common facilities, 
3. Provision of training and skill improvement, 
4. Provision of capital, 
5. Supply of materials, 
6. Bookkeeping and management advice and 
7. Product development 
The results were comprehensively negative, 
Recommendation: The existing Centres should not provide the model for the 
23 R.I.D.C.s proposed in the 1974-78 Development Plan and specifically for 
those shortly to be established in Voi and Malindi. A modified structure 
is proposed. 
2. The K.I.E. proposals In the 1974-78 Development Plan for industrial 
estates at Nyeri, Kakamega and Embu appear to overlap with the R.I.D.P. proposals. 
The research carried out suggests that the K.I.E. proposals may be even less 
successful than the R.I.D.C.s have been, unless Government policy with 
respect to location Is revised. 
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Recommendation: This potential overlap should be scrutinised, 
3. Policies have suffered from a failure to make a clear distinction 
between moderate-sized industries and craft Industries, and to recognise that 
a substantial part of rural Industry promotional activities will be directed 
towards the craft industries. The appropriate forms of promotion for craft 
and for moderate-sized industry are different, 
4. Up to now the K.I.E. and the R.I.D.P. have been inclined to different 
approaches, the K„I.E. towards more heavily-capitalised centres with client 
assistance at the centre somewhat along the lines of industrial estates, and 
R.I.D.P. officials towards an extension approach with assistance at the clients' 
own premises. 
Both approaches have been excessively costly (the estate approach 
because of excessive overheads In relation to numbers served, the extension 
approach especially because of transportation costs); neither has reached 
many clients or created much employment; neither has had much impact on the 
clients. 
5. The absence of content in the extension approach arises principally 
because : the main constraint on the development of craft industry has been 
ignored: the lack of capital in the form of premises, power, tools and materials. 
Recommendation: Reliance on the extension approach should be abandoned. 
6. The capacity for loan distribution has been underutilised, and loans 
have not been distributed in the most equitable way possible. 
7- Some of the existing Centres are badly located vis-a-vis town centres, 
and the different locations produce measurable variations in performance among 
the Centres. 
Recommendation: More attention should be paid to the sites chosen for Centres. 
They should be as close to town centres as possible. 
An alternative form for craft industry development, workshop clusters, 
appears to have significant advantages over the estate and extension approaches. 
Recommendation: This paper proposes an Integrated system of major and minor 
workshop clusters:-
(1) Existing Centres in townships would be transformed by building 
thirty to forty cheap sheds or workshop units around the existing 
buildings. 
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(2) In smaller rural centres, smaller clusters of five to ten 
units would be built around a generator and some common 
facilities. 
9 • T-he cost of such sheds should be such that artisan tenants could 
afford to pay rent which would cover the full depreciation of the building. 
This means that each workshop should not cost more than around Shs 4000/-, 
compared to an R.I.D.P. prototype being built at Embu at Shs 25,000/- and 
actual sheds at Kakamega at Shs 50,000/-. Sheds of the type required are 
being designed at Machakos, but need to be accepted as the general model. 
Recommendation: Flexibly constructed sheds of the Machakos type should be 
adopted generally. Economies of scale in construction could be achieved, 
and more rapid progress made, if these were built by the R.I.D.C.s for rent 
or for sale rather than leaving clients to build their own premises. 
10. The integrated system of major and minor workshop clusters proposed 
represents a compromise between the estate and extension approaches. Its 
advantages would be: (l) By providing premises it removes a major constraint 
on craft industry development, (2) Supervision of tool loans is facilitated; 
(3) Capital can be provided to artisans in minor rural centres more equitably; 
(4) Common facilities would be better utilised; (5) A national system of bulk 
purchase of materials can be undertaken; (6) Training to improve skills, 
particularly for apprentices, would be easier; (7) Wastage in product develop-
ment and innovation due to lack of production capacity to deliver orders would 
be reduced; (8) Assistance to clients in marketing and obtaining orders would 
be facilitated; and (9) It would be easier to place Village Polytechnic leavers. 
11. Recommendation: The range of craft industries assisted can and should 
be expanded. 
12. Recommendation: Village Polytechnics should be located adjacent to 
workshop clusters. 
13. A major objective of the R.I.D.C. system should be the development 
of appropriate technology products and competitive manufactured goods, especially 
tools. Some promising preliminary work has been done already. There appears 
to be a particularly important need to intensify work on identifying and adapting 
promising items of low-cost farm equipment. However, the success of efforts 
to promote local manufacture of such equipment will require a parallel Ministry 
of Agriculture programme to carry out local testing and to organise farmer 
training and extension to promote wide use of items of equipment suited to 
conditions in various farming regions in Kenya. 
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Recommendation: More support should be provided for product development 
with a particular emphasis on simple, inexpensive items of farm equipment. 
Recommendation; The Ministry of Agriculture, in implementing the FAO/UNDP 
Agricultural Equipment Project, should emphasise the identification of simple 
equipment capable of increasing agricultural productivity and the promotion 
of its use on farms. This will simultaneously promote rural industries by 
stimulating demand for items manufactured locally. 
14. So far the R.I.D.C.s have made a negligible impact (by granting 
a very small number of loans only) on moderate-sized rural industry. Most 
projects in this area have not progressed beyond the investigatory stage. 
The main reasons for this are: (1) Possibilities for agro-processing 
industries have often already been taken up, and the new possibilities which 
exist are frequently raw-material dispersed industries not suitable for an 
industrial estate approach; (2) The main need, for loans, is already catered 
for by the I.C.D.C.; (3) R.I.D.C. personnel necessarily have only a limited 
capacity to evaluate potential industries; and (4) Most important, there is 
no policy of directing or persuading industries which might provide nuclei for 
the development of ancillary industry away from Nairobi towards other townships. 
Recommendation: Project evaluation could be strengthened by a regional system 
combining experts at a regional industrial estate with managers .of major district 
centres (major clusters). 
Recommendation: Location policy should be reexamined to explore the possibility 
of directing nucleus industries to townships other than Nairobi. 
15. Recommendation: The proposed Small Business Development Corporation 
should NOT incorporate assistance to trading enterprises, but should concentrate 
on industry. It should comprise a Rural Small Industry Division and an Urban 
Small Industry Division, the latter incorporating major regional industrial 
estates as well as urban craft industry workshop clusters. 
16. The Rural Small Industry Division would administer a decentralised 
system of major and minor workshop clusters, organised on a District basis to 
fit in with a system of District planning. 
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APPENDIX; THE OPERATIONS OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE VIHIGA/HAMISI 
SRDP AREA 
Background and Activities 
In 1971 a pilot project for small business promotion in Western 
Kenya was started by Partnership for Productivity (PfP), a U.S. non-govern-
mental Quaker organisation. The core of the PfP programme has been loans 
and advice to individual businessmen, primarily traders, and promotion of 
handicraft production, with funding from charitable organisations in Kenya, 
the U.S. and Europe. 
The Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP rural industry project is administered by 
PfP with a special grant from USAID, which amounted to U.S. $40,000 in 1974. 
PfP makes no clear distinction between industrial activities and other 
business activities. Its activities in the Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP area are no 
different from those in the rest of the Province, except that there is more 
assistance to businessmen in Vihiga/Hamisi because of the greater funds. 
The USAID finances are used for a variety of trade promotion activities. 
Initially, PfP offered business management and bookkeeping advice, 
and in 1971 a loan agency was begun, West Kenya Productivity Investments, 
Inc. (W.K.P.I.). As a supplement to business activities, a Business Clinic 
was opened in 1972 and management and technical training was begun at a few 
youth training centres. In 1973 PfP began working with rural market committees 
in the allocation of loans, and offices were opened in two rural market 
centres. Also a craft shop was opened by the head office in Kakamega. In 
1974 more branch offices were opened, and PfP started training youths as 
business consultants for its 'Bicycle Brigade'. By 1975, PfP activities in 
Western Province, and in Vihiga/Hamisi in particular, consisted of management 
advisory services, the W.K.P.I, loan scheme and cottage industry projects. 
Total PfP staff was 23, a with 17 Kenyans and 6 expatriates. 
The Rural Industrial Development Centre at Kakamega also provides 
assistance to rural Industries in Vihiga/Hamisi as well as other areas, but 
there are no formal links between the Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP and the R.I.D.P. 
In 1974, the SRDP staff initiated an industrial committee on which both PfP 
and the R.I.D.C. were represented, but this committee has never become 
effective. 
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Loans 
Western Kenya Productivity Investments ,Inc. is a separate legal 
entity with a Kenyan Board of Directors on which PfP is represented. 
Although budgets for the two organisations are meant to be separate, loans 
for all PfP activities come from W.K.P.I. 
The first W.K.P.I, loans were large, in the range of Shs 50,000, 
and repayment rates were low and some loans disappeared or were used for 
purposes other than those for which they had been intended. The low repay-
ment rates were attributed to the dual role of PfP staff as management 
advisors and loan collectors, and the loan programme was shifted in favour 
of smaller loans administered through rural market committees. 
There are six rural market committees in the Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP 
area which select rural traders to receive loans and collect repayments. 
PfP provides management advice to the loan recipients. The market committees 
operate with a revolving loan fund, varying from Shs 4,000 to Shs 10,000, 
and loans are made ranging from Shs 300 to Shs 1,500 with an annual interest 
rate of 6 per cent plus a service fee to the committee. In 1974 a total of 
Shs 38,000 were disbursed. 
Two of the committees have managed to overcome potential favouritism 
in loan allocation, and repayment has been according to schedule. However, 
in the other four rural market centres the scheme has been less successful, 
if not a complete failure. Discontent with the project is voiced by traders 
who have not received loans from the committees. 
Business Clinic and Management Advice 
In 1972/73 PfP operated a Business Clinic in Kakamega where 
businessmen were supposed to come on a regular basis to discuss problems and 
seek advice. Attendance at the Clinic was very low, so a shift was made 
towards management advice given at the client's place of business. Advice 
is given on bookkeeping, accounting, price setting, marketing, customer 
relations, tidiness, and so forth. PfP estimated that approximately 300 
clients were being visited early in 1975, but certainly a smaller number is 
actively responding to the advice. 
Most advice is provided by a group of junior business consultants 
called the 'Bicycle Brigade' , whose recruitment and training were begun in 
1974 according to the advice of Dr. Malcolm Harper, formerly of the University 
of Nairobi. Harper envisaged providing school leavers with basic training in 
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management techniques and using them as rural business consultants. First, 
twelve leavers from Kaimosi Friends Commercial College were recruited and 
later a group with no previous commercial training. It was hoped to bring 
the number of clients up to 1,000 within a year, but rural businessmen have 
proven reluctant to accept advice from young people whose knowledge of 
business is limited and whose ability to deal with actual problems depends 
on recurrent short periods of training. Nevertheless, PfP is currently 
planning to expand the 'Bicycle Brigade' by recruiting a new group of 
commercial college leavers. 
Other Advisory Services 
PfP also gives advice on planning, marketing and lay-out to well-
established firms with expansion potential and takes part in the development 
of new enterprises, though the number of industries which have actually 
been created with PfP assistance remains very small. A cloth printing 
factory was begun In Chavakali with PfP marketing advice and investment, but 
the factory went bankrupt in 1973 when the PfP-appointed manager left. 
PfP has approached the R.I.D.C. in Kakamega for assistance with 
three projects, a Turkana basketweave table with folding legs, tailored men's 
shirts made from handprinted cloth and replication of a sisal-weaving process, 
but none of these has been implemented. Recently, PfP, in conjunction with 
Technoserve, another private organisation, has proposed a Shs 1,000,000 labour 
intensive, intermediate technology sugar factory. Shareholders would be 
W.K.P.I., Technoserve, and I C.P.C. or Barclay's Development Fund, plus ten 
Kenyans. Technoserve expected to be an equity shareholder and to be given 
the management contract. When this proposal was made, the R.I.D.C. in Kakamega 
was already far advanced in planning a similar project. PfP suggested 
cooperation and a company of Kenyan shareholders has now been formed and the 
project accepted by Kenya Industrial Estates. 
PfP provided bookkeeping and mechanics instruction at Keveye 
Village Polytechnic and furnished a mechanics workshop using USAID funds. 
Now instruction assistance has been discontinued in favour of placement 
assistance for Village Polytechnic leavers, and some carpentry leavers have 
been successfully placed in rural workshops. Three mechanics were placed 
in Kakamega's largest garage, but retraining problems were found to be 
considerable. A cooperative workshop in Majenge which would absorb leavers 
trained in mechanics has been in the planning stage for two years, but has 
not yet been implemented. PfP also gives advice on teaching in other Village 
Polytechnics. 
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Cottage Industry Projects 
PfP opened a retail shop in Kakamega in 1972 as an outlet for local 
crafts. This has encouraged a number of women's crafts groups, initiated 
or assisted by PfP technical and marketing advisors. Three of the groups 
are in Vihiga/Hamisi and produce soft toys, banana fibre items, tie-andrdie 
cloth and pottery. The high quality required by the tourist or overseas 
markets to which these products appeal means that saleable turnout is small, 
especially in the case of the Kaimosi pottery project. Members of the Kaimosi 
women's society were previously paid on a piece-rate, but now are paid monthly, 
and many of the women feel that their earnings are too low. All the crafts 
groups depend heavily on expatriate support for procurement of materials and 
marketing. 
PfP has proposed the replication of a sisal-weaving process, 
involving handloom weaving, which would use looms manufactured by R.I.D.C. 
clients. However, experience elsewhere has indicated that handloom weaving 
cannot compete with factory weaving unless a tourist market is secured. We 
are not in a position to assess the prospects for sales to tourists. 
Evaluation of PfP Activities 
PfP is staffed by businessmen, business economists and junior 
trade advisors, rather than industrial economists, engineers or technicians, 
so it is not surprising that PfP has concentrated on business promotion. 
Although PfP was given the responsibility for promoting rural industry as 
part of the Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP, it has concentrated on the promotion of small 
business rather than rural industry, and it is questionable how effective PfP 
activities have been even in the commercial sector. 
Western Kenya Productivity Investments plans to participate in 
business activities and generate additional capital as follows:-
Dec. 1974 March 1975 June 1975 Sept. 1975 Dec. 1975 
nil Shs 100,000 Shs 100,000 Shs 200,000 Shs 300,000 
Loans provided by W.K.P.I, and PfP either directly to individuals or through 
market committees have generally been for working capital. PfP now considers 
the educational effects on the businessmen who are members of the market 
committees more important than the direct economic effects of the loans. It 
has worked in cooperation with a number of other private loan organisations, 
each with its own terms and some with dubious business motives. Residents of 
the Kakamega area have found the overlapping activities of private loan 
organisations confusing and are increasingly suspicious. 
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PfP Is more active than other business promotion organisations in 
advertising Its services. Sub-offices, which were originally meant to be 
business clinics, now serve as centres for the 'Bicycle Brigade' and to 
advertise PfP's presence, The number of junior business consultants is 
being expanded In spite of the limited response of local businessmen and the 
apparent high costs of the programme compared with the benefits. The project 
is not coordinated with Kenya Government activities in the field, and it is 
not likely to be taken up by any Government agency. 
Attempts to place Village Polytechnic leavers need to be coordinated 
with the Ministry of Housing and Social Services' ongoing research and action 
programmes. The crafts groups, mainly women's groups, are handicapped by 
distance from the tourist markets, and none has so far achieved self-
sufficiency. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Partners for Productivity has not been active in the development of 
rural industry. As a business development organisation, it is still 
experimenting and Its justification has not yet been fully established. Its 
primary justification In Western Province so far seems to be the supply of 
capital to the area. 
As Government policies and programmes concerning the promotion of 
rural industry and business develop, PfP cannot be expected to continue its 
activities without Government supervision. Overlap and even contradictions 
among the activities of private organisations and Government agencies are 
already evident and causing confusion. It is recommended that:-
1. The special USAID fund for rural industrial development in Vihiga/Hamisi 
be retained within the SRDP for a future District development body. 
2. Consultancy on rural industrial development be directed to Government 
rural industrial development agencies, at present the R.I.D.C. in Kakamega 
and eventually the proposed Small Business Development Corporation. 
3. PfP should have only a limited role in what may be the trade development 
section of the proposed Small Business Development Corporation. 
4. The operation of a number of essentially expatriate organisations to extend 
loans to Kenyan small businesses should be reexamined. 
5. Curriculum development and placement assistance for Village Polytechnics 
should be channelled through the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Housing 
and Social Services. 
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6. PfP should direct Its business management services to women's handicrafts 
groups to enable them to become self-sufficient. 
7. Alternatively, more emphasis should be placed on developing other 
productive activities for women. If these are to be agricultural activities, 
PfP lacks the relevant expertise and projects should be coordinated with 
Community Development Assistants. 
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APPENDIX TO PART I: 
PESTICIDES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL RESOURCES 
Each year Kenya imports substantial quantities of chlorinated 
hydrocarbon pesticides"'" for such uses as crop protection, cattle dips and 
the protection of stored products. The purpose of this brief comment is 
to sound a note of concern in regard to this practice and to put forward 
some recommendations in connection with it. The issue is raised here 
because of its relevance to SRDP projects. In the Vihiga/Hamisi and Tetu 
areas, for example „ DDT has been a component of the package of agricultural 
inputs in maize credit projects. Another chlorinated hydrocarbon,, toxophene, 
is used in cattle dips, many of which have been constructed under the SRDP. 
There are strong reasons for concern over the pesticide Issue:-
1. Compounds of the chlorinated hydrocarbon group are now widely 
regarded as serious environmental pollutants; they are known to have multiple 
adverse effects across a wide range of life systems, The potentially harmful 
effects of chronic exposure of human beings to chlorinated hydrocarbon 
residues cannot be treated lightly. In addition„ they have not always proved 
to be effective pest control mechanisms; their wide range of biological 
action, affecting non-target as well as target organisms, has often made 
them self-defeating in character since natural enemies of pests can be 
eradicated and the natural system of checks and balances upset. In 
acknowledgement of the hazards which chlorinated hydrocarbons are actually 
known to have, as well as those they are strongly suspected to have, many 
countries have established much tighter controls on their usage. In some 
instances, and particularly in the case of DDT, outright bans have been 
1. Compounds of the chlorinated hydrocarbon group include DDT, 
benzene hexachloride or BHC, dieldrin, endrin, aldrin, chlordane, lindane 
isodrin, toxophene and other chemicals. 
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imposed. 
2. If such substances are to be used locally, they must be 
imported. Government statistics show that in recent years, Kenya has spent 
roughly K£ 1,000,000 annually on imported pesticides. 
3. There appear to be good prospects for the expanded use of 
alternative pest control techniques. Methods of biological control (e.g. the 
use of natural insect predators) and other non-chemical measures such as 
the development of resistant plant strains and proper cultural-practices. 
(e.g., early planting in some instances, crop rotation, mixed rather than 
mono-culture) as well as the use of less toxic chemicals (especially natural 
substances) have long been known and applied. 
Pyrethrum is one of the preferable, safer pesticides that is 
frequently mentioned when there is discussion of alternatives to synthetics 
and the current ecologically damaging course of pest control programmes. 
Kenya is the leading world producer of pyrethrum, supplying about 70 per 
cent of the world market through the export of about 99 per cent of the 
country's total annual production. 
5. The widespread production and use of DDT and other synthetics 
after World War II proved a major setback for the pyrethrum market. A 
combination of the relatively high cost of pyrethrum products and the 
necessity for more frequent applications due to pyrethrum's nonpersistent 
quality made it a poor competitor with the synthetics. The picture is 
now beginning to change with the development of new and improved pyrethrum 
formulations and a growing awareness of the additional costs of the synthetic 
products in terms of environmental impact. While a wholesale substitution 
of pyrethrum-based products and other control techniques for synthetics is 
2. Chlorinated hydrocarbons are wide-spectrum pesticides of extreme 
persistence. They tend to be very mobile in the environment and to 
concentrate at higher trophic levels — i.e., they accumulate in greater 
concentrations in organisms at the higher end of the food chain. These 
characteristics are the basis for both the advantages and disadvantages 
which have been associated with chlorinated hydrocarbons. While their 
wide-spectrum action and delayed effects have often made them effective 
agents in crop husbandry and disease-vector control at least in the short 
run, these two characteristics together with their ease of movement through 
the environment and their tendency to concentrate in food chains have also 
made of them effective agents of environmental degradation and very often 
self-defeating pest control mechanisms. For these reasons many countries 
have restricted the use of chlorinated hydrocarbons. In a number of cases, 
the use of DDT has been banned. 
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probably not feasible at this time in Kenya (or elsewhere), there is 
certainly scope for the greater utilisation of pyrethrum locally 
particularly in stored products and indoor pest control. An intensified 
research and development effort by locally and internationally sponsored 
agencies in the country such as agricultural research stations, the 
Pyrethrum Board laboratories, the International Centre for Insect 
Physiology and Ecology, and certain other agencies, is called for. The 
aim should be to increase the effectiveness and lower the application costs 
of pyrethrum products and to build integrated (chemical and non-chemical) 
control packages for agriculture and other use areas. 
6, A movement away from the current level of reliance on DDT 
and other 'hard' pesticides in Kenya could bring quite substantial benefits 
in the form of the preservation of both environmental quality and foreign 
exchange reserves. 
7, Although the SRDP cannot be expected to consider such a vast 
array of problems in detail, we do feel that it is appropriate to raise the 
issue here. Three aspects of the SRDP are integrated development (i.e., 
the coordination of projects in various sectors so that they are mutually 
supportive), experimentation and the use of local resources- The use of 
standard synthetic chemical techniques for pest control in conjunction with 
such projects as grade cattle devexopment and maize credit in the Vihiga/ 
Hamisi SRDP do not appear to be In line with these objectives. For example, 
the development of fish farming in the Vihiga/Hamisi area has been encouraged 
by the Department of Fisheries for several years, but it is questionable 
whether the use of DDT in agriculture is consistent with fish pond 
development projects. Aside from its directly toxic effects on fish 
(in sufficient quantities), DDT is readily taken up and stored in fish 
tissues, from which it is easily transmitted up the food chain. Again, 
the Ministry of Agriculture has as one of its SRDP projects the development 
of grade cattle in Vihiga/Hamisi, Chlorinated hydrocarbons are readily 
concentrated in milk and other dairy products intended for human consumption, 
yet cattle are repeatedly exposed to these substances through cattle 
dips (toxophene) and feed (contamination from DDT-treated areas). 
8. USAID is heavily Involved in the Vihiga/Hamisi programme, 
including the maize credit scheme and other agricultural projects. Since 
USAID represents a country which several years ago Imposed a ban on DDT, 
one would have expected the agency to demonstrate some Interest and 
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initiative in testing the effectiveness of alternative means of pest 
control (which would include the use of pyrethrum-based products) in which 
DDT is not a component, but this has not been the case. 
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The issue of 'hard' pesticides has been generally treated casually in 
Kenya to date, even though the matter warrants serious consideration. 
There is a strong ease that chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides pose 
far too many real and potential environmental hazards to justify their 
continued extensive and unquestioned use. In addition, the substances 
must be imported even though Kenya could mobilise the basic resources 
required to develop more ecologically sound alternative means of pest 
control in different sectors. 
2. In keeping with the above, there Is a need to stimulate research 
directed towards the determination of: (a) the exact extent to which 
chlorinated hydrocarbons are being used in Kenya, by what Government 
and private agencies and for what purposes; and (b) the use areas In 
which restrictions on these chemicals could be Imposed with Immediate 
effect as opposed to areas in which minimum use of these chemicals 
ought to be allowed3 pending the development of more suitable 
substitute methods, 
3. An Intensified research and development effort should be encouraged to 
establish effective alternative means of pest control in agriculture 
and other use areas. An emphasis should be placed on integrated control 
techniques (i.e. using both chemical and non-chemical measures), one 
aspect of which would be the greater utilisation of pyrethrum as opposed 
to imported, more hazardous substances.. Ideally, this research and 
development effort would be coordinated, using existing local research 
facilities and also involving international research centres and 
financial backing, 
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GHAPIEB TWELVE 
LABOUR INTENSIVE ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND SRDP 
THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL 
A large body of underemployed rural workers represents a resource that 
can be mobilised for the building of rural public works - roads, dams, terracing, 
drainage for fields, irrigation waterways and so forth - and at the same time a 
great need exists for precisely these types of rural public works in many areas 
of Kenya, Roads are required to provide easy access to markets; irrigation and 
water supplementation are required to increase production in dry seasons and 
periods of uncertain rainfall; soil conservation practices are required to main-
tain the fertility of areas with substantial gradients. 
From the experience of SRDP in labour-intensive road construction 
useful lessons can be drawn for a greatly expanded rural access roads programme, 
and for a wide variety of other rural local public works. In this report the 
elements required for the successful operation of a labour-intensive public 
works programme are described, critical decisions which must be made on the 
basis of local conditions are enumerated and analysed,and the implications of 
SRDP experiences for future development of rural access roads in Kenya are 
discussed. 
Mobilisation of a rural unskilled labour force may prove more expensive 
or less reliable than a project carried out by a professionally trained cadre 
of workers. However, the SRDP roads experience indicates clearly that conditions 
exist under which large-scale employment of a local work force can be cheaper 
than the application of a capital-intensive technology. At the same time, use 
of labour-intensive techniques is neither a panacea for developing local infra-
structure nor is it a technique that can be used without careful supplementation 
by capital inputs at critical points and competent supervision. The reasons 
for these conclusions will become apparent after the elements that appear to 
characterise successful SRDP roads programmes have been presented and discussed. 
Next,criteria for scheduling and siting roads are discussed and 
their relevance to the SRDP situation is set forth. Then proposals for 
phasing and maintaining roads with labour-intensive methods are explored, the 
organisation of labour-intensive road gauges is dealt with and lessons learned 
in SRDP are reviewed, and finally recommendations are offered for future 
labour-intensive road building projects. 
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ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL ROADS PROGRAMME 
Operations 
The operation of a labour-intensive roads programme clearly requires 
recruiting, deploying and supervising gangs of workers as they undertake the 
basic tasks of clearing, removing topsoil and rocks, cutting and filling to 
establish the road and drainage gradients, preparing drifts, culverts or other 
necessary waterways to prevent erosion of the road, and providing the road with 
a suitable surface for traffic. 
Recruiting appeared to be one of the least difficult tasks involved 
in the labour-intensive roads programme. The chief of the location in which 
the work was to be undertaken was asked to announce the availability of casual 
employment. Because all the programmes were offering wages far in excess of 
local agricultural levels, far more workers applied than were needed on the 
road gangs."*" Lotteries were used to assign positions to the available workers, 
and that device ruled out charges of favouritism, nepotism or corruption in 
the assignments. 
Once recruited, workers were organised into gangs; persons recommended 
by the chief or kno«n to the local leaders were designated as headmen in charge 
of each gang. A roads inspector supervised eight gangs of 25 workers in Migori 
and appeared amply qualified for the job. In other areas civil engineers headed 
the teams, although the engineer in Vihiga trained an overseer to be in charge 
of day-to-d.ay decisions, so that he could be phased out the programme. The main 
constraint on the programme's expansion was a shortage of skilled overseers 
who combine the necessary technical competence in road building with the equally 
necessary experience of labour-intensive methods. This issue is discussed in 
the section on supervisory personnel. There is ample evidence that both headmen 
(those who supervise the gangs of workers) and overseers (Ministry of Works (MOW) 
technicians whose task includes the laying out, shaping, etc. of the road) can, 
given adequate supervision, rapidly be trained on the job. 
Choice of an appropriate technology required on-the-spot decisions 
by the road engineer according to local costs. 'In a number of SRDP areas it 
has been determined that culverts could be fabricated on the spot more cheaply 
than they could be purchased. In Migori the local river bed provided a ready 
source of rock and this was being chipped by hand. In other areas this procedure 
was regarded as excessively expensive, and ready-chipped rock was purchased. 
1= Tnis situation was quite unnecessary and implied that the cost of 
labour was excessive. See Table 1 and the section on wages. 
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Detailed cost estimates of inputs required for labour-intensive 
construction were prepared for Vihiga. See Table 1. Costing of comparable 
activities using conventional road building technology is now underway at 
2 
the MOW. Nonetheless some tentative conclusions can already be drawn from 
earlier work: 1) A mixture of labour-intensive and machine operations is 
generally required; 2) If labour is paid a competitive wage rather than the 
higher level paid under SRDP, use of labour-intensive methods will be even 
more attractive; 3) It will be difficult for machinery to compete with labour-
intensive methods in clearing brush, and for other activities it is likely 
that the cost advantage has shifted in favour of labour in the last three years, 
as prices of petrol, spares and imported equipment have risen relative to the 
agricultural wage. 
The last element of operations is a procedure for scheduling and 
supervising progress. R.H. Bartolo (the engineer at Vihiga) is in the process 
of preparing a work system that will make it easy for inexperienced supervisors 
to estimate the work required for completing a particular road segment. The 
worksheets also provide for an optimal scheduling of successive work crews to 
a particular road segment as various phases in the construction are completed. 
This work system will be extremely valuable in estimating labour requirements 
and in keeping workers effectively employed on the rural access roads programme. 
The period of time necessary for road construction will vary according 
to the extent of labour-intensive operations. Two general points need to be 
made: 1) It is possible to achieve a wide range of rates of planned construction 
within the framework of a labour-intensive technology. More rapid completion 
simply requires a commitment of more experienced and trained units of workers 
to a given task. (Once the MOW Rura.l Access Roads Programme is at full strength 
there will be 88 units of several hundred men available for labour-intensive 
construction.) Where the cost,in foregone benefits, of delaying the road 
justifies greater speed in road construction, this greater speed is still possible 
within the context of the labour-intensive programme. 2) The strategy of SRDP 
to make a maximum use of local resources implies that labour-intensive road 
construction should not be accelerated beyond a rate that utilises surplus labour 
in between periods of peak agricultural demands for labour. Thus use of local 
resources implies modest rates of road development extended for a period of years. 
2. An extensive research programme on labour-intensive methods has been 
funded through NORAD, ILO and IBRD. Comparison of the costs in Vihiga with 
costs on a similar segment of road built with conventional technologies will 
be available from the MOW in July, 1975. 
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Table 1. Technical coefficients for road construction (per kilometer). 
Bush clearing 
Stump removal 
Labour 
30 man-days 
53 man-days 
Capital 
14 pangas 
16 mattocks 
5 axes 
5 shovels 
Topsoil removal 112 man-days 15 jembes 
15 fork jembes 
15 shovels 
Stone removal 
Tree removal 202 man-days 
jack, hydraulic 
rope, axes 
Preliminary grading 
Final grading 224 man-days 15 jembes 
15 fork jembes 
15 shovels 
15 mattocks 
3 wheel barrows 
Laying culverts (3 culverts/ 
kilometer) 
Surfacing (murram) 
Loading 
Spreading 
Clean-up 
Total Man Days 
@ 3 shs/day 
@ 4 shs/day 
@ 5 shs/day 
Actual cost Vihiga 
162 man-days 
297 man-days 
198 man-days 
30 man-days 
1,562 man-days 
4,986/-
6,648/-
8,310/-
8,443/-
3 culverts 
Tipper and driver 
Capital cost in Vihiga 
was excessive due to 
requirements that U.S. 
products be purchased 
with AIA funds. 
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Planning and Siting of Roads 
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While most of the problems in organising the operations of labour-
intensive road building were carefully studied during SRDP, little attention 
was given to the problem of planning and siting. Inadvertently, Migori 
became the locus of an unplanned experiment. As in all the other SRDP areas, 
plans for road construction were initially laid out by technical experts, rather 
than by indigenous residents. Withdrawal of the planning team occasioned a 
complete rejection of the original road plans. Subsequent developments proved 
that local involvement in road siting can be extremelv advantageous for rural 
access road development. This issue is extensively examined in the section on 
sequential,investment. 
After rejecting the original plans for Migori, the A/C asked the 
headmen in each sub-location to devise an alternate plan. Each headman formed 
a committee that drew up a new plan. The plans submitted far exceeded the funds 
budgeted for road development. The A/C then responded by asking how each sub-
location could contribute to reduce the need for expenditures. As a result it 
was decided that each sub-location should use volunteer labour to clear the 
right of way. SRDP funds would be used to finish the road development. 
Using committees at the sublocation level gave the entire community sn oppor-
tunity to voice its opinion on road siting. Local needs that might not appear critical 
to a planner were included in the recommended plan. However, the A/C's require-
ment that self-help labour be used to undertake the clearing of the right-of-way 
forced some realism into the plans presented by the local committees. Only 
those road segments that evoked a serious commitment from the community elicited 
the volunteer labour needed for clearing. 
Maintenance 
The maintenance of completed segments is a vital ingredient of any 
roads programme. All the SRDP programmes entailed maintenance by the MOW. 
Insistence by the MOW that it would accept roads for maintenance only if they 
were constructed to a minimum standard led to construction of a much higher 
standard of road than required for traffic in the near future. At the same 
time none of the A/Cs saw an alternative to MOW maintenance. The opinion is 
virtually universal that self-help would not motivate a continuing maintenance 
effort. 
It is our view that a maintenance and upgrading scheme using labour-
intensive methods should now be initiated for these non-scheduled, rural access 
roads. This will either require a whole new set of responsibilities for the 
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existing MOW inspectorate, or a new inspectorate. In conjuction with local 
development or project committees, this inspectorate would schedule maintenance 
and upgrading activity, determining whatever labour requirements were necessary. 
Work could be programmed during slack agricultural periods to assist in reducing 
unemployment of small-holders. The amount budgeted for each task would be 
determined by the inspectorate on the basis of local conditions. Local involve-
ment in maintenance combined with a flexible local work force employed on an 
ad hoc basis as the need arose would, in all likelihood, provide for maintenance 
and upgrading at a far lower cost than a centrally scheduled piece of heavy equip-
ment that would be used on the road at far more arbitrary intervals. 
Maintenance is closely related to the question of adequacy of labour-
intensive construction techniques. It is certainly the case that more uniform 
compaction and shaping of the road can be achieved by machines than by labour-
intensive methods. However, the additional maintenance required during the early 
life of a road because of excess settling and drainage deficiencies due to labour-
intensive methods can be compensated by planned early maintenance. 
With a labour-intensive maintenance strategy sustaining labour-intensive 
construction it is not clear that any significant difference in the quality of 
3 
access roads would arise. 
Utilisation 
Road utilisation must be measured periodically. Only in that way can 
it be determined whether the original standard of construction was too high or 
insufficient to meet the local demands. Knowledge of the type of vehicles on 
the road and the character of peak use, as in harvest periods, is essential for 
good allocation of maintenance. 
Measurement of road use also makes it possible to schedule road develop-
ment as a series of small investments rather than a single massive effort. 
Decisions to install some culverts, to murram the surface, or to extend the width 
of the right-of-way need not be taken before the usage of a simple track with 
minimal drainage has been measured. If decisions on up-grading of road segments 
in use are taken according to local demand, it will be possible to spread a 
limited investment over a much wider network of roads. 
3- For a major traffic artery it is clear that some means of mechanical 
compaction is required to stabilise the roadbed. For the moderate loads and 
slow speed traffic on access roads compaction does not raise serious problems. 
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When measurement of road usage is combined with a local system of 
road maintenance, it becomes a relatively simple matter to provide limited 
improvements in road quality through a continuation of labour-intensive 
activities, even after the original track has been cleared. 
Summary 
The operation of rural labour-intensive roads programmes entails 
three phases: planning and siting, managing the operations involved in road 
building, and a programme of maintenance and measurement. The success of a 
road building programme requires local participation in both planning and 
maintenance; thus the involvement of workers in labour-intensive construction 
should be seen as only one element in a continuing plan for using local resources 
for the construction and development of a transportation network. This point 
will be elaborated in the following discussion. 
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR SITING AND SCHEDULING ROAD INVESTMENTS 
For an active road construction programme of any sort to get under 
way, one of the most important questions is the siting and scheduling of what 
roads are to be constructed. The SRDP areas have not followed a single policy 
or procedure on this issue. This section will attempt to analyse and comment 
on various approaches to this problem, drawing on the SRDP experiences. Four 
different methods of choice will be discussed; elements of each have occurred 
in each of the areas where road investments have been undertaken. The four 
different methods to be discussed are: 
1. Engineering choice, 
2. Decentralised choice, 
3. Integrated planning choice, and 
4. Development potential and economic benefit choice. 
These methods are clearly not presented as hard and fast alternatives; they 
are rather designed to highlight different aspects of the decision-making 
process. 
Engineering Choice 
A standard engineering problem is to take a physical map of an 
area, consider existing population centres and existing roads and, within 
a given budgetary ceiling, design an enhanced road network. The installation 
of physically efficient linkups between existing roads and centres is generally 
the principal consideration in this exercise. Minimisation of distance or 
of cost is generally used as the planning criterion. Standard economic 
engineering judgements are made in trading construction cost against maintenance 
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cost on the one hand; and trading public expenditures against user costs on 
4 . . . 
the other. The engineering approach may also give some weight to equitable 
distribution of road over a given area; i.e. new roads are sited in locations 
that are relatively under-served. More sophisticated versions of network 
planning include other skills and disciplines besides engineering and eventually 
tie in with area and regional planning involving the identification of a hierarchy 
of growth centres and appropriate linkages between them. If an area has a 
relatively mature road network, the planning exercise calls for traffic counts, 
source and destination studies and so forth, to help clarify which marginal 
road investments are justified. Where the existing road system is rudimentary 
or non-existent, traffic patterns have not yet developed and such efforts are 
fruitless. 
One difficulty with the engineering approach is that what appears to 
make logical sense on a map may not be related to the productive needs and 
capabilities of an area. Furthermore, the engineering choices may not be 
related to the perceived needs of the people, which is of particular importance 
when a high level of local participation is required for construction. An 
initial road planning exercise was carried out in Migori, for instance, by a 
capable young expatriate engineer, only to be rejected out of hand by the local 
project committee as being totally unrepresentative of what was wanted in the 
division. The final product of a more decentralised approach to choosing where 
roads should be placed looked reasonably similar to the initial engineering 
effort, yet the roads construction project may not have elicited local participa-
tion without this more decentralised approach to siting. 
Decentralised Choice 
The decentralised method of choosing and siting road investments 
involves the mobilisation of local political and decision-making processes. 
This mobilisation was attempted to varying extents in the different SRDP 
areas and with markedly varying degrees of success. Where the implications 
of the choices are adequately understood and the demand for road and 
transport services exists, considerable political energies are released 
that can have very favourable effects on the whole construction phase of the 
project. In Migori, competition for road investment resources became 
intense. No doubt, residents wished to attract the employment opportunities 
into a particular location or sublocation. Nevertheless the perception 
that roads had economic value in the development of their own areas was 
^• The interested reader is referred to engineering economic texts such 
as the classic, Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis, 
New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1958; or Eugene L. Grant and W. Grant Ireson, 
Principles of Engineering Economy, New York, The Ronald Press, 1964. 
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undoubtedly an important motivation for interest in road construction. 
Residents perceived that they were, to some extent, in competition with 
other areas for limited resources. In the atmosphere that developed local 
people became intensely involved in the decisions as to where the roads 
should be placed, and considerable harambee self-help effort was mobilised 
in the initial clearing operations. This local commitment of volunteer 
labour was shrewdly made one of the principal criteria in choosing which 
projects to support. In view of the labour-intensive, participatory nature 
of the construction exercise, broad-based support and consensus at the local 
level was an enormous and almost indispensible asset. The dissemination 
of appropriate information and the generation of local enthusiasm both 
tend to be less of a problem when such support is widespread and consensus 
is achieved. Further, problems of right of way, and even questions of 
compensation or payment for the land used by the road, are swept away by 
a tide of local enthusiasm and local authority, with no reference to 
Central Government agencies or machinery. (We have rather strong reservations 
about not compensating people for land used by roads. Where farms are small, 
the individual farmer whose land is appropriated for the road suffers a 
cost that is completely out of proportion to the benefit that he personally 
gains from the road. Nevertheless if the policy is to be one of no compensation, 
it can probably only be achieved by the use of locally legitimated authority.) 
For the decentralised method of siting rural access roads to lead 
to the most rational allocation of resources from the point of view of the 
economy, some fairly rigid assumptions about the functioning of local political 
processes are required, and herein lies a problem. If those for whom a road 
has the highest economic payoff exert the most vociferous and effective political 
pressure and demonstrate the most effective local organising ability, the 
decentralised method would result in the most appropriate use of economic 
resources. The problem is that organising ability is not evenly distributed 
and road uses with small economic benefits can also generate political pressure. 
If there is a development minded chief in one area and none in another, this 
can lead to a totally disproportionate allocation of resources between the 
areas. A politician or other individual with a car and enough local influence 
can pervert the process to the extent that his own and his family's personal 
consumption needs are met to the detriment of other, more generally beneficial 
productive purposes. It is clear that in devising decentralised choice systems, 
adequate representation and appropriate checks on the abuse of the system should 
be ensured. 
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Integrated Planning Choice 
In the preparation of an integrated plan, a complementary package of 
development projects is conceived of as a whole. An obvious case when roads 
occur in such a package is smallholder tea development. There would be 
little point in growing tea if there were no roads to ensure the timely collection 
and delivery of tea leaf to the factory. The same sort of logic applies to 
dairy development. The marketing of milk, especially if it is to be exported 
from the area, requires relatively sophisticated transport arrangements, and 
there may be little point in developing the productive capacity of the farms if 
the marketing facilities are not dependable. In these cases it is clear that 
any plan for development must consider roads as an integral part of the invest-
ment programme. 
This point can be generalised. In Kapenguria, where the integrated 
approach is particularly explicit, a somewhat unlikely road wended its tortuous 
way down to a river where an SRDP health centre was being developed. Another 
long and arduous road climbed up over rugged and beautiful country to where an 
SRDP sheep development programme was under way. Any of these specifically project-
related roads can have a full measure of 'opening up' effects to be described 
shortly, but the process of selection and phasing is quite deliberately related 
to incremental projects and programmes in which Government is currently involved. 
It is here that perhaps the principal problem exists with the integrated planning 
approach. While roads should clearly be an integral part of a number of different 
types of well-conceived projects, there is a danger of viewing roads almost 
exclusively as addenda to other projects. Roads that are related to current 
Government developments and projects are chosen, and roads that do not relate 
to such projects, but may well have higher economic payoff, tend to be ignored. 
This is perhaps part of the general danger that planners become so mesmerised 
with the projects that they have chosen, and so concerned lest they fail, that 
they overallocate all sorts of additional resources and subsidies to them, 
ignoring areas of higher payoff elsewhere. 
Economic Benefit Choice 
The principal problem with siting roads in terms of the benefits they 
are likely to best ow on the economy is that the benefits are very hard to predict 
before the roads are constructed. Where roads and traffic exist, the principal 
benefits of road or network improvements are road user savings. Where road users 
See, for instance, H.A. Adler, Economic Appraisal of Transport Projects: 
A Manual With Case Studies, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1971; H.D. Mohring 
and M. Harwitz, Highway Benefits, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1962; 
and A.A. Walters, The Economics of Road User Charges, World Bank Staff Occasional 
Paper No. 5, I.B.R.D., 1968. 
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are virtually non-existent, as is the case in a number of areas where SRDP 
roads are being constructed, it is the development effects of the road that 
must be considered as most significant. The problem is that those development 
effects are hard to predict. In formal terms, the development effects of a 
road are the net economic consequences of the decreased transport costs. This 
is not to say that all the developments that go on in an area where a new 
road goes in can be attributed to that road. To take the former example, tea 
roads would not have a very high payoff ex post unless complementary tea 
production investments were undertaken simultaneously with the road investments. 
In the genuine 'opening up of an area' case, the benefits of whatever develop-
ments are stimulated must be measured net of the cost of the resources used 
in their best alternative use without the road. It is necessary to ask, in 
other words, what activities and developments would go on without the road 
and what would go on with it. The difference, in both costs and benefits, 
can then be thought of as stemming from the road, and the net effect, suitably 
discounted, is then compared with the discounted costs of constructing and 
maintaining the road. 
This approach is summarised, not because it is considered realistic 
to go through a complete and rigourous analysis of each increment to the road 
system, but because even where the analysis is not undertaken, the approach, 
at least, should be explicitly kept in mind. The reduced transport costs, 
either in terms of greater timeliness, miles saved or reduced vehicle expenses, 
that are the immediate purposes of the new road permit productive activities in 
an area that would not be feasible without the reduction in transport costs. 
The net value of this increased production (increased over what would have 
happened without the road) is the benefit attributable to the road. In comparing 
two proposed roads of equal cost, for example, it is this benefit which must be 
explicitly considered. 
Reducing transport costs can be thought of as changing the prices of 
goods and resources in an area. The prices of exportable goods are likely to 
be increased and the prices of those coming in from outside are likely to be 
reduced. Enterprises which were previously not economically feasible are 
likely to become so, and those which previously existed are likely to become 
more profitable and experience expansion (except those that depended on the 
high transport costs to restrict competition from outside the area). Benefits 
arise from higher output levels stimulated by the road and from greater local 
value added in existing output as a result of the more favourable prices. Land 
prices rise as higher value enterprises replace those of lower value, and the 
economy tends to improve because of specialisation and trade. 
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Roads that have the above effects may lead to some current Govern-
ment project area, or they may not. farmers can and do respond to price 
signals and price changes with changes in what and how much they produce, 
with or without a Government programme. While there is every reason to link 
road construction to directly productive investments and programmes that are 
planned, it must be recognised that farmers make the overwhelming majority of 
investment and production decisions, and that it is these decisions that 
provide the main justification for the placing and timing of road investments. 
It is our view that the development effects should be explicitly 
considered in road siting and scheduling decisions. In a local area planning 
exercise, this task should be a function of the project committee, and a 
procedure should be laid out for considering and comparing the anticipated 
developmental effects of the various possible roads. We did not find any such 
procedure in operation in any of the SRDP areas. It is our view that experimenta-
tion with such a procedure should begin forthwith, and that an effort be made 
to keep careful tabs on the projects associated with the experimentation so 
that selection procedures may be verified and improved. 
Two significant conclusions can be drawn from this section. The 
first is that costs incurred in road construction or improvement should be 
related to the benefits that are to be derived from the investment. There 
is a great deal of variation in costs between a high quality road, built to 
withstand heavy loads of traffic, and a relatively simple track over which 
occasional vehicles can pass. The high-cost road is clearly not justified 
g 
if the traffic coming over it is light. The second conclusion is that 
forecasting the benefits of roads, especially where no road currently 
exists, is a speculative and uncertain task. Ideally the task requires a 
knowledge of which prices for goods and services will be affected by the 
construction of the road, and a knowledge of the supply and demand elasticities 
of those goods and services. While some estimate of the benefits is required 
to justify incurring costs, it is simply not realistic to expect accuracy in 
these estimates, especially when it comes to long range forecasts. 
The implications of these joint conclusions on the importance of 
relating costs to anticipated benefits, together with the extreme difficulty 
6. The roads constructed in Vihiga, for instance, have been primarily 
engineering procedural experiments, demonstrating the quality of road that can 
be built by labour-intensive means, and ignoring the questions raised in this 
section. It would clearly be grossly inappropriate to build all developmental 
rural access roads to such a standard in the initial construction phase. When 
it is clear that high levels of traffic are coming across such a road, the Vihiga 
experiments demonstrate that a road necessary for such use is feasible with the 
labour-intensive technology that is being used there. 
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of estimating benefits, is that the construction of developmental rural 
access roads should be undertaken in phases. The initial opening up of 
the road should be a relatively primitive, low-cost undertaking. Only as 
it becomes clear that the benefits justify greater expenditure levels should 
those expenditures be undertaken. 
Fortunately, all the benefits we have cited depend very obviously 
upon road use. So much is this the case that relating road investments and 
improvements to traffic counts, i.e. the volume of traffic that passes over 
a road, is a useful rule of thumb. The only problem with this rule of thumb 
is that it does not differentiate between the purposes for which a road is 
used. Uses of the road for consumption purposes (e.g. the local preacher 
visiting his flock or the local big-shot visiting his nightclub) are given 
equal weight with uses that have more productive and developmental implications 
(e.g. a milk collection run that stimulates the whole dairy production industry 
in an area, or a truck that brings in needed farm supplies). If some roads 
are predominantly used for productive purposes and others predominantly for 
consumption purposes, the rule of thumb is a relatively poor indicator of the 
benefits accruing to the economy. If all roads have about the same ratio of 
production-to consumption-related use, the problem does not arise. 
SEQUENTIAL INVESTMENT ON SCHEDULED ROAD SEGMENTS 
A Sequential Approach to Road Development 
A significant conclusion of the previous section was that rural 
access roads should not, at first, be built to a high standard. It was further 
argued that road expenditures should be related to the use to which the road 
is put, and that this should be determined in the field. 
One of the great advantages of labour-intensive technology in the 
construction of a road is that it makes it feasible to programme the develop-
ment of the road in phases. In the case of machine-intensive technology, the 
availability of equipment and the high costs of moving equipment from place 
to place imply that the investment is more of an all-or-nothing affair. Where 
local labour is used, the development of a road can be programmed over a long 
period of time. It is not necessary to make massive investments at a single 
point in time. We view road development as having several stages, each of:which 
must of course be based on sound engineering: 
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1, Basic track -- a minimum width right-of-way such as that 
proposed by the MOW for rural access roads, with a minimum 
of construction to provide needed drainage and a road 
surface that is smooth enough for easy and safe use by 
vehicles. Sufficient murrain to provide one Idne of all-
weather a<: cess 
2. Improved track — a basic track with some additional 
culverts for drainage, the removal of some elevation 
changes by cut and fill, and an additional murrain surface 
designed to carry heavier and more frequent vehicle loads. 
The development of a rural access road network should begin with 
the preparation of basic tracks. Further investments in the right-of-way 
should only be scheduled as it is clear that the use of the road warrants 
additional development.7 
Sequential development of the roadbed also requires a system for 
regularly monitoring road usage. Lack of such monitoring was a major 
deficiency of the SRDP roads programme. It would be highly desirable in 
the first year after opening up a new road segment to sample three or 
four days per quarter to obtain some idea of the amount and nature of 
use of the road. Usage by bicycle, vehicles, animals and pedestrians 
should be distinguished. Usage that entails the development of the local 
economy should be distinguished from consumptive uses. For example, the 
transport of seed and fertiliser from a market centre would be a productive 
development use; the transport of friends to a local feast would not. 
The conclusion of this section and the recommended procedures for 
scheduling road construction run directly counter to the approach and the 
procedure that is current in the SRDP areas in one further respect. It 
appears to us that in all the thinking and planning about roads, the notion 
of 'takeover' of a road by the Ministry of Works (MOW) receives gross 
overemphasis., The whole construction procedure under these circumstances 
takes on something of the character of an attempt to pre-empt MOW resources 
and attract them into a given area by meeting certain MOW standards. To 
summarise our recommendation, rural road building should involve a phased 
sequence of construction, maintenance and upgrading costs, and these costs 
should be related to the level of road use and the economic benefit-associated 
7, An important question that we do not feel qualified to evaluate is 
whether the initial right-of-way needs to have the same profile as the completed 
murram road. If it is possible to build the original right-of-way to a narrower 
profile without excessive labour costs at a later stage, it would clearly make it 
possible to 'open up' more road segments for development. Some of the Kapenguria 
roads involved little more than clearing grass off the track and filling in pot 
holes and washed out sections. With the level of use of some of those remote roads 
it is very doubtful whether more elaborate construction could be justified. The 
MOW is currently evaluating some alternatives for 'phasing' and improving upon a 
bas ic road construction profile-
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with that use. The 'MOW takeover* approach which is currently prevalent 
leads to over-building and under-maintenance. The roads are likely to be 
built to too high a standard purely to meet MOW criteria, with the hope that 
they can join the list of 'scheduled' roads and thereafter be maintained by 
the Ministry's inspectorate, using machine-intensive methods. 
The MOW takeover approach appears inappropriate. In the first 
instance, timely attention to maintenance by machine technology poses a difficult 
scheduling problem. It is our recommendation that an entirely new inspectorate 
be set up to cover the maintenance and upgrading of the labour-intensive roads. 
The criteria proposed in this section could be used as a basis for maintenance 
and upgrading decisions. Needless to say, the technology used in this maintenance 
and upgrading work should be labour-intensive. Gangs of workers recruited for 
road building should be maintained on a part-time, work-as-needed basis. Such 
gangs can slowly improve road quality when improvement is justified by actual use. 
They can measure the road usage to determine whether road development is warranted. 
They can serve as a decentralised work force that can be quickly mobilised to 
handle maintenance. 
The advantages of labour-intensive maintenance should be apparent. The 
trained workers and supervisors required for building cleared tracks become a 
resource that is available when maintenance is required. The decentralisation 
of maintenance to small crews operating independently in each location assures 
timely attention to small problems before major reconstruction of a road is 
required. The availability of trained local labour means that segments can be 
slowly improved when usage shows there is clear benefit. 
The MOW has already created the potential for such developments. The 
establishment of a Special Projects Section containing the Rural Access Roads 
Programme and the Gravelling Programme makes it possible to develop an integrated 
approach to construction, improvement and maintenance by labour-intensive methods. 
It is important for the MFP to support the maintenance activities that will 
develop in the Special Projects Section by an adequate budget. 
WAGES IN LABOUR INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES 
In all the SRDP areas except Kapenguria, a wage of Shs. 5/- per day 
is paid for workers who are involved in the labour-intensive road construction 
programme. These workers are hired as 'casual labour' and receive no other 
benefits such as housing, transport, gratuity, pension or any other allowance. 
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Since the question of wages and terms of service is somewhat controversial, 
and clearly of central importance in any labour-intensive programme, this 
section is designed to analyse and make all recommendations on the topic. 
First of all some evidence will be cited about the 'going wage' in the relevant 
areas. Secondly, the financial implications of the wage paid for the choice 
of technique and the scope of the road construction exercise will be discussed. 
Thirdly, the notion of the 'shadow wage' and the opportunity cost of labour 
will be introduced, and the relationship between road construction activities 
and the alternative use of labour in local agricultural production will be 
raised. The general conclusion of this section will be that for the reasons 
of equity, of employment and of efficient use of labour and other resources, 
the wage has not been too low but rather too high. 
The Going Wage and the Availability of Labour 
A universal feature of the recruitment of labour for these road 
construction projects has been an excess supply of labour at the wage offered. 
Sometimes there have been two, three or four times the number of workers as 
there are jobs offered. In each of the areas this has necessitated some non-
price rationing mechanism for the jobs. These mechanisms have usually involved 
some kind of lottery system whereby there are a limited number of 'yes' papers 
and the rest are marked 'no', with a random drawing being made from a hat. 
So eager are the applicants to win the right to work for five shillings per 
day, that a market frequently develops in 'yes' papers which, until restrictions 
were placed on this kind of transaction, became worth a substantial number 
of shillings. Evidence of this kind clearly suggests that five shillings per 
day is considerably above the workers' estimates of the alternative returns 
to labour either from other employment or on their own farms. The going wage 
g 
for other labour transactions undoubtedly varies among different rural areas, 
but the eagerness and the excess supply of workers offer prima facie evidence 
that the going wage in these particular areas is less than Shs. 5/- per day. 
While Government wage payments and settlements generally tend to ignore 
these market factors, it is clear that no shortage of labour is to be expected 
even at a wage that more closely approximates the market wage in these areas. 
No clear justification for unnecessarily high wages was given! 
various A/Cs and road engineers suggested that some moral duty existed to 
pay workers on this programme a premium. There appeared to be little under-
standing that setting an excessively high wage limited the number of man-days 
8- Other I.D.S. studies indicate that wages in these transactions might 
be as low as 1/00 or 1/50 in some areas and as high as 3/50 or 4/00 in others. 
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that could be used within the fixed budgets allotted for labour-intensive 
road development. There was also no recognition of the fact that " paying 
excessive wages also limited the number and kind of activities in which workers 
could successfully compete with more capital-intensive methods. At the same 
time those in charge of the programme were concerned that large numbers of 
workers had to be turned away from employment at the recruiting barazas. In 
addition there was concern that the programme avoid charges of favouritism or 
the recruiting of workers from outside the particular area in which the 
construction was being undertaken. 
Any economic analysis of a casual labour market will conclude that 
it is not necessary to pay wages above the prevailing level when there is a 
large surplus of underemployed workers. Moreover, administrative problems of 
dealing with an excess of applicants can be minimised by paying wages at roughly 
the prevailing rate for agricultural labour. We conclude that the wage 
offered for labour-intensive road work should be determined by the prevailing 
wages paid to agricultural field labour and should vary from district to 
district according to the relative scarcity of such labour. 
It is clear that some premium should be paid to gangleaders for the 
additional responsibilibities that they take on. This premium should also be 
viewed as an incentive to keep experienced supervisory staff and reduce turn-
over. 
The Wage and the Choice of Technology 
One of the principal reasons for concern about the issue of wages 
involves the choice of technology to be used in road construction. There is 
no doubt that a significant part of the argument for labour-: rather than machine-
intensive construction methods centres around costs. If the total cost of an 
operation using labour-intensive methods is higher than the cost of the 
operation using machines, it will be quite likely that capital-intensive methods 
will b e chosen. No wages will be paid to local unskilled labour and greater 
sales for foreign equipment suppliers will result in a loss of foreign exchange 
reserves. Under these circumstances it is particularly important not to raise 
the costs of the labour-intensive approach unnecessarily by artificially 
inflating the wage. An argument that also deserves mention is that an excessive 
wage implies a social cost rather than a mere transfer from taxpayers to labour. 
If the recipients of wages have a lower propensity to invest (higher marginal 
propensity to consume) than the agency from which the financial resources are 
obtained, capital formation is reduced in proportion to the amount of excess 
wage payments. 
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The Wage and the Optimal Allocation of the Labour Force 
From a social point of view those workers should be employed in 
labour-intensive public works programmes who are the least well used in their 
alternative employment, who have in other words the lowest opportunity cost. 
Discovering who these workers are in some planning or bureaucratic fashion 
must be written off as unfeasible. It is, however, useful to assume that workers 
have a reasonable notion of the opportunity cost of their own time. If a wage 
is offered for some new employment which is too high, a large percentage of 
the work force in a given area will be motivated to come and seek that employment. 
Some of these workers will have an opportunity cost which is substantially lower 
than the wage offered, while others will have an opportunity cost that approaches 
or is equal to that wage. If the wage offered were lower, those with the higher 
opportunity cost would not be motivated to apply, they would rather stay in 
their existing employment. The work force would then be drawn from those with 
a lower opportunity cost, and the cost to the economy of the work force 
mobilised would thus be lower. The labour force of a given area would be 
more efficiently allocated under these circumstances, and there would be less 
disruption to local productive activity. It is very unlikely, given normal 
assumptions, that the social opportunity cost of labour is higher at the 
margin than the wage that a particular work force is prepared to accept. 
A wage that is just high enough to attract the necessary work force and no 
more is therefore the optimum wage from a social point of view. Arguments 
that those workers who do undertake the employment should receive a higher 
wage than the going wage to give them a 'better standard of living"' thah their 
fellows are abhorrent from the equity point of view; employment by this method 
is restricted, and fewer people get a larger slice, rather than more people 
getting a smaller slice of the total wage payment. The latter situation is 
obviously the more equitable. 
Wage Seasonality and the Social Cost of Labour-intensive Public Works 
An extension of the argument of the previous paragraph concerns 
off-season employment. Labour demand in agriculture frequently has a highly 
peaked characteristic, with real labour shortages and even bottleneck constraints 
at certain seasons followed by periods of substantial unemployment or under-
employment at other seasons. Another way of describing the situation is that 
the wage (opportunity cost of labour) varies widely through the year. It 
is argued that the social cost of labour-intensive public works which employ 
labour in those seasons when the agricultural demand is weak is a great deal 
lower than the cost of work undertaken at the peak labour demand seasons. 
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A low wage is an ideal mechanism for attracting workers in their agricultural 
off -season when their opportunity cost is low, and not diverting those whose 
own farm tasks have a high payoff in the particular season concerned. The 
consequent cost to the economy of the road installation is thereby kept to 
a minimum. 
In Vihiga, failure to monitor the need for agricultural labour led", 
to a critical shortage at a time when labour was deployed on road-building. 
This situation can be avoided by coordination between the local Agricultural 
Officers and the Roads Inspector in charge of the unit. 
Recommendation with Regard to Wages 
The recommendation that emerges from our observations and analysis 
is that, far from being too low, the current wage of Shs. 5/00 per day paid 
to construction workers on the labour-intensive road projects is too high. 
It is hard to know how the figure was arrived at in the first place. It 
appears to have been chosen merely as a 'round figure'. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Natural Resources both pay casual labourers 
at a lower rate and appear to have no difficulty meeting their requirements. 
From the employment, the equity, the technology, the allocative and the cost 
points of view, a lower wage appears to be more desirable. In general we 
recommend that the wage to be offered be subject to periodic review, bearing 
in mind the considerations raised in this section; in particular we recommend 
that a wage of between three and four shillings a day be paid, on an experimental 
basis at least, in subsequent labour-intensive road and rural public works 
projects. Our reasoning suggests that a single standard wage should not be 
applied to all divisions. The rural access roads programme should receive 
evidence on the number of applicants in relation to jobs and should pay only 
that which is required to staff the local gang. 
The Ministry of Labour Directive on Wages 
The MOW has now received a directive to establish wages at a level 
of 6/75 per day for its casual labour. This bureaucratic directive creates 
a wage payment formula for the rural access roads and SRDP programmes which 
flies in the face of the reasoning above. 
It can be expected that the increase in rural wages will: (a) aggravate 
the problems of allocating jobs to applicants, (b) intensify the tendency for 
labour-intensive road construction to withdraw labour from productive agricultural 
activities, and (c) overstate the real cost of labour-intensive operations and 
unnecessarily deplete the MOW resources for road construction. 
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While it is clear that flexibility in setting wages at a competitive 
level is a preferable policy to a fixed wage, some of the negative features 
of the wage directive can be avoided: 
A. Labour-intensive construction activity should be curtailed at 
planting and harvest periods, in accord with local AOs' information on the 
need for agricultural labour. 
B. MOW reports and planning activities should choose between the 
use of machine and labour intensive construction methods on the basis of a 
'shadow wage'. That is, MOW should collect information on locally prevailing 
wages for unskilled labour in areas where rural access road units are to be 
deployed. Labour intensive techniques should be employed whenever their cost, 
assuming workers could be hired for prevailing wages, is less than machine 
intensive construction. Estimates for the cost of the rural access roads 
programme should budget the difference between wage costs at prevailing levels 
and the cost at the directed wage level as a special item, to make the cost 
of this policy readily apparent to all concerned. 
C. The MOW should document the relation between applicants for casual 
work and the available positions, as evidence of the excess supply available. 
We would reiterate that a wage boost of the kind that has been 
adopted has the threefold effect of decreasing the employment generating 
potential of the project, worsening the equity with which income is distributed, 
and raising the economic cost of the capital infrastructure that is created. 
Since the aims of the labour-intensive works programme are to achieve the exact 
reverse of these effects, the decision must be regarded as ironic and unfortunate. 
CONCEPTS REQUIRED FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OP RURAL LABOUR ON ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
All of the officials concerned with the labour-intensive road programme 
under SRDP were interviewed concerning their procedures for hiring and remunerating 
the rural work force. Several concepts emerged from these interviews; the need 
for guidance from Nairobi on setting policies in certain areas was also apparent. 
In this section deployment of workers and supervision will be discussed. 
Deployment of Workers, Recruiting Costs and Turnover of Work Gangs 
Concern was expressed by the road engineers and A/Cs about the extent 
of the territory that each work force should cover. Restricting the activities 
or a particular work unit to one sub-location minimised the worker's travels to 
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the job site, but also increased the number of separate groups that had to 
be recruited. In addition, the amount of work for any one individual would 
be smaller if his activities were restricted to road segments in one sub-
9 location. Thus the employment would become more sporadic and less permanent. 
Recruiting workers in separate work groups for each sub-location 
has advantages beyond that of minimising transport to the job. A work group 
tied to a sub-location could easily be employed on a sporadic basis for main-
tenance work. Once trained in road construction, the work group could be 
revived easily for maintenance duties. Secondly, the linking of local workers 
to local planning for road siting and road improvements may generate more local 
responsibility for road projects as a self-help activity. Thirdly, the 
availability of a larger work force makes it possible to schedule a greater 
quantity of work during the slack periods of the agricultural year — thereby 
increasing the number of persons who would be available for employment. 
On the negative side, deploying separate work groups in each sub-
location has some costs. Obviously more workers must be recruited in toto. 
In addition more supervisory gangleaders are required. 
On balance we did not obtain convincing evidence that the cost of 
supervisory personnel and recruitment were sufficiently large to warrant 
organising and deploying work groups on an area larger than the sub-locational 
level. 
This view directly contradicts the opinion expressed in the earlier 
I.D.S. evaluation. In our opinion there is no merit in maximising the amount 
of work per worker employed, which was the view taken by the earlier evaluators. 
On the contrary, the objective should be to minimize the long-run cost of 
building and maintaining a road network, and this can best be done if the skills 
of road construction and gang supervision are available in every sub-location. 
Supervisory Personnel 
A major objection raised against the use of labour-intensive methods 
in construction is that the problem of adequate supervision is insurmountable. 
Not one shred of evidence in support of this assertion can be found in the 
experience of SRDP. While the expansion of the programme obviously depends 
on the availability of such personnel, an adequate supply of individuals to 
take on supervisory roles appears to be readily available and, given proper 
9. One of the A/Cs expressed particular concern that the workers be provided 
with as much job tenure and security as possible. This concern seems misplaced, 
since it can not be imagined that the employment provided by the labour-intensive 
roads programme was the sole source of support of the workers in question. 
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supervision, rapidly trained. This conclusion will be discussed, first by 
reference to headmen, and then by elaborating on the possibilities for obtaining 
competent managers for the programme. 
Recruiting Headmen 
In general, the SRDP pattern Has been that the chiefs and sub-chiefs 
were asked to supply the roads engineer with nominees from the work gangs who 
were known to be reliable and to command respect in dealing with others. The 
list of people obtained in this fashion served as an adequate and acceptable 
source for individuals who could be designated as headmen and made responsible 
for the work performance of a group of up to 25 men. 
Training headmen (road gang leaders) was easily arranged by 
rotating the candidates through a variety of tasks on existing crews and then 
putting them in charge of a new group. On-the-job training of this kind 
implied that it was desirable to phase-in work gradually to build a cadre of 
workers up to full strength. Bartolo's work system is a further aid to 
the development of supervisors, as it involves the use of specialised work 
groups in each of the operations of clearing, stump removal, stone removal 
etc. The need to retrain those engaged in clearing only arises after the 
entire length of the proposed road segment has been cleared. In this fashion 
crews can be initiated to work on a piecemeal basis. 
In any case, those in charge of the road programmes reiterated 
several times that the most important quality in a headman is the ability to 
deal with people and handle such disciplinary problems as absenteeism, tardi-
ness and poor work effort. The standing of the headman with the sub-chief 
and others in responsible positions appeared to be a reasonable indicator of 
leadership qualities, and the system worked in a satisfactory way to produce 
reliable gang leaders. It is also clear that the responsibility entrusted to 
the headman should be compensated with a wage sufficient to retain him. Head-
men were paid 6/- to 7/- per day, and this level may be required to retain the 
quality of men desired over a longer period of time. On the other hand, we have 
no evidence to indicate that the differential of one shilling per day generally 
paid on SRDP projects was insufficient. We would emphasise the importance of 
good headmen in any labour-intensive operation and make the observation that 
good headmen are in some measure discovered rather than trained. This implies 
a crucial role for the selection process. Those headmen who prove to be less 
good on the job should be allowed to go, those who turn out to be particularly 
good should be given the incentive to stay with the programme or return to other 
programmes. 
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Technical Level Supervisory Personnel 
Below the Road Superintendent in the MOW, who is a civil engineer, 
is the Roads Inspector. Personnel at this level are well versed in the technical 
aspects of road design, construction and maintenance. The Migori road projects 
were the responsibility of a Road Inspector who demonstrated that, given an 
interest in the project and an ability to handle a large work force, such an 
individual is fully capable of initiating, laying out and supervising a 
series of labour-intensive road projects. 
Experience in both Migori and Vihiga indicated that it was possible 
to find MOW employees with lesser qualifications than a Road Engineer to take 
on the operation of the road building programme. As the Roads Inspector in 
Migori put it, the task at hand was similar to jobs that he had performed on 
scheduled road segments, the only difference being that men, not machines, 
were required to complete the material moving tasks. 
In Kapenguria the Roads Inspector did not work out so well, the 
problem in this case appears principally to have been one of commitment rather 
than technical competence. Indeed, the Kapenguria experience clearly 
indicates the problems that arise when no one of an inspector level or above 
is given a clear and undivided mandate to develop the programme. The local 
Roads Inspector, no doubt partly reflecting ambivalence with regard to the 
programme at the provincial level, took no interest in it. It therefore 
remained stagnant. Only when a young Dutch engineer who happened to be 
interested in this aspect of the overall road development programme under his 
supervision was posted to the District, was any significant labour-intensive 
construction started. In this case the engineer was directly responsible for 
the headmen on the construction site. He laid out the tasks in visits that 
were often a week or more apart, and they carried them out. In such tasks as 
the installation of simple culverts, for instance, it was this engineer's 
experience that after two or three had been installed under close supervision 
the headmen were capable of supervising further jobs on their own. For the 
construction of masonry drifts which-were used quite extensively in dry areas, 
the mason responsible for making culverts undertook the work. 
Below the Roads Inspector is the Overseer who, in the MOW hierarchy, 
is given considerable responsibility for the road construction process. On the 
technical side of road building, such as ensuring correct camber, determining 
the appropriate amount of cut and fill activity in the earthworks and designing 
appropriate drainage systems, Overseers can deal with the day-to-day problems 
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under the overall supervision of a Roads Inspector or a Roads Engineer. The 
Overseer's task therefore complements that of the headman, with the headman 
providing the crucial management and organisational skills with regard to the 
labour while the Overseer provides the on-site technical supervision. The 
Vihiga experience showed that an Overseer is capable of serving several on-
going road gangs. 
In developing the supervisory personnel to be used in operating an 
enlarged programme of rural access road construction, training will be needed 
to assist them in the management of a substantial labour force and the 
administration of an activity that relates to local development 
generally. One of the reasons for the relative success of activities in 
Migori is that the Roads Inspector had the constant advice and assistance of 
the A/C in matters pertaining to procurement, relations with the residents 
desirous of developing new road segments, and the problems of paying the 
workers. Without an administrator in a similar position to assist, it may 
be rather difficult for a specialist in construction to supervise a roads 
programme. For example, if construction is.to be scheduled during periods 
between planting and harvesting, the Roads Inspector may need to have assistance 
from someone familiar with the area in scheduling periods of work on road 
projects. 
Administration 
One of the strengths of the roads programme, as is mentioned in 
discussing the administration of SRDP generally, was that the A/C was the fiscal 
agent of the programme in three areas (Vihiga, Migori and Mbere). Local decision 
concerning rates of pay, procurement of materials and the siting of roads could 
be executed according to local inputs and local conditions. It would appear 
highly desirable to have this degree of local financial control devolved on a 
district officer in all areas. Appropriate timing of construction activities 
can only occur when an official resident in the area is capable of making quick 
disbursements of funds to workers according to the effort completed. 
In addition there appear to be some rudimentary possibilities for 
using the roads programme to foster the development of local industry in 
constructing culverts, quarrying murram and chipping ballast. Whether that 
is appropriate will depend on the location of the work in relation to existing 
suppliers. Flexibility in the use of roads funds has been an advantage in 
fostering the use of local sources of materials. 
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Summary 
While existing supervisory capacity is a limiting factor in the 
development of labour-intensive construction and maintenance systems, no 
evidence of difficulty in recruiting and training supervisory personnel 
appeared in SRDP road projects. The combination of assistance from the 
A/C plus previous training was sufficient to permit a Roads Inspector in 
Migori to function well in a position held by civil engineers in other areas. 
MOW Overseers were also being trained and utilised to good effect. 
On future rural access roads programmes it might be advisable for 
the Roads Inspectors who are recruited to have some ancilliary training, but 
that training should be directed more at the management of large labour 
forces, human relations and Government administration than at the mechanics 
of labour-intensive techniques. 
The mechanics of labour-intensive techniques have been thoroughly 
systematised by the work of Bartolo in Vihiga; his systems and planning forms 
will provide sufficient guidance to Roads Inspectors. 
The headmen needed for gangs of about 25 workers appear to be readily 
available. Selection of these road gang leaders should be made on the basis 
of their leadership ability in motivating and supervising a work gang. Given 
appropriate supervision there is evidence that these headmen rapidly learn 
the simpler processes and tasks of road construction. Our only recommendation 
is that a sufficient rate of pay be established for these individuals to minimise 
turnover. If, as we have recommended, casual labour wages are reduced, the 
differential between labourer and foreman may need to exceed 1/-. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rural Access Roads 
The SRDP roads programme has been successful. Experience gained 
under SRDP has been a valuable input to the rural access roads programme that 
is now being implemented by the MOW. Reviewing this analysis, the reader 
will see eight major implications and recommendations for rural access road 
programming: 
1) Planning/Siting—Local involvement in the siting of road 
segments can have a powerful motivating force both in the success 
of the roads programme and in other complementary development 
efforts. 
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2) Development Impact Evaluation - Road investments should be 
related to the benefits accruing from the road. A careful 
monitoring and evaluation of these benefits should be built into 
the road development programme. 
3) Sequential Phasing — The development of roads in an extended 
process of small improvements is made possible by local road 
gangs making limited inputs over a long period of time. The 
rate of improvements should be determined by direct observation 
of road use. Large volumes of traffic for productive purposes 
justify priority being given for road improvement. 
4) Maintenance — Labour-intensive maintenance should be planned 
as an integral and permanent feature of the road network created 
under the rural access roads programme. Once the supervisory 
structure is created and local labour has some experience in 
road building, full capability for road maintenance on a 
decentralised labour-intensive basis is also established. 
5) Wages — Wages should be paid at a level barely sufficient to 
recruit the needed number of workers from agricultural pursuits 
during the slack seasons. If higher wages are paid, special 
efforts must be made to avoid the drain of labour away from 
agriculture at peak planting and harvest times. In addition 
decisions on the extent of labour-intensive projects should be. 
made using the lower prevailing agricultural wage as a 'shadow 
price'. 
6) Supervision — Adequate leadership and supervision for the 
construction of rural access roads can be recruited and trained 
from the Roads Inspectorate of MOW (for directing a divisional 
programme) and from local talent (for headmen). Training should 
centre on management and human relations in the case of the Roads 
Inspectorate. Training and selection of personnel should largely 
be done on the job. 
7) Budgeting — The need for considerable local flexibility entails 
fiscal management at the district level. 
8) The 1974 evaluation of the Vihiga SRDP by Harmon and others 
recommends the use of intermediate technologies in road-building. 
Ox drawn carts and compacting devices are examples. We urge 
that such local resources be used, both because they will 
enhance the cost-effectiveness of road building and because the 
incentive to local ownership of ox teams will e^ance the develop-
ment of intermediate technology in agriculture. 
The MOW is already beginning work that will help to implement a number 
of these recommendations. The establishment of the Special Projects Branch 
creates a clear locus of responsibility for labour-intensive construction in 
MOW. Efforts are being made to investigate the cost and logistics of labour-
intensive maintenance and the gains from sequential phasing of construction. 
Work on usage monitoring is planned and should be encouraged. 
10- See B.F. Johnston, and G. Muchiri, Equipment and Tillage: Innovations 
for Small-Scale Farmers in Kenya, Working Paper No. 197, Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, 1974. 
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Current grants for research on labour-intensive technologies from 
IBRD contain plans to investigate intermediate technologies. 
SRDP Roads 
9) The programmes begun under SRDP should be phased into rural 
access roads as rapidly as possible. 
10) The available information on siting and planning of roads 
should be transferred from the Project Committee to the District 
Development Committee. 
11) Extension of the road network in SRDP areas beyond what is now 
underway should not.be permitted until reports from usage monitoring 
can be analysed to ascertain a qualitative picture of benefits. 
12) The Project Committee should consider what opportunities are 
appropriate for labour-intensive development in water and soil 
conservation. 
Ministry of Finance and Planning 
13) Expansion — The experience in building roads should be 
extended to programmes of water and soil conservation to deter-
mine whether small budgets could be used equally effectively 
by labour-intensive projects in those areas. Whether or not 
experimental projects can be implemented in these areas under 
SRDP, the Ministry should explore a fiscal mechanism to allow 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
in particular, to purchase services of the 88 Rural Access Roads 
Units for other types of construction activity. 
14) The Ministry should require supporting evidence on need and 
usage of rural access roads as part of the requests for district 
development grants. 
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CHAPTER'THIRTEEN 
AN APPRAISAL OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
SRDP AREAS OF'TETU AND MBERE IN'KENYA 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The Kenya Government's water development policy provides that 
good quality piped water should be available to all families in the Republic 
by the end of the present century. The Special Rural Development Programme 
was designed to enhance our understanding of the best ways and means of 
promoting integrated rural development by carrying out a number of experi-
mental projects, including water development projects, in six different 
Divisions representing varying environmental conditions. In this chapter 
the development of water resources in two SRDP areas, Tetu-Thengenge and 
Mbere, will be evaluated. The following aspects of water development will 
be examined:-
1. Water Availability. For the proper development and utilisation 
of water supplies in these areas^ it is necessary to have infor-
mation on the flow characteristics of the streams feeding the 
water systems. Here both low and high flows as well as the 
total water availability are important factors. 
2. Water Quality. In these two areas .water is used primarily 
for domestic consumption and for livestock. This water must 
therefore satisfy minimum chemical, bacteriological and 
physical standards if it is to be used for these purposes. 
3. Water Management and Utilisation. For proper planning of the 
management and development of these water projects, it is 
important to look at the various social, economic and environ-
mental problems which have arisen either in connection with 
these schemes or with the previous use of water in these areas. 
Actual and potential benefits must be scrutinised, as well as 
costs, with a view to offering suggestions for future projects. 
THE TETU-THEGENGE WATER SUPPLY 
Introduction 
This SRDP water development project is located in a high rainfall 
and medium to high potential division of Nyeri District. The area is 
relatively densely populated, with a population of 400 per sq. km. 
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The project is being carried out by private contractors on behalf 
of the Kenya Government, with funds provided largely by the Swedish Inter-
national Development Authority (SIDA). It is being undertaken in two 
phases - Phase One is partly completed, whereas construction for Phase Two 
is still underway. A feasibility study of the scheme was completed in 
August 1970. The design of the water works was started in May 1971 and 
the construction started in February 1972. It was estimated that Phase One 
of the project would cost about shs.4,880,000. The design for Phase Two was 
completed in May 1973 and construction started the same year. It is 
estimated that Phase Two of the project will cost about shs.3,978,000 on 
completion. 
The primary objectives of the project are to increase employment 
and incomes in the area, but other benefits may also be gained in the 
process such as creating a more positive attitude on the part of the local 
people toward innovation, building up the administrative capabilities of 
the local communities so that they can operate some of their own local 
institutions, improving the quality of rural life through expanded social 
and cultural activities, and many others. It was hoped that there would 
be close coordination of development activities in the area so that the newly 
available water resources could be used for maximum agricultural development. 
The Government has not been very much concerned with generating 
revenue through charges to water users-, but rather the primary concern has 
been to supply water to the local people. Thus, users at the communal 
watering points will be charged only shs.4/- per month, which will not even 
cover the costs of operating the water system. Estimates for maintenance 
costs are quite high, though no actual figures are available as yet, because 
of breakages, especially of taps. In the long run it is hoped to provide 
every household with its own water connection, but at present the emphasis 
is on communal watering points. 
Water Availability 
The project is mainly supplied by the Zaina River and can provide 
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maximum water storage of 1200 m . Runoff data for this stream indicate 
that sufficient water can be supplied for more than 60,000 people and some 
25,000 livestock. At present Phase One of the project is serving over 250 
families. Pumping is done by gravity, which reduces operating costs 
considerably. 
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Water Quality 
A chemical analysis of a sample of water drawn from the intake is 
given in. Table 1. It shows that although the water is neutral and soft, it 
is coloured and turbid. The sample indicates a high iron content and organic 
pollution. Table 2 shows that the sample contains a concentration of 46.9 
mg/1 of suspended sediment. These findings indicate that the water should 
be treated to make it suitable for domestic use. 
Table 3 gives the results of a chemical analysis of a water 
sample taken from one of the watering points in the Tetu-Thegenge supply 
system. This analysis shows that the water is neutral and soft; it has a 
low mineral content, but it is organically polluted. The concentration of 
suspended sediment for this sample, as shown in Table 2, is 46.8 mg/1. 
The chemical analysis and sediment concentrations of the two samples are 
nearly the same, which indicates that merely pumping the water from the 
intake to the watering point does not substantially change its quality. 
This water needs to be treated to render it suitable for domestic use. 
Water Development and Utilisation 
Phase One of the Tetu-Thengenge Water Supply was completed in 
November 1973, but the treatment plant was not in operation as of December 1974. 
It was hoped that the treatment plant would be functioning by the time 
the second phase of the project is complete. The main gravity line for the 
first phase is of a diameter varying from 80 to 250 mm. There are six 
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reservoirs with a total gross capacity of 607.5 m . As of December 1974, 
there were 31 communal watering points and 199 individual connections, which 
are watering points connected to individual households. 
From the field survey it was evident that practically all families 
would like to have individual connections, but the cost was apparently too 
high for the majority of farmers. To have a private connection, an individual 
or group of individuals has to pay labour costs of about shs. 150/-, a 
deposit of shs. 60/- and the cost of pipes from the main pipeline to his 
house or shamba. This means that a farmer would have to raise about shs. 225/-
to have a connection installed at his farm, and subsequently he will have to 
pay a monthly charge of shs. 15/-. Considering that the average monthly 
income for a farm household is around shs. 200/-, the cost of installing a 
private connection is still out of reach for many. 
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At present there is no charge on water drawn from the communal 
watering points. When Phase Two and the treatment plant are completed, 
each household using the watering points will be charged shs.4/- per month, 
regardless of how much water they use. It is hoped that in future, parti-
cularly if there are more private connections, it will be possible to 
charge people for the amount of water they actually use, rather than just a 
standard amount for everyone. 
The communal watering points are located at estimated intervals 
of 1.5 km, but emphasis has been placed on locating them at markets, schools 
are other sites of dense population. Field observations have indicated 
that some of the watering points are poorly sited in terms of the population 
they are intended to serve. Indeed, some of the watering points are within 
about 50 metres of a stream, and are thus unlikely to be of great benefit. 
There are strong suspicions that extraneous factors have influenced the poor 
siting of some of the points. Watering points should of course be located 
where they will most efficiently serve the needs of the surrounding human and 
livestock population. 
The management of the communal watering points, which is left • 
entirely in the hands of the local users, has been a serious problem. Indeed, 
management problems could jeopardise the success of the entire project. For 
example, in December 1974 more than half of the watering points were not 
functioning because the taps had been broken or destroyed. There were long 
delays in arranging and carrying out repairs, and as a result water was left 
flowing, sometimes for as long as a month, wasting water and in some cases 
causing serious soil erosion. 
Phase Two of the project, when complete, will provide for the 
extension of the distribution system and the installation of 17 more reservoirs 
with a total capacity of 675.0 m . The treatment works will also be expanded 
to provide sedimentation tanks and chlorination and mixing chambers. Because 
of shortages and delays in the delivery of materials, the treatment works 
were not completed on schedule, but they are expected to be ready in late 
1975. 
Impact on the Local Population 
The direct effect of this scheme is the provision of good quality 
water in convenient locations for livestock and domestic use. Housewives 
will be relieved of the burden of hauling water for distances often as great 
as three to five kilometres return, and will have more time for other 
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activities. It is hoped that there will be a significant increase in the 
number of grade cattle and pigs in the area, and that the quality of the 
cattle will be enhanced since they will no longer have to walk long distances 
in search of water. Finally, new income-generating activities may become 
possible, such as irrigated vegetable growing. 
Since the water project has been in operation for such a short 
time, it is difficult to find quantifiable evidence of economic benefits. 
However, available data show that there has been a continuous rise in milk 
production since the implementation of Phase One of the project. It is 
Government policy to expect a water scheme to show a reasonable economic 
return after it has been in operation for about three years, but this will 
require coordinated action from the extension service, from other Government 
agencies and from the local farmers. The local people must be taught how to 
help maintain the purity of the water supply and minimise wastage and how to 
take advantage of the potential economic benefits. 
Supplying piped water to a rural area is bound to have both 
negative and positive effects on the productivity and welfare of the 
different groups of people living in the area. For example, in Tetu-Thegenge 
burst pipes have been quite a common problem which causes soil erosion and 
damage to crops. In most cases the Government is compelled to compensate farmers 
for this type of damage. 
Repair and maintenance of the system is inadequate for a number 
of reasons. For one thing, supervision of pipeline maintenance is not 
sufficient to ensure that breaks are detected promptly. At the time of the 
survey, there were only two maintenance personnel for the'entire system, and 
four or five would appear to be a more adequate number. In addition, delays 
in receiving spare parts have added to the difficulties. These comments are 
made in order to illustrate that, although the water system has certainly 
brought economic benefits to the area, it has also created certain economic 
and environmental problems. 
This water development scheme should not be introduced into the 
area in isolation, but rather as an important component of a comprehensive, 
integrated development programme. As a crucial aspect of such a programme, 
a baseline study should have been conducted to determine the potential impact 
of the new water supply on the population in terms of health and economic 
productivity. Unfortunately, such a study has not been carried out. 
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MBERE WATER SUPPLY 
Introduction 
Mbere Division in Embu District is a difficult region geographi-
cally. It is surrounded by rivers - the Thuchi River to the north, the Tana 
River to the east, the Tana and Thiba Rivers to the south and the Rupingazi 
River to the west - but the only permanent stream which runs through the 
Division is the Ena River in Evurori, the northernmost Location in the 
Division. Rainfall is insufficient throughout the area, and dry periods, 
when most of. the streams dry up, are experienced during large parts of the 
year. The area is mostly underlain by the old metasediments of the 
Precambrian Period. 
There are two main water schemes in Mbere, the Ena River Water 
Scheme and the Thuchi River Water Scheme. The Ena project is by far the 
biggest and most sophisticated in the area. It covers the more densely 
populated and fertile areas of Nthawa, Mavuria and Mbeti Locations, where 
cash crop production has been planned, and the lower parts of Mavuria and 
Mbeti where group ranches have been proposed. The scheme is intended to 
serve a population of 25,000 people and 12,100 stock units. 
The Thuchi scheme will supply the drier parts of Evurori Location 
and Ishiara. This scheme is small and simple. It is designed to serve 
some 2,000 people living far from the permanent streams by extending the 
existing gravity pipeline about eight kilometres from the Thuchi River via 
Ishiara Market to Kamutu where there is a storage tank. Besides these two 
major projects, there are two smaller ones: the repair of an existing small 
water supply at Kerie and an extension of the supply at Iriatune. 
Several factors were taken into account in siting these water 
supply schemes, including population density, scarcity of water, the potential 
for economic development and the likely ability to pay for the water. Areas 
within two miles of permanent streams were excluded. 
Economic Aspects 
Due to the limited number of permanent streams in Mbere, people 
walk eight kilometres and over each way to fetch water during the dry seasons. 
This means that during dry periods a good part of the day is spent' fetching 
water. It also means that the amount of water obtained for household use is 
less than optimal, and this has contributed to a high incidence of disease 
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in the area with negative effects on the labour supply. It is hoped that 
increased water supplies will make possible a higher standard of health 
and improved labour productivity. 
In Mbere land preparation and planting are done during the dry 
season, just when the farm family is forced to spend a good deal of the day 
fetching water. In particular, the women who are responsible for fetching 
water are also the primary source of agricultural labour, so that scarcity 
of water creates a serious farm labour bottleneck. Children also spend a 
great deal of time fetching water, so that once a more convenient supply is 
provided this responsibility will be lightened and they may find it easier 
to attend school. School attendance would also be increased if fewer days 
were lost due to illness. In the long run^of course, better education for 
the children will be of crucial importance for the general development of 
the area. 
It is not possible to calculate a full cost-benefit ratio for the 
water development schemes in Mbere because the economic benefits of the new 
water supplies cannot be quantified. It Is obvious, however, that the 
provision of water is vital for development In the area. An attempt has 
been made to calculate one economic benefit of the water development schemes -
the resolution of the labour bottleneck which has acted as a constraint on 
increased agricultural production. This has been done by considering a 
number of factors and making comparisons with similar areas where intensive 
surveys have been carried out. 
It was found that for each family In Mbere at least 100 man days 
a year are spent collecting water. More time for this task is required 
during the dry season, just when labour is needed for land clearing, land 
preparation and planting. The value in increased production of additions to 
the agricultural labour force has been estimated at shs.2/- per man day, so 
with an estimated 3,500 families living in the areas served by the water 
projects, the value of Increased production would be shs.700,000/- per year 
if no time were spent collecting water. This figure should be compared with 
the total cost of the projects of over shs.3,290,000/-. Of course, this is 
only a consideration of the increases to the labour force which might result 
from the water projects. A more thorough analysis of the potential economic 
benefits of the schemes would require three or four years. 
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Initial estimates of the overall costs of the water projects 
in Mbere Division, Including construction as well as operating costs, were 
based on field surveys, plan sketches and comparisons with similar Instal-
lations recently constructed elsewhere. The estimates were as follows:-
Scheme Construction Costs Cshs) Operating Costs (shs) 
Ena (Slakago, Mavuria, 
Mbeti) 1,385,000 90,000 
Thuchi 49,000 
Total 1,434,000 90,000 
These initial projections proved to be much too low: the present estimate, 
based on costs already Incurred and estimated future costs , Is that the total 
project on completion will cost at least shs.3,230,000/-. The increase in 
projected costs can be attributed to the rising price of materials and earlier 
underestimations. The cost of the project per head of population served will 
be at least shs.100/-. 
It was recommended that water users, should be charged rates which 
would help pay for operation and maintenance of the schemes, and repay the 
loans used to finance construction. Although most people in Mbere are not 
accustomed to paying for water, a survey revealed that a number of users, 
such as shop owners., butchers and bar owners, were already paying. It was 
found that retail shops used from 13 to 24 gallons of water a day, butcheries 
up to 30 gallons and hars up to 70 gallons. Each 4-gallon debe cost from 15 
to 80 cents, depending on the location and the season, so that the owner of 
a retail shop was spending up to shs.300/- annually for water. 
For the Ena River Project, detailed proposals were formulated for 
a system of rates and methods of collection. The rates are tied closely to 
the consumers' ability to pay which means that only certain types of con-
sumers are charged for water at all - private traders, group ranches and the 
Mbere Farmers.1 Cooperative Society. Ranches will be charged according to the 
number of cattle owned, and the Cooperative Society will be charged according 
to the number of members., with rates deducted from sales receipts. House-
holds with private connections will be charged according to the Ministry of 
Water Development's scale of tariffs The proposed water rates are as 
follows: -
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Retail shops 
Butcheries 
Bars, coffee shops 
Group ranches, per stock 
shs 180/- per annum 
shs 360/- per annum 
shs 600/- per annum 
unit 
Mbere Farmers' Cooperative 
shs 12/- per annum 
Society, per member 
Private connections 
shs 20/- per annum 
shs 180/- per annum 
When the project is complete, the projected revenue will be about shs 18,000/-
per annum. 
The Ena River Water Scheme 
Water Availability: As shown in Table 4 and as indicated by the flow 
characteristics of the Ena River at RGS 4EC3 given in Table 5, the highest 
recorded discharge at that station is 0.14 cusecs and the lowest is 0.009 cusecs. 
The station is not yet rated, and fear has. been expressed that there may not 
be enough water to supply areas beyond Klritirl (See map.). Although further 
investigation is required, the data available suggest that in fact the Ena 
water supply may not be sufficient for the needs of the area it is intended 
to serve. If this proves, to be the case, then alternative sources of water 
will have to be found, perhaps, from the main branch of the Thiba River 
further downstream or from earth dams, boreholes or wells. 
Water Quality: Table 6 gives the chemical analysis of a sample of water 
taken at the Ena River intake. It indicates, that the water is. of low mineral 
content, neutral and soft. The suspended sediment analysis given in Table 2 
indicates a concentration of suspended sediment material in the water of 2.4 
mg/1. There is slight organic pollution which may require treatment before 
the water is suitable for domestic consumption. Further treatment is 
recommended to remove colour and turbidity. 
a well at Kathira near Kiriua which is near Kiritiri Market. According to 
this analysis, ground water in the area is neutral and soft but contains 
excessive amounts of iron and is also polluted and highly turbid. To render 
it potable this water should undergo chemical treatment. In general, a 
thorough study is needed of the underground water resources in Mbere to 
discover the potential quantities available, the quality of the water and 
the economic implications of its exploitation. 
Table 7 gives the chemical analysis of a water sample taken from 
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Water Development and Utilisation 
The feasibility studies and design for this scheme were completed 
in 1971. The project was to be constructed in phases - Phase One was the 
construction of the intake, works, and the supply of water to Siakago Township. 
The scheme is based on an intake near the 4,000 foot contour line on the Ena 
River. From here the water Is: pumped to a reservoir 8 kilometres west of 
Siakago which, is 500 feet higher. The storage tank has a capacity of 50,000 
gallons. The. .main line for this phase of the project required about 16 
kilometres of pipeline; a total of 90 kilometres of pipeline was used in all. 
Communal watering points were to be constructed in the densely 
populated areas no more than two miles apart. However, at the time of our 
survey only four communal watering points had actually been installed on an 
experimental basis. It Is planned to provide, many more when the project is 
completed. 
After Phase One is completed, work will start on the Nthambu-
Kawenindi extension and then the Mbeti. supply. The development of later 
stages will depend on the. completion of the main line and the quantity of 
water available from the Ena River. 
The consumption of water was estimated at five gallons per capita 
(per unit), or a total of 130,000 gallons a day. The feasibility studies 
showed that the present scheme of pumping water from the Ena River is the 
most economical way to meet this demand. The few boreholes In the area could 
not begin to provide, this amount of water, and even If it were possible to 
find sufficient catchment areas — which It is not - the cost of constructing 
storage tanks to meet this level of demand would be prohibitive. 
Thuchi Water Supply 
Wat er Availability: Table 4 indicates that the highest recorded discharge 
at the intake point for this scheme is 337.32 cusecs and the lowest is 0.80 
cusecs. This means that the water supply may be inadequate during the low 
flow periods, but this problem should be minimised If the storage tanks are 
fully utilised. 
Water Quality: Table 8 shows that the water in Thuchi River is neutral and 
very soft, and has a low mineral content, but some traces of organic pollution 
have been detected (as revealed by the level of absorbed oxygen). Table 2 
shows that the concentration of suspended sediment is 15.9 mg/1. The chemical 
analysis shows that the water must be treated to render it fit for human 
consumption, and appropriate treatment works are under construction. 
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Water Development and Utilisation 
The Thuchi River water scheme is a gravity system, so that there 
are no diesel generators at the intake. However, the cost of the project will 
evidently be much higher than originally estimated. The Catholic Mission 
associated with the Diocese of Meru, receiving funds from Italy, has provided 
the bulk of the support for the project in the form of material and personnel. 
The Mission has donated a total of shs 300,000/- in material and cash, and the 
Kenya Government has contributed shs 100,000/-, mainly from N0RAD funds. In the 
1973/74- financial year shs 186,915/- was spent on the project, and by December 
1974 a further shs 130,208/-. It is expected that the Kenya Government may have 
to spend a great deal more than it has up until now by the time the project is 
completed. 
It was learned from field observations that the pipes for this project 
have been laid at less than the minimum prescribed depth due to labour shortages 
and the rocky soil in the area. This may well lead to burst pipes in the future 
with the serious environmental and economic consequences described earlier. 
Another potential problem is that these pipes were made and tested in Italy and 
the very different climatic conditions in Mbere might lead to a shortened life 
expectancy for the pipes. 
Delays in obtaining materials at the site have caused considerable 
delay in the implementation of the project. Sometimes work has had to be suspended 
for as long as one month. These delays have sometimes been caused by late orders 
and sometimes by delays in passing through customs at Mombasa. For future projects 
of this type s a much more efficient system for ordering materials and delivering 
them at the site should be employed. 
CONCLUSION 
The two SRDP areas discussed in this chapter, Tetu-Thegenge and 
Mbere, are quite different socially, economically and geographically, and these 
differences mean that the introduction of water development schemes is bound to 
have different effects in the two areas. Tetu-Thegenge is a high rainfall area, 
suitable for many types of farming, and Mbere is a semi-arid area with'only 
limited suitability for crop production. Tetu-Thegenge is also much more densely 
populated than Mbere at the present time. Agricultural production in Tetu-
Thegenge is also much more highly developed than in Mbere, where, due to the 
harsh ecological conditions, possibilities for rapid economic development are 
limited unless new technologies are introduced. 
Because Tetu-Thegenge is already more highly developed, water schemes 
introduced in the area will not bring about any immediate dramatic economic 
changes unless they are coordinated with other development projects. Economic 
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development will take place with increases in agricultural productivity-
brought about by improved inputs and machinery. Water development can help to 
enhance dairy production and irrigated vegetable crops. Poultry production 
should also be encouraged on a larger scale. 
In Mbere, on the other hand, the completion of the water development 
projects could bring about impressive economic changes if carefully planned and 
if the local people are suitably motivated. There will not be sufficient water 
to introduce irrigated farming, but Government projects for ranching and the 
introduction of grade cattle will be more likely to succeed if water is 
available. More research should be conducted on drought resistant crops and 
varieties, if increased crop production is to be encouraged in the area. 
In Tetu, where the water supply is already in operation, there 
have been maintenance problems, particularly in regard to the communal 
watering points. No specific individual or group is entrusted with the 
responsibility for looking after the watering points, and half the taps are 
broken by negligence or vandalism. One possible way to maintain the watering 
points would be to employ the owner of the plot on which a point is located 
for a small payment (say, shs 15/-a month) to see that the taps are not 
damaged. 
It is also evident that poorer farmers are using less water than 
the wealthier ones, so that it is not equitable for all users to pay the same 
rate. One solution to this problem might be to charge each household 
according to the number of people in the family and the number of livestock 
owned. This problem will disappear, of course, when all farms have private 
connections and the use of water is metered. 
Water in both Tetu and Mbere is slightly polluted and needs 
treatment to make it safe for human consumption, but this problem will be solved 
when the treatment plants presently under construction are completed. Apart 
from the Ena River scheme, there seems to be adequate water for human and 
livestock consumption, but not for irrigated farming. 
The delays in constructing the systems in both SRDP areas can be 
attributed to a number of factors. Late delivery of materials has been due 
to late orders, delays in shipping and delays in clearing at Mombasa, 
especially in passing through customs. Increases in the price of materials 
required additional funds which could not be raised at short notice. Also 
during the rainy seasons, especially in Tetu, materials could not be delivered 
to some sites because the roads became impassable, and this halted construction 
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in some instances for several weeks. Finally, there is evidence of some 
cases of inefficiency, and there were unnecessary delays in giving tenders 
for construction to contractors. 
In conclusion, any evaluation of the impact of a water develop-
ment scheme requires baseline studies carried out before, during and after the 
introduction of the water system. These studies should be of an inter-
disciplinary nature, taking into account the environmental, health, social and 
economic implications of the introduction of piped water supplies. It must 
also be stressed that these water schemes should not be introduced in 
isolation if they are to have significant economic benefits. Rather they 
should be introduced as one aspect of a comprehensive development programme 
including other projects designed to exploit the potential benefits of the 
water supply. 
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Table 1. Chemical analysis of a water sample taken at the intake point on 
the Zaina River, Tetu-Thegenge, November 23, 1974. 
COLOUR 
DEPOSIT 
TASTE 
PH 
TURBIDITY 
ODOUR 
ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY AT 25°c (Micro Mhos/cm ) 
BICARBONATE (HCO^) 
CARBONATE (CO ") 
CHLORIDE (CL1) 
SULPHATES (SO ") 
NITRATE (NO ') o 
NITRITE (NO ') 
FLUORIDE (F1) 
IAN IONS 
SODIUM (Na') 
POTASSIUM (K1 ) 
CALCIUM (Ca") 
MAGNESIUM (Mg) 
IRON TOTAL (Fe) 
AMMONIUM (NH4' ) 
MANGANESE(Mn) 
HEAVY METALS (Pb, Cu,Zn) 
£ CATIONS 
HARDNESS CARBONATE (CaCoJ o 
HARDNESS NON-CARBONATE (CaCo„) o 
HARDNESS TOTAL (CaCo ) o 
BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND 5 DAYS @ 20 C 
TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS RESIDUE DRIED AT 180°C 
TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS AFTER IGNITION 
Co^ FREE 
SiO 2 
0 2 ABSORBED 
50 
SILT 
7.1 
19 
NIL 
37 
Mg/1 
17 
NIL 
4 
4 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
25 
2.1 
2.2 
4. 8 
1.9 
6.0 
0.3 
0.2 
1.0 
18 
14 
6 
20 
50 
3 
15 
6.4 
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Table 2. Results of suspended sediment analysis. 
SAMPLE SOURCE SAMPLING DATE SILT CONTENT MG/L 
ENA RIVER 28-11-74- 2.4 
THUCHI RIVER 28-11-74 15.9 
ZAINA RIVER (INTAKE) 23-11-74 46.9 
ZAINA RIVER (WATERING POINT) 22-11-74 46.8 
Table 3. Chemical analysis of a sample from the Zaina River taken at a 
watering point on November 22 , 1974. 
COLOUR Less than 5 
DEPOSIT Silt 
TASTE 
PH 6.9 
TURBIDITY NIL 
ODOUR NIL 
ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY AT 25°C (Micro Mhos/CM3) 33 
BICARBONATE (HO,') 3 
Mg/1 
15 
CARBONATE (CO ") NIL 
CHLORIDE (CL') 4 
SULPHATES (SO^") NIL 
NITRATE (N03') NIL 
NITRITE (NO ') 0.01 
FLUORIDE (F') NIL 
£ ANIONS 19 
SODIUM (NA') 2.8 
POTASSIUM (K') 2.0 
CALCIUM (Ca") 2.4 
MAGNESIUM (Mg) 3.4 
IRON (TOTAL)(Fe) 0.3 
AMMONIUM (NH4') NIL 
MANGANESE (MN) NIL 
HEAVY METALS (Pb, Cu, Zn) Not detected 
£ CATIONS 11 
HARDNESS - CARBONATE (CaCOg) 20 
HARNESS 'NON-CARBONATE (CaCo^ NIL 
HARDNESS TOTAL (CaCo„) 20 
BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND 5 DAYS @ 20°C 
13-16 
Table 3. Contd. 
TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS RESIDUE DRIED AT 180 
TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS AFTER IGNITION 
CO2FREE 
SIO2 
0 2 ABSORBED 
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Table 5. Flow characteristics of the Ena River (4 Ec3). 
DATE GAUGE-HEIGHT (M.) DISCHARGE (Cusecs) 
1. 13-2-7 3 0.020 
2- 2-3-73 0.17 0.025 
3. 3-4-73 0.13 0.0092 
4. 27-6-73 0.305 0.143 
5. 2-8-73 0.26 0.10 
6. 2-1-74 0.22 0.0366 
7. 3-2-75 0.16 0.0297 
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Table 8. Chemical analysis of a water sample taker, at the intake point on 
the Thuchi River, Mbere,on'November'28, '1974. 
COLOUR 
DEPOSIT 
TASTE 
Less than 5 
Vegetable Matter 
6.9 
TURBIDITY NIL 
ODOUR NIL 
ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY 25°C (Micro Mhos/cm ) 43 
Mg/1 
BICARBONATE (HCO^) 22 
CARBONATE (CO" ) NIL 
CHLORIDE (CL') 4 
SULPHATES (SO ") 1 
NITRATE (NO^) NIL 
NITRITE (NO^) 0.2 
FLUORIDE (F') NIL 
SANIONS 27 
SODIUM (Na') 4.8 
POTASSIUM (K') 2.0 
CALCIUM (Ca") 3.2 
MAGNESIUM (Mg) 1.4 
IRON (TOTAL) (Fe) 0.8 
AMMONIUM (NH4') NIL 
MANGANESE (Mn) 0.1 
HEAVY METALS (Pb,Cu,Zn) Not detected 
^CATIONS 12 
HARDNESS CARBONATE (CaCo^ 14 
HARDNESS NON-CARBONATE (CaCo3) NIL 
HARDNESS TOTAL (CaCOg) 14 
BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND 5 DAYS AT 20°"C -
TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS RESIDUE DRIED AT 180°C 35 
TOTAL DISSOLVED SOLIDS AFTER IGNITION -
CO FREE 6 
sio2 15 
02ABS0RBED 2.1 
13 - 22 IDS/OP 12 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Hove, A.R.T. and Ongweny G.S.O. "An Outline of Kenya's Groundwater 
Quality." Journal of Eastern African Research and Development. 
4_ (1) 1974. 
2. Jakobsen, B., Ascroft, J. and Padfield, H. The Case for Rural Water 
In Kenya: An Explanatory Study of the Effects of a Small-Scale 
Piped Water Scheme for Household and Animal Consumption. Paper 
read at the Workshop on Strategies for Improving Rural Welfare, 
held in Nairobi on May 31 to June 3, 1971. Occasional Paper 
No. 4, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 
1971. 
3. Kenya. Rural Water Supply Programme I and II. Progress Report, January 
1 to March 31, 1973. April 1973. 
4. Kenya. Minor Urban Water Supply Programme. Overall Plan of Implemen-
tation. 1973, 
5. Kenya. Development Plan for the Period 1974-1978. Nairobi, Government 
Printer, 1974. 
6. Kenya. Rural Water Supply Programme I and II. Progress Report, 
October 1 to December 31, 1973. February 1974. 
7. Kenya. Rural Water Supply Programme I and II. Progress Report, 
January 1 to March 31, 1974. June 1974. 
8. Kenya. Rural Water Supply Programme I and II. Progress Report, 
April 1 to June 30, 1974. August 1974. 
9. Ongweny, G.S.O. The Significance of the Geographic and Geologic Factors 
in the Variation of Groundwater Chemistry in Kenya. M.Sc. thesis, 
University of Nairobi, 1973.• • 
10. Ongweny, G.S.O. A Regional Assessment of the Problems of Ground Water 
Quality in Kenya. Paper presented at the Workshop on Environment 
and Rural Development in East Africa, held in Nairobi on November 
•11-30, 1974. 
11. Prabakhar, D.R.L. Kenya's Water Resources, A General Assessment: 
Current Research Programme and Future Needs. Nairobi, Water 
Development Department, 1970. 
12. World Health Organisation. Kenya Government Sectoral Study Report 
for Community and Rural Water Supply, Sewerage and Water Pollution 
Control. Reports No. 7 and 16. Brazzaville, 1971, 1972, 1973. 

CHAPTER FOURTEEN IDS/OP 12 
THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS AND THE 
SPECIAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
INTRODUCTION 
Project Manuals of the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) 
generally classify the adjudication process as a 'supporting service'. This 
is in line with a broader and long-standing Government policy, namely that 
reform of African land tenure systems is a prerequisite to rapid agricultural 
development. The essence of this view, which is most consistently formulated 
in the Swynnerton Plan of 19541, is that customary tenure must be transformed 
from a community based to an individualised system before it can provide a 
basis for sound agricultural planning and management practice. More specifically 
agronomic experts argued that individualisation would cure certain alleged 
ills of customary tenure, namely its diffuseness and tendency to encourage 
fragmentation, incessant disputes, and infinite subdivision of holdings. 
In order to achieve this goal, it was recommended that a three-tiered 
process involving first the adjudication of claims, secondly the consolidation 
of holdings and thirdly their registration be undertaken in all those areas 
still under customary tenure. The adjudication process was expected to define 
clearly once and for all what interest each person had in what land and thus 
clarify what was seen as an area of much confusion and internal conflict. It 
was this diffuseness in customary tenure that was seen as a source of disputes.-
The consolidation process, however, was expected to eliminate fragmentation - a 
factor that greatly reduced returns to labour and time in customary land use. 
Besides, the aggregation of scattered holdings in single units was seen as a 
more sensible basis for farm-planning and the delivery of extension service advice 
The registration process as the final stage would confirm the above processes 
and thus render African-owned land 'secure' and therefore an acceptable basis 
for generating agricultural credit, and an incentive to long-term capital 
investment. Furthermore, a state-guaranteed record of this kind would make 
it easier to regulate customary inheritance procedures and thus make it 
possible to control sub-economic parcelation of holdings. 
In evaluating the impact of land adjudication on the SRDP therefore, 
some caution is necessary (a) not to isolate this process from the total 
1- See R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African 
Agriculture, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1954. 
2. The word 'fragmentation' is used to mean ownership of scattered fragment 
not contiguous to one another. This is in contradistinction to 'sub-economic 
parcelation' which merely refers to the relationship between size of holding and 
its optimum potential. 
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Tenure Reform Programme (TRP) of which it is merely a 
phase, and 
(b) to isolate general questions about the relationship between 
the T.R.P. and agricultural development from specific issues 
that have arisen from the interaction between the farmer 
and the SRDP. 
The discussion next following will be limited to those SRDP areas that were 
visited by the author, or in respect of which relevant data were available from 
other members of the evaluation team, namely Kwale, Mbere, Tetu and Kapenguria. 
THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS IN SRDP AREAS 
The three-tiered T.R.P. processes outlined above remained standard 
procedure for the whole country from 1956 to 1968 when it became quite clear 
that this was not simply inappropriate in certain areas, but also that the 
consolidation phase was extremely unpopular. It was inappropriate in such 
areas as the Mwereni sections of Kwale, much of Lower Mbere and practically 
the whole of Kapenguria, where the dominant land use pattern was basically 
3 
pastoral and therefore not as fragmented as in most agricultural areas. 
According to a senior land adjudication official in Coast Province, consolidation 
was unpopular because it did not take into account the people's notions of 
land ownership and distribution^ a factor which goes to the root of the entire 
raison d'etre of the Tenure Reform Programme and to which we shall return later. 
Consequently new legislation was passed in 1968 to enable TRP personnel 
to by-pass the consolidation phase and thus register adjudicated holdings 5 
directly. The original intention was to apply this new Act mainly to pastoral 
areas or to those areas to which existing legislation was as yet not applied. 
In the event, however, the new Act was applied to all areas in which adjudication 
was not complete whether they were under the old Act or not. The only exceptions 
were areas such as the Taita Hills in which fragmentation had reached rather 
absurd limits. This meant that of the four SRDP areas under discussion only the 
Tetu T.R.P. was carried out under the old regime. Indeed the Tetu programme was 
one of the first ever to be undertaken in the country, having been done during 
1952-56 under Emergency conditions.6 Of the other three, Kwale and Mbere started 
See the recommendations contained in the Report of the Mission on Land 
Consolidation and Registration, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1965. 
4. Personal Communication, Senior Land Adjudication Officer, Coast Province, 
23/11/74. 
5- The old Act is the Land Consolidation Act (Cap.283), Laws of Kenya (passed 
originally in 1959). The new Act is tne Land Adjudication Act (Cap.284), Laws of 
Kenya. 
For a full discussion of the Nyeri Tenure Reform Programme see M.P.K. 
Sorrensen, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1967,Ch.VIII. 
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in ea.ly 1970 and Kapenguria in late 1971- Table 1 below indicates the progress 
which has been achieved in-each of these areas -as of October 31, 1974. 
Table 1. Process of land adjudication. 
SRDP AREA LOCATION ADJUDICATION 
SECTION ' 
STATUS OR TRP 
KWALE KIKONENI 
MSAMBWENI 
MWERENI 
SHIMBA SOUTH 
Bumbani 'A' 
Mrima 
Mwananyamala 
Bumbani 'B' 
Bumbani 'C' 
Mw an an as ini 
Mwagunda 
) Registration under 
) individual title 
) 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication in progress 
Mafisini 
Suirazi 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Mwereni Trust 
Lands 
Registration under 
group title 
Mkongani 'A' 
Mkongani T B1 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
MBERE MBETI 
MAVURIA 
EVURORE 
NTHAWA 
Kiamuringa 
Gachuriri 
Gachoka 
Mb it a 
Riacina 
Reg. under individual 
title 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Kithunthiri 
Kirima 
Mavuria 
Gichiche 
Kiambere 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Nguthi 
Kerie 
Gachabari 
Evurore 
Kamazandi 
Kasavari 
Iriaitune 
Nthambu 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
Adjudication in progress 
) Adjudication planned in 
) 1975/76 period 
Gitibari 
Siakago 
Riandu 
Gangara 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication complete 
Adjudication in progress 
Source: Land Adjudication and Registry Records. 
Two very general observations may be made about this brief review. The 
first is that except for Tetu and parts of Kwale the full T.R.P. was not complete 
in many of the areas under discussion before the commencement of SRDP. This 
means that many of the agricultural experiments discussed elsewhere in this 
Report were and are being undertaken essentially on traditional tenure founda-
tions. This per se would not have been problematic, as was implied, for instance, 
in the 19 72 Special Report on Kwale , had it not been for the fact that the 
latter programme was substantially pre-dated by the former both in concept and 
national implementation. This has generated two important areas of conflict. 
On the 
one hand, the administrative machinery associated with T.R.P. in the 
country, if not in the specific areas concerned, appeared to be much more established 
and therefore far more inflexible than that of the SRDP. On the other hand there 
were many aspects of the SRDP package, e.g. the issue of credit and farm-planning, 
for which individual tenure was considered indespensable by many SRDP personnel. 
The mere fact that T.R.P. was not complete before SRDP in many areas, therefore, 
had very important implications for the flow of these resources, not simply as 
Information on Kapenguria was obtained from Mr. John Reynolds, a member 
of the SRDP Evaluation team. 
3- See GrC.M,. Mutiso's evaluation of the Kwale SRDP in Appendix B-14 of the 
1972 I.D-S. SRDP Report. 
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between various SRDP areas but within individual areas as well. Both of these 
factors presented problems in relation to interdepartmental cooperation and the 
coordination of specific experiments which we discuss fully below. 
The second general observation is that even in those areas where T.R.P. 
was complete, it was invariably carried out without the benefit of compulsory 
consolidation since the only way "that this could be achieved under the new Act 
9 
was through voluntary exchange of fragments. But as I have pointed out elsewhere , 
this system almost never yields results and this for reasons not only of cultural 
notions of land distribution alluded to above, but also because of the range of soil 
types and ecological variations within specific T.R.P. areas. This means that T.R.P. 
would in these areas have little impact on the degree of fragmentation, and the 
location and size of holdings. In the Bumbani 'A' , Mrima and Mwananyamala sections 
of Kwale SRDP for which data were available, the registry records showed clearly that 
each person held an average of at least three parcels of land most of which were not 
even contiguous to each other."1"0 The size of holdings comes out clearly in the 
analysis contained in Table 2 below. According to that Table 69 per cent of all 
registered parcels in Bumbani 'A' are three hectares or less. In Mrima the figure 
is 64 per cent and in Mwananyamala 57 per cent. 
Table 2. Size and distribution of land holdings in Kikoneni Location . 
SIZE IN HECTARES NUMBER OF HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY 
BUMBANI 'A' MRIMA MWANANYAMALA 
0 1 174 173 118 
1 2 248 172 134 
2 3 146 90 94 
3 4 94 75 53 
4 5 33 47 48 
5 6 26 36 34 
6 7 28 20 31 
7 8 5 14 17 
8 9 13 9 10 
9 - 10 7 8 12 
10 - 11 2 10 12 
11 - 12 1 4 6 
12 - 13 4 1 5 
13 - 14 Nil 2 6 
14 - 15 3 2 3 
15 - 16 Nil 1 3 
16 - 17 1 1 1 
17 - 18 1 2 3 
18 - 19 1 3 5 
19 - 20 3 3 Nil 
20 + 16 5 15 
OUT OF 811 OUT OF 678 OUT OF 610 
Source: 1973/74 Kwale SRDP Project Report and Annual Evaluation Review, Appendix B. 
9. In a report on Kenya's land tenure reform programme, to the Commission of 
Inquiry into Land Matters of the Government of Papua and New Guinea, September ,1973 , 
pp. 28ff. 
10. Indeed as GfC.M. Mutiso (ibid.) pointed out, there were even cases in which 
individual holdings were scattered in different sublocations in the SRDP area. 
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An obvious implication of these observations is that the impact of 
T.R.P. cannot be analysed entirely in terms of the Swynnerton formula since 
many of its structural prerequisites have not been realised in these areas, 
except perhaps in Tetu. There are nonetheless, several important problems 
that have emerged in the course of the implementation of SRDP under these 
tenure conditions which merit special attention. 
EFFECT OF T.R.P. Oil SRDP 
Land Use Policy and / dm. ini strati on 
The first of these problems relates to land use policy and administra-
tion in the SRDP areas. The first point to make is that the presence of T.R.P. 
personnel, consisting of no less than thirty people and incorporating local 
and traditional leadership, meant that in most cases there were two separate 
authorities operating within each SRDP area both of which had at their disposal 
a lot of power over the same subject-matter, i.e. land. This differed from 
the situation in non-SRDP areas in that administrative and technical personnel 
in these cases have never pretended to work as an integrated development machinery. 
Rather they have tended to work in a sectoral and fragmented manner, and 
consequently issues of interdepartmental coordination and consistency in the 
communication of agricultural and other development policy, strategy and plan 
implementati on have seldom arisen in the context of on-going development 
programmes. As much coordination as exists between these personnel has been 
confix. J O District and Sub-district Development Committee meetings at which 
various officers present a catalogue of on-going projects supported or supervised 
by their ministries. To the extent, therefore, that one of the cardinal 
principles of SRDP called for 'comprehensive rural development' "^deliberate 
steps needed to be takento mould T.R.P. and SRDP teams into an integrated 
and complementary whole. This was particularly crucial in those areas where 
T.R.P. was lagging behind SRDP experiments since the principles and objectives 
of the latter needed to be understood by personnel of the former in order that 
their choice of proprietary forms might not subvert SRDP. Our investigations, 
however, show very little attempt to do this and as a result some important 
SRDP experiments floundered for lack of appreciation of what each team was 
trying to accomplish. Perhaps the most glaring manifestation of this was in 
the Mbere SRDP area, particularly in relation to the attempts to establish 
group ranching schemes in Gacavari, Gichiche, Iruma, Muchonoke, Kangara, Ngaru, 
Mihiriga and other areas. 
11. See 1972 Evaluation, p.3. 
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The following areas of confusion emerge from the data available. 
In the first instance it was quite clear that T.R.P. personnel were prepared 
to adjudicate the SRDP are... on the same basis and according to the same 
principles as were used in the earlier schemes in upper Mbere. Upper Mbere 
is basically an agricultural area and the system of land use there is quite 
intensive as compared to the drier more pastoral SRDP area. It was thus natural 
for T.R.P. personnel to adjudicate on the basis of individual rather than group 
title as could have been done under the new Act referred to above. The problem 
seems to be that no adequate steps were taken to explain this alternative way 
of owning registered land to the people, particularly in the light of the ranching 
experiments that SRDP personnel had planned for this area. Consequently a lot 
of time and effort went into the adjudication of individual claims, even though 
there was ample evidence to show that ownership and control of land in Lower 
Mbere was still quite definitely centred on clans. Indeed much of the time 
was spent on the allocation of land to clan members rather than adjudication of 
claims stricto sensu. This is evident from the procedure followed by T.R.P. 
personnel which first involved the adjudication of clan lands followed by the 
identification by clan elders of 'individual' holdings. 
In the second instance, SRDP personnel, however, were quite clear 
in their own minds that much of the area should be developed as group ranches. 
At a meeting called at Siakago on October 9, 1972, local elders, members of 
parliament and SRDP personnel had worked out proposals for the establishment 
of a group ranch at Muchonoke. This was followed later with constant exhorta-
tions from range management officials in an attempt to convince the people that 
ranching was their best alternative. On one such occasion the District Range 
Officer assured Chiefs and Sub-chiefs that^ranching in /your/ area is the 
greatest and foremost solution to _/your/ lack of adequate health". He added 
that "this has been surveyed and ascertained by economic experts. So you 
should have no doubts whatsoever when we ask you to establish ranches in your 
locations." 
The fact that adjudication was proceeding on the basis of individual 
title greatly irritated SRDP personnel who found this an obstacle to the sound 
economic planning of the area. The Area Co-ordinator complained that it was 
"contrary to development planning for the future of the wananchi in this non-
13 crop potential area". The reason is that adjudication on the basis of individual 
12. See 195/Range/1/11/14 d. 21/5/73, DRO to Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. 
13. See MBR/SRDP AGR 2/10/133 d. 27/9/74 Area Coordinator to Land 
Adjudication Officer; also 221/Range/18/315 from Provincial Range Officer to 
LAO. d. 27/9/74. 
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title meant that these ranches could not be organised around the legal frame-
work for the administration of'group' lands set out in the Land (Group 
14 Representatives) Act 1968. It was still possible, of course, to organise 
15 
co-operative ranches, but this alternative for some reason or other was not 
acceptable to range management officials."'"6 Instead they insisted on unilateral 
cancellation of all individual entries in the a.1 judication regJster and their 17 substitution with group title - a proposition which the Area-Co-ordinator 
considered "an illegal imposition unless they the people were themselves 
18 
willing and did so out of spontaneous urge". When finally the Muchonoke Ranch 
failed to take off, the District Range Officer attributed this to the fact that 
"land was adjudicated on individual basis and would-be members were not ready 
to revoke their individual title deeds in favour of one covering the whole •U ti 19 ranch." 
It is quite clear from this debate that there was no consensus between 
T.R.P, and SRDP personnel as to what the relationship between tenure and land 
use planning should be. One might even detect among SRDP personnel themselves 
a certain amount of uncertainty and confusion as to what alternative legal 
forms were available, or even whether this excessive legalism was necessary 
at all given the structure of access to land use in Mbere itself! The 
explanation for this inter-departmental conflict goes further than merely lack 
of consensus in the field. T.R.P. personnel, as one official put it, had their 
own 'targets' to reach. These were 'national level' prescriptions to which they 
were bound to comply. As far as we could gather, these targets were reckoned 
m terms of the quantity of parcels they were able to adjudicate in any given 
P-.riod of time rather than the quality of the work in terms of the developmental 
needs of an area. As far as these officials were concerned the economic arguments 
of SRDP personnel which, in a general sense, form part of the original raison ditre 
See Cap.287 Laws of Kenya and the regulations made thereunder, especially 
The Land (Group Representatives) (Prescribed Provisions) Order, LN 204/1969. 
15• In accordance with the Societies Act (Cap. 108), Kenya Laws, Revised 
Edition, 1970. 
The only reason the officials gave was that cooperative ranches can 
only operate through the purchase of shares and by leasing land from members 
and imposing admission fees. This was thought to be unpopular. In Gacavari 
and Gachiche where such cooperatives were tried, shares were being offered at 
Shs 200/- and 500/- respectively, even though admission fees were only Shs 5/-. 
• The DR0 argued that since the reasoning capacity of the people in 
Mbere was apparently still too narrow, administrators had a duty to direct them 
m this manner. See 204/Range/10/l/20 d. 23/10/73, DR0 to Provincial Director 
of Agricul :-re Eastern Province. 
18• See MBR/SRDP/AGR 2/10/74 d. 25/10/73 Area Co-ordinator to District 
Agricultural Officer. 
19. See 195/Range/l/ll/(72) d. 14/3/74 DR0 to AC. 
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of the T.R.P. in Kenya did not seem to have any relevance to their work! 
The only way in which SRDP personnel could have influenced the conduct of 
land adjudication would have been to lay before the people by way of well-
informed persuasion a programme that addressed itself not merely to the pattern 
of land use in the area but also to the tenure question. As it is, they did 
nothing of the kind and attempts to impose group registration antagonised not 
only the people but drove a wedge between certain SRDP personnel as well. 
The Issue of Credit and Farm Planning 
The second problem relates to the issue of credit, farm level 
planning and the deployment of extension service personnel. This is a major 
storm centre in the analysis of T.R.P. and agricultural development. In a 
recent paper we had occasion to point out that the transmission of farm 
planning advice and the issue of agricultural credit by private and public institu-
tions seem to take little account of the fact of individualisation or other-
wise of land tenure. On the question of credit we pointed out that land 
titles are now regarded merely as a necessary condition to a loan application, 
never as a sufficient one. We argued further that "in order to receive a 
loan what appears to count is the social status of the applicant and his 
20 
liquidity in the monetary system". This conclusion is by and large valid for 
most peasant agricultural areas of Kenya. No significant difference seems to 
emerge even in the light of the experimental nature of SRDP. In other words, 
title deeds do not seem to have been accepted as a sufficient condition for 
the provision of loans. As would be evident from Table 1 above, this means 
that there was a definite bias in public and private credit lending in favour 
of those areas in which the full T.R.P. was complete, e.g. Tetu, parts of Kwale 
and one section of Mbere, and only to those people who were in a position to 
offer substantial collaterals in the form of urban properties, salaries and 
similar forms of personal property. 
The monthly registry reports for the whole of Kwale District (and 
not just the SRDP area) show, for example that although 4,742 parcels had been 
registered in the District as of October 31, 1974, only 221 title deeds had 
been collected as of November 30. Of these only 23 title deeds were utilised 
between January 1 and October 31, 1974 to raise a cumulative total of £75,970 
in loan funds. This might give the impression that a lot of money was 
flowing into agriculture in the District. This, however, is grossly misleading 
20. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, "African Land Tenure Reform", Chapter V in 
J. Heyer et al. , editors, Agricultural Development in Kenya, Nairobi, Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming. 
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since almost all of these loans were from the Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation (I.C.D.C.), and commercial banks and have been 
issued essentially for non-agricultural purposes. Lending by the Agricultural 
21 Finance Corporation (A.F.C.) is thus almost negligible. 
This confirms a trend that has been observed elsewhere in connection 
with the use of land titles for the generation of credit. This is that 
much of the credit secured on agricultural land, particularly after 1967, 
goes into business enterprises. The intensification of the policy of Africanisa-
tion of petty business enterprises has created the impression even in these 
areas that these ventures offer better returns* at least in the short-run, 
than agriculture, despite the very high risks involved. Title to land, in 
addition,of course, to other collaterals has become an important basis for 
generating the credit necessary for such businesses. The pay-off to agricul-
ture is not exactly clear since many of these enterprises are not complementary 
to it at all. 
Although the situation in Tetu is radically different from Kwale in 
the sense that a lot more credit has in fact been issued by the A.F.C. for 
agricultural purposes, we do not think that this invalidates any of the 
inferences we have drawn above. Being a much older scheme, most of the farmers 
in Tetu have had the opportunity to purchase their title deeds. But more 
importantly, Tetu being a much more intensive and basically cash-crop area, 
many credit institutions are quite prepared to accept as collateral the value 
of permanent crops on the land; and to rely on the cooperatives to supervise 
this . This also means that the loan recovery process that has bedeviled rural 
lending in many parts of the country is not a special problem in Tetu. The 
records show for example that more than 80 per cent of the small-farm credit 
in the Tetu SRDP area is recovered without much difficulty. This,A.F.C. 
officials agree, is an exceptionally high standard for public lending. 
On the question of farm planning and transmission of extension services, 
no significant concession seems to have been given to the tenure question either, 
except perhaps negatively by not paying much attention to those areas where 
T.R.P. was incomplete. For example, it was relatively clear in the case of 
Kwale that SRDP personnel preferred to work with registered holdings although 
the actual selection of demonstration farms was based on the size and the 
status of the parties involved rather than the factor of registration per se. 
Table 3 below shows the size and zonal distribution of the thirteen holdings 
chosen to spearhead exotic crop varieties in the area. 
21. The monthly registry reports from the Land Registry give fairly 
accurate information on the total amount of loans secured on title whether 
these are vetted by the Land Control Boards or exempted as is the case with 
A.F.C. applications. 
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Table 3. Size and zonal distribution of demonstration farms in Kwale. 
Location Ecological L.R. Size in 
Zone No. Hectares 
Coastal 277 9.4 
(Kigombero 292 13.0 
KIKONENI area) 294 6.4 
297 9.4 
298 14.2 
High Potential n.a. 38.34 
(Kikoneni n. a. 16.4 
village area) n. a. 15.4 
n. a. 13.26 
n.a. 3.0 
Marginal 497 19.5 
(Mwananyamala 633 19. 5 
area) 634 24. 5 
Source: District Agricultural Records, South Kwale SRDP, Msambweni. 
Read in the light of Table 2 above, it will be appreciated that most 
of these holdings were very much above the average sizes recorded in Kikoneni 
Location, and as the biographical data on the people involved indicate, many 
22 of them were 'influential' members of the community. 
This is likely to have an important impact on agricultural development 
particularly on the rate of diffusion of technological innovation to the general 
populace. In view of current research on the extension service theory espoused 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, this position is likely to lead not only to 
income differentials within the community but also to an overall credit shortage 
within the agricultural sector of the rural economy. The reason is really quite 
obvious. Once it is accepted as fact that most of the land comprised in the 
SRDP area had not in fact been registered or even adjudicated, there is no point 
in insisting on completion of T.R.P. as a prerequisite to the acquisition of 
loans or the extension of agricultural advice. And once it is discovered that 
even title is not a sufficient basis for raising agricultural credit, a different 
type of credit scheme clearly becomes necessary at least on an experimental basis. 
22. These data were obtained in an interview with the Divisional Agricultural 
Officer. The names of the people involved have been withheld by the author. 
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The Structure of Land Distribution 
The third problem we have identified relates to the structure of 
land distribution within the SRDP areas, particularly in those areas where 
T.R.P. is complete. The first and rather general comment to make here is that 
all over the country T.R.P. has been accompanied by substantial redistribu-
tion of land in a manner that was not exactly contemplated by its authors. 
For the adjudication process did in fact pre-empt a fairly brisk market. 
23 
Many people took advantage of this to expand their existing claims. The 
fact that all SRDP areas were (and still are) very high service areas kept 
alive the market so pre-empted by attracting many in-migrants into the areas. 
Under customary tenure this would have raised no special alarm since outright 
dispositions are in general rare and in any case closely scrutinised by all 
interested parties in the family or clan, whichever is the unit of land use 
administration. Individualisation of tenure, introducing as it did a freely 
negotiable title and shifting the power of land administration to Land 
Control Boards, made it much easier for in-migrants to acquire property in many 
SRDP areas, particularly Migori, Mbere and Kwale. 
In Kwale this phenomenon has been greatly assisted by the fact of 
fragmentation of holdings and their location in relation to village centres, 
and the rather low land prices prevailing in this area. As we have already 
noted, this area was not at all consolidated and therefore multiple ownership 
remained a common feature. It is clear both from registry index maps and 
on-the-ground investigations, however, that the larger, less intensively used 
fragments are in fact located much further away from the villages than smaller, 
24 
more intensively used ones. It is these larger parcels that tend to be sold 25 to m-migrants. 
The going price of land has been an important catalyst here. Although 
accurate figures are hard to come by, figures quoted to the Kwale Land Control 
Board indicate that the average price of land ranges from shs 200/- per hectare 
in parts of Bumbani 'A' to shs 450/- per hectare in parts of Mwananyamala. This 
price range, however,is likely to appreciate as the market stabilises and begins 
to narrow down. 
The Kwale Land Control Board and SRDP personnel seem to view this 
trend with indifference and in some cases with unconcealed approval. Their view 
seems to be that this will enable the more adventurous and 'progressive' minded 
2 3 • This point is expanded in my chapter, op.cit. 
21+- This finding is also reported by GrC.M. Mutiso, op. cit. 
2 5 T h i s conclusion is drawn from a perusal of land adjudication and 
registry records. These show among other things that land transactions in 
this area involve whole transfers rather than sub-division and transfers as 
is the case in less fragmented areas. 
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in-migrants to 'develop' the area. We believe, however, that there is a 
more important economic angle to this trend, and that is that in the long 
run it reduces the capacity of the local population to expand their own 
agriculture. Besides, as was indicated in the 1972 SRDP Report, this can 
be the cause of much future political friction in the area, because even 
though people are in a manner of speaking 'freely' transferring land to 
in-migrants, most people still see this as a form of 'invasion'. This 
feeling came out strongly in random interviews in Kwale, Mbere and Kapenguria.' 
The second comment we want to make in connection with land distribu-
tion relates to the position of women in the control of land. This is an 
issue that is scarcely ever considered since many researchers do not seem to 
distinguish between the question of ownership of land and access to the use 
of it. Under traditional tenure, as we have noted, the power of disposition 
was restricted within very narrow limits. This is because rights of access 
to the use of land have always been a paramount consideration in the rural 
economy. Hence security of tenure lay not so much in ownership (whether 
evidenced by the power of allocation or administration of use), but rather 
in actual use. As such the position of women remained just as secure as it 
would have been if they possessed the power of allocation or transmission 
rights. 
The Tenure Reform Programme changed this situation radically by 
conferring upon land holders all the attributes of ownership unencumbered 
by rights recognised by customary law unless these were actually entered 
against title. The conduct of adjudication, however, took scant notice of 
the se rights since the tendency was to regard only the power of allocation 
as equivalent tc ownership. Many of our communities being basically patri-
local and inheritance systems patrilineal, the powers of allocation were 
27 . . 
invariably conferred on men as the permanent members of society. Adjudication 
along these narrow limits effectively weakened the proprietary position of 
women in the rural economy by concentrating ownership rights exclusively in 
the hands of men. Table 4 below represents an attempt to analyse the situation 
in those sections of Kwale already registered. The percentage figures hide an 
important factor in Kwale that tends to weaken the position of women further. 
This is that most of the women on the register were in fact common owners with 
their husbands rather than separate owners. Hence the rather high figure in 
Bumbani 'A' should be read with some caution. 
26. Those who sell land do so to raise cash needed for fixed expenses 
such as school fees, food and clothing. Very rarely is land sold to finance 
business ventures. 
27. Digo society was until recently matrilineal. The position now seems 
to be that the society is shifting more to a patrilineal system. 
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Table 4. Registered women landholders in Klkoneni Location. 
Registration 
Section 
Total No. of 
People in Register 
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Total No. Women 
of Women in as % c 
the Register Total 
Bumbani 'A' 
Mrima 
Mwananyamala 
820 
678 
612 
127 
20 
37 
Source: Land Registry Records, Kwale. 
15.0 
2.8 
5.6 
Although an attempt to work out similar figures for Kiamuringa in 
2 8 
Mbere failed , we think the position is much worse than in Kwale. This would 
follow from the manner in which adjudication was done which we have already 
outlined. The tendency in this case would be to allocate land to male heads 
of households and heirs rather than to women. 
The Kwale Land Control Board following common practice in all former 
trust lands has triedto redress this situation by requiring wives and other 
relatives of registered land holders to consent to transactions before the 
29 
Board can approve them. But this is neither a legal requirement nor is it 
likely to last. Hence one can predict that in a few years the proprietary 
posit ion of women might become extremely precarious. The significance of this 
point for SRDP and development generally is that the rural economy is bound 
to be adversely affected if women who form the most important part of the 
labour force have no effective say in the system. This is quite apart from 
the obvious exploitative consequences of such a situation. 
We have gone into the question of land distribution at some length 
because in a land-based economy it is an important indicator of effective 
power in rural society. If - as we believe is the case - comprehensive rural 
development includes socio-political development, we suggest that some of these 
qualitative issues should have been given far greater attention than the 
SRDP and T.R.P. personnel have hitherto done. 
28- The Land Registrar in Embu would not release any of his records with-
out "written authority from the Chief Land Registrar in Nairobi". 
29. The Board's powers derive from the Land Control Act (Cap. 302), Laws 
of Kenya. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have attempted in this chapter to indicate general points of 
interaction between T.R.P. and the implementation of SRDP. What emerges clearly 
is that none of the personnel involved in both programmes really appreciated 
the interconnection between tenure and agriculture. More particularly T.R.P. 
personnel were never really integrated into SRDP Indeed they appeared 
remarkably unconcerned with the original rationale of the Programme itself! 
The most important lesson to learn from this perhaps is that it 
cannot be taken simply for granted that the Swynnerton formula will work; 
particularly when the tenurial form recommended is as inflexible as individual 
tenure obviously is. Significant variations in tenure structure were quite 
clearly necessary to take account of differences in cultural and economic 
matrixes of given communities. The policy recommendations emerging from this 
review may be summarised as follows:-
1. The T.R.P. should be brought directly under the control of SRDP 
personnel. This would ensure badly needed integration at that 
level. 
2. T.R.P. personnel should pay special attention to so-called 
'lesser rights' under customary law so as to guarantee to as 
many categories of people as possible access to the use of 
land. This is particularly important in the case of women 
since they are by and large responsible for the family economy. 
3. A certain amount of sensitivity is required in areas such as 
Kwale and Mbere to the question of the sale of land to in-migrants. 
This would mean greater supervision by Land Control Boards than 
has hitherto been the case. Whereas we do not want to develop 
'localised' economies along the same lines as that propagated 
during the colonial era, we do not want to encourage a policy 
that will create 'localised' political problems either! 
4. Since there is no indication that title to land per se is a sufficient 
condition for the issue of public or private finance, this precondition 
should be dispensed with altogether. A special credit scheme along 
the lines of the Guaranteed Minimum Returns but flexible enough to 
take into account smaller holdings is necessary. 
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THE WOMEN'S GROUPS PROGRAMME IN THE SRDP 
INTRODUCTION 
Our evaluation of the Women's Group Programme is based on 
fieldwork in all six of the SRDP areas. In addition to interviews with 
various Government officials, personnel from non-governmental agencies 
working with the Programme (Programmes for Better Family Living of the 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation (PBFL/FAO), UNICEF, the Family 
Planning Association and Partnership for Productivity) and women's group 
leaders and members, we have consulted a number of documents — primarily 
Government reports and publications of PBFL/FAO. Case studies which trace 
the Programme in more detail in the specific SRDP areas will be presented 
in I.D.S. Working Papers Nos. 231 to 236 and I.D.S. Occasional Paper No. 13 
to be issued at a later date. The present report is limited to overall 
discussion and recommendations for the Programme, although some recommenda-
tions for the specific SRDP areas are also included. 
The 1972 I.D.S. Evaluation of SRDP paid little attention to the 
Women's Programme. There is a one-page description of the Kapenguria 
experience and that is all. However, the Programme calls for more'detailed 
analysis as its contribution to the SRDP is in fact of some importance. 
The principles of the Programme seem to be well in line with those of the 
SRDP. 
The background and development of the Programme has been described 
in PBFL Report No. 14.(10) As this Report notes: 
The Women's Group Programme is more of an extension approach 
than a single programme. It is concerned with some parts 
of many programmes, designed and executed by different 
agencies, but for the benefit of the same rural family and 
farmer. 
The major objectives are: 
a) To revitalise and strengthen women's groups in the 
rural areas through enabling them to make effective use 
of local resources such as personnel and materials; 
b) To increase the influence of group activities on 
the welfare of the group member's family; and 
c) To establish more functional connections between 
group activities and development of the community, (p. 8) 
The first formal Government-sponsored programme for women can be 
traced to the early 1950s when the Department or Community Development 
decided to form an organisation intended to promote development amongst women 
in rural areas. This new body was called Maendeleo ya Wanawake. The Maende-
leo ya Wanawake Organisation was preceeded by and co-existed with a large 
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number of more local-level groups which formed an integral part of 
indigenous social institutions in various parts of the country. These 
local-level solidarity groups, being more closely linked with processes 
in their societies, were and are able to play a far more active and 
substantial role at the local level than the national organisation. The 
ngwatio among the Kikuyu, the risaga among the Gusii and saga among the 
Luo are historically all groups associated with mutual aid efforts in the 
spheres of agriculture and home and community improvement and welfare. 
The intention of the SRDP was to build on the foundation provided by such 
indigenous groups and to some extent the more recently created Maendeleo 
ya Wanawake body. 
The Women's Programme involves experimentation in the area of 
leaders' training and subsequent follow-up by field Staff.-The idea is 
to select leaders of existing groups and train them in a variety of fields 
related to family welfare and community development (e.g. nutrition, 
vegetable growing and poultry-keeping). The leaders then go back to their 
groups and pass on the acquired knowledge to the members. The trainers, 
who are also to be responsible for the follow-up exercise, are supposed to 
be drawn from all departments whose activities are in anyway related to the 
Programme, such as the Department of Social Services and the Ministries of 
Agriculture, Cooperatives and Health', in this way, there is an attempt to 
make this a genuinely integrated programme, unlike the less systematic 
approach to women's groups which the Department of Social Services (D.S.S.) 
and Home Economics section of the Ministry of Agriculture have had in the 
past. In addition, a thorough monitoring and evaluating component has been 
designed for the Programme, through which detailed information on the 
situation of each group in each area is to be obtained. The Programme has 
also tried to meet the SRDP principle of replicability. In mid-1974, a work-
shop was held in order to assess how far this could be done. (See PBFL 
Report No. 14 (10) and Report No. 15 (11). Steps are now being taken to 
extend the Programme to various non-SRDP areas in the country. 
Although we identify in the following discussion a variety of 
problems and areas where there is scope for improvement in the Programme as 
it has been implemented thus far, we take a strongly positive general view 
of the effort to date. There is a solid case for the existence and continu-
ation in an expanded form of a development programme focussed on rural women. 
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Access and Equity 
Women constitute the majority of Kenya's rural population - about 
66 to 67 per cent - and, in an economy that is basically agricultural, they 
carry the main burden of farming work. In addition, rural women play a very 
important management role in the farming and domestic spheres, and their 
contribution to self-help efforts across the country, both by joining the 
men in local communities or carrying out action on their own, is of major 
importance. The substantial workload carried by rural women both in Kenya 
and in other African countries has been reported in a number of studies. 
(See 1, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13 and 14.) It has also been noted that since a larger 
number of men in Kenya leave the countryside to look for work elsewhere, 
rural women have assumed an even greater share of agricultural and community 
improvement work than before. (See 2, 5, 14, 15 and 16.) 
Up to the present, extension activities in the agricultural and 
cooperative development sectors have shown little recognition of the tremen-
dous part which women in fact play in maintaining and improving rural welfare. 
It is widely recognised that extension activities carried out by Government 
agencies and their personnel tend to concentrate on more 'progressive' 
elements in local communities and thus often overlook those who stand most 
in need of assistance and who would benefit most from such activities. 
(3, p. 153) It is perhaps less widely realised that the population of 'forgot-
ten farmers' is predominantly female. 
We note that the problem of access and equity for women in Kenya 
has already been extensively reviewed in the I.L.O. Report and recommendations 
made for possible solutions. As the I.L.O. Report states, "The specific prob-
lems of the integration of women in the economy and in society seem important 
enough from all standpoints to warrant special and sustained attention". 
(3, p. 299) We also note that the Kenya Government response to this section 
of the Report contained in Sessional Paper No. 10 on Employment did not 
really adequately address itself to the issues raised. Indeed, it was merely 
observed that, "The Government is not aware of overt discrimination against 
women in the country. Women are employed in important positions in the Armed 
Forces, in the Police, in the Prisons and in the Government as well as in the 
private sector". (4, para. 241, p. 64) 
Past policy has tended to ignore the real place women have in 
subsistence and development activities and this has been reflected 
in the neglect of women in the channelling of the informational, organis-
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ational and material facilities needed to capitalise on locally available 
development resources. As long as this state of affairs continues, a 
valuable major development resource base will be wasted. 
Contributions of the Programme Thus Far 
In terms of gains achieved through this particular Programme, 
several significant contributions can be identified. 
The attempt to involve various relevant ministries and agencies 
in a joint effort to plan, administer and follow-up women leaders' training 
courses has been very productive. The integrated approach stems from the 
realisation that development cannot and should not be viewed as taking 
place in mutually exclusive sectors, and that Government structures and 
functions regrettably tend to operate as if such sectors were a true 
reflection of development events on the ground. The Women's Programme has 
provided a practical demonstration of the feasibility and desirability of 
cooperation among ministries and agencies in planning and administering 
leaders' training courses. Such joint effort is no small achievement given 
the strong spirit of departmentalism which sometimes can be observed among 
Government officers. The emphasis on cooperation among personnel from 
different Government departments has also been carried over to some extent 
to group follow-up and extension activities. A sustained effort to monitor 
group activities and progress following the training of leaders, and to 
foster the implementation of lessons learnt in training through the provision 
of extension services, is critical to the success of the leadership 
training strategy. Although there is clearly a need for significant 
improvement in the degree of inter-ministerial cooperation in these basic 
field level activities, the Programme has certainly helped to encourage the 
idea. This point came out several times during the course of field 
investigations in interviews with extension and supervisory staff. 
A related point is the emphasis the Programme puts on the group 
approach to extension efforts. This is a highly welcome development. The 
group approach has distinct advantages: in the first place, when an 
extension officer visits a women's group, it is possible to address a far 
larger audience than would be found on visits to individual homes and farms; 
secondly, the group approach has a built-in follow-up capacity that is 
lacking in the one-to-one approach. After the extension officer has left, 
the lessons or advice which were given can be built on and reinforced as 
the group members collectively consider and act upon the new ideas. What 
we see emerging from the Women's Programme is a pattern in which extension 
teams are joining together with client teams to work for development. It 
13-5 IDS/OP 12 
is important to note that the potential client teams — women's groups — 
already widely exist on the ground, thus providing a ready context for the 
application of group extension strategies. This fact should not be over-
looked when it comes to the implementation of such programmes as Maternal and 
Child Health/Family Planning (MCH/FP) projects planned by the Ministry of 
Health. 
There has been some progress towards the Programme's three 
objectives of encouraging women's grouts in general by opening access to 
resources, by fostering connections between group activity and family welfare 
on the one hand and between group activity and community development on the 
other:-
1. The training of group leaders has been linked to increased 
group membership in some cases. (11, p. 55) 
2. Groups with trained leaders are in effect receiving extension 
services far more consistently than previously was the case; 
the leaders themselves are providing these services. This 
fact is appreciated by group members themselves, judging from 
comments made during interviews. 
3. There has been an improvement in the focus and direction of 
group activities. The need for careful planning and organ-
isation is being increasingly recognised by the groups, 
many of which have suffered in the past from overly casual 
definitions of goals and a consequent diffusion of efforts. 
4. At the same time, a re-orientation of attitudes has been 
encouraged in many cases as women begin to perceive a new 
meaning in the group experience, to see a broader relevance 
between the group and their day-to-day concerns. The pre-
independence 'women's clubs' functioning under the auspices 
(or direction) of Government or voluntary agencies sometimes 
had the closed and non-utilitarian character of a sewing 
circle. (See 13, p. 81.) Such an orientation persists even 
now in certain cases, but is fortunately on the decline. It 
is our view that this re-orientation in attitudes has been 
fostered by increased awareness of the availability of new 
options for women, particularly in the areas of community 
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development and income generation. This increased awareness 
is especially noteworthy amongst groups in poorer regions 
less well endowed with resources for group development. The 
development of a new outlook can be traced in turn to 
enhanced group consciousness and confidence and to a better 
appreciation of what is available in the way of tools 
(materials and expertise) for a group to use for self-
development. The question of income generation for women's 
groups has proven difficult as we shall discuss later. 
While it is unfortunate that a number of the income generating 
projects which different groups have initiated either 
have not got off the ground or have fared poorly, it is too 
early to form any negative conclusions about the general 
long-term prospects. As we note later, a major problem has 
been the lack of sound advice from the proper quarters. At 
present, the fact that women's groups are increasingly 
thinking in terms of new commercial endeavours, such as 
trading ventures, posho mills and poultry projects, is signi-
ficant in itself. 
5. In the areas of group activities and home and community 
development it is clear that the Programme is having a 
posii ive impact. On the social welfare side, group members 
have been encouraged in a number of activities aimed at home 
improvement, ranging from improving family nutrition, child 
care practices and home gardening to the building of better 
fire-places or latrines. On the community side, groups have 
engaged in such activities as adult literacy classes, 
communal labour on group plots, and self-help projects such as 
the construction of multi-purpose meeting halls which serve 
community as well as group interests. 
THE GROUPS 
The basic elements of the Programme are, of course, the women's 
groups in the local areas. In this section, we present some of the main 
features of these groups. 
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It can be said that women's groups both within and outside the 
SRDP areas fall into two broad types of orientation. In the first place, 
there is the social welfare type, which is the predominant one. Here the 
concern is to improve the living conditions in members' households and the 
local community. A group may devote its attention to such matters as 
improved nutrition and child care practices, home improvement such as helping 
members to replace thatch with iron roofing or to develop better water 
supplies, etc., or self-help activities aimed at community development such 
as the construction of a health centre or a nursery school. Many of these 
groups also engage in recreational activities such as singing and dancing, 
sometimes for community entertainment, and sports. 
The second type of group orientation is the commercial type, where 
the primary focus is income generation. Commercial goals may be achieved in 
a variety of ways. For example, a group may set up a small enterprise such 
as a bus service or a posho mill; or it may set itself up as a savings 
society through which registered members can borrow money for various invest-
ment purposes. 
While these two types can be distinguished, it is useful to think 
of them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive categories. It will 
be found that the two orientations generally co-exist as different activities 
of the same groups, but they are emphasised differently from area to area. 
The commercial orientation is most pronounced among groups located in 
relatively well-developed areas; outside of these areas, social welfare 
activities are paramount. The relative emphasis placed on these different 
activities can also change over time. Groups may pass through an earlier 
phase in which social welfare concerns are primary and during which a stable 
membership and cohesive ©utlook are acquired* This provides a foundation 
for a later phase in which commercial projects receive greater emphasis, 
although attention is still directed to the social welfare side as well. 
The mabati/savings groups in Tetu can sometimes be seen in these terms. 
Groups in Taita/Taveta and mabati groups in Mathira Division in Nyeri 
provide even stronger examples of this pattern. 
The Mbai sya Eitu (literally, clan of girls) in Machakos District 
is yet another example of a women's organisation which has assumed a strong 
political and economic role at the local level and plays a leading part in 
soliciting funds for self-help projects in the area which the members choose 
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to support for political reasons. This group has increased its fund-
raising capacity as a result of the political influence it has acquired 
at the grass roots level. (See (7).) 
While some of the groups are quite old and trace their origins 
to pre-colonial times, others can be linked to programmes in the early 1950s 
and still others have orginated since SRDP was begun. Two basic modes of 
group formation seem to be operating at the present time: first, a group 
may be initiated as a result of the internal dynamics of an already 
existing group; secondly, external mechanisms may come into play, where 
either individuals or organisations stimulate group formation. In the 
first mode, women's groups build on primary foundations of solidarity 
groupings such as indigenous mutual aid teams and religious associations. 
For instance, a group of women who belong to an agricultural work group 
may see the need to organise themselves in a somewhat more formal fashion in 
order to improve their positions by collectively bargaining for access to 
services which can be obtained through local politicians or Government 
programmes. Again, members of a cooperative society or a church group may 
decide that more needs to be done to mobilise women for local development 
efforts and they may therefore encourage the establishment of a women's 
group. 
A group can also be formed through influences from outisde the 
local community. Groups may be organised through the efforts of: (1) indi-
vidual women who have had training in homecraft and related skills through 
programmes in the early 195Cs or more recently at an urban homecraft centre; 
(2) wives of prominent local persons such as businessmen, clergymen or 
politicians; or (3) a locational Community Development Assistant, Home 
Economics Assistant, Nutritionist or a field worker from a voluntary agency 
such as Partnership for Productivity. In this last case, a field worker may 
undertake to organise a group out of personal interest and initiative and/or 
as a representative of a particular agency whose policy is to encourage 
women's groups. Such field workers often work in cooperation with local 
leaders and pre-existing solidarity groups such as school committees or 
church groups. Thus, what we have labelled as two categories are once again 
not to be viewed as mutually exclusive but as complementary. Both mecha-
nisms of group formation may be active in the -arly stages of a group. 
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Group Membership 
We are unable to give precise figures on group membership and 
average group size within the SRDP areas. The statistics available from 
our field investigations and various Government and PBFL reports are not 
always consistent. Although it is difficult to obtain very reliable figures 
for all areas, we present the following statistics as a rough approximation 
of membership. 
Table 1. Membership of women's groups in SRDP areas. 
SRDP Area No. of Groups Recorded 
Membership 
Kapenguria& 33 500 
Vihiga/Hamisi 43 1312 
Migori/Kuria53 34 680 
Mbere 25 950 
Tetu 71 4328 
Kwale 23 280 
TOTAL 229 8050 
a. Accounts of group membership in Kapenguria vary significantly 
among sources. The figures cited above represent a best estimate 
based on field investigations and correction for the low and high 
extremes of figures recorded in official reports. 
b. There is a marked discrepancy between D.S.S. reports which 
recorded 23 groups with a membership of 321 and a PBFL/FAO 
report which recorded 34 groups with 630 members for the same 
year (1974) in the Migori/Kuria SRDP area. The PBFL figures arfe' 
the more reliable ones in our assessment. 
The sizes of individual groups vary from a low of around ten 
members to a high of several hundred. Where membership fees are collected, 
it sometimes happens that a group has an 'official' (regular and paying) 
membership a^d a much larger 'unofficial' (irregular and non-paying) membership. 
One should be cautious about assuming that groups with large 
memberships are more successful. For one thing, women's groups, like 
harambee groups, tend to be larger, better organised and more active in 
areas with sedentary populations where cash cropping and diary farming 
flourish and ensure steady cash returns to faritiers. Secondly, group 
membership tends to be higher in areas of high population density and lower 
in less populated regions. Thus, membership figures should be interpreted 
with reference to the general development and population density of the areas 
where the groups are located. 
13 - 10 IDS/OP 12 
Group Activities 
As previously noted, women's groups are involved in a variety of 
activities, some of which are primarily directed towards home and community 
welfare while others are primarily commercial. As has also been indicated 
above, commercial and social welfare activities are emphasised differently 
in the six SRDP areas. Groups located in relatively less developed areas 
which lack a strong pattern of cash crop production or other income gener-
ating employment tend to have a weaker commercial orientation. Groups in 
Kwale and especially in Tetu are much more involved in commercial activities 
than are groups in Migori/Kuria and Kapenguria, for example. 
Table 2. Women's group activities. 
A. Activities undertaken in regular meetings (including lessons/ 
demonstrations given by Government extension officers and group 
leaders):-
Adult literacy 
Cookery 
Nutrition 
Child care 
Family planning 
Home hygiene 
First aid 
Vegetable gardening 
Crop and animal husbandry 
Handicraft work (e.g., pottery, basketry, beadwork, 
sewing, knitting, etc.) 
Entertainment (e.g., singing, dancing, sports) 
B. Self-help activities:-
Construction of multipurpose halls (group and community 
meeting halls, day-care centres, adult literacy centres) 
Home and community improvement (e.g., developing water 
supplies, installing mabati roofs or improved fire-
places and latrines) 
Savings/credit arrangements for members 
C. Income generating activities:-
Poultry-keeping 
Produce sales 
Labour teams (e.g., farming work, roofing houses) 
Production and sale of building blocks 
Handicraft sales 
Savings/credit societies 
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The preceding list, though not exhaustive, provides a fuller 
picture of the range of group activities. It should be noted that in 
several instances both social welfare and commercial objectives are served 
by the same activity. For example, poultry keeping and vegetable gardening 
have a nutritional value for group members' families and should not be 
judged solely in terms of economic gain. Again, some types of handicrafts 
can either be marketed or used in members' homes. Even dancing can have a 
commercial aspect when a group is paid to perform at a local ceremony. 
Groups generally meet once or twice weekly. The venue may be a 
local church or school, the group's own hall, a member's house or outdoors 
under a tree. The fact that many groups lack an adequate meeting place is 
the reason why the construction of a group hall is so often given priority 
attention. 
THE ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED 
If any agency may be said to have overall responsibility for 
the Women's Programme it is the Department of Social Services (D.S.S.). 
SRDP" officers in Nairobi have often taken an initiating and coordinating 
role, but in the field these tasks are performed by the officers of D.S.S. 
The central figure in the field is the Asst. Community Development Officer 
(A. C •D.O.) who is responsible for arranging the leaders' training courses 
as well as the follow-up activities through which group progress is monitored. 
In this task the A.C.D.O.s are assisted by other D.S.S. staff, as well as 
staff from other ministries and departments, especially Health, Agriculture 
and Cooperatives. These other ministries are more involved with the Programme 
in the field than at the national level. The main voluntary body which has 
played a part in the Programme is the Family Planning Association of Kenya. 
In the Vihiga/Hamisi area, Partnership for Productivity has also had an input. 
Interestingly, the Maendeleo ya Wanawake organisation has not been involved 
at the national level, and neither has the National Council of Women of Kenya. 
The donor arrangements differ from those normally applied to 
SRDP. The costs of the Programme are borne primarily by the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), which has financed development programmes for 
women in Kenya since 1957. Another U.N. body, PBFL/FAO, has substantially 
contributed to the Programme in the capacity of both a funding and consulting 
agency for D.S.S. PBFL has prepared materials, organised leaders' training 
courses and workshops for the trainers, and worked on group follow-up. D.S.S. 
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has assigned one officer to work with PBFL — first on a half-time basis, then 
full-time since the 74-/75 financial year. Currently this officer is 
assisting with efforts to extend the Programme to twelve other districts in 
the country. 
COSTS 
Funding for the Programme has been drawn from UNICEF and PBFL. 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate the amount of allocation and expenditure from the 
two agencies since the inception of the programme in 1972. 
In addition to UNICEF and P33FL funds, part of the D.S.S. budget 
allocation for training has been utilised for the Women's Programme, though 
the figures have not been available because D.S.S. expenditures on training 
have not been presented in a disaggregated form. However, D.S.S. officials 
are preparing such figures, and they should be available at some future 
date. It is noteworthy that a token such of £10 has been set aside in the 
75-76 financial year for activities pertaining to women in development. This 
is significant as an indication of Government's recognition of the Women's 
Programme. It will now be possible to submit budget requests for expanding 
Women's Programme activities in this and subsequent financial years if 
convincing proposals are made. 
There appears to have been some difficulty in disbursing UNICEF 
funds allocated for equipment for women's groups whose leaders have received 
training through the Programme. The principal reason for non-expenditure, 
according to the SRDP officers at D.S.S. headquarters, is that previously 
equipment was wasted which had been purchased for groups who were not ready 
to use it. Some equipment fell into disuse or was misdirected to persons 
outside the groups. A cautious attitude was therefore adopted lest this 
experience be repeated. Disbursal of these funds is now long overdue, 
however, since there are a great many sufficiently well-organised groups now 
in existence. As of mid-1975, steps are finally being taken to clear this 
matter up. D.S.S. has requested lists of funding needs from women's groups 
and is forwarding this information to UNICEF. 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Finance 
The Women's Programme has not been financed in the normal SRDP 
way. The principal donors have been U.N. agencies, UNICEF and PBFL/FAO. 
However, this arrangement has not enabled the Programme to be altogether 
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free from inter-agency organisational problems. Until recent staff changes, 
UNICEF's officers had a poor understanding of SRDP and did not cooperate 
fully with the Department of Social Services. Delays in disbursing UNICEF 
funds can be partly accounted for by poor communication between the two 
agencies. On the other hand, PBFL/FAO seems to have been able to work 
fairly closely and harmoniously with the D.S.S., but not with UNICEF. It 
would be beneficial to the Programme if all the participating agencies had a 
clearer understanding of their respective roles and relationships. 
Central Government Administration 
Another problem at the national level is that the Programme has 
been considered to 'belong' to the D.S.S. by other ministries which should 
be fully involved themselves. This can create difficulties in the field. 
A Public Health Officer in Tetu, for example, may not feel he can become 
actively involved in the Women's Programme unless he is assured of support 
from the senior officers at ministry headquarters. In one case the parti-
cipation of a Home Economics Officer in a training course for women leaders 
in Kwale was questioned by Ministry of Agriculture personnel at the 
provincial level. The involvement of M.O.A. staff in various aspects of the 
Programme is crucial, yet here inter-ministerial cooperation seemed to be 
impeded because there were no strong signals of M.O.A. commitment transmitted 
down the administrative channels. 
Field Level Integration 
Despite difficulties at the national level, the Women's Programme 
has probably fared better than most as an integrated programme in the field. 
Cooperation among different departments is especially evident in the leaders' 
training courses and the associated trainers' workshops, as demonstrated by 
the course syllabi. However, there are instances where the Programme has not 
achieved a high level of integration. In Mbere, for example, at one point the 
M.O.A.'s Home Economics Division and the D.D.S. each had 'their' groups. 
Even now, although inter-agency cooperation may be valued in the abstract 
by field personnel, the concept often proves difficult to put into practice, 
for example in the areas of group follow-up and extension activities aimed 
at reinforcing lessons learnt during the training course. Also, little 
cooperation was observed in the provision of transport, and possibilities 
for allowing several different Government workers to visit groups together 
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Table 3. UNICEF budget for Women's Group Programme 
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(U.S. dollars). 
TRANSPORT, SUPPLY 
AND EQUIPMENT 
Equipment for Trained 
Women's Groups 
Field Supervisors 
(1 Land Rover) 
NON-SUPPLY 
Women's Leaders 
Basic Course 
Seminars and 
Conferences 
Community Develop-
ment Assistant! 
and Youth L«adOP» 
Course 
Freight 
BUDGETED 
1973 1974 1975 $ $ $ 
3,900 7,800 
4,000 
500 20,000 5,400 
2,600 20,000 17,900 
7,100 
10,400 47,900 31,100 
500 
10,400 48,400 31,100 
TOTAL ACTUALLY 
EXPENDED 
73/75 
$ $ 
11,700 Nil 
4,000 Nil 
25,900 3,882 
40,500 4,402 
7,300 7,300 
19,400 15,58* 
500 
BALANCE 
NOT SPENT 
$ 
11,700 
4,000 
22,018 
36,098 
Nil 
73,816 
Source: P»la (8). 
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Table PBFL expenditure on Women's Programme '(.U.S. dollars and K. shillings). 
June - Dec. 1972 $ 1894.00 Kshs 13,523/-
Jan. - Dec. 1973 2380.00 17,000/-
Jan. - Dec. 1974 4301.00 30,711/-
Jan. - May 1975 . ,8092.00 57,777/-
TOTAL: $ 16667.00 Kshs 119,011/-
(June 1972 - May 1975) 
UNSPENT TOTAL FOR 
1975/77: $ 52451.00 Kshs 374,500/-
Note: PBFL funds have been used for the following purposes:-
1. Petrol and subsistence allowance for fieldwork, 
2. Workshops, 
3. Educational materials, and 
4. Evaluation survey. 
A further $2661.00 (Kshs 19,000/-) has been spent in connection with 
the Report and Evaluation Study. PBFL personnel have also devoted 
a considerable amount of their time to the Programme, so that in 
effect one PBFL officer has been working full time on the Programme 
since 1974. In terms of salary, this represents a total of $9804.00 
(Kshs 70,000/-). 
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by sharing a vehicle have not been fully exploited. In order to facili-
tate communication and cooperation among departments in the field, a 
newsletter could be circulated among Government personnel, as has been 
done in Vihiga/Hamisi. 
On a more general level, it seems that the field staff of some 
ministries, such as Health and Agriculture, are trained to think in terms 
of dealing with the individual patient or farmer. The Women's Programme, 
however, is organised on community development or group principles. This 
has produced misunderstandings. The long-run solution is to give all 
ministry field staff some kind of training in working with groups. It is 
understood that the newly established Bukura Institute of Agriculture in 
Western Province is making this welcome innovation. 
Income generation for women's.groups is an area in which dramatic 
improvement needs to be made in the integration of national and local 
Government efforts, as will be discussed in the following section. 
Income Generation 
Women's groups throughout the SRDP areas are engaged in a number 
of commercial, income-generating projects. To elaborate the earlier listing, 
these include such things as the sale of garden produce derived from both 
individual members' and group plots; the production and sale of various 
handicraft items for tourist and local markets such as pottery, basketry, 
sewn or knitted clothing, decorative items such as embroidery and beadwork, 
simple home utensils, farm implements and furniture; poultry-keeping; 
production and sale of building blocks; and forming savings/credit societies. 
Many groups earn money occasionally by working as labour teams. This may 
take the form of work on private farms during times of peak activity — weed-
ing, harvesting, bush-clearing, etc.; or it may involve roofing a building, 
cementing walls or doing other sorts of home repair/improvement work. 
Interest in commercial activities among the groups seems very high. Even 
groups that are not actually engaged in such activities at least have plans 
to do so in the near future. In addition to the enterprises listed above, 
some of the groups are interested in starting other sorts of operations, 
such as posho mills, small shops for craft and consumer items and cooperative 
marketing ventures in which a number of groups within one area would join 
forces. 
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A number of groups have achieved modest successes in their income-
generating activities. For example, a group in Kwale has made a profit 
raising poultry, one group in Mbere has earned money by providing farm 
labour and some groups in Vihiga/Hamisi have made modest profits selling 
garden produce, handicraft items and building blocks. On the whole, 
however, the Women's Programme has not enabled many groups so far to 
generate a significant income: in areas such as Tetu where mabati/savings 
groups have achieved significant commercial success, the pattern for group 
activity was well developed before the advent of SRDP. 
Handicraft and produce sales are perhaps the most popular 
approaches to income generation. By and large these supply only negligible 
returns,although' they would be somewhat more profitable if marketing 
organisation were adequately developed. In some areas it was observed that 
certain groups seemed preoccupied with the idea of making and selling rather 
elaborate sewn and knitted items, such as embroided doilies and the like, 
or children's wool socks and pullovers, for which adequate markets simply do 
not exist. As consumer articles, such things are outside the scope of local 
household priorities and budgets. Furthermore, the knitted items rarely 
become part of the rural household's functional clothing collection owing to 
the high cost of materials used and intensive nature of the labour involved 
in producing them. While it can be observed that the production and display 
of such fancy goods serves as a status indicator for some, there is no 
question that these activities also serve to create a false sense of 
elevated status for persons and families whose resources may be extremely 
limited (See 5, p. 70.) If in these instances income generation is the real 
aim, as group members assert that it is, then extension workers should seek 
to rechannel group efforts into more productive activities. 
The widespread practice of women's groups forming labour teams 
for hire, which might be seen as a contemporary variation on a traditional 
theme, viz., the mutual aid work party, has limited income—generating poten-
tial due to constraints on group members' time, given their own farming 
and domestic duties, and on the availability of employment at meaningful 
wages. One possibility which does not seem to have been considered is to 
offer women's groups (along with local self-help groups) employment as work 
teams on labour-intensive projects such as roads or erosion control. Such 
work would prove far more remunerative and, if scheduled to take place in 
relatively slack periods of agricultural activity, more convenient for the 
women than agricultural work on private farms
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The collection of membership dues is another device commonly 
employed by groups to raise funds. These dues may amount to as little as 
Shs. 3 to 5/- a year, to as much as Shs. 5/- a month (reported for Tetu 
mabati groups). In most instances, the payment of dues does not have much 
promise as a means of generating working capital for projects since the 
amounts involved are very small and group members cannot afford to contri-
bute more. 
The role of Government agencies and their staff should also be 
considered. The dominance of the D.S.S. with its strategy for the Programme 
thus far, together with rather poor cooperation among various Government 
departments in the planning and implementing of income-generating projects, 
seems likely to slow down the pace of commercial development. The D.S.S. and 
non-governmental agency personnel have emphasised the promotion of women's 
groups by building leadership and group self-confidence stressing the social 
welfare aspect of group activities. 
Particularly in less developed areas, this approach has been of 
value in helping groups get off the ground and become viable social units. 
However, it does mean that rather less emphasis has been placed on organising 
productive activities, and this imbalance should now begin to be corrected. 
Group members may anticipate and appreciate instruction in such subjects as 
nutrition, child care, family planning, etc., but there is also a felt need 
for complementary activities of a commercial nature. This is due in part to 
the recognition that there is ultimately little point in instructing women 
on family welfare or other topics if the lessons cannot be acted upon for 
lack of resources (money). It is also partly a function of the new enlarged 
view of the group experience which the Programme has encouraged. Members 
see new possibilities for group action - not least of all in the commercial 
sphere. Although the Programme has helped to create a change in orientation, 
it does not yet have the resources necessary to cater for the new expectations. 
In order for income-generating activities to assume a more 
important role in the Women's Programme, there must be fuller involvement of 
staff from departments other than the Department of Social Services. Greater 
participation from the Ministry of Agriculture is especially desirable. This 
ministry has been insufficiently involved in the Programme except through the 
Home Economics Section. The situation stems from the traditional M.O.A. 
practice of distinguishing between home economics and farm management 
extension services. There has thus been a tendency to block off women and 
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regard them as homemakers for whom home economics extension services should 
be provided, but not as farmers in need of farm management extension advice. 
Yet as we observed earlier, women in rural areas often play as active a 
role in farming activities as they do in the domestic sphere. Another 
ministry which could usefully play a more substantial role in the Programme 
now is the Ministry of Cooperative Development. 
Proposed women's group ventures such as poultry-keeping, 
cooperative vegetable marketing or tourist handcraft shops, whether on a 
small or large scale, require careful study and planning. This in turn 
calls for a close working relationship between D.S.S. officers and others 
with relevant expertise in the Ministries of Agriculture and Cooperative 
Development. Without this cooperation, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to establish the feasibility of commercial projects and then 
initiate them. If such foundations are in turn lacking or inadequate, 
proposals bog down in the discussion stage, or, worse, unsound proposals are 
actually implemented. In either case, local expectations have been raised 
and there is the consequent risk of disillusionment and lowered""initiative 
amongst local people should the project collapse. During the field investi-
gations a number of instances yere encountered in which either proposed or 
recently started commercial ventures involving women's groups were suffering 
from inadequate preparation and little or no joint effort from various Govern-
ment departments. Three cases will be cited here: 
1. In Kapenguria, there is considerable interest in a proposal 
to establish a combination handicraft and consumers' 
cooperative shop which would be a joint project of groups 
throughout the Division and from other parts of West Pokot 
District (bound together as the 'Kiletat Women's Organ-
isation'). Both D.S.S. staff posted in the area and local 
women's groups seem enthusiastic about the idea, but 
Government staff seems to have done little other than 
discussing the proposal in general terms for several years. 
To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to carry out a 
study to determine the feasibility of such a shop, what 
goods it should carry and on what scale, etc. Such a study -
leading to a firm decision either to drop the idea or to 
pursufe it - would necessitate the participation of the 
Ministry of Cooperative Development personnel, amongst others. 
While it is true that a plot has been assigned for the shop 
15 - 20 IDS/OP 12 
in the local market centre, and that local women have 
collected Shs. 2,000/- (Shs. 20,000/- is thought to be 
required), the organisational effort is definitely lagging 
and prospects for the project are not bright. 
2. The second case involves the proposed 'MANYATIBU' cooperative 
in Vihiga/Hamisi. This proposal calls for the establishment 
of a large-scale (Division-wide) women's cooperative for the 
marketing of garden and other farm produce and perhaps craft 
items as well. Although the local Cooperative office has 
been actively promoting this project, it was not planned with 
advice from the agricultural experts or marketing specialists 
who have studied the situation in Vihiga/Hamisi. D.S.S. 
personnel seem to have gone along with the 'MANYATIBU' idea, 
but almost in a passive way, and M.O.A. officers seem not to 
have been involved at all. Given that the project is to be 
based on women's groups on the one hand, and farm produce on 
the other, it is surprising that D.S.S. and the M.O.A. 
staff have not participated more fully. Much discussion has 
taken place over the last few years, some funds have been 
collected from individuals and groups, but the project is 
disorganised and shows no sign of being implemented in its 
present form.^ 
3. The third case is that of a poultry-keeping project now being 
run by a group in the Migori area. The group was able to 
begin this business through financial assistance organised 
by the local D.S.S. office. One hundred grade hens were 
purchased and these were placed in a well-constructed chicken 
house which was loaned to the group. It soon became apparent, 
however, that the economics of the project had not been care-
fully investigated. Costs of commercial feeds were too high 
to permit a profitable operation given current local prices 
for eggs. The women found it difficult to break even. This 
is unfortunate: poultry production seems to be a particularly 
suitable project in this case. There appears to be a ready 
_ The Ministry of Cooperative Development has no projects in the 
Vihiga/Hamisi area which are specifically associated with SRDP. The lack of 
a formal role for this Ministry may have contributed to the present state of 
the 'MANYATIBU' cooperative. 
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market for eggs in the Migori area, and the group in 
question is well organised and entirely capable of running 
a successful operation given the proper advice. Use of 
local hens - or perhaps a cheaper exotic variety - in 
combination with less expensive feeds would quite probably 
have made this a profitable operation, In fact, the project 
still has promise if assistance can be obtained from M.O.A. 
officers who know about poultry production. 
Although other ministries now need to become more fully involved 
in efforts to promote income generation among women's groups, the role 
of the Department of Social Services is still crucial. D.S.S. ought to coor-
dinate the implementation of proposals for commercial activities. In all 
three cases noted, D.S.S. officers could very appropriately have taken a far 
more active role in mobilising the technical expertise necessary to ensure 
the soundness of the ventures before they were embarked upon. In both the 
Kapenguria and Vihiga/Hamisi examples, one would have expected Community 
Development staff to take a much more active role in the organisational 
effort required at the field level as well as within Government bureaucracy. 
Social Services personnel should also play a more active role in assessing 
whether particular women's groups are actually capable of carrying out 
proposed commercial ventures. Moreover, there is of course a continuous 
need for D.S.S. assistance in ongoing self-help projects. 
On the national level, participation from the Ministries of 
Agriculture, Cooperative Development and others could be encouraged through 
a central interministerial coordinating body. One of the urgent tasks which 
such a group might initially undertake is an investigation of the commercial 
opportunities available for women's groups. This investigation could 
possibly yield a set of income-generating strategies based on past experience, 
the potential success of specific ventures in particular agri-climatic areas 
and the level of group development. 
A final point has already been mentioned: the merit of some group 
projects should be measured in more than economic terms. Such projects as 
vegetable growing and poultry keeping can also generate indirect benefits in 
the form of better nutrition. In areas where these activities do not show 
promise from a commercial standpoint, they may still be promoted with a view 
13 - 22 IDS/OP 12 
towards subsistence objectives. In such Instances, women's groups should 
be led to expect an improved diet rather than monetary gain. 
The Women's Bureau 
It is our recommendation that a Women's Bureau, as now under 
consideration, be designed to serve In a coordinating capacity for the 
Women's Programme, (See 3, p. 229..) The Bureau should be structured to 
inciude high-level representatives from all ministries and departments that 
have anything to do with the Programme, Besides the department of Social 
Services, the Ministries of Agriculture, Cooperative Development, Health, 
Commerce and Industry, Labour, and Lands and Settlement should certainly be 
involved, ana also perhaps the Ministries of Works, Tourism and Wildlife, 
and Broadcasting and Public Information In order that they may effectively 
participate In policy formation and implementation, the ministry representa-
tives to this body should be highly qualified and have sufficient authority 
to carry out decisions in their own ministries. In addition, a new and 
stronger spirit of commitment needs to be forthcoming from the individual 
ministries if the Women's Programme Is to move forward. For the Ministries 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives in particular, there is a pressing need to 
review the quantity and quality of services offered to women, and to take 
steps to Improve these services in accordance with women's actual and poten-
tial contributions to social and economic development. 
Personnel Administration 
The Programme has experienced severe difficulties in the area of 
personnel administration. Except in Kapenguria, the Community Development 
Assistants (CDAsJ, who are the key local-level staff of D.S.S., are employees 
of the local authorit ies. Most of these local awthorxiti.es experience chronic 
financial difficult ies. Moreover, they appear to find it possible to pay 
their senior officers regularly and well, while they tend to pay more junior 
staff such as CDAs poorly and irregularly. In some areas (e.g. Mbere, Tetu, 
Migori) all the locationai CDAs have been dismissed. In other areas where 
they remain (e.g. Vihiga), irregular pay is extremely damaging to staff 
m o r a l e I t is hard to imagine how D.S.S. can continue to play a meaningful 
role m these circumstances. Of the six SRDP areas, only Kapenguria and 
Kwale (where the County Council's financial administration appears sound) 
are able to provide staffing arrangements which are In any sense conducive to 
satisfactory performance, The only solution seems to be for the central 
Government to take over the employment of these workers. 
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We would emphasise that much of the success of the Women's 
Programme ultimately rests with communication between local extension agents 
and the women. It is primarily the CDAs who fill this crucial communications 
link. During field investigations, it was apparent that the women's groups 
themselves were very concerned about the situation. The dismissal of the 
CDAsmeans more than the disappearance of an important source of practical 
advice for the groups. Visits by extension officers also contribute to a 
group's perception of itself as a significant, recognised body tied in 
with a larger programme. The CDA plays a crucial role in this regard. 
A second problem is that women leaders at present are not paid 
for carrying out what is really a form of extension work. The case studies 
suggest that the leaders feel they should be paid something for providing 
these services Ca sentiment frequently shared by the group members themselves). 
2 
It should be possible to provide at least a small honorarium for them. 
Reporting 
A fairly elaborate system for statistical reporting has been 
designed and is beginning to be put into operation, and quite a lot of 
research has been done. (See 11.) Although these are valuable efforts, 
there remain major problems. Many of the figures which we obtained from 
documents do not make sense. In Migori for example, the available figures 
on the number of groups are very inconsistent, and in Kapenguria, there is 
substantial variance in membership figures given by different official 
3 sources. 
PBFL, in conjuction with other personnel working in the Women's 
Programme, has drawn up a check list to be used ny T)A= for recording the 
progress of groups. (See 11, pp. A6-A? ? TV. - h--.k list ha-; beta utilised 
to some extent in the field but it si'i-aXd JDecome a permanent part or the 
monitoring and evaluating system. Through this means, annual progress 
reports on each group could be written and kept by AsstoCommunity Development 
Officers. This would be a substantial Improvement over the poor quality 
reporting often encountered ax present. 
2. The amount of money in question is minimal. Women simply think 
it would be appropriate to provide group leaders with a little pocket or 
'soap® money and also to compensate them for such expenses as bus fare to and 
from training centres. 
3. In Mbere and t/ihigo. we tried to calculate the proportion of all 
female adults wh:> oei ;r.g co a women's group and found the data available suggest 
that 18 per cent c. e members in Mbere and 2 per cent in Vihiga. However, it is 
questionable whether these figures are correct; one would have expected Vihiga 
to have the higher proportion given the differences between the socio-economic 
and agri-climatic conditions in the two areas. All of this indicates a need 
for further improvements in the reporting system. 
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Leaders' Training 
A common problem in the training of women's group leaders is the 
breadth of the curriculum and its relatively inadequate depth. In two to 
three weeks an enormous amount of material is covered. It Is likely, in the 
circumstances, that many of the leaders end the course knowing a little 
about a lot of things but nothing very specific. What is required is a more 
precise and specific focus for the training. The best way of achieving this 
is to ensure that the training is geared to what is practicable or can be 
implemented given existing resources, A fu.ther point has to do with the 
phasing of the training courses. In certain instances it appears that not 
enough time has been allocated for follow-up exercises (to assess the .impact 
of the first-phase training course) before the commencement of the second-
phase course. 
Mass Media 
Most women evidently have some access to newspapers and radio. 
It seems, however, that the mobile cinema unit has reached few of them. The 
effectiveness of this unit in fostering genuine local involvement is 
potentially considerable. In future planning, the possibilities of making 
greater use of the unit should be investigated. 
The Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation 
It is surprising that this organisation plays such an insigni-
ficant role in the Programme. Few of the women's groups seem to be affiliated 
with it; many do not know of its existence; others know about it but are 
distrustful. The rhetoric suggests that Maendeleo plays a vital role in 
"mobilising women for development". In reality, in most of the rural areas 
we visited it is marginal. Assuming that an organisation like this can 
make a meaningful contribution to rural development, it seems necessary that 
steps be taken to revitalise it. 
Replication 
The Programme is now being replicated In various other parts of 
the country. One important lesson which has been learned from four years of 
experience is that maximum use should be made of existing resources, and the 
Government should make a definite financial commitment to the Programme 
instead of continually relying on the external resources provided by UNICEF 
and PBFL/FAO. Existing Government resources such as staffing and transport 
arrangements should be made available for the Women's Programme in all areas, 
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rather than special arrangements being made only for those areas where the 
Programme is presently being initiated. In this way Government will be 
able to take the Programme over should it decide to do so. Special funding 
can only be justified if it Is made available to the Department of Social 
Services for its activities throughout the country, and not just for SRDP 
areas. For example, we recommend that the CDAs be employed by central 
Government, not just in SRDP areas but throughout the country. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
General Findings 
1. There is a need for improved cooperation among U.N. consulting 
and donor agencies involved in the Women's Programme and between these 
agencies and the Department of Social Services. 
2. Other ministries, such as Agriculture, Health and Cooperative 
Development should be more fully involved with the Programme at the national 
level. It should not be assumed that this Programme is the sole responsibi-
lity of the Department of Social Services. Wider participation could be 
achieved through a central coordinating body with a strong interministerial 
structure. In this way, the ministries already mentioned, as well as the 
Ministries of Commerce and Industry, Labour, Lands and Settlement, Works, 
Tourism and Wildlife, Information and Broadcasting, and Water Development 
could make important contributions to the Programme. In addition to parti-
cipating in this interministerial structure, there must be a strong commit-
ment to the Women's Programme within the individual ministries. 
3. We recommend that the proposed Women's Bureau should be designed 
to serve as the coordinator of the Women's Programme. The Bureau should be 
composed of ministerial representatives who are well qualified and occupy 
senior positions in their ministries so that their participation in the 
design and implementation of the Women's Programme can be effective. It is 
also important that the Women's Programme be fully integrated into the plans, 
activities and structure of the Women's Bureau. 
4. At the local level, different ministries have played a more active 
role, especially with regard to the leaders' training courses. However, 
interdepartmental participation and cooperation need to be further streng-
thened. Follow-up and extension activities aimed at reinforcing or imple-
menting the training courses would be much more effective if they were carried 
out jointly by the field staff of different ministries. 
5. Several measures are recommended to facilitate wider participation 
of officers from different Government departments and better integration of 
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efforts in the field. First, since transport is scarce, more attention 
should be paid to possibilities for sharing vehicles among departments, 
with two or more workers teaming up to use one vehicle for visits to 
women's groups. Secondly, the idea of a newsletter circulated among SRDP 
and other Government staff could be used more widely to encourage communi-
cation and cooperation. Finally, as a long-term measure, field personnel 
in such ministries as Agriculture and Health should receive training in 
techniques for working with groups. 
6. In view of the fact that the primary economic activity in Kenya 
is agricultural production, it is regrettable that the Ministries of Agri-
culture and Cooperative Development have not fully involved themselves in 
the Women's Programme. There is a particular need for these two ministries 
to offer greater assistance in the planning and implementation of income-
generating activities for women's groups. 
7. The employment and training of Community Development Assistants 
must be put on a sound basis. Ideally, they should remain employees of the 
local authorities, but if these bodies are allowed to continue to deteriorate 
financially, the employment of the CDAs should be taken over by central 
Government. 
8. Reporting and monitoring of the Women's Programme needs to be 
improved. This can best be achieved by giving encouragement and adequate 
training to the CDAs since they have the greatest responsibilities in this 
important sphere. 
9- The training of women's group leaders needs to be more selective 
and concrete. At present the tendency is to 'swamp' the women with a wider 
range of material than anyone could absorb or use effectively in a short 
time. 
10. Women's group leaders should be paid a small honorarium in recog-
nition of the important service they are providing, which is really a form 
of extension work. 
11- The mass media could be used more fully to publicise and support 
the Women's Programme. At present insufficient use is being made of the 
mobile cinema unit. 
12. The very small role played by Maendeleo ya Wanawake is cause for 
surprise and regret. It is obvious that this organisation needs to be 
revitalised, since its public image of active involvement in the concerns of 
rural women is not reflected in the actual situation in the field. 
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13. In the initial replication exercise of the Women's Programme in 
non-SRDP areas, care should be taken that too many resources are not 
allocated to a few specific areas, particularly if it would not be possible 
to provide a similar level of inputs in other parts of the country. 
Recommendations for Income-Generating Activities 
14. It is crucial that income-generating projects now become a 
central concern of the Women's Programme. Up until now there has been 
somewhat more emphasis on social welfare activities, but this imbalance 
should now be altered, especially since many groups have the interest, 
initiative and capability to engage in commercial enterprises. 
15. Proposals for commercial ventures must be carefully worked out 
with full knowledge of local conditions and expert advice from the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the Department of Cooperative Development to ensure that 
they are veil designed and economically viable before they are Initiated. 
16. Local D.S.S. personnel, especially the ACDOs, ought to play a more 
active role in organising and coordinating commercial projects, seeking 
outside assistance and expert advice, assessing the feasibility of projects 
and the capabilities of groups to carry out different types of projects and, 
in some cases, drawing up, submitting and following up on requests for aid. 
Up until now, a variety of proposals has been made by local officers for 
aid to specific commercial projects, but some have not been followed through 
to the implementation stage. In other cases, poor proposals have been 
Implemented without adequate planning or organisation. 
17. Many women's groups have tried to sell handicrafts or garden 
produce, but in many cases returns have been small considering the effort 
expended. In some areas markets are poorly organised, but in others there 
simply is no adequate market for these products. There seems to be little 
point in continuing to produce goods which can neither be sold nor used in 
the members' own homes, as Is the case with certain handicraft Items. In 
fact, concentration on handicrafts may be counter-productive if it slows down 
the pursuit of other alternatives, 
18. Groups commonly earn money by working as agricultural labour teams, 
especially for weeding. The possibility of hiring women's groups to work on 
labour-intensive Government projects such as roads ought to be investigated. 
19. Projects such as vegetable growing and poultry keeping must not be 
assessed in purely commercial terms. Provided costs are met, activities 
of this type which generate little profit - may make valuable contributions to 
the diets of group members and their families. For this reason these projects 
should be encouraged. 
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Recommendations for Specific Areas 
20. Kapenguria: The Kiletat organisation can potentially make a 
major contribution benefiting women throughout the District and should be 
encouraged more actively. Plans for a cooperative consumer goods shop and 
handicraft production should be encouraged, but the initial objectives 
should be modest. An assessment should be made of the local market before 
deciding what goods should be carried in the shop. The local Cooperatives 
office should be much more involved in this project. 
21. Kwale: The poultry project in Bomani has clearly been a success. 
Steps should be taken to ascertain its potential for replication elsewhere 
in the area. 
Handicraft sales have a fairly good potential in Kwale due to 
the proximity of the tourist market, but a better marketing organisation 
needs to be developed if this potential is to be exploited fully. 
22. Mbere: It is worth considering a water project as part of the 
Women's Programme here since fetching water takes up so much of the womens' 
time. 
Markets for the handicrafts produced by the groups need to be 
exploited more fully, especially the possibility of selling craft items at 
the Isaac Walton Inn in Embu town. 
23. Migori: The reporting system here is particularly inadequate, 
perhaps because PBFL's involvement in the area has been relatively slight. 
We feel that the PBFL team and Government officers in the Women's Programe 
at the national level should give more attention to this area. 
Poultry production in Migori appears potentially profitable, but 
the one group currently engaged in poultry keeping is experiencing diffi-
culties because inadequate attention was given to the production costs of 
using grade hens and commercial feeds. Ministry of Agriculture staff 
should assist more fully in this and fucure poultry projects. 
2 4 • Tetu: The women's groups in this area should be encouraged to buy 
grade cattle. This would be especially beneficial to low income families 
in improving their nutritional status, and any excess milk could be sold. 
25-- Vihiga/Hamisi: The MANYATIBU cooperative project, as presently 
conceived, faces immense practical problems. The proposal should either be 
dropped or pursued more vigourously in a substantially revised form. 
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The new papain extraction plant In the area offers an opportunity 
which should be investigated for women's groups to earn an income by growing 
papaya. 
The Partnership for Productivity organisation should be used more 
fully to assist women's groups who wish to become involved in viable 
commercial enterprise. 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
THE KENYA FUNCTIONAL LITERACY PROGRAMME: 
IDS/OP 12 
AN EVALUATION 
This report is divided into three sections. In the first section, 
we shall discuss the teaching methods used in the Kenya Functional Literacy 
Programme- Then we shall turn our attention to the content of the literacy 
lessons. Finally, we shall discuss the administration of the Programme. 
TEACHING METHODS 
How best to teach reading is a topic which has generated a great 
deal of controversy over many years. Methods which have been used can 
be arranged along a continuum, according to the emphasis which they place 
on x,uiJUi£ng up from small units towards larger ones ('synthetic' methods) 
or downwards from large units to smaller ones ('analytic' or 'global' methods). 
Small 4 Primary Units ^ Large 
i | 1 1 j » 
Letters Sounds Syllables Words Sentences Stories 
(Alphabetic) (Phonic) 
'synthetic' methods 'analytic' or 'global' methods 
At one extreme of the continuum is the formalistic and now super-
ceded 'alphabetic' method. Pupils were first drilled in the names of the 
letters of the alphabet ( ay bee see), and then taught their sounds. When 
these had been mastered, the sounds were built up into words ( b - a - g), 
and these words combined into sentences. Because of the phonetic constraints, 
these sentences were often virtually meaningless ("The cat sat on the mat in a 
hat"). At the other extreme are methods in which a phrase, a sentence, or even 
a whole story is taken as the primary unit of meaning. When the pupils have 
grasped the meaning of the whole unit, they analyse it into its component 
parts; first the words, then the syllables, and finally, perhaps, the individual 
sounds and their alphabetic names. 
Most practical reading methods fall somewhere along the continuum 
between these extremes. During the 1950s analytic methods, based on the whole 
word or on larger units of meaning, had a tremendous vogue. The pupil was 
taught to regard each word essentially as a picture> locked at its contours 
and then said its meaning, without analysing it into sounds or syllables. An 
important advantage of this method is that by focussing on the meaning of whole 
words and groups of words, it arouses the learner's interest in the content of 
what he is reading and thus maintains his incentive to go on learning. But its 
more extreme proponents tended to forget that the letters and syllables from 
which words are made up are not arbitrary; they also convey meaning, although, 
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of course, of a lower order of generality. Without access to this meaning, 
the learner is handicapped. Even with a non-phonetic language such as English 
the constituent parts of a word usually convey some information as to how the 
word should be sounded. The Information may be Incomplete or faulty, but at 
least the range of alternatives from which the learner must choose is greatly 
reduced. With a fully phonetic and strongly syllabised language such as SwahiJ1 
there is a greac deal to be gained from teaching the sound-values of letters 
and syllables very early in the learning process. 
But purely synthetic methods also have their disadvantages. As 
we have already noted, if the attention of the learner is focussed too strongly 
on the smallest building-units, the "ounds and the syllables, he may well lose 
sight of the message the writer is attempting to convey. Learning tends to get 
bogged down in a tedious morass of drilling and repetition. 
Recent attempts to devise reading schemes have for the most part 
avoided dogmatic adherence to either synthetic or analytic methods, but have 
tried instead to combine the best features of both in an eclectic approach. 
The balance between the two methods will depend mainly on the characteristics 
of the language in which the learners are to become literate. In languages 
such as English where the links between the written symbols and the spoken 
sounds are weak and Irregular, the analytic or global method will play a large 
part. But only with those languages where the elements of the written word give 
no clue as to how it is spoken (Chinese is the obvious example) will a purely 
global approach be appropriate. 
The fact that Swahili (together with most other East African 
languages) is both phonetic and strongly syllabic gives it an enormous 
advantage over English as a vehicle for a literacy programme. It means that 
pupils can learn to read Swahili words quickly and easily, even if their knowl-
edge of the language Is only fragmentary. Swahili uses only five vowels and 
25 consonants, and these 30 sounds are invariable represented by the same 
written symbols. Once he has mastered these basic symbols, together v/ith their 
common syllabic combinations, the learner's main literacy problem has been 
solved. He can then concentrate on learning the language, which Is likely to 
be much more difficult task. 
Karen Blixen, an early settler in Kenya, recounts in her autobiography 
Out of Africa, (London, Putnam, 1937, paperback edition, London, Cape, 1964, pp. 
132-133) how she could read her employees' Swahili letters for them soon after 
arriving in the colony, and before she could hold the simplest Swahili conver-
sation. Her employees could speak the language but not read It, whereas she could 
read the language but not speak it! 
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The Kenya Functional Literacy Programme follows a mixed analytic -
synthetic method which has now been tried in a number of countries. The basis 
of the approach is a list of key words, (sometimes called the "generative" 
words) which are chosen so as to cover all the sounds used in the language. 
The pupils learn to recognise the key words one at a time, or in small batches, 
first in conjunction with relevant pictures, and then on their own. As soon as 
a new key word has been mastered, the pupils are encouraged to break it down into 
syllables, and then to recombine the syllables so as to generate new words. 
During the first two or three lessons the possibilities for recombination are 
of course rather limited, but as each new generative word is learned the alter-
natives multiply rapidly. 
The next stage in most programmes is to analyse the syllables into 
their component sounds. This may be•started right from the first lesson, or it 
may be delayed until the learners have built up a stock of known syllables. 
Once they have mastered this step, the range of words which learners can 
construct from their own resources is, of course, enormously extended. 
The first two key words introduced in the Kenya Functional Literacy 
Programme are udongo (soil) and tofauti (different). They were presumably 
chosen because of their relevance to the content of the course: the first book 
deals with types of soil, the use of fertilisers and soil erosion. The teacher 
introduces them during the first lesson, using flash cards. He then shows the 
pupils how to break the words up into syllables: u-do-ngo and to-fa-u-ti. When 
they have mastered this, the teacher encourages them to recombine the syllables 
to form different words. Some suggested new words are given in the text for 
each lesson: those for the first lesson are ufa (crack), ungo (joint), and uto 
(a kind of oil). 
But there is a major difficulty here. In other countries where 
literacy programmes have been mounted, most learners have had a sophisticated, 
adult knowledge of the spoken language. They have lacked only the ability to 
read and write it. Thus once the recruits have learned the first few generative 
worlfis, and have grasped the principles of analysing and resynthesising them, they 
can begin forming and reading new words for themselves, without help from the 
teacher. From the very first lesson they can become active participants in the 
learning process, and can discover as much from their own efforts as from what 
the teacher tells them. If the language is fully phonetic most of them should 
have mastered all the skills needed to read any text written within the vocabu-
lary of the average adult within a few months. 
! 
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But in Kenya the problem is more complex. Standard Swahili, the 
language of Instruction for the Functional Literacy Programme, has an elegant 
grammar and a rich vocabulary, but it is spoken as a first language by only 
a minority of Kenyans, most of whom live along the narrow coastal strip. In 
up-country districts Swahili is used widely as a lingua franca, but the 
grammar is usually simplified and the vocabulary restricted. The typical 
recruit to a functional literacy class is unlikely to have a working vocabulary 
of more than a few hundred words. In some districts and among some groups 
(for example, those without experience of working in a formal job) the 
typical vocabulary of known words may be a good deal smaller. Most new 
recruits to literacy classes probably know the word udongo, and a smaller number 
probably know tofauti, but very few indeed are likely to have ever heard ufa, 
ungo or uto. 
During the visits to literacy centres we made while carrying out the 
evaluation we discussed this problem with a number of the instructors. Most of 
them admitted freely that they themselves had not known any of these words 
before joining the Programme. Nor is it possible to form other, better-known 
words from the syllables of the first two generative words. The instructors 
could not remember any student coming up with a single suggestion. They had 
thus had to show the students how to form the new words, and, furthermore, 
to explain what they meant. The generative words for the second and third 
lessons (aina, za, ni, nini and hizo) were not much more fruitful. Hence, 
far from engendering attitudes of active participation among the learners, 
the opening lessons of the course had quite the opposite effect. The only 
response which a new recruit could make was one of passive acceptance of what 
his teacher told him. Progress towards gaining independent mastery over his 
own learning processes was virtually impossible. 
It is not only the derivative words that cause problems. A high 
proportion of the generative words are also little known. Examples from the 
first reader include: rutuba (fertility), kinyesi (manure), mkondo (flow of 
water) and mtelemko (downward slope). We asked the students in one literacy 
class to explain to us the meanings of five of the more difficult words from 
the second reader which they had just completed. The words were kudumu (to' 
last), maradhi (sickness), kupalilia (to pile in heaps), kustahimili (to 
endure), and dhaifu (weak, poor quality). Although they had been introduced to 
all these words within the past few weeks, not a single student could remember 
even one of them. Clearly it is unrealistic to expect new recruits, preoccupied 
with the task of learning to read and write, to memorise at the same time large 
numbers of uncommon words, well outside the range of their known vocabulary. 
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It may well be that the main problem with the Functional Literacy 
Programme is that it is too ambitious. For the Programme not only attempts 
to teach its recruits practical facts about farming, household management 
and health at the same time as it teaches them to read and write, but it also 
undertakes to teach them the language through which they learn the facts 
and express their new literacy skills. In other words, the Programme has three 
goals: to teach literacy, to teach the Swahiii language, and to provide practical 
adult education. Perhaps this triple burden is too heavy for it to bear, and 
more modest goals need to be set up. 
Nevertheless the attempt to combine the three goals in one programme 
is well worth making. There are obviously major savings in time and money 
if they can all be attained successfullly. Fortunately there is one important 
factor which makes the task a great deal easier. As we have seen, Swahiii is 
a fully phonetic and strongly syllabised language. Unlike English, the 
words are built up from the smallest ec.jnd ihit^ in an orderly, logical and 
entirely consistent manner. Once the system is understood, learning to read 
becomes a great deal easier. It should therefore be possible for recruits to 
become fully fluent in reading and perh~-"s writing Swahiii within a matter of 
months provided that in initial stages of the programme the attainment of 
literacy is given priority over the other two goals. This means that in 
constructing the first two or three readers the vocabulary used must be confined 
to words which are widely understood in rural Kenya,. It also means that in 
these introductory readers it may not be possible to orient the content so 
strongly towards specific, work-oriented topics as has been done in the experi-
mental readers. 
In evaluating a programme conceived and carried out by other people 
it is always easy to point out the shortcomings, but much more difficult to 
suggest alternative approaches which might work better. Very few projects 
indeed ever succeed in achieving fully the ambitious goals with which they 
started, and an evaluation which is nothing but a catalogue of criticisms is of 
limited use in devising future policy. For this reason we shall concentrate in 
the remainder of this section on suggesting some ideas as to the form which the 
first few lessons of a revised Functional Literacy Programme might take. It 
should be stressed that these ideas are tentative and only partially worked out: 
and we have had only limited opportunity to test them in the classroom. A 
great deal more effort and ingenuity would have to be expended on them before 
they could be developed into a usable programme. Further comments on the 
teaching methods used in the existing programme will take the form mainly of 
comparisons with our alternative proposals. 
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The first lesson might start by introducing the generative words 
kusoma (to read) and kulima (to cultivate). These two words have a number of 
advantages over other possible choices. In the first place, and perhaps 
most Important of all, they are words which are widely understood all over 
Kenya. We do not have Swahili word frequency lists for Kenya, but in lists 
based on written materials used in Tanzania, kusoma is number 65 in frequency 
of use (that is, only 64 other words are used more commonly) and kulima is 
about number 160. Udongo and tofauti, the first two words in the present 
2 Functional Literacy Programme, are at about numbers 240 and 350 respectively. 
second advantage of these words is that they are highly 
relevant to the lives and perceived needs of the participants. The new learners 
have come to the class because they want to know how to read (kusoma) and also 
how to be better farmers (kulima). Thus each generative word points towards 
a major concern of the participants and a major goal of the Programme, and 
by so doing should strengthen their incentive to persevere with the course. 
A third point is that the words lend themselves very easily to 
Illustration. Good, clear photographs or drawings are especially Important-
early in the course before the pupils have learned how to analyse words into 
sounds, and are therefore dependent on memory- Of the six key words introduced 
during the first three lessons In the Kenya Functional Literacy Programme, only 
one (udongo) is capable of being illustrated. 
Fourthly, the words break easily into syllables: ku-so-ma and 
ku-li-ma. Moreover; the syllables are all of a single type; each consists 
of two letters, made up of a consonant followed by a vowel. It Is probably 
advisable to delay Introducing more complex syllables - such as those In which 
a single consonant Is represented by two letters (for example, sh In shi-ka), 
or in which two separate consonants precede the vowel (for example, ngo In 
u-do-ngo) - until a number of simple two-letter and one-letter syllables have 
been mastered. 
2- The Tanzanian written Swahili word frequency lists were constructed 
by Dr. Marian Halvorson, Literacy Consultant to the National Christian Council 
of Kenya. We are most grateful to Dr. Halvorson for making them available to 
us.. 
It should be pointed out that the use of frequency counts from 
written materials has limitations, Many words ? especially common nouns, are 
widely used in everyday spoken Swahili, but are met with less frequently in 
books, magazines and newspaper articles. Examples are chai (tea), kuku (hen), 
duka (shop) and pombe (beer). It would obviously be more satisfactory to use 
statistics indicating how widely the various words are known, especially by 
potential recruits to literacy programmes, but unfortunately such data are not 
available. 
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Fifthly, the generative words have two syllables, ku and ma, in 
common. Thus the amount of new learning mvoived in mastering the second 
word is reduced to one syllable only Further, pupiis are introduced to 
ths principle that a syllable is always pronounced in the same way, no matter 
what word it appears in. 
How much repetition is needed among tne syllables and sounds of 
the generative words depends mainly on the level of familiarity the learners 
have with the spOKen language* When uhe literacy programme is being conducted 
in the learner's mother tongue, systematic repetition is probably unnecessary. 
In Paoio Freire's programmes for native Portuguese speakers in Brazil, for 
instance, only about 15-17 generative words are used to cover all the sounds 
in the language. But wnen, as m Kenya, most learners have only a limited 
familiarity with the spoken language, some opportunity to hear the syllables 
and sounds in different contexts is certainly needed, No matter how commonly-
used the chosen generative words may be, there will always be some pupils who 
do not Know them ail. It seems iikeiy that after the first few lessons 
repetition of known syllables in new generative words could be dropped, but 
that repetition of known sounds in new syllable combinations would need to be 
more extensive. At a guess, the full list of generative words might number 
somewhere between 30 and i0, 
The sixth and finax advantage of the generative words kusoma and 
kulima is one of the most crucial. The syllables which make them up can be 
rearranged to -orm three simple words, all of which are widely known. Mama 
(mother; is one of the commonest words In Swahixi; only 33 other words were 
ranked 'higher in the Tanzania written word frequency counts- Kuku (hen) ranked 
at about number HOO, but In everyday spoken Swahiii it is used more often. 
The third word, maii (property, wealth, goods) is also listed around number 
400, but again this ranking is somewhat deceptive. The word is widely under-
stood by rural Kenyans, especially in economically advanced areas, where the 
acquisition of wealth has become a major preoccupation. In most parts of the 
country it would probably be uncommon to find any new recruits who did not 
know at least one of these D. Q P I V a. tive words; a majority would probably know two 
of them, or perhaps even a n three. Hence, if the teacher is skillful, there 
is no reason why most students should not return home from their first 
lesson with the satisfaction of having read and understood at least.one word 
m • 
for themselves, without being helped. None of the three derivative words for 
the first lesson of the Kenya Functional Literacy course (ufa, ungo, and uto) 
are used commonly enough to appear at ail among the 1,000 words covered by 
the Tanzania word frequency lists; and, as we have seen, none of them was known 
by any of the learners in the classes taught hy the teachers we consulted. 
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Students might perhaps begin the second lesson by revising the five 
words learned during the first lessons with the additional help of pictures for 
the three derivative words, (These pictures would not be Introduced during the 
first lesson, because the learners should try to synthesise the derivative words 
from the syllables they already know,, without extra help.) Then the new generative 
words would be Introduced, Suitable choices might be- pesa (money), watoto, 
(children) and the phrase hakuna kazi (no work). Pesa and watoto are both widely 
known; their rankings In the word frequency lists are about numbers 160 and 100 
respectively. They are both easy words to illustrate, and for most Kenyans carry 
heavy loads of meaning. Between them they introduce the two remaining vowels, e 
and o, which were not learned during the first lesson5 together with the consonants 
ps w and t. The.vowel a and the consonant s are repeated, but in different syllabic 
combinations. 
The phrase hakuna kazi probably appears on Swahili signboards in Kenya 
more often than any other, with the possible exception of mbwa mkali (fierce dog). 
It Is to be seen at factory gates, on building sites, and at the entrances of 
offices and shops, and is well known to anybody who has ever been a jobseeker. Its 
use as a generative phrase gives the teacher the opportunity to initiate a 
discussion of the problems of unemployment with the class. If he does not have 
a job (kazi) how can someone get money (pesa) oiid provide for his children 
(watotoj? One of the purposes of the Functional Literacy Programme is to help 
people who cannot get paid jobs to earn more money through better farming 
(kulima), better household management, -and, perhaps, through participation in 
trading or business. Learning to read (kusoma) gives people access to knowledge, 
and this can be a powerful weapon in reducing the problems oi poverty. Using 
the illustrations for the five generative words and phrases introduced so far, 
the teacher should have little difficulty m starting a lively discussion. 
Phonetically, the phrase hakuna kazi is equally useful. It repeats 
the syllable ku, but in the middle of a word rather than as the initial 
syllable. It also repeats the known vowels a. and i., but in new syllabic 
combinations: ha? na, ka, and jzi. 
The syllable na is especially important, for it provides the 
learners with a key whereby they can start reading and writing whole sentences 
rather than just single words. As an infix between the pronoun and stem of any 
vert>» £2. denotes the present continuous tense, (for example, wa-na-soma; they 
are reading)» which Is the simplest and most useful tense for beginners to learn, 
furthermore, in conjunction with a pronoun, but without a verb stem, na denotes 
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the present tense of the verb to have, (e.g. wana - they have); and as a single 
word on its own it corresponds to the English word 'and'. 
Common words which can be generated from pesa, watoto and hakuna 
kazi include sasa (now), sawa (correct, or smooth), kutoka (to go out) and 
sana (very much). In combination with the two generative words from the first 
lesson they also give rise to: matope (mud), wall (cooked rice), mapema (early), 
kupewa (to receive), maziwa (milk) and kali (angry, fierce). But as well as 
these, there are also the verb-forms wanasoma, wanalima, wanatoka and wanapewa. 
And these verb-forms can be used to create simple sentences, which might be 
presented to the students on cards, Illustrated with photographs: 
mama na watoto wanasoma 
(the mother and the children are reading) 
sasa mama na watoto wanalima 
(now the mother and the children are cultivating) 
These sentences are especially important, because they provide the 
learners with tangible evidence of their progress. Although they have been 
attending classes for only a few sessions, they are already able to read 
simple sentences from their own resources with little or no help. Confidence 
In one's ability to master new skills is a powerful incentive to continued 
effort. From this point on, similar passages should form a part of every lesson. 
The work just outlined, springing from the second batch of generative 
words, Is probably enough to keep students busy for at least two lessons. 
When they finish it, perhaps by the end of the third or fourth lesson, they 
should be able to recognise at least ten derived words, as well as the six 
generative words. They will also have made their first attempts at reading 
simple sentences. They will have met all the five vowels (a, e, I, o, u), and 
ten consonants (h, k, 1, m, n, p, s, t, w and z), but so far only In syllabic 
combinations. 
The next batch of generative words to be introduced might consist 
of: jikoni (kitchen, literally 'at the fireplace'), duka (shop) and kulipa 
(to pay). These words are again widely known, easily illustrated and relevant 
to the lives of all rural Kenyans. They Introduce two new consonants (d and j), 
bringing the total to twelve, and five new syllables, two of them Involving 
the new consonants (du and ji) and three involving known consonants in new 
combinations (ko, ni and pa). The derivatives they give rise to include such 
significant words as maji (water), dudu (Insect - commonly used for agricultural 
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and household pests),,, jiko (fireplace - now used often for charcoal braziers 
made from, scrap metal), hapa (here) and hapana (literally 'here is net', 
commonly used to mean 'no'). 
At this point the learners have been introduced to seventeen 
syllables, set out in the following table: 
Consonants 
vowels d h j k 1 m n p s t w z 
a ha ka ma . na pa sa wa 
e pe 
i ji li ni zi 
o ko so to 
u du Ku 
It will be seen that of these seventeen known syllables, seven are 
from the family involving the vowel a (ha - ka - ma - na - pa - sa - wa). The 
_i family is represented by four members (]i - li - ni - zi); the c> family by 
three (ko - so - to) and the u family by two (du - ku). The only which 
has appeared so far in only one syllabic combination is _e. Three pairs and 
one tria. involving a common consonant are also represented (pa - pe, na - ni, 
sa - so, and ka - ko - ku). Within each group the common consonant is coupled 
once with the vowel a. and at least once with one of the other four vowels. 
These consonants thus establish links between the a. vowel family and each of the 
other four vowel families. We shall see shortly that these 'consonant links' 
between vowel . families make it easy for learners to learn new syllables, without 
having to meet, them first in generative words. 
The learners are now ready to take a major step forward. Until 
now they have broken down the generative words only as far as the syllables, 
and then recombined these syllables to make new words,, With knowledge they now 
command, it should be easy for them to grasp the principle that the syllables 
themselves can be broken down Into simpler building-blocks, each composed of a 
single sound and represented usually by a single letter. 
It should be stressed that our ideas as to the methods which 
teachers might use to bring their pupils to this crucial insight are 
tentative. They need £ great deal o f testing and revision. In particular we 
are uncertain as to how rapidly it would be feasible to make the changeover 
from syllabic to predominantly phonetic (single - sound) units. All told, 
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Swahili uses nearly 200 different syllables. Clearly, if all of these were to 
be introduced initially through the generative words, the acquisition of literacy 
would be a long, drawn-out process. But on the other hand, pupils probably 
need a certain amount of practice at recognising syllables before they are 
ready to begin tackling the building up of words from single sounds. If the 
changeover Is made too quickly, learners are likely to lose their fluency in 
reading whole words and sentences. 
To a certain extent we are dealing with a tradeoff situation. 
If we decide to concentrate on the larger units, that is the generative words 
and the syllables, we will place a heavy burden on the learner's capacit.'es for 
memorising and recapitulation, but will make relatively light demands on his 
abilities to syntheslse known elements into larger arrangements with new meanings. 
If, however, we stress the smallest units, that is the separate sounds, the 
balance Is reversed; there will be relatively little memorisation to be done, 
but a great deal of syntheslsing. As we have seen, Swahili uses only 30 
different sounds, which are always represented by the same written symbols. The 
choice, In other words, Is between memorising a large number of big units and 
then learning to arrange them In relatively simple combinations, or alter-
natively memorising a much smaller number of small units and then learning to 
arrange them in more complex combinations. Thus, in deciding the teaching 
method to use we are at the same time largely determining the type of intel-
lectual skills the course will demand. 
In any practicable reading scheme there will obviously be some 
teaching at each of the three levels: the whole-word level, the syllabic 
level, and the phonetic (single-sound ) level. But In our view there are 
overwhelming advantages In moving away from memorisation towards a full 
engagement of the pupils' capacities for synthesis as early as possible in the 
learning process. Memorisation Is essentially a low-le'-el activity, which 
requires of the learner mainly that he act as a passive recipient for information 
coming from an authoritative source - in this case the literacy teacher. Thus 
a stress on memorisation as the principal teaching method implies a prolonged 
period of Intellectual dependency. Synthesis, by contrast, is a much more 
active process, and one which involves a wider spectrum of abilities. The 
learner starts with his elements of remembered knowledge, but must work with 
them to create new combinations which express new meanings. He arrives at these 
new meanings by his own efforts, and in so doing gradually takes charge of his 
own learning, and weans himself from his dependency on his teacher. The satis-
i 
faction which he experiences when he reads and understands a new word without 
being helped provides a powerful Incentive for continued learning. 
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The implication is clear: the move from whole-word and syllabic 
teaching towards phonetic methods should be made as rapidly as is consistent 
with the maintenance of reading fluency. The purpose of the generative words 
is to introduce the full range of separate sounds In meaningful contexts, and 
to provide enough repetition for recognition to become easy and automatic. 
Once this has been achieved, generative words are no longer needed. 
The first step in the changeover from syllabic to phonetic units 
would be perhaps to Introduce single sounds in contexts where they represent 
whole syllables, as for example the vowel a in a - na - so - ma or the 
consonant m in m - to - to. All the five vowels, together with the consonants 
m and _n, are commonly used as full syllables in Swahiii. These single-sound 
syllables are easier to recognise when they occur at the beginning of a word 
(e.g. a - na - so - ma) than they are in the middle (ku - fu - a_ - ta) or at 
the end (ku - to-a.), so we would introduce them first in that position. The 
next step might be to show pupils how to derive new syllabic combinations from 
known single sounds. With these two bridging steps mastered, students should 
be ready to tackle the sound-values of the consonants which never constitute 
whole syllables, and thus move towards fully phonetic reading. 
The teaching outline which follows is meant simply to suggest some 
practical methods by which the first of these steps might be introduced In the 
classroom. The sequence Is as follows: 
1. A single vowel forming a complete syllable at the beginning of 
a word. 
2. A single consonant forming a complete syllable at the beginning 
of a word. 
3. A new syllabic combination, made up of known sounds. 
It is difficult and cumbersome to describe teaching methods on paper, 
partly because of the problem of distinguishing between what the teacher says 
and what he writes on the blackboard, and partly because what he does depends 
so much on the response he gets from the learners. In the classroom, the 
methods would seem much more straightforward. 
The teacher might start by asking his pupils to compare the known 
words ku - so - ma and ha - ku - na. He writes them on the board and gets the 
learners to say them slowly, separating the syllables. He then elicits from 
them the fact that the first syllable of kusoma is the same as the second 
syllable of hakuna, but that the other syllables are different. 
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Then he invites the students to look at and listen to the last two 
syllables, ma and na, carefully. Are they completely different, or are they 
alike in any way? 
What the teacher does now depends on the replies he gets. If he 
has led up to the point well, nearly everyone will be prepared to volunteer 
some answer such as, "They start off differently, but they and in the same way". 
If he gets a response of this kind, he appeals to the rest of the class: "Is he 
right?" "Yes." But if most of the students seem hesitant, he goes back to 
the syllables and tries again. The key point is that the teacher, having 
assembled all the facts the learners need to solve a problem, never tells them 
the answer, but.•Father elicits the answer from them. He leaves them to close 
the 'insight gap' for themselves. Further, having elicited an answer from a 
volunteer the teacher does not confirm or reject it himself, but rather appeals 
to the rest of the class: "Is he right?". In this way, each learner internalises 
the answer; it is a solution to the problem that he and che rest of the students 
have worked out for themselves, not one that has beer, imposed. 
The teacher then writes other known words containing syllables from 
the _a vowel family on the blackboard, one at a time: pe - sa, du - ka, wa - to -
to, ku - II - pa. Can the pupils find other syllables in these words which end 
with the same sound? As each new syllable is Identified, a student adds it to 
a list on the blackboard: 
ma 
na 
sa 
ka 
wa 
pa etc. 
Everyone now reads these syllables out aloud together, listening 
to the sounds. Teacher: "So what is the sound that they all end with?" 
Students: "a". 
Teacher: "Now, supposing we want to write just the sound a_ by 
itrelf. How do you think we could do it?" A volunteer writes his answer on 
the blackboard. Teacher: "Is he right?" "Yes." 
The teacher moves immediately to consolidate the new knowledge by 
using a. as a separate syllable in a meaningful context. "Here is a problem for 
you. We know how to write 
wa - to - to wa - na - so - ma 
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But here is a picture of the mother reading by herself. How do you think 
we could write 'mama anasoma' underneath it?" 
A volunteer writes his solution on the board, and the teacher 
confirms it from the class, as before. The teacher then writes the second 
sentence below the first so that the syllables can be compared, and everyone 
looks at them and reads them slowly: 
wa - to - to wa - na - so - ma 
ma - ma a. - na - so - ma 
The teacher might then Introduce the following story, illustrated 
with photographs. The story uses only known words: 
mama anaiipa pesa dukani 
(.mother Is paying money at the shop) 
sasa mama anapewa jiko 
(now mother is receiving a charcoal brazier) 
sasa mama na watoto wanatoka dukani 
(now mother and the children are leaving the shop) 
This story gives the learners practice in recognising the vowel-
syllable a_ in association with two other verb stems, and further practice in 
differentiating a_ from wa. It also, of course, provides them with more 
evidence of their progress in learning to read. 
In the next lesson the learning continues. The teacher might begin 
by reading the known sentences: 
ma - ma a - nasoma 
wa - toto wa - nasoma 
"But here is a picture of only one child reading. So we need to write mtoto 
anasoma." 
"We know how to write ma (ma - ma) and we know how to write a on 
3 
its own a^ - na - soma). So how do you think we write m. on its own, so that 
we can write mtoto?" 
The teacher then elicits and confirms the correct answer, using the 
methods already described. He continues: 
3- Single consonants are, of course, much more difficult to sound than 
single vowels. In Swahili, however, the consonants m and n are relatively 
simple, because, as we have seen, they often constitute complete syllables. 
Sometimes these syllables even carry a stress (e.g. m - bwa, m - bu). It thus 
seems justified to introduce these two single consonants early in the teaching 
sequence. 
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"So now we can write: 
ma - ma a - na - soma 
wa - toto wa - na - -soma 
m - toto a - na - soma 
"BUT perhaps you might want to write ' I am reading' (ni - na -
so - ma). How do you think we could write that?" The syllables of 
ninasoma are all known, although this particular form of the verb is a new 
derivative. When the syllables have been correctly assembled, the teacher 
continues: 
"But most people when they have learned to read are very happy. 
Suppose you want to write 'mimi ninasoma', and not just 'ninasoma' 
(I myself am reading, with emphasis on the personal pronoun). How do you 
think we could write 'mimi'? 
"We know how to write na (wanasoma, analipa) and we have written 
ma many times (mama, anasoma). We also know how to write ni_ (jikoni, dukani). 
So we can write ni, na, and ma. In fact there Is one word we have written 
today, where we use all three of them.. Can anyone think which word it is? 
iNi - na - so - ma)„ We can write them on the blackboard like'this: 
na ma 
ni 
Everyone then reads the syllables aloud from the blackboard, in 
all possible arrangements: na - ma, na - ni, ni - na, ma - na. 
Teacher: "We can read across: na - ma. If we wanted to read 
the next line, we would start with ni; and what would we say next? 
Listen: na - ma, ni - ?" If the learners seem puzzled, the teacher might 
recall some more known syllables from the _a vowel family, for instance sa 
(pesa) pa (lipa) and wa (watoto), and add them to the top line: 
na ma sa pa wa 
ni ? 
"Starting with na, we can say ma, sa, pa, and wa. So if we start 
with ni, what would we say?" 
The teacher thus elicits the new syllable ml from the known 
syllables na, ma, and ni, and the learners can now add mimi ninasoma 
to their list of sentences: 
ma - ma a_ - na - soma 
wa - toto wa - na - soma 
m - toto _a - na - soma 
mi - mi ni - na - soma 
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The next step might be to introduce the vowel a in contexts 
where it follows rather than precedes other syllables, and is thus more 
difficult to recognise as a separate syllable. This might be done by 
comparing the known word ku - to - ka with the new but commonly used ku -
to - a (to give out). The single sounds a and m_, and the 'derived syllable' 
mi, would then be used, together with the known syllables, to construct new 
derived words. There are many possibilities, including m - soma - ji (reader, 
pupil) m - kulima (farmer), ku - mi (ten), mi - a (hundred), m - ji - ni 
(town), m - to - ni (river), du - ni - a (world) and mi - wa (sugar cane). 
With the resources of generative and derivative words now available, con-
struction of further sentences for reading practise presents little difficulty. 
It will be seen that the method we used to derive the new syllable 
mi was to use the consonant family na - ni to establish a link between the a_ 
and i_ vowel families. It would be quite feasible to carry on in the same 
way, using the same 'consonant link' to fill In all the gaps in the two vowel 
families: 
ha (ja) ka (la) ma na pa sa wa (za) 
1 (hi) ji (ki^  II (mi) ni (pi) (si) (wi) zi 
Note: The derived syllables are indicated by brackets, and the 
'consonant link' by an arrow. 
In fact it would not be difficult to continue, using all the 
consonant links (na - ni, pa - pe, sa - so, and ka - ko - ku), until all 
the 60 possible two-sound combinations of the 12 known consonants and the 5 
vowels had been mastered. The 17 syllables introduced through the generative 
words would thus give rise to 43 derived syllables. These new derived 
syllables, in turn, would be used to construct new derived words. While this 
was going on, the sound-values for the.individual vowels and consonants 
would gradually be taught, using the methods we have already outlined for a 
and m. 
During all this work, no new generative words would in theory be 
needed. In practice, however, generative words would almost certainly be 
used from time to time, to introduce the remaining consonants and the more 
complex syllables, Involving three or more elements. 
By now the principles underlying our suggested methods should be 
clear, and we shall not pursue our step-by-step account any further. In any 
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case, as we have already said, the details are highly tentative, and are 
meant simply to illustrate an approach. Development of a practical course 
along these lines would require a great deal of experimental work in the 
classroom. 
Let us now try to summarise our discussion. We have argued that the 
Kenya Functional Literacy Programme may be too ambitious, in that it attempts 
to achieve three separate goals at the same time. First, It tries to teach 
literacy. Second, It tries to teach the language, Swahiii, In which literacy 
is to be acquired. Third, it attempts to be a programme in adult education, 
teaching practical facts about agriculture, health and household management 
In the texts which are also teaching literacy and the Swahiii language. By 
not establishing an order of priority among these three objectives, the 
programme runs the risk of falling to achieve any of them. 
We feel that there Is a strong case to be made for tackling the 
teaching of reading and writing first, and for subordinating the other two 
objectives until this has been achieved. Teaching literacy in Swahiii should 
be a relatively straightforward task, provided It is recognised that most rural 
Kenyans have only a limited knowledge of the language, and provided also that 
every advantage is taken of the fact that Swahiii Is fully phonetic. Once 
participants can read and write simple, everyday Swahiii with fluency, they 
will be able to turn their attention to extending their knowledge of the 
language. They will also be a great deal more receptive to the adult 
education component of the Programme. 
We have attempted to outline some methods by which participants 
might be taught to read and write quickly. We saw that Swahiii uses only 30 
different sounds, and that each sound is always represented by the same 
symbol, which usually consists of only one letter. Hence, in theory all a 
new learner needs to do in order to be able to read Swahiii is to learn the 
sound values associated with the 30 different symbols. In practice, however, 
a teaching method which started by introducing these smallest sound-units 
would inevitably involve a great deal of repetitive and somewhat meaningless 
drill. The learners would probably have difficulty in acquiring the fluency 
needed to synthesise whole words, and there might well be problems in main-
taining their motivation to continue with the course. We therefore feel thaj 
initially a whole - word approach should be used, to provide a framework from 
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which learners can move rapidly to phonetic reading. These whole words (the 
generative words) would be chosen on the following criteria: 
x. They should be commonly used words, widely understood in 
rural Kenya. 
2. They should have relevance and meaning in terms of the life -
styles and perceived needs of literacy course participants. 
3. They should be concrete words, capable of being illustrated 
with photographs or drawings. 
They should break easily into syllables. For the first few 
lessons these syllables should be of the simplest type, consisting of a 
single consonant followed by a single vowel. 
5. The const*1"tuent syllables of the generative words should be 
capable of rearrangement to form other derivative words. A high proportion 
of xhese derivative words should also be familiar and meaningful to the 
learners. 
6. In the early lessons the generative words should introduce 
learners systematically to the five major syllable families involving the 
five vowels, and to consonant links from which the learners can derive new 
syllabic combinations inside these families. Later, the generative words should 
introduce the less common sounds and the more difficult syllabic combinations, 
such as those involving more than one consonant before the vowel. 
The crucial point, however, Is that the usefulness of the generative 
words Is strictly short-lived. Their purpose Is simply to provide a meaning-
ful context from which students can educe the sound - values of the units 
from which words are made up, and thus learn to read phonetically. In our 
Illustrative lessons, students learned the sound for the vowel a because they 
wanted to write the sentence, mama a_ - nasoma, having already written watoto 
and kusoma as generative words, and mama as a derivative. Similarly they 
learned the sound for the single consonant m because they wanted to extend their 
writing to Include m - toto anasoma, and they derived the new syllable mi so 
that they could write mi - mi ninasoma. In each case the new unit was the only 
unfamiliar element In a known context, and furthermore, the pupils had a real 
purpose In learning it. 
Using these techniques, It should not be difficult to move quite 
quickly away from whole-word towards phonetic methods, teaching the learners 
tne sound-values of the smallest units whilst preserving their fluency in 
reading whole words and sentences. The rather meaningless drilling usually 
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associated with the early stages of phonetic teaching is avoided, but at the 
same time pupils are not expected to go on memorising whole words for a moment 
past the point when they have mastered the tools they need to synthesise the 
words for themselves. The studentsf higher—level intellectual capacities are 
engaged as fully as possible, while the minimum use is made of rote memory 
and recall. The aim, in short, is to capitalise on the advantages of both 
methods, but to avoid their complementary disadvantages. 
The suggested learning sequence is summarised in the accompanying 
chart. (See Figure I.) The three main levels of analysis are listed from top 
to bottom: first the whole words, then the syllables, and finally the single 
sounds. The generative words and their component parts are listed on the left 
hand side of the chart*, the syllables and words derived from these components 
on the right., The seven major activities involved in learning to read (apart 
from memorising the generative words) are Indicated by arrows, and numbered 
from one to seven. Activities indicated by downward-sloping arrows are 
mainly analytic, whereas upward-sloping arrows indicate syntheslsing 
activities. Thus arrow number 3 Indicates the breaking down of the syllables 
of generative words Into their component sounds; while arrow number 5 indicates 
the building up of derived words from derived syllables. The activities are 
numbered roughly in the order in which they would be introduced to new 
learners. During the early lessons, learners would be engaged mainly in 
activities 1 and 2, together, of course, with memorising the generative words. 
Later, activities 3, 4 and 5 would become more important, as the learners 
begin breaking the component syllables into separate sounds, and deriving 
new syllables from the vowel families and consonant links. Finally, as they 
move towards fully phonetic reading, activities 5, 6 and 7 would predominate. 
It will be seen that as learning progresses, there is a change in the dominant 
mode of intellectual activity: at first it is memorisation, then analysis, 
and finally synthesis. 
The chart is of course highly stylised, and learning any new word 
(apart from the generative words) would almost always involve more than one 
of the numbered activities. 
It may be useful to compare briefly the teaching method proposed 
here with that used in the Kenya Functional Literacy Programme. The methods 
start off in the same way, by introducing generative words which are then 
broken down into component syllables and reassembled into new derivative words. 
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But this is about as far as the similarities go. Perhaps the most conspicuous 
difference is that in the Functional Literacy Programme at present there is no 
attempt to phase out the generative words and move towards phonetic reading. 
New words are introduced throughout the 96 lessons contained in the four main 
readers for the programme, at the rate of about four words per lesson. These 
new words are printed at the beginning of each lesson, and are taught to- the 
students before they begin reading the text which contains them. Most of the 
classes we visited were working on the third reader, and were in their second 
year of instruction. In every class, without exception, the teacher introduced 
the new words as if the students were complete beginners: he first read the 
words to them, and then gave them memorisation drill until they could repeat 
the words without hesitation. We never heard a teacher suggest that the 
students might attempt to read the words for themselves, even when the word 
was extremely familiar in spoken Swahiii, and contained no new syllables or 
sounds (as, for example, sawa in Book Three, Lesson Nine, or kulala in Book 
Three, Lesson Twelve). 
The order in which new words are introduced seems to bear little 
relation to their phonetic or linguistic difficulty. Many of the words which 
appear in the first few lessons have complex syllabic constructions (e.g. m -
cha - nga, u - do - ngo, kwa - mba); others in addition are almost unknown 
in everyday Swahiii (cha - nga - ra - we, dha - i - fu). By contrast, a 
number of the words introduced in the last few lessons of the final book are 
both commonly used and phonetically simple (te - na, ka - ri - bu, sa - na, 
cha - ku - la, m - bo - ga). There is no reason why words such as these, 
and many others like them, should need special introduction so late in the 
course; by this stage the learners should all have long since mastered the 
skills needed to read them without help. 
In general, the requirements of the adult education component of 
the Programme seem to have determined the order in which the generative words 
are Introduced, and how often they are repeated. Considerations arising from 
the other objectives of the programme - acquiring literacy and learning the 
Swahiii language - have been almost entirely subordinated. The topic for the 
first reader is different types of soil. Thus among the first generative words 
the learner must memorise are towe (clay), matope (mud), cnangarawe (grit), and 
mchanga (sand), regardless of their phonetic characteristics or how widely they 
are known. 
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By the same token, little consideration seems to have been given 
to systematically repeating newly-introduced syllables in different contexts, 
so that the learners have a chance to consolidate their new knowledge before 
moving on to fresh material. Nor is any attempt made to introduce the learners 
to syllable families. 
A final major difference is that in the Kenya Functional Literacy 
Programme generative words are broken down to the syllabic level only. Pupils 
are not systematically taught the way single sounds are represented. The 
underlying orderliness and rationality of the way Swahili words are built up 
from the simplest units thus remains inaccessible. In the classes where we 
were able to make a check, we found that although the students knew many 
syllables, they were baffled when we asked them to break them into separate 
sounds. A number knew the alphabetical names of the letters, but very few 
their sound-values. Partly for this reason and partly because of the 
emphasis on memorising generative words, pupils tended to have poor word-
attack skills. Their characteristic expectation when a new word came up 
seemed to be that the teacher would tell them how to read it. 
Early in this section we said that we have had only a limited 
opportunity for testing in the classroom our suggestions as to how Swahili 
literacy might be taught. We were, however, able to try them out with two 
classes, on occasions when the regular teachers happened to be absent on the 
day of our visit. In both classes the pupils were unsure as to how they 
should tackle the reading of new words. But they understood the principle of 
syllable families very quickly, and within a short time had learned the 
sound-values of a number of consonants. By the end of the lesson many 
students were able to synthesise whole words and even sentences without help. 
The rapidity of their progress was, of course, largely due to the amount of 
practice they had already had in recognising whole words and syllables in 
the two readers they had completed, but there seems little doubt that an early 
introduction of phonetic reading would greatly speed up the acquisition of 
literacy. 
COURSE CONTENT 
In a short account it is Impossible to consider the content of all 
the readers used in the Kenya Functional Literacy Programme in any detail. 
We shall therefore concentrate our attention mainly on the first introductory 
reader, called Aina za Udongo (Types of Soil) and within that reader, on the 
first sequence of lessons. 
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The first sequence, which contains twelve lessons, introduces the 
learners to a classification of soil types. The text repeatedly stresses 
the importance of understanding the characteristics of different soils, and 
at one point comes close to implying that such knowledge, by itself, is 
enough to make someone a good farmer: 
Ikiwa unajua namna za udongo 
utalima vizuri. 
Kulima vizuri ni kujua 
namna ya udongo. 
If you know the characteristics of soils 
you will farm (cultivate) well. 
To farm well is to know 
the character of the soil. 
(Page 12) 
The classification which is presented to the learners can be 
represented schematically in the following way: 
UDONGO I 
(General word for soil of all types) 
r 
TOWE 
Clay 
Holds water, not 
air 
Bad for planting 
— I 
MATOPE 
Fertile soil 
.Holds water and 
air 
Good for planting 
Can be obtained by 
mixing towe and 
mchanga 
MCHANGA 
Sand 
Holds air, not 
water 
Bad for planting 
j 
CHANGARAWE 
Grit 
Good for growing 
trees 
In the functional literacy scheme, udongo is the general word for 
soil, it can be of four main types: towe, matope, mchanga and changarawe. 
Towe is clay; it holds water but not air. Mchanga is sand; it holds air but 
not water. Plants need both air and water; therefore both towe and mchanga 
are bad for growing crops in. But the farmer can mix towe and mchanga, and 
§ e t ma"tope» which holds both air and water, and is thus good for growing crops. 
Furthermore, matope is fertile: 
Matope ni udongo mnono 
na wa rutuba 
Matope huweka maji 
na hewa 
Matope is rich soil, 
and it is fertile. 
(p 18) 
Matope holds water and 
air (p 21) 
The fourth type of soil is changarawe, or grit, 
growing large trees: 
It is good for 
Mimea mikubwa hupenda changarawe 
na mawe 
Large trees like changarawe 
and stones 
(p 21) 
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This 'cognitive map' of the different types of soil and their 
characteristics is clear and straightforward. But it has a major defect: 
it is not consistent with the map already in use among Kenya farmers. 
In two widely separate areas (Vihiga dnd Tetu), we were able 
to talk with several farmers not attending functional literacy classes. 
One of the topics we discussed was how they would describe different types 
of soil in Swahili. Their replies were for the most part unambiguous and 
consistent. Schematically, they can be represented as follows: 
MATOPE 
'Iud: soil saturated with 
water 
Used for building houses 
'Found on roads after rain 
Bad for planting 
1 UDONGO 
Cultivated soil 
prepared for plant-
ing 
Loose, moist,'fertile 
Good for planting 
1 
MCHANGA 
Uncultivated soil, 
requires hoeing 
Often covered with weeds 
and bushes 
Bad for planting 
There seems to be no widely-accepted Swahili word in up-country 
areas for soil in general, although some farmers suggested mchanga or ardhi. 
Towe is not known at all, and changarawe to only a few. But matope, udongo 
and mchanga are understood by nearly everybody. Mchanga is used with a much 
wider meaning than it is in the functional literacy course. It is understood 
as referring to uncultivated soils of all kinds; heavy, clay soils as well 
as light, sandy soils. Mchanga tends to be regarded as lacking in fertility, 
because it has been left uncultivated and is often covered by weeds or bushes, 
Udongo is soil which has either been just prepared for planting, 
or which has crops growing in it. The word has strong connotations of 
friability, dampness and fertility. Hence udongo and mchanga are contrasted 
in meaning; they are distinctive and different types of soil. Mchanga is 
certainly not regarded as a variety of udongo, as it is in the functional 
literacy text. 
v 
Matope has an equally definite meaning. It is mud; either the 
type used for daubing on the walls of houses, or the type which bogs down 
cars on roads after heavy rain. Asked whether matope was good for planting 
seeds in, all our informants responded with a categorical.'*no^ . 
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Hence the classification of soils offered by the first functional 
literacy reader is at variance with the classification used by Kenya farmers 
in at least two respects. The discrepancy in the meanings given to the word 
mchanga is probably of only minor importance. All our Informants agreed 
that sand was a type of mchanga; where they differed from the writers of the 
literacy text (and with the compilers of the standard Swahiii dictionary) was 
in including'Ottie?- types of soil within this same 'concept boundary'. The 
discrepancy was thus mainly In the level of generality, 
But with matope the case Is different because the two meanings 
are directly contradictory to each other. The functional literacy text 
describes matope as fertile, friable soil, able to hold both air and water 
and suitable for planting seeds- But for most farmers, matope has virtually 
the opposite characteristics: it is not friable, it does not hold air, it Is 
not especially fertile and it Is certainly not suitable for planting seeds. 
Farmers use udongo to refer to soil of the type called matope In the literacy 
readers. 
A major purpose of any programme of education is to provide the 
learners with new and useful categories with which to order the world around 
them. But no learner ever comes to the classroom without an extensive series 
of existing categories, based on his out-of-school experience. The older 
the learner, the more comprehensive and more firmly entrenched his categorisation 
system is likely to be. Kenya farmers have been winning a living from 
the soil for generations, often under very difficult conditions. If they had 
not developed a working knowledge of the characteristics and potential of 
the main soil types, they would never have survived, 
We investigated the effects of the 'dissonance' between the two 
soil classification systems during our evaluation trips. On every farm we 
visited we picked up a handful of prepared soil and asked the farmer what 
word be would use to describe it, If the farmer was not a functional 
literacy student his answer usually came promptly and confidently: "udongo'^ 
But literacy students were generally not so sure. Some had succeeded in 
mastering "teacher's Swahiii" (as one of them called It), and knew that 
despite what they might have thought previously, and despite what they might 
still hear other people sayings prepared soil was really matope, But for 
others9 the two sets of contradictory signals had apparently cancelled each 
other out. They w o u M look at the soil for a few seconds,, and then say "I don't 
know". One farmer perhaps remembered that he had been taught a different word 
in his literacy class, but had now forgotten what it was. After a pause he 
said in an apologetic voice "udongo tu" (just udongo), 
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Another example of dissonance between the world of the literacy 
classroom and the world the recruits live in may be given from Lesson Seven: 
Lesson Seven 
1. Towe huweka maji, haiweki hewa. Towe holds water, but not air, 
2. Mchanga huweka hewa3haiweki maji, Mchanga holds air, but not water. 
3. Maji na hewa ni vitu vizuri. Water and air are good things, 
Weka maji vizuri. Keep water well. 
Weka Is one of the commonest verbs In Swahili, and Is known to 
almost everyone who has acquired even a smattering of the language. Its iasic 
meaning is "'to put'. In coastal Swahili, however, it has a wide range of 
other meanings, Including to preserve, to look after, to delay and to hold. 
These alternative meanings are rarely encountered In upcountry spoken Swahili. 
Weka appears for the first time in Lesson Seven, but it is not used with its 
commonly understood meaning. Instead, it takes two separate alternative 
meanings. In lines 1 and 2 it means hold, and in line 4 it means keep or look 
after. 
We asked several farmers who were literate In Swahili but who had 
not attended functional literacy classes to read Lesson Seven to us and 
explain its meaning. They were all clearly disconcerted by finding weka, a 
word they were all familiar with, in a context where Itsknowu meaning did 
not make sense. One farmer suggested (when we had explained the meaning of 
towe to him) that "towe huweka maji" might mean "towe puts water (Into other, 
dry, soils)"-, while another said, very tentatively, that "weka maji vizuri" 
•might mean "put water (into a container) carefully (so that it does not spill)". 
It should be stressed that we are not suggesting that a literacy 
course should teach only the commonest meanings of Swahili words, and should 
ignore the more subtle and less frequently heard usages. The Issue is one of 
timing. After the learners had completed two or three readers, and had met 
weka in its common meaning several times, it would be quite appropriate to 
introduce the alternative meanings. If this were done, the new recruits' 
first experience of the word in the literacy programme would confirm their 
existing knowledge. Later on, they would find little difficulty in extending 
their understanding of the word to Include the new meaning. In this way the 
new knowledge would be built on to old knowledge, and there would be no 
incompatibility between them. But by introducing the alternative meanings -
first, the programme creates unnecessary dissonance between what the students 
know from the world outside and what they are taught in the classroom. 
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It is clear that In devising any programme of adult education, 
especially one which is concerned with improving the daily lives of the 
learners, the question of how to articulate the new knowledge with existing 
knowledge is of central importance. In the examples we have considered so 
far the difficulties have been due mainly to linguistic factors. For most 
literacy recruits, Swahiii Is only a second language; and, moreover, the 
version they speak is a simplified and somewhat modified form of standard 
coastal Swahiii. 
But there are similar problems which spring from the content of the 
lessons rather than from linguistic factors, and which would thus have occurred 
even if the literacy programme had been conducted in vernacular languages. 
Consider the information given in Lesson Eight: 
Lesson Eight 
1. Fanya udongo kuwa mzuri. Make the soil good. 
2. Changanya towe na mchanga. Mix towe and mchanga. 
3. Udongo wa towe na mchanga Soil of towe and mchanga 
h„ Huweka maji na hewa., Holds water and air. 
Lesson Eight carries the central message of the whole Introductory 
sequence of twelve lessons. The seven lessons which precede it are concerned 
mainly with describing the different types of soil, and the four lessons 
which follow it mainly with repetition and amplification. To recapitulate the 
message briefly: there are four main types of soil, each with different 
characteristics. Matope is good for planting seeds, because it holds both air 
and water. Farmers should obtain matope by mixing towe (clay) and mchanga 
(sand). 
We discussed this lesson informally with two small groups of 
functional literacy teachers, None of them could recall it having given 
any special difficulties. The Swahiii was a good deal simpler than in some 
previous lessons, and the learners had readily understood the agricultural 
advice it contained. The lesson, In short, was a good one. But when we asked 
them whether they or their students had acted on the advice they all Immediately 
saw where the lesson was deficient. No one had ever attempted to improve the 
soil in the class plot or in his own farm by mixing clay and sand. Indeed, 
ho one could remember ever seeing this done by any farmer. 
16 - 28 IDS/OP 12 
It is, of course, quite likely that many Kenya smaxlholdings could 
be Improved by mixing sand with the heavier soils and clay with the lighter 
soils. But the costs would be high, even assuming that soils with the needed 
complementary characteristics could be found on the same holding. It is a 
great deal easier to choose the types of crop to grow according to the soil 
characteristics than it is to try to change the soil characteristics to suit 
the crops; and this, of course, is what most Kenya farmers have always done. 
In Central Province, for example, the traditional practice has always been 
to use the saturated clay soils along the bank of streams for planting arrow-
root, because this crop thrives under such conditions. The land a little 
further away from the water, where the soil is still heavy but less saturated, 
was kept for crops such as sweet potatoes and sugar cane; while on the lighter 
well drained soils of the hill slopes the farmers grew - and still grow -
their maize and beans. 
We do not mean to imply, of course, that all traditional knowledge 
should be treated as sacrosanct. The practice of burning long grass before 
the rains, for instance, is destructive of the long-term fertility of the soil 
and the functional literacy text should say so. But where the advice to be 
given is at variance with existing practice, careful consideration needs to 
be given to whether the recommended practices are in fact an improvement. 
There may well be constraints operating which make the existing practices much 
more rational than they seem at first sight. 
The most important point to notice from our discussion of Lesson 
Eight is the difficulty which our informants had in recognising that the 
information it transmitted was deficient. Information which comes in a well-
produced book from an authoritative source carries a powerful mystique, 
especially to poorly educated readers. They may well be aware that the 
information is for some reason irrelevant to their own lives, but they will 
not reject it as being wrong. Just as there is 'teacher's Swahili', which is 
better than the Swahili of ordinary people, so also there is 'teacher's 
knowledge', which is superior to ordinary knowledge. When asked about Lesson 
Eight, everyone agreed that it contained 'good' advice. Perhaps they felt • 
that there must be some people, living somewhere else, who act on it; maybe 
because they are richer or more sophisticated. Many of the literacy students 
we met on our visits could tell us that to get good soil, you should mix sand 
and clay. But not one of them had done so on his own farm. 
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The problem of ensuring that the new Information and advice to 
which learners are exposed is both accurate and relevant is perhaps the most 
difficult that a functional literacy programme must cope with. If it is 
not tackled successfully very little'of what is taught will be followed by 
permanent behaviour changes. It is not enough that the literacy readers be 
technically accurate in content. They must also recognise the effects of 
the constraints under which Kenya smallholders work - constraints such as 
shortage of capital, shortage of land and inadequate rainfall., The readers 
contain a great deal of Information about the benefits to be gained by using 
artificial fertilisers, but nothing at all about what they cost to buy. 
Similarly the students are told that they should dig bench terraces to 
protect their land from erosion, but they are not told what they can do to 
Improve their chances of getting a crop if they live in an area which is prone 
to drought. 
The most striking examples of failure to take account of the 
circumstances in which low-income families in Kenya live are to be seen, 
perhaps, in Book Four, The title of the book is Kukuza Mboga (Growing 
Vegetables), and it discusses carrots, tomatoes, English potatoes, and onions, 
The book is enthusiastic as to the prospects for increasing cash incomes through 
growing and selling these crops. Here, for example, is the advice which it 
gives about marketing carrots: 
Watu hupenda karati. People like carrots, 
Watu wote hawawezi kukuza karati. Not everyone is able to grow carrots. 
Lakini watu wote hula karati. But everyone eats carrots. 
Kwa hivyo wao hununua karati sokoni. For this reason they buy carrots 
at the markets. 
Ukiuza karati unapata pesa. If you sell carrots you will get 
money. 
Mnunuzi huvutiwa na karati zako zikiwa The customer will be attracted 
nzuri -to your carrots if they are good. 
(Book Four, page 11) 
With minor variations, the same advice is given for each of the 
three other crops. For onions, it reads as follows: 
4 
Book Four Is intended for use only in areas where the soil and 
climate are suited to the growing of these vegetables. Our comments are 
concerned only with the advice given about marketing. 
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Kuna nafasiL nzuri ya kuuza vitunguu There is a good opportunity to sell 
sokoni. onions in the market. 
Karibu kila mtu hula vitunguu. Nearly everyone eats onions. 
Ni mboga inayopendwa sana- It is a very popular vegetable. 
Lakini si kila mtu hukuza vitunguu. But not everyone grows onions. 
Kwa hivyo; wewe ukikuza, utaviuza For this reason, if you grow onions 
na kupata faida. you will sell them and get a profit. 
Ukikuza vitunguu vikubwa; na vizuri If you grow large onions, of good 
utaviuza bila shida. quality you will sell them without 
difficulty. 
Pia utapata bei nzuri. Also you will get a good price. 
Kuza vitunguu na kuongeza mapato Grow onions and increase your earnings, 
yako -
Furahia maisha na mapato zaidi. Be happy in life with bigger earnings. 
(Book Four, page 52) 
The assumption seems to be that there is a major irrationality 
in the production and marketing of these crops which is waiting to be 
exploited by functional literacy participants. The crops are eaten widely, 
even universally, but for some unexplained reason many people do not grow them 
and therefore must buy them. The facts of course are different„ It is quite 
untrue to say that "everyone eats carrots" or that onions are "a very popular 
vegetable ". The great majority of low-income rural families in Kenya eat none 
of the vegetables discussed in Book Four, with the partial exception, in some 
areas, of English potatoes. But even If they did, most families would grow the 
vegetables In their own gardens rather than buy them at the markets. Nearly 
all the customers for carrots, onions and tomatoes are in the higher income 
brackets, and most of them live in the cities and big towns. Even at quite 
large market centres such as Kakamega the turnover in these crops is very 
restricted. Unless they live near a big town, or can sell their produce to a 
vegetable processing factory or a marketing cooperative, most literacy parti-
cipants could probably improve their income-earning prospects more by 
increasing their output of the food crops which are in strong local demand. 
Almost everywhere in Kenya there is a period, just before the new harvest, 
when prices for staple foodstuffs reach very high levels in local markets, 
and farmers who have managed to retain a surplus reap substantial profits. 
It would be quite legitimate, of course, for the booklets to 
suggest that participants should grow the new vegetables on a trial basis, for 
their own consumption and also to test the marketing possibilities. But to 
assert, without any qualification, that participants can increase their 
incomes substantially by growing these crops for sale is counter-productive 
and disfunctional. 
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In choosing lessons to discuss in this section, we have concen-
trated on those which best illustrate general themes. We have discussed, for 
example, some of the difficulties which arise from the fact that most Kenyans 
speak only a simplified and somewhat modified version of standard Swahili. 
Similarly we have discussed the problems of ensuring that the information 
given during the course supplements, rather than contradicts, the useful 
knowledge which participants already have. But in addition to these major 
issues, there are also numerous minor points of detail, often specific to one 
lesson, In which revision is needed. To Illustrate these, we give a line-by-
line critique of Lesson Nine in Book One. The text reads as follows: 
1. Udongo ule ni mzuri. That soil Is good. 
2. Unaweka maji na hewa. It holds water and air. 
3. Matope ni namna nzuri ya udongo. Matope is a good kind of soil. 
4 . Matope ni namna mzuri ya udongo. Matope Is a good kind of soil. 
5. Ule ni udongo wa matope. That soil Is matope. 
6. Huweka maji na hewa. It holds water and air. 
7. Udongo ule hauweki maji. That soil does not hold water. 
8. Towe na mchanga huweka maji Towe and mchanga hold water and air. 
na hewa. (Book One, page 17) 
Lines 1 and 2. The text reads "That soil Is good. It holds water 
and air." Presumably the teacher should have an appropriate sample of soil 
In the classroom while teaching this lesson. But the three teachers whom we 
asked said that they had used the illustrations in the text, on pages 8 and 14. 
Neither of these illustrations, especially the one on page 8, is at all clear. 
When asked to identify the pictures of the four soil types on page 8, the 
answers of participants were almost random - although there was a tendency to 
Identify the picture labelled changarawe as matope, and the picture labelled 
towe as mchanga.. Clear photographs would be a marked improvement. 
Line 2, The verb weka is more commonly used to mean put than to 
mean hold, as we have seen. In this context, it Is especially ambiguous, 
Unaweka is obviously meant to mean it holds; the pronoun prefix u referring to 
udongo in the previous line. But the same prefix also denotes the second 
person singular; and this usage is far more widely known. Thus many new 
readers are likely to interpret "unaweka maji na hewa" as meaning "you put 
water and air". The ambiguity over the pronoun could be removed by repeating 
udongo ule at the beginning of line 2. 
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Line 3. Matope is not generally regarded as a good type of soil 
to plant seeds, as we have discussed. 
Line Repeats line 3, with one slight variation (mzuri 
instead of nzuri). Line 3 is grammatically correct. 
T.-fnps 3 and 4. The best translation of namna in these lines is 
perhaps kind (of soil). But in previous lessons the word aina has been used 
to refer to the four named types of soil, and namna to refer to soil 
characteristics (e.g. Lesson Six: udongo tofauti una namna tofauti: 
different soils have different characteristics). Learners have also been 
introduced to hali in Lesson Five (unajua hali ya udongo: you know the 
condition of the soil); and in Lesson Eleven, asili is used (unajua asili ya 
udongo: you know the nature of the soil). The distinctions between asili, 
hali, namna, and aina are extremely subtle, and quite beyond the capacity of 
beginners, especially when the contexts in which they are used give virtually 
no help. 
Line 6. The use of the present habitual tense hu is confusing 
to beginners (huweka). They may easily mix it up with the present negative 
tense (huweki: you do not put, or you do not hold). This is especially 
important in this context, where the distinction is being drawn between soils 
which do hold water (huweka) and soils which do not hold water (hauweki). 
Line 8. As it stands, the information given in this line seems 
directly to contradict what the learners were told in Lesson Seven (towe holds 
water but not air; mchanga holds air but not water). Several literacy teachers 
whom we consulted were unable to resolve the puzzle; one of them suggested 
that the line was not meant to convey agricultural information, but simply to 
give practise in reading Swahiii! Clearly what is meant is that towe and 
mchanga, when mixed together, hold both air and water. 
One final point must be made. It may have been noticed that in 
discussing teaching materials and methods in this and the previous section 
we have referred only sporadically to the progress of the programme partici-
pants in acquiring the new literacy, language and farming skills. We have 
not presented systematic data showing how well they have learned how to read 
and write, how much Swahiii they have learned or how much they have modified 
their farming practices in response to the information and advice given in 
the booklets. 
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One reason for this is that gathering reliable data of this kind 
was beyond our resources. The task of carrying out a survey to measure the 
impact of an educational programme bristles with methodological difficulties. 
To mention only one: there would have been enormous problems in identifying 
an adequately matched control group, especially given that most of the 
literacy participants were self-selected. The only way in which really 
valid information could have been obtained would have been to have conducted 
a longitudinal follow-up of the participants from the time they were first 
recruited. 
But there is a more important reason. In carrying out an 
evaluation of a project such as the Kenya Functional Literacy Programme, 
there are two main sets of questions to be asked. The first concerns the 
internal workings of the programme: how effective are the teaching methods 
used, is the course content appropriate, do the learners have an adequate 
grasp of the language in which they are being taught, and so on. The second 
group of questions concerns the 'output' effects of the programme: have its 
graduates learned to read and write; do they speak better Swahiii; are they 
better farmers. Logically, the first group of questions precedes the second. 
If the teaching methods and materials are deficient, the programme is hardly 
likely to have a major impact on the knowledge, skills and behaviour of the 
participants. It was not necessary for us to carry out a full-scale survey 
to find out that participants were not carrying out the advice given in the 
booklets about mixing sand and clay, nor to discover the reasons why. 
Similarly, detailed investigation was not needed to find out that new recruits 
found difficulty with little known and phonetically complex words such as 
changarawe or dhaifu, and that they tended to forget them as soon as the course 
passed on to other topics. 
But on the other hand, even if the preparation of materials and the 
training of teachers hae been impeccable, the programme may still fail. 
There may well be constraints external to the programme itself which limit 
its effectiveness. A systematic follow-up of literacy recruits would be 
invaluable in helping to Identify these. But the appropriate time to carry 
out such a survey will be when the internal problems of the project, which we 
have discussed in this report, have been rectified. 
The main points we have made can be summarised very briefly: 
1. The teaching method being used places too much emphasis on the 
whole-word approach. Whole words are broken into syllables, but these 
syllables are not broken further into separate sounds. Even at the end of the 
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fourth reader, the new words from each lesson are singled out and printed 
at the top of the page, and the learners are given memorisation drill in 
reading them, Bat by the end of the second reader at the latest, learners 
shouid have mastered ali the skills they need to read any Swahili word they 
encounter without help from the teacher, and without recourse to memorisation. 
Swahili Is fully phonetic; the 30 sounds used in the language are always 
represented by the same symbols- Once these symbols have been mastered, 
the learner's main literacy problem is solved, even If his knowledge of the 
Swahiii language Is still far from complete. The readers and the teaching 
methods should be revised to take full advantage of the phonetic character of 
Swahiii. 
2 - The order in which words are Introduced takes no account of 
their phonetic cnaracteristics. The two words introduced in the first lesson, 
for exampie, contain complex as well as simple syllables and sounds-, 
Similarly no attempt is made to ensure that the syllables and sounds are 
introduced systematically, and with adequate repetition.. 
3, In the same way little account has been taken of the frequency 
with which Swahili words are used m rural districts. Difficult, little 
known words are used in the introductory lessons, while simple, universally 
known words are introduced (with memorisation drill) towards the end of the 
course, 
4, Familiar words which have more tnan one meaning are sometimes 
introduced with an uncommon, little known meaning first. This tends to 
create an unnecessary gap between classroom knowledge and everyday knowledge. 
5, The advice given In the readers is quite often at variance 
with common practice on Kenya farms. When this happens, careful consideration 
needs to be given to whether the recommended practices are in fact an 
improvement. There may well be constraints operating which make the existing 
practices much more rational than they seem at first sight. Two examples are 
given from the text of the literacy booklets of advice which is probably 
counterproductive for most Kenya farmers. 
In short, the booklets need io be rewritten and the teaching 
methods revised. Furthermore, the booxiets should be written in the 
language in which they are to be usea: chey should not be translated from 
English, The writing should be the work of a team, which should consist of, 
at minimum, a literacy expert, a Swahili specialist and people with extensive 
fieldwork experience in agricultural education and domestic science. The 
first two booklets, which would be concerned mainly with teaching reading and 
writing, could probably be written for Kenya as a whoie; but for the subsequent 
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booklets, in which the adult education component of the programme would 
become dominant, separate editions suited to local conditions of climate 
and soil, and also to local economic factors, would need to be prepared. 
Local fieldwork staff should be fully involved in writing these editions. 
It is inevitable that a report such as this should give more 
attention to the weaknesses and failures of the Functional Literacy Programme 
than to its successes. We should therefore conclude this section by 
stressing that everywhere we went on our field trips we were most favourably 
impressed by the enthusiasm of the professional and administrative staff, 
the teachers and, above all, the learners. With these reserves of commitment 
and energy to draw on, there seems no reason why a revised programme, with 
changed teaching materials and methods, should not be a major success. 
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PROJECT ADMINISTRATION 
The first :SRBP . area in which the Functional Literacy Programme 
was initiated was Migori, where It has now been in existence for three years. 
The programmes in Kwale and Mbere were started a month or so after the one 
in Migori. The Kakamega, Tetu and Kapenguria programmes have been in 
existence for just over a year. At first 15 centres were started in each 
area with, in principle, a maximum of 25 - 30 students. The programme staff 
did not have enough time to site the centres carefully. They failed to 
consider thoroughly the relevant factors such as population density and other 
local peculiarities which might affect the performance of the project. Some 
centres closed shortly after they had opened and were replaced with new ones 
elsewhere. Of late the policy has been that if average attendance falls 
below fifteen the centre is closed down and not replaced. In Mbere, for 
example, about five centres have closed. The most important justification 
for this measure was economic: it was argued the costs of maintaining a 
class with low average attendance are too high. In areas such as Tetu where 
there are many educated adults, this is probably justified, but in less 
developed areas such as Mbere the contribution of even a few successful 
literacy graduates as role models should not be overlooked. One of the 
students in a centre which closed in Mbere was a toothless old woman who 
had attained the status of a local :egend for her competence in literacy. 
Once a class has started, the teachers are not supposed to enroll 
new students. This principle has been fully observed in some SRDP areas, but 
not in others. It seems unrealistic to be rigid about this requirement; 
adult education inevitably has a floating clientele and tit is surely better 
for the programme to adapt itself to this fact. But the classes which waived 
this requirement and continued to take in new Illiterate adults to replace 
dropouts often encountered problems with streaming. We found in several 
classes that the adults were divided into three streams, informally labelled 
A, B and C. The A stream usually comprised the most advanced participants 
and the C stream the most recent entrants. There were cases, however, of 
relatively new recruits who had demonstrated superior ability In reading and 
writing and who for this reason were Included in the A stream. Conversely 
some of the.oldest members could not read, and write and remained in the C 
stream. 
The teachers devise their'own solutions to this problem. What 
they do normally is to focus the lesson on the A stream. After covering the 
reading with these students, the teachers assign them writing and then turn 
their attention to the others, 
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The classes are supposed to meet six times a week in two-hour 
sessions. This regulation has been very flexibly applied. The decision 
as to what time of day a class should meet, and the length of the lessons, 
is left to the discretion of the teacher. In spite of this, the problem of 
attendance has continued to be quite serious, more so in some areas than in 
others. There are certain periods when absenteeism is so great that the 
centre should be closed. These periods include market days, and the busy 
times during sowing and harvesting. But we do- not have: enough datai to; specify-
completely the causes of irregular attendance» More information is need on 
this point. 
All areas have experienced the phenomenon of 'dropping out'. 
This must always be expected to some degree in an adult education programme -
some people are always likely to migrate, to experience family problems which 
prevent them from attending classes, etc. But dropping out cannot be 
explained entirely by these factors. Some indication of the extent of 
dropping out is given by the figures below: 
1) Kwale - In January 1973 there was a total of 401 students, 
of whom 194 were men and 207 women. At the end of 1974 there was 
a total of 280 students, of whom 143 were men and 137 women. 
2) Mbere - In December 1972 there was a total of 361 students, 
of whom 330 were women and 31 men. At the end of 1974 there were 
101 students, of whom 16 were men and 85 women. 
3) Migori - In early 1973 there were 349 students. By late 
1974 there were 280. 
4) Vihiga - At the end of 1973, there were 387 students. By 
late 1974 there were 352. 
50 Tetu - At the end of 1973, there were 450 students. By 
late 1974 there were 308. 
6) Kapenguria - In late 1973 there were 354 students. By late 
1974 there were 334. 
These figures should be interpreted cautiously. Reference will 
be made to the element of fabrication which can enter into reporting by the 
teachers. Secondly, registers seem to be kept irregularly in a number of 
centres. Thirdly, not all areas have followed the policy of a once-and-for-all 
recruitment system. Also, these total figures are affected by the policy of 
closing down centres when attendance drops be±o^- fifteen. Despite the effects 
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that continuing entry and closure of centres have on the attrition rate, 
it is obvious that dropping out has occurred with considerable frequency, 
especially in Mbere, Tetu and Kwale, In Tetu there is one centre where 
the total enrollment dropped from 80 to 60 in two months, to 50 in the 
following month and to only 30 students at the end of the fifth month. At 
the time of the interview, which was anout eighteen months after the opening 
of the centre, there were only 25 left, most of whom were young mothers 
between the ages of 20 - 25 years. 
Most of the reasons given by the project staff and by the learners 
themselves for dropping out involve factors which are external to the Programme. 
These factors include pregnancy, migration and death. But it would appear that 
certain factors within the pcgramme itself are also involved. In the Mbere 
case, the high dropout rate is connected with: 
1. The use of Swahiii which is not understood by many people in 
the area; 
2, The high rate of turnover of teachers. Of the original fifteen, 
only four now remain. This seems to be associated with the level of 
honoraria for these teachers.. One of the teachers who deserted the 
project joined a teacher training college, and another becai e a 
subchief. A third took a job as an office messenger with the Ministry 
of Health, The new teachers lack training and are only briefed on what 
to do bjr the Adult Education Supervisor In his office. He is expected 
to give them on-the-job training during visits; 
3. The absence of the Adult Education Supervisor from his post 
for a large part of 1973 while he attended a course in Europe. The 
other Divisional Social Services staff do not seen to" have been able to 
fill the gap adequately. For instance, they^failed to keep records on 
attendance, dropping out and the progress of students in reading and 
writing. Suppl ies of the second reader were not obtained when the first 
reader was completed, and instead a supplementary book for Unit Uhe was 
used as a primer„ It was only when the students complained of the re-
petition that steps were taken to obtain Book Two. and 
4, The inappropriateness of much of the material to Mbere 
conditions. 
Conversely the low level of dropout in Kapenguria may be explained 
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1. The generally high level of acceptance of Swahili (here it 
should be noted that most of the students are Baluhya, not Pokot); 
2. The low turnover of teachers - of the original fifteen, only 
two have left; 
3. A flexible recruitment system; and 
A policy of allowing non-adults to join the classes. 
As far as staffing is concerned, each area has up to fifteen 
teachers (usually with seven years of primary education) who earnshs 150/-
per month. Their work is supervised by Adult Education Supervisors (one per 
SRDP area). These are on a salary scale which is comparable to that of PI 
teachers: 860/- to 1625/- per month. Other staff in the Department of Social 
Services are also associated with the Programme - Assistant Community 
Development Officers and Community Development Officers (where they exist) 
are supposed to keep in close contact with the classes. This has been of 
considerable importance in areas where the Adult Education Supervisors have 
been absent for long periods. At headquarters there is a staff of three adult 
educat ion specialists, one of whom is a UNESCO adviser. They are concerned 
with the general administration of the Programme, Its Internal evaluation and 
the preparation of teaching materials. 
Costs 
Costs of the Programme for the years 1972-73 and 1973-4- are given 
in the following table. 
Table 1. Costs of the Functional Literacy Programme» 
1972-73 
Item Cost 
Instructors' honoraria shs 50,000 
Equipment (non recurring) 40,000 
Material production 7,000 
Total 97,000 
1973-74 
Item Cost 
Instructors' honoraria shs 162,000 
Equipment (non recurring) 84,000 
Materials production 60,000 
Research and evaluation 18,000 
Training 18,000 
Total 342,000 
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For 1974-75 the allocation is 200,000/-; how this amount is to be 
spent has not yet been finalised. 
All these figures exclude the following emoluments: Adult 
Education Supervisors, the Kenyan Headquarters staff and the UNESCO adviser, 
UNESCO's only financial commitment so far is to cover the salary of the 
adviser, 'There is a possibility of their providing some printing machinery 
later. 
The problem of adequately monitoring the experiment has absorbed 
a great deal of the time of the headquarters staff in Nairobi. A number of 
different report ana evaluation forms have been designed with this in view. 
The reachers and the Adult Education Supervisors have thus been able to 
regularly convey their views as to the progress being made. However, a fully 
satisfactory reporting system has not yet been evolved. Many teachers, for 
instance, are unclear as to the kind of Information which is required of them. 
This was noticeable In Kapenguria where it was obvious that none of the teachers 
had any Idea of what they should write under the headings of 'club activities' 
and 'adult motivation', There have also been problems of fabrication. In 
Migori this went to the extent of producing attendance figures which were over 
100 per cent! The difficulty of getting reliable information is compounded 
by the fact that the Adult Education Supervisors have very little mobility. 
None of them find it possible to visit all fifteen centres In their areas the 
requisite two times a month, Since good monitoring is vital to experimentation, 
it might have been better to begin with fewer centres per SRDP area - always, 
of course, with a view to increasing their number later. 
In late 1974, each SRDP area was asked to carry out Its'own evalu-
ation. Teams were TO be established in each area. These were TO consist of 
officers representing The various ministries - health, agriculture, provincial 
administration, etc. - which nave been involved in the programme in one way 
or another, In addition to staff of the Department of Social Services (D.S.S.), 
This exercise was more successful in some areas than in others. It was some-
times difficult to get a genuinely inter-departmental team together (for 
example, in Mbere no officer outside D.S.S. participated.). Also, in many 
areas the evaiuators, for reasons which are not clear, seem not to have 
understood the purpose of The exercise and produced information which is too 
vague to be of much use, However, where evaluation reports make Interesting 
points (as the Kapenguria and Mbere reports do, for example), these have been 
taken into account in the preparation of this chapter. 
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The notion of functionality required not only the preparation of 
teaching materials suited to the students' everyday experience, but also the 
involvement of local extension workers in every aspect of the Programme. 
These expectations, however, do not seem to have been realised to any great 
extent. The preparation of materials is done by the Nairobi officers with 
little involvement of officers or teachers in the SRDP areas. The books 
which have been prepared are often inappropriate and sometimes technically 
unsound, as has already been pointed out. 
At first books were designed to serve all areas. Obviously this 
creates problems since the kind of agriculture found in Kwale is not the 
same as that of Tetu. However, the attempt is now being made to produce 
books which are better geared to local needs. For instance, manuscripts 
have now been completed on beekeeping for Mbere and Kapenguria; poultry for 
Migori, Kwale and Mbere; tobacco for Mbere, Kapenguria and Migori; hybrid 
maize for Tetu; and Katumani maize and cotton for Mbere. In producing this, 
material close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture is essential. 
Integration into the Programme of extension workers from other 
ministries has also been something of a problem. An important element to be 
integrated is agriculture. To link functional literacy to agriculture, 
demonstration plots were started and every centre should have had such a plot. 
Although the tea Ver is responsible for the general management of these plots, 
he obviously should involve the local agricultural extension staff in this 
work. The agricultural staff should also lecture to the class from time to 
time. The experience in Tetu seems to be satisfactory from this point of 
view, but Mbere has been almost a complete failure. Even in Tetu, however, 
teachers complained of the great difficulty "involved in arranging'" for-extenSion 
workers from var• -•us ministries to meet their classes, either for demonstrations 
or to give introductory lectures on key themes introduced in the literacy texts. 
The Migori case falls somewhere in between these two. About half 
of the plots seem to be going concerns; the most successful tend to be at the 
centres where the Agricultural Assistants or Junior Agricultural Assistants 
take an active interest. In Kapenguria there is a danger that Ministry of 
Agriculture staff will fail" to involve themselves sufficiently. 
The Kwale and Vihiga cases seem similar to Migori. The contri-
bution made by the Ministry of Agriculture may be described as 'patchy', but 
that of other agencies such as the Ministry of Health, Family Planning 
Association, etc. is even more marginal. This is primarily explained by the 
more difficult staff position of these agencies. Other suggested reasons are 
that the classes normally start in the afternoon when extension workers are 
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finishing their day's work, and that these employees of other extension 
services feel they already have enough work to do without getting Involved 
In functional literacy. However, it would seem possible for them to be consi-
derably more involved than they are at the moment. For family planning and 
home economics workers the functional literacy classes would seem to be ideal 
target groups composed as they usually are primarily of women. In some areas 
the Functional Literacy Programme has duplicated the services of the Home 
Economist employed by the Ministry of Agriculture by adding a. Home Science 
Demonstrator, who is expected to teach the women tasks such as needlework an 
and cookery. When literacy teachers have contacted the Home Economists they 
have often been told either to make use of their own staff or to advise the 
women students to join the demonstration groups organised by the Home Economist. 
The Programme uses radio broadcasts to broaden its coverage. 
Topics of general interest, and others considered important to the lives of 
the rural communities, are selected and prepared by the Programme staff in 
Nairobi. This information is passed on to the Voice of Kenya and is relayed 
by radio to the adult students. We are not in a position to say much about 
this aspect of the Programme because we-listened to only one broadcast during 
our field work.- The topic was the value of water and various methods of water 
conservation. This is indeed an important topic and the rural population 
should be exposed to it. But it was somewhat discouraging to see how little 
adults learned on their own from the radio. One obvious problem which reduced 
the effectiveness of the exercise was the very complicated language used. 
The writers had failed to take into account the limited Swahili background of 
rural people. The language used was roughly at the same level of complexity 
as that used in the V„O.K. news bulletins. Furthermore, the broadcaster read 
the text very quickly. The background noise from the radio also made it 
difficult for the adults to follow. 
After the broadcast the teacher organised a discussion, but he so 
monopolised it that it was difficult for the learners to participate. One 
woman, however, learnt something. She thought that water flows through 
electricity lines, and thus wondered why anyone could be electrocuted by 
pouring water on the lines. The teacher did not know a great deal about the 
subject, but nonetheless succeeded in explaining that electricity Is not 
water even though it is generated from water. 
We may now summarise the points raised in this discussion of the 
administration of the Functional Literacy Programme: 
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1. The initial selection of locations for functional literacy 
centres was often rather hasty, and sometimes failed to take into account 
whether the surrounding area contained a dense enough population to support 
a viable class„ For this reason a number of the orignal centres had to 
be closed and relocated elsewhere, 
2. Dropout rates are difficult to estimate with any accuracy, 
because in many centres new students have been recruited to replace leavers. 
Nevertheless it is clear that in some areas - especially Mbere and to a lesser 
extent Tetu and Kwale - losses have been high = Some possible reasons 
include rapid turnover of teachers; inappropriateness of teaching materials 
and methods; and the use of Swahiii at a level of complexity which the 
students find diffucult to understand: 
3 c The policy has been to close a centre when the enrollment falls 
below fifteen, This is probably justified in advanced areas such as Tetus 
but in Mbere and other less developed areas there is a strong case to be made 
for keeping small centres open provided that the participants continue to 
make good progress, In places where most adults never attended school^ even 
a few successful literacy graduates can make an important contribution as 
role models. 
Absenteeism has also been a problem, especially at times of 
the year when planting and harvesting have to be donee There is a strong case 
to be made for closing the centres3 or at least reducing the hours of 
attendancea during such busy periods, 
5, Local extension workers should be involved much more fully in 
the operation of the functional literacy centres than they have been in the 
past. They should participate in the writing of teaching materials suited 
to local conditionsa they should advise as to the management of the 
demonstration plots attached to the centres„ and they should give 
occasional lectures, It was noticeable that the most successful 
demonstration plots tended to be at centres where the local agricultural 
extension worker took an" active interest. Because they are composed 
mainly of women, literacy classes would also seem to be an ideal target group 
for home economics and family planning workers, 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TEACHING METHODS AND COURSE CONTENT 
1. The teaching method being used at present places too much emphasis on the 
whole-word approach. Advantage should be taken of the phonetic nature of the 
Swahili language by introducing students to the sounds of individual vowels 
and consonants early in the learning sequence, so that after a limited number 
of lessons they can construct new words on their own and are no longer 
dependent on learning by rote memorisation. 
2. The order in which words are introduced should be planned carefully. 
Words made up of simple syllables should be introduced before more complex 
words, and the syllables and sounds should be introduced systematically, and 
with adequate repetition. 
3. Better advantage should be taken of the pupils' previous familiarity with 
Swahili by introducing simple, commonly used words in the introductory lessons 
and only later adding difficult, little known words. 
4. Words with more than one meaning should first be introduced with their 
common everyday meaning, and other less widely known meanings introduced 
later. 
5. The reasoning behind common farming practises in Kenya should be carefully 
investigated, and different practices should only be recommended in the 
functional literacy readers if it is quite certain that these practises would 
in fact represent an improvement. 
6. Following these recommendations, the booklets for the Functional Literacy 
Programme should be rewritten and the teaching methods revised. The writing 
should be done by a team consisting of, at minimum, a literacy expert, a 
Swahili specialist and people with extensive fieldwork experience in agri-
culture and domestic science education. The first two booklets should be 
concerned mainly with teaching reading and writing, and the adult education 
component should largely be reserved for subsequent booklets. Separate 
editions of the later booklets would need to be prepared suited to local 
conditions of climate and sdil and local economic factors." Local 'fieldwork 
staff should be fully involved in writing these editions. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMME ADMINISTRATION 
1. The location of functional literacy centres needs to be planned carefully 
taking into account the population level of the surrounding area so that 
centres do not have to be closed because of an insufficient number of pupils. 
2. Dropout raxes are difficult to estimate accurately, but in some areas 
they have been high. Possible reasons for high dropout rates, such as 
rapid teacher turnover, inappropriate teaching methods and materials, and 
the use of Swahili too complex for the pupils to understand, need to be 
investigated and corrected, 
3. In less developed areas it may be advisable to Keep centres open even 
when the number of pupils falls below fifteen because a few successful 
literacy graduates can make an important contribution as role models. 
4. Provision should be made' for closing centres or reducing the hours of 
attendance during periods of peak agricultural activities when absenteeism 
is likely to be high. 
5. Local extension workers should be involved much more fully in the 
operation of the functional literacy centres, in such activities as writing 
appropriate teaching materials, supervising the centres' demonstration plots, 
and occasionally lecturing. 
JIIAggER SEVSLTTEEET 
THE FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMME IN VIHIGA/HAMISI, 
KAKAMEGA DISTRICT IDS/OP 12 
It is unnecessary in this report to comment on the seriousness 
of Kenya's population problen, The rate of population growth is now 
estimated at 3,5 per cent per annum and is thought to be moving up 
towards 4 per cento"'" The- important question is whether anything can 
be done about it, and specifically whether this can be done through 
increased expenditures on a family planning programme,, Accordingly an 
experimental programme was initiated in the Vihiga/Hamisi Divisions of 
Kakamega District, the experiment consisting mainly of substantially 
increased expenditures in that area to finance an intensified family 
planning effort, Vihiga/Hamisi was an appropriate choice, having the 
highest population density in 19 69 of any rural area in Kenya, 538 per 
square kilometre. The response secured in this area should therefore be 
an important guide to potential response elsewhere in the country, and to 
whether returns would be obtained from a similarly high level of expenditure 
made at the national level. 
The special features of this programme were: (1) use of a male 
field educator; (2) higher numbers of field educators per Division than the 
other areas which have a ratio of only one per District; (3) a greater number 
of clinics than other similar administrative units; (4) more midwives than 
any other comparable unit in the district:; and (5) the provision of three 
vehicles for transport. 
The main elsnent in this intensive programme was the provision 
of additional clinics. Family planning clinics were practically new to 
the District in February 1971, when 16 clinics were opened, 7 in Vihiga/Hamisi 
and 9 in other Divisions, with a further clinic in Vihiga a year or so 
later. This input was substantially increased in what may be called a 
second phase in February and July 1974, bringing the number of clinics 
in Vihiga/Hamisi up to 14, compared to 10 in the rest of the District. 
We shall attenpt here to compare the response to the expansion 
1. IoL.O., Employment, Incomes and Equality, Geneva, 1972, p. 121. 
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of clinics and other aspects of the programme, in the 'intensive effort' 
area of Vihiga/Hamisi with that in the rest of the District. Kakamega 
District is fairly homogeneous trihally and culturally, the people in 
both areas being members of the Baluyia tribal group. Unfortunately 
from the point of view of a controlled experiment, the economic factor 
is not constant xn the two areas, as Tab_e 1 shows, population density in 
19 69 was 538 per square kilometre in Vihiga/Hamisi, and only 162 in the rest 
of the District. Thus the economic pressure to seek family planning advice 
in Vihiga would be substantially greater. 
The second major difficulty is that it is too early to attempt 
to measure the response to the second phase of the programme. A new clinic 
attracts relatively few clients in its first year of operation, so that the 
clinics set up in 1974 would only this year be establishing a clientele. 
However, we can see from Table 1 that while the number of clinics 
was about the same in the two areas in 1971, the average number of people 
served per clinic was substantially lower In Vihiga/Hamisi, 39,000 compared 
to 57s 000, More significant, however, is the proximity to a clinic. The 
average number of square kilometres served per clinic was only 69 in 
Vihiga/Hamisi, compared with 334 in the rest of the District, a very 
substantial difference. While generally the furthest a client would need 
to travel to a clinic would be 4 or 5 kilometres in Vihiga, elsewhere it 
might be as much as 10 or 13, Thus even in 1971 and up to 1974, access 
to family planning facilities would be much greater in the test area. 
The establishment of additional clinics in 1974 reduced the 
average number of people served per clinic to 24,000 in Vihiga compared 
with an essentially unchanged figure of 56,000 in the rest of the District; 
and the average number of square kilometres served is reduced to 39 in 
Vihiga, compared with 301, The impact of this further expansion cannot be 
gauged here3 and a further statistical exercise in,say, 1977 is called 
for. The number of clinics is not necessarily an accurate indicator of 
access to services since clinics majr be open on a daily basis, weekly 
basis or monthly basis, and for a different number of hours on days open. 
Table 2 shows the times at which clinics were open as of December 1974 
in SRDP and non-SRDP areas, The table shows that the difference in access 
is actually much greater than Indicated simply by the number of clinics. 
For example while none of the SRDP clinics were open on only a monthly 
basis, none of the non - SRDP clinics were open on a daily basis. For 
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Table 1, The expansion of the family planning service in Kakamega District, 
1971-1974. 
Vihiga/ Rest of Kakamega 
Ham is i Kakamega District 
Population9 1969 296,254 486,332 782, 586 
No. of Sq. Km. 551 3,007 3, 558 
Density per sq, km. in 1969 538 162 220 
623 187 255 Estimated density per sq. km. in 1974a 
No. of clinics; 
February, 197Ib 8 9 17 
February, 1974 11 10 21 
July, 1974 14 10 24 
Average no. of people 
served per clinic: 
February,, 1971 39,287 57,328 
Februarys 1974 31,222 56,379 
July, 1974 24,531 56,379 
Average no. of sq. km. 
served per clinic: 
February, 1971 69 334 
February s 19 7 4 50 301 
July, 1974 39 301 
a. Population is assumed to increase at 3 per cent per annum in this 
table. 
b. The number of clinics assumed for 1971 includes one actually set 
up a year later. 
1 8 - 4 IDS/OP 12 
illustrative purposes if we measure access in units of one day a month, 
and estimate clinics open twice monthly as ? units, weekly clinics as 
4- units, and daily clinics as 8 units, then access in the SRDP area would 
equal 60 units and in the non-SRDP area 20 units, a ratio of 3 to 1. 
This is inaependent cf the distance-from-clinic factor. 
Vihiga/Hamisi was also favoured in the allocation of complementary 
and other resources. Seven enrolled nurses were working in the area in early 
1975, and eight field educators, This compares with only two midwives working 
in non-SRDP health centres and one enrolled nurse operating a mobile service 
on a part-time basis (though assisted by an SRDP financed nurse)-. While 
the SRDP area had three vehicles, each with a driver, for the sole use of 
field motivators, the nurse in the non-SRDP area had partial use of one 
vehicle only. 
The SRDP vehicles were to provide transport for a campaign which 
would operate through barazas, schools, film shows and the like. This campaign 
unfortunately appears to have been held back by delays in recruiting staff, 
so that the motivators are said not to have started work until early 1973. 
Once they were recruited, staffing was maintained at this level during 1973 
and 1974. The main activities were public meetings, film shows and home 
visits. 
The public meetings were organised by chiefs or assistant chiefs 
in the form of barazas where the Field Educator or any of her assistants 
was given time to explain the aims and objectives of family planning and 
to answer questions. These were held at the locational and sub-locational 
levels. Other public venues utilised for this purpose were adult education 
centres, women's groups or clubs and church meetings. The approach was to 
use meetings with these groups as a follow-up to the barazas, attempting to 
enlist the support of group leaders and use them as agents to spread 
information to people with whom they had contact. 
Abc_L _?00 meetings were held in 1974 with an average audience 
of 85 and 110 film snows with an dVSDT'3. gc cl i—1 iience of 180. A total of about 
110,000 people attended the meetings (which may not have been held exclusively 
for family planning publicity purposes, however) and 20,000 attended the 
film shows. About 650 home visits were made in 1974 averaging 54 per month. 
This amounts to a programme of something like three public meetings and 
one or two home visits pas? week, and a monthly fixm show per educator. This 
Table 2. Schedule of open days of SRDP and non-SRDP clinics, 
SEDP 
Non-
SRDP 
Daily Basis 
1, Mbele Health Centre 
2. Ebusiratsi Health 
Centre 
J, Kaimosi Mission 
Hospital 
4c Kima Mission 
Hospital 
None 
Once A Week 
1. Vihiga Health Ctr. 
2. Hamisi Health Ctr, 
3, Lianaginga Harambee 
Health Centre 
4c Tigoi Harambee Health Ctr, 
5, Fudumi Health Ctr. 
6, Emuhaya Health Ctr, 
1, Kakamega District Hospital 
2, Matungu 
3, Malava 
Note: All clinics are open from 8.00 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. 
Twice a Month Once a Month 
Kilinglli Health Ctr, 
Sabatia Health Ctr, None 
Banya Harambee Health Ctr. 
Butere 1. Iguhu 
Mwihila 2, Mautuma 
3. Luma Kanda 
4-. Navakholo 
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suggests that the organisation of public meetings was the most time-
consuming activity. 
There would seem to be considerable scope for substitution 
between methods to Increase the effectiveness of the programme, though in 
part the extension methods could be complementary. The present number of 
home visits would appear not to account for more than half a morning's 
work per educator weekly. At the rate of 1 home visits per day, which is 
not excessive5 the number of home visits for the area might have been 
Increased from 650 to 169000„ 
Secondly3 according to the annual report of the Senior Field 
Educator s film shows were "the greatest attraction and most powerful medium 
of effective communication". Certainly they appear to have a considerable 
advantage ever public meetings In that they can in any case be accompanied 
by a public address or discussions while attracting approximately double the 
audience. It is therefore unfortunate from the point of view of the SRDP 
experiment that only one film van was available, and this for the Province 
2 as a whole rather than the District or SRDP area. 
However contact made at public meetings and film shows is 
something very different from securing acceptors. The main choice is 
therefore between these two approaches (especially film shows) on the one 
side3 and home visits on the other: the success rate may be higher from 
16s000 home visits than from 120,000 members of public meeting audiences, 
particularly in view of the drop-out rate discussed elsewhere in this 
report. To gauge the relative effectiveness of the two alternatives, it 
would be necessary to Interview new acceptors and re-visitors regarding the 
form of extension contact made, It was not possible to do this in the time 
available,, but It Is a procedure that could now be adopted as a regular 
part of the family planning interview. That it has not been adopted 
already Is perhaps a weakness in the experimental approach followed. 
One of our principal conclusionss to be elaborated upon in a 
later sectionj, is that considerable attention should be given to experimenting 
with alternative techniques for diffusing family planning and related 
information on health and nutrition through home visits. And these 
experiments should be designed in such a way that it will be possible to 
compare the effectiveness of home visit techniques with the results 
2. The single van provided by the Family Planning Association of 
Kenya stays approximately three months in each District, rotating between 
the three Districts of Kakamega9 Busia and Bungoma. 
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obtained through public meetings. 
EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAMME ON THE NUMBER OF FIRST VISITORS 
Table 3, Number of first visitors in 1971-74 in Vihiga/Hamisi and the rest 
of Kakamega District. 
Vihiga/ 
Hamisi 
Rest of 
District 
Kakamega 
District 
total 
1971 71 214 285 
1972 483 824 1307 
1973 959 862 1821 
(estimate for 
1974 full year") 1142 1079 2221 
1974 (to October) 952 899 1851 
" Estimated as direct proportion of total for 10 months. 
Table 3 shows the number of first visitors from 1971 to 1974 for 
Vihiga/Hamisi, for the rest of Kakamega District, and for the whole District, 
All show an encouraging upward trend. Figures for acceptors will not differ 
too much from those for first visitors. 
Table 4, Percentage increases in number of first visitors for Vihiga/Hamisi, 
the rest of Kakamega District and Kenya, 
Period Vihiga/ Rest of Kenya 
Hami s i Kakamega 
District 
1972 over 1971 580 285 10,0 
1973 over 1972 99 5 11.0 
1974 over 1973 19 25 1.5 
1974 over 1972 136 31 12.0 
Table 4 analyses the trends in Table 3 by calculating the percentage 
increases from year to year. Although most of the clinics in the District 
date from early 1971, we should expect some time lag before people become 
aware of and respond to the facilities offered, Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to take changes between 1972 and 1971 as measuring a response 
to facilities established earlier in 1971, 
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This first year shows an astronomic rate of increase of 580 per 
cent In Vihiga/Hamisi and 285 per cent in the rest of the District, While 
this comparison Is favourable tc Vihigas these rates mainly reflect the very 
low initial level of visitors in 1971; and too much emphasis cannot be 
placed cn t h i s O n the other hand this Increase suggests there could be 
a significant advantage in cost-benefit terms in putting clinics into 
receptive and previously neglected areas such as Vihiga was In 197U that 
is j, a significant number of births could be avoided by spreading clinics 
through receptive parts of the rural areas, 
lor assessing the possible long-run success of the programme and 
its impact en the population problem,, however,. It Is more important to 
compare the 13'~'2 figures, when the initial heavy response has been absorbed, 
with those for I3?<+, .This will tetter Indicate whether the clinics are 
likely tc be able to progressively expand the number of clients and thus 
make some kind of dent in the population growth rate. The figures indicate 
significant continued expansion,, by 136 per cent In Vihiga/'Hamisi and 31 per 
cent In the rest of the District» As indicated earlier, we cannot assert 
categorically that this difference is due to the Intensive approach used in 
the former area: the response could simply be due to the greater population 
pressure which exists. Nevertheless It is encouraging. However, the 
apparent slow-down during the last year,, 1973-74 s In Vihiga does Indicate 
that there Is still some uncertainty as to whether the momentum of 
recruitment will be maintained, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY PLANNING ACCEPTORS 
An Important question is what kind of people are responding to 
the facilities ceing made available,, For example9 are they merely those 
who already have a lot of children., or who are more educated? Accordingly, 
a check was made on the characteristics of first visitors in Kakamega 
District, 
Size of Present Family 
As expected,, a large number of acceptors were women who already 
had large families in 1974, One quarter had six children or more9 but 
feM- per cent h-_u n ee children or fewer, and 42 per cent had two children or 
fewer. The - in Vihiga was significantly different in this respect 
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than in the rest of the Districts though this may simply reflect the larger 
percentage of younger women in the area. Also significant is the increasing 
proportion in the 'small family' category: the proportion (with 3 children or 
less) increased from per cent in 1971,to 46 per cent in 1972 and to 54 per 
cent in 1974 in the District as a whole. 
Age of First Visitors 
The proportion of first visitors in the younger age categories is 
significant in that if there is to be a widespread change in the desired family 
size an increasing proportion of younger women who might still be having children 
should be attracted to the programme. 
Table 5 shows that a substantial proportion of first visitors were 
in the younger age group of 10 to 24 years. More significantlys the proportion 
in this group has increased significantly in just a few years from 34 per cent 
in 1971 to 48 per cent in 1974= 
Table 5, Percentage of first visitors in the 10 to 24 and the 10 to 29 age groups. 
1971 1972 1973 
=>- ® 
1974 
Vihiga Rest Total Vihiga Rest Total Vihiga Rest Total Vihiga Rest Total 
10 to 24 
years 
32 
34 
34 
44 
36 
39 
47 
40 
44 
52 
44 
48 
10 to 29 
years 
60 
48 
56 
66 
58 
61 
64 
60 
62 
72 
65 
69 
The increase in the proportion of younger first visitors has been more rapid in 
Vihiga/Hamisi than in the rest of the District9 though it may be somewhat optimistic 
to attribute this to the programme. 
Education of First Visitors 
According to one school of thought, a major change in desired family 
size can only come about through economic development affecting the level of 
income, education and other social factors, and in the absence of this change 
17 - 10 
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Table 6. Education of first visitors to family planning clinics in Kakamega 
District, 
Extent of 1972 1974 
Education Vihiga 
% 
Rest Total 
0, 0 'o ~0 
Vihiga 
% 
Rest 
9-
Total 
9-•6 
No education 
31 
42 
38 
23 
39 
31. . . 
Standard 3 
or less 
40 
48 
45 
33 
46 
39 
Standard 7 
or less 
93 
90 
91 
91 
90 
91 
Form 1 or 
more 
7 
10 
9 
9 
10 
9 
Standard 1-3 
9 
6 
7 
10 
7 
8 
Standard 4-7 
53 
42 
46 
58 
44 
51 
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family planning campaigns can have only limited success, recruiting a few 
acceptors from among the more educated and well-to-do. There is some evidence 
that family planning services affect educated and less educated population 
groups differently. Between 1972 and 19743 the percentage of first visitors 
with no education fell from 38 to 31 per cent for the District as a whole while 
the percentage with standard 4 to 7 schooling increased from 46 to 51 per cent. 
This was mainly due to changes In Vihiga/Hamisi, where the percentage without 
schooling fell from 31 to 2 3 per cent and those with standard 4 to 7 education 
ros® from 53 to 58 per cent. This effect might therefore be associated with 
the special programme in Vihiga, though one should be rather cautious in coming to 
this conclusion. 
CONTINUATION RATES IN KAKAMEGA DISTRICT 
Success in recruiting acceptors does not necessarily imply similar 
success in avoiding births, since these clients may not continue with birth 
control for long. If we are concerned with population limitation or limitation of 
the rate of Increase of population, we must look at the number of avoided births. 
In order to calculate the costs and benefits of the Vihiga programme, therefore, 
it is important to take account of continuation rates. 
Accordingly, all 1972 acceptors in Kakamega adopting the pill as 
a contraceptive method were traced through their subsequent visits to their 
initial clinic until the end of November 1974. Since very few of these 1,039 
clients were still attending by that date,this gave almost the equivalent 
number of complete 'case histories", each starting some time in 1972. Continuation 
rates for clients adopting the I.U.D. were not calculated, as this would have 
required a longer time series of data than was available. 
Table 7 shows that only 28 per cent of pill adapters remained ill 
the programme after 12 months, and only 3.4 per cent after 24 months. Out of 
the 1,039 clientss only 25 visited a clinic In the last three months of the 
period surveyed and might therefore reasonably be thought still to be attending. 
Thus extending the period surveyed beyond November 1974 would not affect these 
figures. 
It Is worth comparing these rates with similar figures for some 
other developing countries. After twelve months In Kakamega District the 
continuation rate is 28 per cent for pill users, compared to a mean of 51 
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per cent for the countries listed. The situation after 24 months is even more 
striking: 3.5 per cent continuing In Kakamega compared with 47 per cent for 
(West) Pakistan and 38 per cent for the Philippines. As we shall Indicate 
presently, the probability is that a Kenya national figure would be lower than that 
for Kakamega, since Kakamega is not among the least responsive Districts. 
More striking than these figures, however, is the drop-out rate after 
one month which is 33 per cent. In other words one-third of acceptors did not 
return to the clinic at all after the first visit. This is shown In Figure 1, 
which gives the continuation rate - and thus the drop-out rate - on a cumulative 
basis. 
Figure 1 Indicates the inadequacy of reliance on numbers of first 
visitors and re-visitors as a measure of progress in acceptance of family limitation 
and avoidance of births. Continuation rates are not calculated at present by the 
statistical unit for family planning within the Ministry of Health, although it 
would not be too difficult to do so on a sample basis: each client has an 
Individual number, retained for all visits, which can be fed into the computer. 
Such calculations appear essential In order to monitor changing receptivity to 
family limitation over time and the changing effectiveness of the programme, as 
well as the comparative position in different areas. 
The high drop-out rate would appear to indicate two things: (1) that 
there Is a lack of commitment among first visitors to adopting birth control 
seriously. First visitors may be willing to collect an initial supply of pills 
without necessarily any definite intent to use them; and (2) that there is need 
for special tactics to prevent drop-outs, particularly among those who have paid 
this initial visit. The most effective deployment of field educators might be 
in following these particular clients rather than in attempting to make new 
converts only. This same evidence also casts doubts on the effectiveness of 
the field educator system, though it is still too early for a final judgement. 
These data also raise questions about the practice of issuing pills 
as opposed to the I.U.D. The pill has always been the most widely distributed 
contraceptive method, accounting for 80 per cent of the total in the last quarter 
of 1974, compared to 9 per cent for the I.U.D. Thus pills are used nine times 
as often as the I.U.D. It is not obvious why this should be so, as there is no 
evidence on clients' forms of any widespread resistance to adoption of the 
I.U.D. In fact, only very occasional comments regarding a client's preferences 
are reported. The practice seems to be to issue pills more or less automatically 
in the absence of specific objections based on high blood pressure or such 
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factors. Yet pills cost considerably more than the I.U.D.; women in rural 
areas are much more likely to take the pills erratically reducing the 
actual effectiveness of the method in preventing pregnancies, perhaps 
considerably; and it appears that nurses are just as competent as doctors 
in making the insertions, so that there is no staffing problem in recommending 
the I.U.D.4 in contrast the advantages of the I.U.D,, given the alarming 
drop-out rate mentioned, are that a positive effort on the part of the client 
to discontinue participation is required - the client cannot discontinue 
without returning to the clinic; secondly, the clinic staff have an opportunity 
to persuade the client not to discontinue; and thirdly, despite the lack of a 
commitment among first visitors, acceptance of the I.U.D, guarantees a minimum 
participation of two years if there is no positive decision for removal. The 
effect, measured in numbers of avoided births, could be substantial. 
We may now turn to consider whether there is any evidence of better 
performance in Vihiga/Hamisi in respect to the continuation rate. As already 
pointed out, the programme has not been fully operative for long enough to permit 
a proper evaluation of its Impact; this Is even more true with respect to 
the continuation rate, as an initial impact on the number of first visitors is 
presumably easier to achieve than a large number of fully-committed acceptors. As 
Table 7 shows, the continuation rate in Vihiga/Hamisi after 12 months was 24.'5 
per cent, compared to 31 per cent for the rest of the District. The drop-out 
rate after one month was 36.6 per cent, compared with 30.3 per cent for the rest 
of the District. One would expect a lower drop-out rate in Kakamega Township since 
the clientele might be more sophisticated and the clinics more convenient. The 
drop-out rate after one month is indeed significantly less, 27 per cent. The 
explanation for the high drop-out rate in Vihiga/Hamisi may be that the larger 
the increase in the number of acceptors, the higher the proportion of the less 
committed. 
At any rate we may conclude that the programme has so far had no 
impact as far as the continuation rate is concerned; but this needs to be 
checked by a re-calculation of continuation rates, say early in 1976, taking 
a cohort of 1975 acceptors, and repeating this exercise annually. The location 
4. J. Mugo Gachuhi states that 'oral contraceptives are the most 
problematical methods of fertility control that have been introduced to 
African women', in Who Needs Family Planning?, Staff Paper No. 115, Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1970. 
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and follow-up of first acceptors and other clients has been made difficult by 
the fact that complete information is not always recorded at the first visit. 
A new coupon is proposed for recording fuller Information. 
ATTITUDES TO FAMILY PLANNING 
This evaluation cannot be expected to Incorporate any thorough-
going investigation of the attitudes to family planning in the area affecting 
receptiveness to and the success of the programme. There have already been 
studies on this subject, though they are not conclusive. Some Impressions 
may however be given. 
The general predisposition of women is towards a large number of 
children., with six or more being a commonly desired family size. Many women 
only seek family planning advice when it would be inconvenient to bear a child, 
as for instance during a period of separation from their husbands. 
Male attitudes are well known to be a major obstacle to successful 
family planning In Kenya9 and this is the opinion in Kakamega. There is strong 
personal resistance to the use of the condom (except by schoolboys and some 
married men, who provide the main market for these). Men feel that family 
planning is the responsibility of the women, and that their cooperation is not 
required; at the same time it is estimated that because of male disapproval some 
20 per cent of the women who come to clinics do so without letting their husbands 
know. A common feeling among men is that there is enough land to support 
additional children. 
In this connection, the experience of the male educator is interesting, 
although the provision of one male field educator can only be considered as an 
experiment and cannot be expected to make a significant impact by Itself in 
such a large area. To our knowledge, this experiment is not at present being 
watched closely or systematically enough to learn as much as possible from it. 
However, the local staff consider that the work of the male field educator has 
had a positive effect. 
There is a general feeling that family planning knowledge may 
corrupt women and girls. Even the Family Planning Association of Kenya takes 
the unrealistic and unhelpful -attitude that family planning advice and 
assistance should be offered only to.these unmarried women who already have 
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one child. Further, the attitude of local politicians has frequently been 
unhelpful3 and family planning, like many other sound items of policy, has 
sometimes been exploited as a useful political campaign target. 
There is a strong local feeling, which is perfectly understandable, 
that family planning facilities should not be considered a priority in an area 
in which basic medical facilities are still lacking, This may itself engender 
a negative attitude towards family planning. More important, perhaps, is 
chat first acceptance can much more effectively be achieved where advice is 
offered through general medical facilities. There is an opportunity for medical 
staff to raise the question of family planning and those women who would feel 
embamnasseldto visit family planning clinics can seek advice. Attempts to 
prevent drop-outs can be facilitated by maintaining periodic contact with clients 
on other matters. Two conclusions might be drawn from this: opportunities 
to offer family planning advice wherever curative facilities exist should not 
be missed; and the possibility of providing other kinds of medical advice at 
family planning clinics (perhaps those newly established and open on a 
periodic basis only) as a means of facilitating acceptance might be 
investigated. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE VIHIGA/HAMISI EXPERIMENT 
The volume of resources allocated to the programme, and the 
preference given to this particular area in this allocation as compared to 
other areas, means that the programme in Vihiga/Hamisi must be seen as an 
experimental one aimed at gauging the possible response to a more intensified 
approach. Despite this fact, no statistical monitoring of the programme has 
been instituted or is currently planned, even though there is of a well-staffed 
statistical division with which all the necessary data have been lodged. 
In this respect one may also mention the lack of interest to date in calculating 
a continuation rate and apparent lack of awareness of its importance. In 
addition, there seems to have been some bias in the allocation of finance 
towards the establishment of additional 'static points' in the form of 
rural clinics rather than the more experimental field campaign, and finally this 
campaign could have been i~.ter planned and monitored as an experiment. 
As it happens this apparent absence of monitoring was part of the 
reason for the recent extraordinary decision of the American donors to 
terminate financial support for the programme from the end of June 1975, and 
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to end the employment of the eight field educators from that time. While it 
is true that the field education campaign was slew in being established, this 
is not exceptional for development projects, and just when the campaign 
could be said to be in full swings it has had to be discontinued. The 
decision to end the services of the eight field educators is particularly 
unfortunate at a time when the Kenya Government has received the sum of 
$30 million for ffee specific purpose of training 800 field educators over 
the next five years. In any case the field educators consitute only a part 
of the programme, the other aspect being the opening of additional clinics, 
which we have seen were functioning from the beginning of 1971, and with 
apparently some encouraging effect. Especially, however, the decision is 
unfortunate because this was an experimental scheme, and the statistical 
testing of the results would necessarily require pursuit of the programme 
for a minimum number of years. Discontinuation of this project will only 
lead to the need to renew the attempt elsewhere, given the urgency of the 
population problem. As we have Indicated, it is important that the project 
be continued for at least three more years so that the possible impact of 
increased effort in family planning in Kenya can be statistically assessed. 
THE APPLICABILITY AND RELEVANCE OF THE KAKAMEGA EXPERIENCE FOR OTHER 
DISTRICTS OF KENYA 
Is the Vihiga experience replicable in other areas? Clearly not 
in all other areas. We can certainly exclude the pastoral areas: the social 
and cultural system is very different in these areas, the population density is 
low and economic pressures for limiting population are different and the 
present number of acceptors is negligible in relation to numbers of population. 
If we select Districts on the basis of a high level of acceptors in 1974 
(2193 in Kakamega District), we have Uasin Gishu (1293), Kirinyaga (1287), 
Embu (1364), Meru (4328), Nakuru (1594), Kiambu (3613), Nyeri (3553), Muranga 
(1308) and Machakos (1378), excluding major towns. However it might be expected 
that similar results to those in Kakamega might be obtainable only where the 
trend in the number of acceptors was significantly higher in 1974 than 1972, 
as it was in Kakamega by 73 per cent. Of the group listed, only Uasin Gishu 
(129 per cent) showed a higher rate of Increase, while in Embu the increase 
was 41 per cent and in Meru 19 per cent. In Nakuru (3.1), Kiambu (4.4), 
Nyeri (4.2), Muranga (2.2) and Machakos (-19), the increases were very low or 
negative. Of the Districts listed Kakamega had the highest population density per 
square kilometre in 1969 (220), compared to Kiambu (184), Muranga (176) and 
Kirinyaga (146). 
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We can therefore conclude that Kakamega District is one of the 
most 'favourable' districts for intensification of the family planning effort 
in terms of population pressure, of a high current level of acceptors and of 
a trend of Increasing numbers of acceptors. On the basis of very limited evidence, 
we should not expect expenditures in other districts to yield particularly 
higher returns than those in Vihiga/Hamisi, 
CONCLUSIONS 
The upward trend in the number of first visitors/acceptors in 
Kakamega District is encouraging, as is the differential rate of increase in 
this number in the 'test area' as compared to the rest of the District. The 
characteristics of new acceptors in Vihiga/Hamisi are not discouraging. They 
are not merely women with very large families already: the proportion with 
smaller families seems to be increasing. They are also not only people from 
the older age groups: the proportion from the younger age groups is 
increasing, especially in Vihiga/Hamisi. Nor are they only women with 
more education. 
However the continuation rates of family planning clients are 
very low: 33 per cent never return to the clinic after the initial visit. 
The number of avoided births achieved and the actual impact on the numbers of 
babies being born and on the size of the population is so far probably quite 
limited as a result. The test area has not performed any better in this 
respect than the rest of the District, If anything it has done worse. 
Perhaps an increase in the number of acceptors means an increase in the 
proportion of less commmitted acceptors. This may reflect an Inadequate 
effort In experimentation with techniques of persuasion and a concentration 
on merely setting up clinics. 
The extent to which the Kakamega experience is replicable for other 
districts is highly uncertain; the probability, however3 is that substantially 
better results would not be forthcoming elsewhere. 
From the point of view of population policy in Kenya, the overall 
conclusion should be not the abandonment of the programme despite the 
difficulty of demonstrating a substantial Impact but, first, a reformulation 
of the programme to attack the problem of drop-outs and more experimentation 
with alternative ways of making family planning activities more effective; and 
second, in the face of the increasingly serious population situation, the 
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acceptance of the hopeful indicators referred to, and of the fact that 
controlling population growth is a"long-range task and the problem will become 
worse the longer the delay in coming to grips with it. 
As noted earlier, we believe that there are cogent reasons for 
experimenting with alternative techniques for diffusing family planning and 
related information on health and nutrition through home visits. The strong 
local feeling that family planning facilities should not be given exclusive 
priority in a situation in which other services for improving family health are 
being neglected is not only a very understandable reaction but a viewpoint that 
should be recognised explicitly in devising alternative methods. There is 
considerable evidence that confidence on the part of parents that the children 
that they already have will survive increases their receptivity to family 
planning. More generally, there is reason to believe that linking health, 
nutritional and family planning services is likely to increase the attractiveness 
and effectiveness of each. In particular, a programme using village workers trained 
to carry out case finding to screen for protein-calorie malnutrition among 
infants and small children could be combined effectively with the diffusion 
of information about simple health practices, nutrition, and the importance of 
child spacing for the health of mother and child, along with the diffusion of 
information about the possibilities for controlling births. 
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1. The intensive programme should be continued for at least a few 
more years to permit fuller evaluation of the effects. 
2. More mobile film units should be provided, to permit substitution of 
film shows for ordinary public meetings, 
3. The relative effectiveness of home visits in securing re-visitors 
and of film shows and public meetings in obtaining first and re-visitors 
should be investigated with a survey of present clients and in future by regular 
client records. 
In the meanwhile, hors visits directed at potential drop-outs should be 
increased. 
5. Better information should be recorded regarding the location or 
clients' homes and the possibilities of contacting them. 
6. Specie ertcrcs should be made to check the rate cr first visitors who 
drop out after one month. 
7- New efforts should be made to substitute the lu-D- for the pill as 
a contraceptive. Success in this direction should be monitored. 
8. The experience and success oi the male educator should be more 
systematically monitored, and much more attention given to male education 
in family planning. 
9. Possibilities for the association of family planning services with 
curative medical services should be maximised, including the introduction of 
limited medical advice in presently full-time clinics. 
10. Data regarding the continuation idte in different parts of Kenya 
should be computed systematically by -.he Family Planning Statistical Unit 
in Nairobi. A re-calculation of the continuation rate in Kakamega 
District should be made in early 19 76. taking a cohort of 1975 acceptors. 
11. Financing for the experimental, programme as a whole should be re-assessed, 
the field educators involved re-engaged, and the programme carried on in 
experimental fashion for at least three more years as a matter of priority. 
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA -
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This discussion of co-operative development is divided into three 
parts. In the first, a general account of the co-operative movement in 
Kenya is given, and certain major issues and problems reviewed. The focus 
of attention is on the rural marketing co-operatives (primary societies) and 
the district-based co-operative unions (secondary societies) Into which many 
of the co-operatives have been amalgamated.1 The problems of co-operative 
development in Kenya and elsewhere In East Africa have been examined in a 
number of studies, and some of these provide a basis for discussion here. 
The work of Hyden in particular has been used for reference. The attempt has 
been to draw out of previous studies some central Issues relating to 
co-operative development problems and possible ways of dealing with them. 
This exercise seems warranted on several grounds.. The recent Sessional 
Paper on co-operative development policy ClO) must be viewed against the 
background of earlier critical appraisals; planning for the Integrated 
Agricultural Programme, to be instituted In the near future, should take into 
account past experiences, as co-ops are to play a major role in this programme; 
and finally, co-operative development activity within the SRDP should be set 
within the larger national context. 
In the second part, some experiences with co-operative development 
within the SRDP areas are considered. The treatment given is perforce a 
summary one. Most attention Is paid to the case of Kapenguria, and shorter 
comments, are made on the situations in Vihiga/Eamisi, Migori/Kihancha, and 
South Kwale. 
The third part consists of a summary of findings and recommendations. 
It hardly needs emphasising that the field of co-operative develop-
ment presents researchers, planners and administrators alike with an exceedingly 
.complex and difficult array of issues, and problems. Any summary account such as 
this trie ricksbelng overly general and simplistic. Although it has not been 
possible here to consider co-operative development In as great a depth as would 
be desirable, still a number of critical issues have been pointed out, and hope-
fully further research will be carried out In this very important area in the 
future. 
1. The nation-wide co-operative organisations such as the Kenya Planters' 
Co-operative Union (KPCU), Kenya,Farmers' Association (KFA) or the Horticultural 
Co-operative Union (HCU), the farm purchase societies, and the urban-based 
savings and housing societies are not" dealt with here. 
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PART I: CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA — SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The course of co-operative development In Kenya has not been an 
easy one; It has in fact been fraught with, major difficulties. As Hyden has 
shown in his study of the co-operative movement. development has been impeded 
partly by difficulties which were a product of the colonial era, and partly 
by difficulties Inherent In the post-independence era, namely the social, 
political, and economic conditions In rural Kenya, and Government policy towards 
the movement. The course of the co-operative movement may be briefly summarised 
2 as follows i 
1. The circumstances in which marketing co-ops were introduced 
among the African population in the colonial period militated against the 
smooth and straightforward development of the movement from the outset. As 
something sponsored by a colonial administration with an obvious concern for 
tempering political grievances, while preserving "establishment" interests, 
co-operative schemes, were not unnaturally regarded with some scepticism by the 
target population- The emerging African elite took an unfavourable view of 
co-ops as an expression of continued economic dominance, by foreign parties 
who "were themselves participating in a strong ©apitallst system. 
2. As independence approached, co-ops began to assume a new 
significance as arenas for political activity.-. In a broad sense-, co-ops 
developed a political aspect Insofar as they functioned as mechanisms to 
redress inequities of resource distribution between the African and non-African 
populations, particularly in the area of land distribution. More specifically, 
co-ops became political as local and national leaders Increasingly involved 
themselves in co-op activities, mostly with, a view towards building their 
constituencies rather than out of genuine, primary interest in the organisations 
as such. 
3. Although emphasis after independence was placed Initially on 
the social and Ideological side of co-operative development — co-ops were 
represented as especially important and appropriate agencies for economic 
development in the rural areas - the tendency over the last decade or so has 
been for the Government to become Increasingly pre-occupied with practical 
issues. A more reserved attitude towards, the movement has come to prevail: 
the role co-operatives have to play in development is still regarded as 
2- See Eyden (4, pp.17-32) or Hyden and Karanja (5, pp.167-188) for 
a more complete account. 
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important, but the chief concern is for better, more 'efficient5 performance 
of existing societies and unions rather than for further expansion of the 
movement. This attitude Is reflected In Sessional Paper No. 8 of 1970 (8), 
Sessional Paper No. 14 of 1975(10) and in both second and third Development 
Plans. (7, p.277; 9, pp.209-10) 
The priority given to improving current operations rather than 
expansion has been justified by the Government on the basis of negative 
experiences with the movement. It is recognised that many serious problems 
have been encountered. A number of these were frankly spelled out in the 
1970-1974 Development Plan:-
Within the co-operative movement, ....there has been considerable 
variability between the performances of individual organizations. 
However, while some co-operatives have been efficiently managed, too 
often the reverse has been the case- There have been numerous cases 
of fraud and dishonesty or favouritism to committee members. Due to 
poor management, many of the marketing societies have been paying out 
to their members too low a proportion of the proceeds realised from 
products sold. Just as Important, Inefficient societies have not been 
able to perform certain valuable services, such as the supply of credit, 
for their members. Probably the most Important factors contributing 
to the inefficient management of societies have been the lack of 
understanding of business principles on the part of co-operative 
commit;.ee members and staff and the inability or unwillingness of 
societies to hire experienced staff at competitive salaries. The 
standard of book-keeping has been especially poor, yet a- well kept set 
of records and accounts should be one of the most valuable aids to 
efficient management. Partly because Inadequate records have been kept 
by many of the societies it has been difficult for the Department of 
Co-operative Development to audit the societies' accounts. A shortage 
of audit staff within the Department has. aggravated this situation. 
For these reasons, a large number of societies had their audits 
substantially In arrears .... The lack of good records and accounts 
a Is o made It difficult for the staff of the^Department^jto assist many 
societies to improve efficiency, for co-operative staff must base much 
of their advice on their interpretation of the societies' records and 
accounts. Other factors have also made It difficult for the Department 
of Co-operative Development to provide adequate field services to the 
co-operative societies, Especially important have been shortages of 
money for meeting the travelling expenses of staff and difficulties 
experienced by the Department In recruiting staff of a suitable calibre. 
(7, pp.276-7) 
The problems which confront small-holder co-ops, such as those 
outlined In the above passage, have mostly been interpreted by Government 
policy-makers as administrative-technical in nature, to be met with admini-
strative-technical measures. Thus, such tactics as stricter Government 
supervision of the movement, education programmes for co-op staff and manage-
ment committee members, staffing increases within the Co-operative Development 
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Agency (now a separate ministry), and attempts to Improve recording and 
accounting practices are all indicative of a strategy to discipline the 
movement along the lines of good business and sound management principles. 
The aim is to increase technical proficiency through technical means. 
Rather less attention has been directed towards factors of a 
socio-politico-economlc nature which are active in the environment in which 
co-ops are expected to operate, and which often underlie managerial and technical 
problems. The importance of taking such factors into account when examining 
problems of co-operative development Is a familiar theme, having been 
stressed for example by Karanja (6), Migot-Adholla (11, 12) and Wldstrand (14). 
In particular, the paramount role of these societal factors in influencing 
the" course of the co-op movement in Kenya is the main theme of Myden's study 
(4), and he rightly argues that they demand fuller consideration since the 
persistence of many of the critical difficulties experienced by the movement 
traces back to them. In the following sections, attention will be given first 
to the question of local environment and the features which act as constraints 
on co-operative development. Next, the negative impact of certain Government 
policies themselves will be considered. Finally, certain problems In 
co-operative management which derive both from the local situation and Govern-
ment policy will be reviewed more specifically. 
THE LOCAL SETTING 
Although circumstances vary somewhat from place to place, It can 
be broadly stated that rural Kenyan society Is characterised by the existence 
of local solidarity groups based on ethnic, residential or other ascrlptive 
criteria. Competition for available resources tends to take place In terms of 
these groupings. As several observers have noted, for example, local self-
help activities are widely and strongly distinguished by just such a pattern. 
In what has been termed the "pre-emptive strategy of development", each group 
attempts to manipulate the situation to its own advantage: "In view of the 
scarce resources available these local groups or cliques act In such a way as 
to make it impossible for other contending groups to obtain the same benefits". 
(4, p.208; also see 1, p.222) 
This pattern can sustain a system of marked social differentiation 
in rural communities, for the leaders or would-be leaders of these local 
interest groups gain access to the prerogatives of leadership — wealth, 
prestige, power — on the basis of their ability to represent group interests 
effectively. Indeed, primary group segmentation and social differentiation 
can be seen as mutually reinforcing elements: each encourages the other. 
(See 11, p.33.) 
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Such a state of affairs does not make for a very congenial 
environment for co-operative development, The rational and efficient 
operation of co-operative activity requires a radically different basis of 
interaction in which local solidarity group interests are subordinated to 
those of the co-op organisation as a whole. Segmentary organisation and the 
dominance of the underprivileged majority by the elite3 which are the dominant 
patterns in the local areas 3 are incompatible with the emergence of a common 
collective interest. When co-operative societies are Initiated locally, they 
can easily be turned Into new arenas for competition between groups, and 
- 3 
"serve as stepping-stones for more ambitious persons". (3, p.304J In this 
way, the objectives of co-operative organisation per se are quickly frustrated. 
As one writer has phrased It5 co-op organisations can be altered by forces 
in their local environments so that their orginally intended purposes, the 
"formal and manifest goals", are eclipsed by "informal or latent goals". 
(12, p.91) The co-operative ideal of a collection of Individuals interacting 
on a contractual basis founded on perceived common interest deriving from 
common economic/occupational status and aspiration. yields to a situation in 
which there is a collection of Individuals only nominally related who are 
clustered into constituent and contending groups. 
Local Model Co-operative Model 
Criteria of Ethnic„ residential. Economic/occupational 
interaction etc„ 
Mode of Primary group Contractual agreements 
interact ion segmentation and between individuals 
conflict 
Relevant Social standing. Business competence 
qualities for political competence 
leadership/ 
management 
This fundamental incompatibility accounts for many of the management 
problems which have hindered co-operative development in Kenya. Effective 
co-op organisation calls for certain bureaucratic prerequisites9 but the context 
in which co-ops are expected to function is to a marked degree "debureaucratised". 
3, Hyden comments that;-
Almost everywhere in Kenya? co-operative leaders are drawn from the 
economically stronger members of local communities. Ordinary peasants 
are under the domination of more successful villagers, some of 
whom are deeply involved in non-agricultural activities. Besides 
individuals with large holdingss teachers and traders frequently 
perform leadership roles in rural cc-operatlves. (3S p. 304) 
Similarly, Karanja speaks of the control of rural co-ops by the 
"rural bourgeoisie" and of committee members' accountability to "political 
constituencies". (6, p.108) Also see Widstrand (14, pp. 18-19), 
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Holmquist, In discussing the organisation of self-help activity for the 
construction of cattle dips in Kisli, draws attention to this kind of 
disjunction•-
.... local communities are by no means co-equal to modern 
bureaucratic organizations which can establish authorities, 
regulate behaviour, hire and fire, all without great regard for 
extra-organizational considerations. Local communities, such 
as those in Kisii, with decentralized authority roles and a 
premise of equality between lineage segments of equal rank, may 
..be quite antithetical tc^bureaucratic behaviour,,-.. Organizations 
within these communities are required to carry a host of what 
might be called 'sociological burdens', They must operate in a 
context of numerous historical feuds; a local status 
system which may not be compatible with the org an iz at ion1s 
leadership requirements; an environment of poverty which encourages 
corruption; lack of opportunities for wage employment which, 
coupled with the local power structure, is unlikely to encourage 
employment (for example of dip attendants) according to achievement 
norms . , „ , A radical breakdown, of present principles of community 
interaction may In fact be a prerequisite for the creation of 
modern community activities based on bureaucratic principles, 
(1, pp.223-4) 
The prevalence of external concerns in the decision and management process 
of primary co-op societies and co-op unions likewise militates against the 
implementation of measures designed to benefit the co-op organisations as 
such. Hyden has described the behaviour of management committee members as 
being almost wholly conditioned by the segmentary nature of the local 
community:-
.... their views on policy questions usually reflect the 'traditional' 
interest they represent; rarely do they take an Independent view 
of financial matters, and these as well as other Issues are perceived 
in terns of how they might benefit or be of advantage to the 
committee member and his constituents. Thus, most decisions are 
highly particularistic and 'political" and few, if any, are 
influenced, by technical considerations or concern for economy and 
efficiency. For instance, if a co-operative union wishes to 
devise Its own. transport system, probably the most important 
consideration will be the stlpulatlon-democratically advanced-
that each member society be allocated its own lorry, quite apart 
from any considerations of the diseconomies that might result, 
Such strong emphasis upon distributive equity between various 
local communities and the concern of committee members to Influence 
the distributive process in such a way as to favour their own 
constituents renders the introduction of technical-economic allocative 
criteria, and administrative reforms, most difficult to realize. 
The amalgamation of uneconomic and non-viable co-operative societies 
invariably meets with resistance due to the common apprehension 
among members that their society will be disadvantaged, and the 
same is true of proposals to reduce the number of committee members 
for the sake of managerial efficiency. (3, p,309; also see 4, 
pp. 89-90, p, .106; 6, p,1.08; 1", pp. 1.8, 24) 
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There 1s obviously a need to counter those influences in the 
local environment which now impede co-op operations and objectives. But this 
cannot be achieved merely through the provision of what are essentially admin-
istrative-technical inputs — that is, education of management in better 
business practices, closer Government supervision, and the like. These may 
be necessary measures, but they are not sufficient in themselves. 
As others have previously remarked, the really crucial ingredient 
for promoting business efficiency, an ingredient now largely absent from the 
co-op movement, is 'pressure from below', (6, p.109; 11, p.238) In other 
words, the task of securing efficient operations can hardly be achieved 
without a far greater degree of participation by rank and file membership 
than has heretofore been the case. Ordinary members need to become much more 
actively involved in their own organisations. Indeed, they must develop a 
sense that these organisations are their own. 
The problem, then, is to foster a stronger sense of loyalty to 
co-operative organisations themselves, in place of loyalty to the various 
Interest groups of which they are composed. A new kind of solidarity needs 
to be encouraged, whereby members interact as "a functional group, based on 
shared economic interests" (4-, p. 218), and are willing'to comply with 
organisational objectives because they have a strong moral and ideological 
commitment to these objectives. Members must be convinced about "the superio-
rity of co-operative action". (4, p.222) This kind of conviction is not 
likely to emerge in the present situation in which co-ops are expected to 
cater for the interests of both the 'haves' and the 'have nots' in rural 
society; this is supportive of a commitment to segmentary groups rather than 
a functional co-operative organisation. If co-ops were to become more the 
province of the ordinary, less prosperous smallholders, on the other hand, the 
chances for the development of loyalty to co-operative organisations per se 
could be enhanced. This argues for a policy of aiming co-operative development 
activities and opportunities towards the less privileged members of rural 
society. Such a policy would not only help alleviate the most severe manage-
ment problems experienced by co-operatives, but would also serve to promote 
social equity. 
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THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The co-operative movement has had to contend with a hostile local 
environment; it has also had to contend with hostile features In the 
institutional framework provided by the Government and Its policies. This is 
ironical, as the co-operative movement has been much less a movement from 
below than a programme sponsored by Government from above. 
The Intervention Strategy 
The widespread shortcomings in the performance of co-ops have been 
used to justify the appropriation by Government of extensive supervisory 
powers over the movement, as exercised by the Co-operative Development agency. 
Indeed, Hyden goes so far as to say that "whenever co-operatives have shown 
signs of failure or ineptitude, government has restricted their legitimate 
sphere of action and increased its control over them". (3, p.315) The 
tightening of Government control has had clear benefits in some areas, as 
for example in regularising the arrangements by which co-operative unions 
and societies grant "loans" to Individuals, some not even co-operative members, 
who then use the money for a wide variety of purposes often unrelated to the 
business interests of the co-operatives. (4, pp.103-5) In Sessional Paper 
No. 14 of 1975 , the results of stricter Government supervision are characterised 
in the most encouraging of terms:-
The stage where co-operatives were rendered static by rampant 
embezzlements and financial mismanagement is over. Co-operatives 
are now dynamic organizations with a much wider horizon, as a 
result of improved control systems and constant surveillance and 
guidance. (10, p. 25) 
This is decidedly an over-optimistic view*4 which Ignores the costs associated 
with a strong Intervention strategy, although these have been pointed out in 
a variety of earlier writings. 
Grounds for this assertion are provided by Sessional Paper No. 14 
itself. In the very next paragraph following the one just cited, for Instance, 
the policy of 'strengthening Government supervisory services' is reaffirmed. 
If it is indeed the case that co-operatives have become the successful 
organisations just described, it is questionable whether still more Government 
control is necessary. It is recognised elsewhere In the document that 
co-operative development, to be successful, cannot be simply imposed but must 
involve the partnership of the Government and the participants. (See p.23.) 
Also, as was seen from the passage cited earlier from 1970-1974 Development 
Plan, improvement of efficiency is thought to have been hindered by the problem 
of audit arrears. The latest Sessional Paper states that this problem has not 
been entirely overcome as yet. (10, p.20) Finally, it Is reported that "The 
number of dormant and Inactive co-operative societies ... has increased". 
(10, p.21) It would therefore seem that an unqualified positive appraisal of 
the effects of strong intervention does not accord well with other statements 
made in the document. 
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To begin with, increased Government supervision and penetration of 
co-operative organisations obviously" requires concomitant Increases in 
Co-operative Development staff, and In the resources, such as training and 
transport, which will allow them to carry out their work effectively. It is 
well known that the Co-operative Development agency has been plagued by 
shortages of qualified staff and supportive services, and this means that the 
expectations created by a sophisticated administrative structure have been 
exceedingly difficult to fulfil. The result has been what could be termed 
"administrative overload" (See 2, p.74.) for the Department. The strategy of 
strong intervention has not been adequately backed up with the means of 
implementation. This problem and its remedy - i.e. more inputs of personnel 
and material - have been a chief concern of past and present policy and 
planning documents. 
Until very recently, the Government agency charged with the task 
of overseeing and aiding co-operative development has for the most part been 
assigned a junior status In the ministerial structure. Details of the 
"shifting institutional affiliations" of the Department of Co-operative 
Development are given by Hyden. (4, pp.59-60} This lack of a strong position 
has put Co-operative Development at a disadvantage In commanding adequate 
resources for its task. Now that Co-operative Development has been accorded 
full ministerial status, a move which hopefully reflects a renewed and stronger 
Government commitment to co-operatives, the situation could improve. 
The problem of "administrative overload" has also been acute within 
the co-operative organisations themselves. The Introduction of such improved 
techniques for management as standardised accounting systems or monthly trial 
balances, and in general the increasing extent to which local co-ops are held 
accountable to Government regulations and policies, has meant that a greater 
burden has been placed on the shoulders of the co-operative managers. Despite 
emphasis on technical training, local co-op staff and management committee 
members do not always have the expertise necessary to implement new measures 
demanded by Government. Also, there is the risk of glutting the management 
process with bureaucratic details, leading to a pre-occupation with routine. 
This can have a detrimental effect on the "learning capability" of the local 
organisations. A situation can develop in which "Routine activities take 
precedence over creative thinking. The co-operatives become bureaucratic and 
inflexible - organizational cripples". (2, p.76; also see 4, p.171) 
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Restrictions on the ability of co-op societies to adopt organisational 
structures to local conditions are apparent in another area. The Government 
has placed strong emphasis on the centralisation of certain activities in an 
effort to promote better management and overall effiency. Such services as 
book-keeping, bulk purchasing of agricultural inputs, transport, and savings 
and credit facilities have therefore been consolidated into the district 
co-operative unions. The attempt is to achieve economies of scale, but 
obstacles have been encountered. Frequently, the unions have not enjoyed the 
confidence of their constituent'societies. Mismanagement, poor service and 
high overhead costs at the union level have sometimes made primary societies' 
membership in the union more of a burden than a benefit. The larger-scale 
organisations may reduce members' sense of effective participation. Moreover, 
those in primary societies may be suspicious of the union committee members, 
who are liable to respond to pressures from their own constituencies in making 
decisions as to how union resources should be distributed. (4, pp.97-101) 
Amalgamation of smaller single-purpose societies into larger societies is also 
not automatically a good thing. As Karanja has noted:-
If an amalgamation is carried out because it would look tidy 
on the chart of the co-operative movement, such a merger will 
not go very far. Such a type of amalgamation only causes unrest 
am.ng th-> members and the committees and also destroys the much-
needed co-operative spirit, (6, p.130) 
A more comprehensive Government authority over the movement together 
with increased workloads for Co-operative Development staff create conditions 
which foster a "bureaucratic mentality". The danger is one of staff insisting 
on adherence to bureaucratic strictures for their own sake, without giving 
due attention to local conditions which may sometimes make such an inflexible 
attitude dysfunctional. There are times when rules must be tailored to fit 
the circumstances. Blind obedience to bureaucratic ritual, an obsession with 
proper form, can be as counter-productive as disregard for rules, from the 
point of view of the smooth functioning of an organisation. Hyden cites a 
case, for example, for example, in which a Co-operatives Assistant strongly 
and publically criticised the committee members of a primary society for 
announcing a general meeting without allowing for the full interval of time 
which the Rules stipulate should elapse between the announcement and the 
meeting proper, when the difference was only a matter of a few days. (4, 
pp.153-4) Doubtless such a rule Is a good one, and ought to be followed 
whenever.possible. But the more effective way to gain compliance is by quiet 
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persuasion that the rule in fact makes sense, Officers in the field who 
harangue co-operative society members about not following Government 
regulations to the letter, when the Issues involved could be settled more 
tactfully, only invite the hostility of the members. 
In general, the build-up of an extensive bureaucratic structure 
to control the co-operative organisations can have an alienating effect on 
the membership insofar as it is perceived as coercive in nature. The 
curtailment of local initiative and autonomy In the name of efficient 
business practices or organisational principles, the Importance of which is 
not always appreciated by the local co-op members, reduces the chances that 
the members will really identify with their organisations, and thus feel a 
strong commitment to them. (See 14, pp.29-30.) 
Other Influences 
Certain other circumstances in the Institutional setting have not 
been complementary to co-operative development efforts. For instance, the 
fact that the County Councils have been stripped of much of their political 
significance, and that, the formal political party organisation is often very 
weak at the local level, would seem to contribute to the tendency for co-
operative organisations to serve as political arenas. As discussed earlier, 
when co-operatives become politicised, the objectives of co-operative 
organisation are subordinated to the objectives of competing interest groups. 
(4, p.66) 
Lack of co-ordination and agreement on policy issues between the 
Department of Co-operatives and the Ministry of Agriculture are also reported 
to have caused difficulties in the past. (4, pp.60-1; 3, pp.310-11) At the 
local level, more Government supervision and guidance translates Into a need 
for more extension workers. However, "In the realm of agricultural extension 
work the Ministry of Agriculture objects to the idea of co-operatives 
employing their own field personnel". (3, p.311) 
An even more critical problem-area, one that does not admit of easy 
solutions since major policy issues are involved, Is that of the marketing of 
agricultural products. Local co-operatives in Kenya have had to face severe 
competition from private traders, and they have proved by and large unequal 
to the task. The Government has not deemed it necessary to heavily curtail 
the activities of private traders for the benefit of co-operatives, as has 
been done in neighbouring Tanzania, for example. Frequently in Kenya, the 
private traders operate from such a strong position and so effectively that 
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local co-ops experience difficulties getting their own members to sell through 
the organisation. (See 13, p.150.) Government has justified its position 
of not giving co-operatives a more responsible role in marketing activities 
e.g. by fuller representation on the statutory marketing boards or more 
liberal licensing arrangements allowing co-ops wider buying rights for certain 
products, with the argument that they are ill-prepared to assume such 
responsibility. While it is clear that co-ops suffer from many operational 
deficiencies and that perhaps "... the cooperative call for monopoly in 
marketing reflects more an intra-elite struggle over the allocation of 
resources than a genuine concern to improve the situation of the ordinary 
farmers" (4, p.63), it may also be true that the lack of prospects for a 
fuller role in the marketing process provides little incentive for co-operatives 
to improve their operations. Hyden observes that: "The leadership of the 
cooperative movement in Kenya naturally tends to adopt a rather passive 
attitude towards the development of their organisations realizing that there 
is little room for expansion of cooperative marketing responsibilities". 
(4, p.63; also see 3, p.312) 
CO-OPERATIVE MANAGEMENT 
A number of management problems have been mentioned in the earlier 
discussion. In this section, a few of these are singled out for more specific 
con s 1 der at Ion. 
The fact that the co-operative management process at both primary 
society and union levels tends to be heavily influenced by external concerns 
has had a direct consequence for the relationship between co-operative society 
and union committee members on the one hand and the staff of these organisations 
on the other. There is often a marked conflict of interest between committee 
members and their executive staff. 
Committee members commonly regard co-operative organizations 
as their own instrumentalities and fully expect to control the 
decision-making process. Consequently such members, especially 
chairmen, frequently interfere In the day-to-day management of 
the organization. Interference of this nature is most frequent 
in those societies and unions where the secretary or manager is 
independent-minded and concerned with exercising executive 
5- A t present, the interests of small-holder marketing co-ops are 
represented by the Commissioner for Co-operatives, who is a member of all ttie 
agricultural boards. Co-operatives are given buying monopolies for specific 
agricultural products in areas where they handle over 60 per cent of those 
products. The recent Sessional, Paper indicates that there will be no 
fundamental change in Government policy on the question of marketing, although 
the possibility of wider representation on marketing boards is held open. 
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authority, particularly in respect to financial matters. Thus, 
co-operatives in Kenya are frequently characterized by a persistent 
tension between committee members (including chairmen) and executive 
staff concerning management matters, especially in the financial 
sphere. (3, pp.309-10) 
Insistence by committee members on close supervision of management affairs 
may sometimes be motivated out of a concern to prevent fraudulent practices 
on the part of executive staff, something which is not unknown. However, as 
Hyden goes on to point out:-
.... the most unfortunate aspect of such tension and mistrust is 
not the occasional impropriety of secretaries and managers, but 
rather the fact that it makes effective management of co-operatives 
so much more difficult to achieve and tends to drive the best 
managers to leave the co-operatives for better-paid jobs in the 
private sector. (3, p. 310) 
Besides this lack of autonomy in carrying out tasks, cooperative 
staff have found other conditions of employment unsatisfactory. In a survey 
of one group of cooperative employees, it was found that many feel that the 
co-operative movement does not offer good career prospects, or even job 
security:-
A position as clerk or book-keeper in the cooperative movement 
is for the'majority of staff only a way of gaining some experience 
before joining a private company or the civil service. They do 
not join the cooperative movement for a life career. This 
attitude can be found also at the more senior ranks in the 
cooperative unions. Many report that they do not feel secure in 
their positions in the cooperative movement. The union committee 
can dismiss them at any time, they say. The 1969 (Co-operative 
Societies) Rules do not give the Commissioner the same power to 
prevent arbitrary dismissals as he has regarding appointments 
of graded staff. (4, pp.84-5; also see 6, pp. 108-9.) 
Another factor that helps to account for staff dissatisfaction and 
high turnover in the movement is that irrelevant criteria are often employed 
by co-operative union officials in the selection of staff. Hyden observes 
that preference may be shown those who come from committee members' home 
areas: "The committee member whose 'constituency' has several employees 
in the union is in a strong position. He has proved his service to those 
who elected him". (4, p. 85) 
One further area of management-related problems, or potential 
problems, may be identified. Government has tried to promote diversification 
of activities within cooperatives as part of its strategy to strengthen the 
movement. However, new schemes for multi-commodity, multi-purpose operations 
through provision of credit, improvements in the standard of bookkeeping, or 
the supply of agricultural inputs, place an emphasis on further training for 
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co-operative leaders, as distinct from ordinary members. While the leaders 
acquire more proficiency, the bulk of co-operative participants are left behind. 
This reduces the effectiveness of general meetings as arenas 
for membership participation and control, since discussions tend 
to focus on matters which are easily understood by the rank-and-file 
such as the size of committee members* allowances and the like. 
Moreover, the Increased complexity of co-operative activities 
together with the Inadequate supervision of Co-operative Develop-
ment staff might Increase the opportunities for committee 
members to abuse their position. Though certainly unintended, 
such a consequence of government policy does not appear improb-
able. (3, p.312; also see 4, p.163) 
CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The foregoing discussion has dealt with a number of problems which 
have been recognised by various observers as obstacles to co-operative 
development in Kenya. In what ways, and how effectively, does present 
Government policy, particularly as set forth in Sessional Paper No. 14 of 
1975, address these problems? A very welcome development in the Sessional 
Paper is the recognition of the importance of more meaningful Involvement of 
the general membership In the movement, and emphasis Is laid on expanding 
educational efforts to include the ordinary members. This is to be achieved 
through educational centres established at the provincial level and through 
the posting of District Co-operative Officers (Education). 
Attempts to reduce the 'education gap' between leaders and members 
is certainly a step in the right direction. Much more remains to be done, 
however, in order that co-operatives may cater to the interests of the 
average - i.e. less privileged - farmer. Although the smallholder agricultural 
sector is supposed to receive priority attention, no specific measures are 
outlined in the Sessional Paper as to how regulatory and supportive services, 
such as the provision of credit arrangements, will be structured to guarantee 
that the genuine smallholder (I.e. not the trader- or teacher-cum-farmer, but 
the peasant) will benefit from these services. This is a most critical issue. 
The Co-operative Development Council which is now. proposed "as a consultative 
f.orum between the Government and the movement, whose objectives, in particular, 
will be to aavise the Minister and the movement on the strategies for co-
operative development, especially on fields where priorities should be placed" 
(10, p.23), could most appropriately concern itself as a first priority with 
making the co-operatives more relevant to the smallholders. It might also 
be observed here that the Integrated Agricultural Development Programme now 
being put into operation and involving the Ministry for"Co-operative Development 
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1s to have as one component the provision of credit and agricultural inputs 
to smallholders. The distribution of credit and services should be closely 
monitored to ensure that it Is Indeed the smallholder who is the beneficiary. 
Recognising that It Is not desirable for Government to simply 
impose plans on the movement, the Sessional Paper calls for fuller participation 
of the membership in the planning process. As just indicated, the 
Co-operative Development Council Is to serve the function of bringing 
representatives of the Government and the movement together to jointly work 
on planning and policy. The extent to which this body will be effective in 
achieving greater Integration of Government and membership remains to be 
seen. Certainly the problem of attaining effective membership participation, 
in other words of achieving a true co-operative, movement, is one that must 
be tackled on several fronts. In addition to opening educational opportunities 
for the rank and file, and aiming development efforts at poorer farmers in 
order to create a new solidarity amongst co-operative members based on common 
economic conditions and aspirations, other measures are necessary. 
Hyden has pointed out that the system of electing committee 
members could be modified in an effort to reduce the influence of solidarity 
groups in determining committee structure and the tendency of committee 
members to serve their own ' constituenciesr. As. a minimum step, committee 
size could be allowed to be variable, so that in any particular area all local 
solidarity groups are represented and the power struggle between them made 
less intense. O , p. 22 8) However, committees should not be allowed to 
become so large that they are unwieldy and Ineffective as decision-making 
bodies. 
Great care should be taken in regard to the centralisation of 
co-operative activities within the unions as well as. the amalgamation of 
smaller societies Into larger ones. The membership must be provided with 
more opportunities to decide on questions of consolidation. They must be 
given the chance to fully appreciate the disadvantages as well as the advantages 
which will accrue from participation in a larger unit. The larger the scale 
of organisation, the greater the chances for members to feel alienated. If 
participation in a large-scale organisation Is compulsory, this only aggravates 
the situation. A further point is that centralisation of services should only 
be Instituted in cases where there is assurance that the larger body has the 
administrative competence to perform its functions effectively. Especially 
in the case of the district unions, this competence has too often been lacking. 
There is also the matter of the attitude of Government personnel towards 
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co-operatives. The training of Co-operative Department staff should be geared 
to making them more aware of the alienating effects of extensive Government 
control, and why bureaucratic inflexibility Is counterproductive. 
The recent Sessional Paper proposes several measures relevant to 
the problems of "administrative overload" and high staff turnover. Further 
intensive education and training will be directed towards Department staff 
and the staff and leadership of the co-operatives. To improve the capacity 
of the Department's auditing section, staffing increases are planned. For 
both Department and co-operatives staff, the necessity of designing better 
terms of service, and making employment in the co-operative sector more 
attractive as a career, is recognised. One new development in the effort to 
deal with the "administrative overload" problem is a plan to establish a 
management pool which will supply expertise in cases where co-ops are suffering 
from management problems or where special personnel are required to help get 
new projects off the ground. There is still the danger of giving co-ops too 
great a burden of administrative detail, with the result that they get bogged 
down and are unable to adapt or readjust themselves to special or changing 
circumstances in their local environments. 
One aspect of management not dealt with directly in the Sessional 
Paper is the existence of conflict between the staff of co-operatives and 
management committee members discussed earlier. It has been suggested else-
where (4, pp.228-9) that management staff should be allowed to become committee 
members themselves. In this way, the technical considerations of management 
would be given more weight and the now common divergence of interest between 
committee members and executive s^aff would be lessened. 
With reference to the question of co-operatives and the marketing 
of agricultural products, the Sessional Paper Indicates there will be no 
fundamental change in Government policy. The marketing agencies will carry 
on as before and co-operatives will be encouraged to direct their activities 
towards "tne mobilization and education of the small-scale farmers, and 
assisting them in the production and collection of produce for-eventual delivery 
to the marketing agencies". (10, p.7) However, the possibility for wider 
representation of smallholder co-ops on the marketing boards is held open. 
"Continuous consultations" between the Ministries of Agriculture and Co-operatives 
are called for concerning the relationship between co-ops and marketing 
agencies, and the Co-operative Development Council will provide a forum for 
these consultations at the national level. This is an indication that the 
Government is at least concerned with the question of how fully the co-operatives 
should participate in marketing and hopefully a more thorough investigation 
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can be made of this important issue, so that appropriate policies can be 
formulated. 
As a final and general point. It should be noted that setting 
forth intentions in Sessional Papers Is one thing, and putting intentions 
into practice quite another. While Sessional. Paper No, 14- outlines some 
promising measures, In the last analysis judgement of their effectiveness 
has to be reserved until they are put in operation. 
PART II: CO-OPERATIVES IN THE SRDP 
CASE STUDY: CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN KAPENGURIA 
The budget allocation for co-operative development in the Kapenguria 
SRDP is as follows: 
YEAR DEVELOPMENT COSTS (K£) OVERHEAD COSTS (K£) 
72/73 - 1802 
73/74 2500 1180 
74/75 4000 838 
75/76 4500 920 
76/77 (No allocation. Estimates — 
not yet submitted) 
The 73/74 allocation was channelled through the Co-operative Production Credit 
Scheme (SRDP Project CO-OP 1; selected members of a dairy co-op were granted 
loans to purchase grade cattle. In the financial year 74/75, £1000 has been 
used for construction of a maize store (SRDP project CO-OP 2). The balance is 
to be used in conjunction with the Co-operative Production Credit Scheme 
(CPCS), this time for: (a) sheep, pyrethrum or English potato development, 
loaning a total of £2500 to members of a recently formed co-op In Lelan Location; 
and (b) sunflower development, with a loan of £500 to a co-op society in 
Mnagei Location. Except for £1500 earmarked for SRDP CO-OP 2 in 75/76, there 
are no firm plans, for the use of the 75./76 or 76/77 funds as yet, though several 
possibilities are being considered. These Include further loans to existing 
co-ops, starting a consumers® co-op shop in Makutano trading centre to be run 
by a women's organisation, and developing a livestock marketing co-op. The 
state of co-operative development in Kapenguria will now be discussed in more 
detail. 
The Teleu Dairy Co-operative 
CPCS: The 73/74 CPCS loan was given to a group of farmers belonging to 
the Teleu Farmers' Co-operative Society. The loan was innovative in several 
respects: (a) the requirement that a co-op has to be In existence for at least 
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three years to be eligible for credit was waived; (b) in the selection of 
loan recipients, primary emphasis was placed on farm management ability 
rather than on security offered; and (c) the credit was designed to be a 
revolving kind, so that as the first set of recipients pay back their loans, 
other society members will be able to borrow from the same pool of funds. 
According to the Assistant Co-operative Officer, Kapengurla, the objectives 
of the project are the following: (a) the education of farmers in the 
mechanics of credit arrangements and the benefits which accrue; (b) the improve-
ment of local welfare by increasing local incomes; and (c) promoting a process 
of self-generating improvement by initially providing a boost of external aid. 
When this first CPCS project was being planned, there were only two 
co-op societies within the Kapenguria area- One was the Pokot Farmers' Co-
operative Society (discussed below), which had been in existence for some 
years; the other was the newly formed Teleu group. Teleu first started its 
activities in September 1973, and received its registration certificate in 
January 1974. This group was reportedly chosen to receive the loan instead 
of Pokot F.C.S. because the latter society would have required loans of longer 
duration and was also suffering from a number of management and crop production 
problems. 
At the time that the loan was being arranged, the Teleu F.C.S. had 
52 members. Of the 25 or so members who made applications for credit (For 
some reason a number of people who were not members of the society also tried 
to apply), 14 were approved. Participants in the scheme were supposed to be 
chosen on the basis of: (a) farm management expertise, as determined by a study 
team who visited the farm of each applicant (composed of the SRDP Area 
Co-ordinator, the Assistant Co-operatives Offleer, the Animal Husbandry Officer, 
the Crops Officer and members of the Teleu society Including the Chairman and 
Treasurer); (b) the security offered (land and livestock); and (c) whether the 
applicant was a fully paid-up member of the Society (10/- entrance fee; 100/-
per share, minimum one share). Of the 14 loan recipients, 9 received loans of 
3000./-, and 5 loans of 4500/-. A loan of 3000/- covered the cost of two cows, 
with 400/- remaining for fencing, feed or milk cans; a loan of 4500/- bought 
three cows, with 600/- left over. A total of 34 cattle were purchased (One 
farmer elected to add another 900/- to his 600/- balance and purchase an 
additional animal.). 
Problems: Some problems were encountered as the project got underway, but these 
have now been settled. According to the original agreement, repayment was to 
commence immediately in the form of deductions from milk sales to the K.C.C. 
m Kitale (terms: 18 months, 7%). There were complaints that repayment 
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deductions initially agreed upon were too large to be taken out immediately 
because the new cows would take time to begin milk production (Most of the new 
stock were in-calf heifers.),. Also, there was a problem that all Society 
members were subjected to deductions, even though most were not participating 
in the scheme. A delegation composed of the Area Co-ordinator, Project 
Adviser and the Assistant Co-operatives Officer (ACQ) visited the Co-operative 
Bank and succeeded in working these problems out. A refund was negotiated and 
forwarded to those who had been subjected to wrongful deductionse and new 
terms were arranged (a one year grace period, and an 18-36 month repayment 
period), 
The success of the Teleu CPCS project depends to some extent on the 
provision of services through other SRDP projects. The SRDP roads improvement 
project has contributed by up-grading the Teleu area roads; in the past regular 
lorry runs to and from, the delivery depot in Kit ale were not possible. 
It was reported to members of the I,D.S, study team In late 1974 
that an artlcial insemination, service was tc be started in the Teleu area in 
the near future (Teleu was to be the first area In the District to receive 
A. I. service,) The. ACQ reported that members of the society were very 
interested in artificial insemination, and had contributed labour- and money 
for the construction of a building to be used for a cattle feed store, the 
society's headquarters, and an A,I, station. In checking back on the situation 
in October 1975 , it was learned, that the A,I, programme was not yet started, 
and that furthermore it had been decided that A.I. would be carried out on 
the basis of individual farm visits rather than, roadside crushes,. The bottle-
neck is apparently lack of a vehicle for the A,l.„ personnel, In the meantime, 
eight society members have said, their bulls In anticipation of A. I., and this 
has caused a decline In milk production, Some of those who sold their bulls 
are now thinking of buying new ones, 
Dip construction obviously has a part to play in the project as 
well, and there have also been problems here. The Teleu ar-ea Is served by 
three dips, all built with SRDP funds, As of the end of October 1975 , only 
one of these is operating properly. One of the dips has had a water supply 
problem, Another was constructed on land adjudicated for this purpose, but 
lying inside a private holding. This dip was first constructed in 1973 and 
used for a year, but now the owner of the surrounding land (who also happens 
to be a society member and a loan recipient) is refusing the public access to 
the dip. The dip supervisor for the District Is supposed to be looking into 
the situation. As SRDP funds were used to build the dip, either the farmer 
should reimburse SRDP or a road giving access to the site should be gazetted. 
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Over the last year, six of the grade animals purchased through 
loan arrangements have died due to East Coast Fever. This of course represents 
a loss of means for loan repayment. It is the view of the Project Adviser 
that cattle losses have been caused not only by lack of sufficient dips and 
understrength mixtures In existing dips, but by lack of proper management as 
well. This points to a problem with extension services. Farmers are not 
being made aware that dipping frequency should be determined by fluctuations 
in the tick population, rather than timetabled rigidly. 
At the close of October 1975, loan recipients had paid back four 
instalments, and there has been no problem so far in meeting the payments. 
However, milk production has not been as high as expected from the new stock 
for reasons already alluded to and also because of an outbreak of Foot and 
Mouth Disease in the area in February 1975, which temporarily stopped milk 
deliveries. 
Two members of the Teleu society attended a short course on dairying 
at the Kaimosi Farmers'Training Centre In October 1975, and are so far the 
only members of the group who have received any special training. Steps should 
be taken to broaden training opportunities so that a nucleus of farmers can 
be formed who can advise fellow co-operative members on proper farm management. 
The success of the scheme demands that the new stock be kept in the best 
possible condition, yielding maximum returns. Already some stock acquired 
through loans has been lost, and further attrition may impose severe handicaps 
on members of the Society. 
The Project Adviser arranged for the Society to receive two milk 
separators from the F.A.O. These were delivered about six months ago but so 
far have not been installed. 
Equity: According to the information available from the loan applications, 
the loan recipients tend to be younger farmers Cage range: 29-50; average: 38) 
with considerable land holdings (range: 20-80 acres; average: 42). In terms 
of ownership of grade or improved stock at the time of loan application, the 
recipients averaged almost 14 animals. Although It was not possible to 
obtain a great deal of additional background information on the recipients, 
it was 3.earned that about half of them have primary sources of income besides 
farming, e.g. as teachers or Government employees. More information would be 
needed on the loan applicants, the Teleu F.C.S. members, and Kapenguria area 
farmers in general, but the question is at least raised as to whether the 
credit is being provided to those who stand most in need of it - i.e. those 
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who primarily rely on farming for their incomes but have fewer assets in land 
and livestock, etc. 
Although the idea of giving relatively more weight to farm manage-
ment ability when considering CPCS loan applications may have been adopted 
with the intention of encouraging more equitable distribution of credit, it 
is doubtful whether such an objective can be ealised in this way. Farm 
management ability will obviously be greater amongst the more progressive 
farmers, and these by and large are not the ones who need assistance. It may 
be argued that for a grade cattle project, it is mandatory to require manage-
ment expertise lest the investment be wasted. The experience with dairy 
production in the Tetu SRDP, however, where provision for training was made 
as part of the credit scheme, indicates that other options might be available 
which do not favour the better-off farmer (See Chapter 9 of this Report.). 
The Muruny Co-operative 
The Muruny F.C.S. is a very recently organised Society in Lelan 
Location, having registered late In 197|4, It has a membership of over 200 
farmers who are primarily engaged in wool and pyrethrum production. Farmers 
in the Lelan area were formerly affiliated with the Pokot F.C.S. It appears 
that a strong motivation In forming the Muruny group was dissatisfaction with 
the Pokot F.C.S. The Lelan farmers were not happy with the amount deducted 
by the older Society for handling their wool and pyrethrum shipments, or with 
the services which the Pokot F.C.S. prov'ded. 
CPCS; In 74/75, a total of £2500 was to be made available to 
members of the Muruny society through the CPCS. The original intention was 
to provide loans for any of three types of production: wool, pyrethrum or 
English potatoes. The members seem to prefer to concentrate on sheep. By 
October 1975, a total of 247 Corrledale sheep had been purchased by 25 farmers 
24 farmers received 10 ewes each, one farmer received 4 ewes, and 3 rams were 
distributed to farmers In different sub-locations, CPCS funds amounting to 
about £1550 were used for this purpose. As In the case of Teleu, the credit 
will be revolving Decisions as +o who will receive loans are made by a loans 
committee within the Society.. It is not clear to what extent, if any, the new 
CPCS project is being co-ordinated with the Ministry of Agriculture's Small-
holders' Credit Scheme, or with a grade sheep development project which has 
been operating in the area since 1972. (See Chapter 9 of this Report.) 
Pyrethrum: Pyrethrum has been promoted in. Lelan for many years. Since the 
SRDP started, £800 has been set aside for pyrethrum development. To the knowl-
edge of the Project Adviser, there has been no official assessment of the 
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effectiveness of the effort. In 1973, a lorry-load of splits was ordered and 
sent to Lelan. There was insufficient prior consultation with the farmers 
who were supposed to receive the splits, and few had plots properly prepared. 
As an emergency measure, a pyrethrum plot was quickly made ready near 
Kabichbich Chief's Centre in order to salvage the shipment. A member of the 
I.D.S. study team visited this plot in December 1974-, and found that it was 
badly maintained and had not been properly planted In the first place. 
Currently the plot supplies some plants to local people, but a fee is charged. 
It is surprising that the plants should be sold rather than given away, as 
the original intention was to provide them free to farmers. Several farmers 
have now started their own small nurseries, growing pyrethrum from seed rather 
than waiting to receive splits. This development should be encouraged as much 
as possible, as it is a faster and more economical method for promoting the 
crop. More needs to be done to show Lelan farmers the advantages of pyrethrum 
growing, and to train them In proper cultivation practices. Such education 
and training could easily be carried out through the Society. 
Potatoes. Although English potato bulking has been carried out in the area by 
the Ministry of Agriculture (A total of £1050 has been spent on this since the 
start of the SRDP.), the Muruny Society so far has no role in the project. 
Currently, bulking is being carried out by the MOA on its own plot, using hired 
labour. All profit, if any, from the sale of seed potatoes is returned to the 
Ministry. This appears to be a good project for the co-op; members could carry 
out bulking on their own plots, and the co-op Itself could buy, store and sell 
the seed potatoes. There seems little reason why the MOA should carry out this 
project on its own when the Society could profit from it. 
Transport: Transportation to markets has been a chronic problem for farmers in 
the Lelan area. As part of the forthcoming Integrated Agricultural Programme , 
it has been suggested that a lorry be purchased for the use of all co-op 
societies in the District. This appears to be a good proposal, although the 
economics must be investigated further. One condition that ought to be made, 
should the lorry be purchased, is that it be under the sole control of the 
Co-operative Department, and not subject to commandeering for non—co-operative 
business by any other Government officers. Such "re-directing" of Government 
department vehicles has been something of a problem in the Kapenguria area, 
as elsewhere. 
The Pokot Farmers' Co-operative 
The Society is headquartered in Makutano trading centre, and has a 
membership of approximately 300 individuals. From what can be learned, the 
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society has suffered almost from the beginning from several of the problems, 
especially difficulties in management which have commonly been identified in 
primary societies elsewhere. Information on the background of Pokot F.C.S. 
was obtained from Government documents on file in Kapenguriaa. and through 
interviews with Government and Society personnel. The situation is a very 
confused one. Accounts of the Society's history given in records and inter-
views vary in detail and are incomplete. As far as we can determine, the 
course of events has been as follows. 
The Pokot F.C.S. was started in the early 1960s. For a time it 
functioned under two names: West Pokot Pyrethrum Growers and West Pokot Coffee 
Growers. This was a reflection of the fact that the Society served both 
pyrethrum farmers in Lelan and coffee growers in Mnagei. Both "branches" were 
under the same officers and management. In 1966 there was an official change 
of name to the Pokot F.C.S. At present, the Society handles sunflower in 
addition to coffee, and also supplies fertiliser, seed and other farm inputs 
(It is the local agent for Kenya Farmers Association.), Wool and pyrethrum 
from Lelan farmers are no longer marketed through Pokot F o 0• S • 2 3S the Lelan 
area now has its own society. 
Agricultural Finance Corporation Loan: After pyrethrum had been experimented with 
unsuccessfully in Mnagei Location, the "emphasis there shifted to coffee. In 
the financial year 63/64, the AFC granted a loan of 84,000/- to the Society. 
Of this amount, 44,000/- was used to buy coffee seedlings and establish a 
coffee nursery, and 40,000/- was used to build a coffee factory near Tartar. 
The society has re-paid part of this loan, although accounts differ as to how 
much.^ It is definitely known that problems arose with the coffee seedlings. 
Originally the coffee nursery was to produce enough seedlings to plant about 
600 acres of coffee, the 44,000/— loan to be repaid by sales of seedlings to 
farmers. But when the seedlings were ready to be transplanted, there was a 
period of drought and the equivalent of around 400 a res of plantings was 
destroyed. This severely hampered the Society's ability to repay. To compound 
the difficulties, in 1967 a change of policy resulted in planting restrictions, 
and infilling only was allowed. In 67/68 the Society received about 13,000/-
from the Coffee Board as compensation in view of the restrictions, and this 
money went for loan repayment. A case for writing off the remaining 31,000/-
6. According to the Society's Treasurer, about half of the total loan 
has been repaid. This is not clear from records available in Kapenguria. The 
Provincial Coffee Officer (interviewed in December 1974) had the Impression 
that the society has only been able to repay 25,000/-. 
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was made to the Treasury In 1968. According to correspondence from the 
Provincial Director of Agriculture (R.V.P.) xo the Assistant Commissioner 
for Co-operatives (R.V.P.) in December 1974, this application had not yet 
been approved. Various sources, Including the Pokot F.C.S. Treasurer and the 
SRDP Project Adviser, say they have heard that the.loan has been written off, 
but there is no evidence in the records available. The ACO himself is not 
sure of the situation. 
An additional and confusing point is that in 1970 the Assistant 
Minister for Agriculture visited the Kapenguria area, toured the coffee 
factory and some coffee shambas, interviewed Society officials and addressed 
a large baraza in Makutano. Reportedly, the Society was informed by this 
official that the loan would be waived, provided the Society would offer as 
much as it could at the time toward repayment. The Society provided 6,000/-
for the purpose. 
It can be seen that the whole AFC loan question is in urgent need 
of clarification and resolution. The Society has found itself in a difficult 
situation which is not entirely Its own fault, and there is a strong case for 
waiving the outstanding amount. 
_Society Management: The management of the Pokot F.C'.S. is exceedingly weak, 
with the possible exception of the Treasurer, who in the opinion of the ACO 
is the only person who keeps things going. The Chairman is not very active. 
He has himself neglected his coffee trees. Despite his poor to Indifferent 
leadership, the Chairman has held his position since the founding of the 
Society. The same is true of several other members of the management 
committee. It has been observed in other parts of the country that members 
withdraw from active participation in their society when It is faring badly 
or there is great dissatisfaction with It, and this pattern is very evident 
here. Meetings are rarely held and poorly attended. There have been complaints 
in the past of favouritism and misuse of privilege amongst the society's 
officials. It has been alleged that officials obtain credit or crop advances 
for themselves when such arrangements, are not available to the general member-
ship, for instance. Such allegations do not help to build members' trust 
and confidence in the Society. Also, for a very long period members could not 
be at all sure of the financial position of the Society since between 1964 
and 1972. the Society's books were not audited. 
The coffee factory has been mismanaged and badly maintained almost 
from the time it was built, judging from reports of various Inspection teams. 
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Until mid-1973, the Society had a Secretary/Manager who acted both as 
bookkeeper and factory manager, This person reportedly received some training 
through the Co-operative College and at Njoro, but he left his job soon after 
appointment complaining of the low salary and poor working conditions. His 
relationship with the Society officials was very poor, characterised by 
mutual ill-feeling and mistrust. Management of the factory reverted to the 
former assistant factory manager, and bookkeeping is now being carried out by 
an entirely new employee. Currently the factory is in an extreme state of 
disrepair and competent management is urgently required. The pulpers are worn 
out and need immediate attention, which even the present manager did not seem 
to realise when interviewed at the site. The tanks and drying tables are 
also in bad condition. The berries are not always fermented properly, sometimes 
being allowed to soak in the tanks up to 3 days, when 48 hours is the standard 
time. The consequence is that the coffee supplied by the members is down-
graded because of poor processing at the factory. Hiring of an untrained 
person to run the factory and neglect of upkeep is obviously false economy. 
Decline in Coffee Production: Over the years, coffee acreage in the Kapenguria 
area has dwindled substantially. For example, 131 farmers made deliveries 
for the 70/71 crop. This level of participation was low enough, but now only 
about 60 farmers are active as coffee producers. Moreover, a mere 30 are said 
to be tending their trees in a satisfactory manner. The evidence of neglect 
is not hard to find: one sees former coffee shamhas now returned to bush, or 
unpruned trees standing double-cropped with maize. 
There are several reasons why Society members have neglected their 
coffee. Undoubtedly the most important factor has been delays in payments for 
crop deliveries. One extension worker summed up the attitude of reluctant 
coffee growers by saying their response to him was: "If you want us to grow 
coffee, tell those who keep our money to come," 
The Pokot F.C.S. is a member of the Sirikwa Farmers' Co-operative 
Union, a multi-purpose Union in Eldoret. The society joined Sirikwa in 1968, 
and has not found Its membership at all advantageous. About 4000/- (or 4 per 
cent of annual turnover) Is paid to the Union each year for bookkeeping services 
which have been performed poorly and slowly. Unnecessary delays at the Union 
7. As a union member, the society is eligible to buy certain supplies 
at discount, but transport costs to Kapenguria offset this advantage. A few 
years back, the union supposedly promised to provide a bookkeeper for the 
society, hired at union expense. So far, nothing has come of this. 
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level are the main reason why coffee farmers receive their payments so late. 
Local feeling against the Union runs high; people see little point in 
belonging to it. 
Another reason for the delay in payments is that the Society does 
not produce enough coffee to make up a full consignment for auction. The 
annual shipments to the Kenya Plantersf Co-operative Union must wait to be 
augmented by other shipments of similar grade to form a whole consignment. 
When coffee was being introduced into the Kapenguria area, land 
adjudication had not yet commenced. Apparently the motive of many farmers in 
planting coffee was to buttress their claims of access to parcels of land. 
Some of these farmers had migrated to the area from elsewhere and may have 
felt their land tenure was especially insecure. Those who had planted coffee 
were later able to point to it as a token of land ownership. Having served 
this purpose, the coffee trees could then be neglected and the land turned 
to other uses. 
A final point concerning the neglect of coffee relates to the way 
it was promoted by some Government officials. Sometimes farmers who were not 
convinced of the advantages of coffee were persuaded to grow the crop. Their 
lack of commitment to coffee later became apparent in abandoned, double-cropped 
or badly maintained coffee fields. 
In summary, the decline in coffee production in Kapenguria is 
explained by the conjunction of a variety of factors. The strategy which has 
been used to promote production, the SRDP spraying demonstrations (against 
C.B.D.) coupled with visits by extension personnel to coffee farmers, in no 
wise meet the problem. Farmers in the area are not particularly interested 
in coffee growing, especially since they can get immediate cash returns for 
maize or sunflower. Even when farmers can have their trees sprayed free 
during the SRDP demonstrations, they are generally unwilling to take part 
because they will later be expected to keep the demonstration plot properly 
maintained by weeding, etc. Labour expended on coffee is not seen as worthwhile, 
under the circumstances. 
Although there is a potential for coffee production and profitability 
in the Kapenguria area (See Chapter Six of this Report on crop production 
in Kapenguria.), it will have to be made more attractive to local 
farmers in several ways. Improvements In management and equipment at 
the factory and the expediting of payments to producers are needed at once; 
delay in payment should be further alleviated as production rises. Renewed 
interest in coffee growing needs to be stimulated amongst the society's members 
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through training courses in proper husbandry and in society and factory 
management to ensure maximum returns. The Society is in need of new and more 
responsible leadership and this can best be brought about by increasing the 
members' participation through such training. The Society itself should be 
encouraged to assume more responsibility for increasing production. Means 
could be provided for the Society to operate a properly equipped spray team 
8 
service as needed. A special team composed of trained Society members and 
Government extension personnel could also be organised to inspect coffee 
shambas and advise farmers. Similar measures have been employed successfully 
elsewhere, and have been noted as factors explaining member satisfaction in 
their societies. Another option that could be explored is the formation of 
Agricultural Village Committees, using the model tried in the Migori SRDP 
area which has shown great promise. 
The Maize Store: In July 1975, a small store (20 x 40 feet) was completed in 
Makutano for the use of the Pokot F.C.S., at a cost of £750. The money 
represented a grant from SRDP funds to the Society. A sum of £1000 was 
originally allocated for this project, but £250 was used to complete staff 
houses for the Co-operative Department in Kapenguria. The intention is to use 
the new building to house the Society's office and to store farm supplies as 
well as maize. 
Private traders operating in the area have long followed the 
practice of passing transportation charges (to and from the Maize and Produce 
Board depot in Kitale) on to the producer and consumer. This is so even though 
it is the policy of the Maize and Produce Board to give a special allowance 
to traders operating from a distance. The early plan for the maize store project 
was to eliminate transport costs, thereby reducing the exploitation of'the 
producers by middlemen. As originally envisioned by the Project Adviser, the 
project was to be carried out on a far larger scale. The proposal was for a 
store big enough to accommodate the off-season maize needs (for 3 months) for 
West Pokot and Turkana Districts, at a cost of £25,000. The Pokot F.C.S. was 
to have functioned as the local agent of the Maize and Produce Board. However, 
the Board did not concur with the plans, claiming that the Kitale depot was 
adequate to serve the entire area. In view of the Board's reluctance, the 
Co-operative Department decided that a small store could be built instead, and 
that the Society could at least gain some experience by running this. Apparently, 
8. As noted in Chapter Six of this report, the promotion of good 
husbandry is more important than spraying campaigns. 
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other options were not considered. Assuming the donor country is willing 
to allocate sufficient money^bolder and more imaginative projects ought at 
least to be explored. If the Maize and Produce Board does not want another 
store in Kapenguria, the money could, for example, be used to purchase a lorry 
to supply a network of smaller stores in outlying areas. 
Although the scale of the project has been drastically reduced, 
the Society is still in a strong position to function as a local buyer and 
seller of maize and other produce. With the new storage space, it can compete 
much more effectively with private traders. A further grant of £1500 is 
available for 75/75 for the same project. This money will probably be used 
to construct another small store and branch office of the society in Cheperaria. 
Alternatively, it may be used to enlarge the present store in Makutano. 
Sunflower Development: £500 has been budgetted for 75/76 for the participation 
of Pokot F.C.S. in the CPCS. The Assistant Co-operatives Officer has proposed 
to use this money for a project in sunflower marketing. Capital would be 
provided to the Society so that it could buy harvests on a cash-on-delivery 
basis. Again there is interest in discouraging Society members and other 
local people from selling to private traders. The latter have the advantage 
over the Society since they can buy for cash-on-delivery even though they offer 
lower prices. The Society would in all likelih©5d benefit from the project. 
However, there may be some question as to whether the CPCS can be used for 
the purpose envisioned, as the scheme is ordinarily used to provide credit for 
agricultural inputs and not for trade loans. Moreover, until the earlier 
A.F.C. loan is straightened out, it may be difficult for the Society to receive 
further credit. A final point is that the possibility of using CPCS funds 
for coffee production development ought to be explored. As discussed above, 
the Society faces critical problems In regard to coffee production and these 
should be rectified as a matter of priority. 
Kiletat Women's Organisation 
Planning for organising a consumers' co-op shop at Makutano in 
conjunction with the District-wide Kiletat Women's Organisation is supposed 
to be underway. This project has long been discussed, but does not appear 
to be getting off the ground. Decisions need to be made as to what the 
feasibility of the project is, what the shop is going to handle and what the 
exact role of the Co-operative Department ought to be. There is a strong 
possibility of using the 76/77 funds for this project, but a proposal and 
estimate must be submitted soon. 
\ "j We t IDS/OP 12 
A seminar on consumer co-ops is planned for the near future at the 
Co-operative College, and West Pokot District has been allocated three places. 
Strong encouragement should be given to Kiletat women to send representatives, 
and an attempt ought to be made to provide a travel allowance to the represent-
atives by the Kapenguria Co-operatives and Social Services office. 
Co-operative Education and Staff Training 
Educational opportunities for management committee members, society 
staff and regular members have not been fully exploited by the movement in 
West Pokot. Only two society officials in the area have attended courses at 
the Co-operative College, in 1969, the Chairman and Treasurer of the Pokot 
F.C.S. went for a one-week session. As previously mentioned, Teleu F.C.S. 
recently sent two representatives to a short dairy course at Kaimosi F.T.C. 
Although the present Area Coordinator has conscientiously informed local 
societies about courses for society officials and staff, the response generally 
seems poor. The problem has been lack of funds, as the societies are expected 
to meet expenses of travel and course fees. 
At the local level, educational activities aimed at committee 
members and general membership have taken the form of "Committee Members' Days" 
and "Members' Days" when the Co-operative Education Team (Rift Valley North) 
conduct one-day training sessions for management committee and society members. 
The Assistant Co-operatives Officer reports that Committee Members' Days have 
been well attended in all three societies, but for the Members' Days, only 
Muruny and Teleu have shown good response. Not surprisingly, the response of 
Pokot F.C.S. members has been very poor. The few attempts at holding Members' 
Days for this Society have been failures, another symptom of member apathy in 
this Society. 
No SRDP funds have been used for training society staff. Staff 
training in the area has mostly consisted of general supervision of society 
bookkeepers by the Assistant Co-operatives Officer. The present Secretary/ 
Manager of the Pokot F.C.S. has received some formal training through corres-
pondence courses ("Elementary Bookkeeping" and "Basic Co-operative Knowledge") 
offered by the Co-operative College, but he failed the exam given at the end 
of these courses. Bookkeepers of the other societies have had no training 
whatever. At Teleu, the bookkeeper is a society member who has volunteered 
his services. At Muruny, the bookkeeper was hired just recently, replacing 
the earlier one who left because of the low salary offered (150/- per month). 
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COMMENT: PROPOSED CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN VIHIGA/HAMISI 
The Ministry of Cooperative Development does not have any projects 
in the Vihiga/Hamisi area which are specifically associated with SRDP. However, 
the Cooperatives Assistant stationed in Vihiga is interested in creating a 
large-scale cooperative through which the women's groups in the area would 
be able to market garden and other farm produce as well as handicraft items. 
The proposed cooperative is known as MANYATIBU (an acronym of the six locations 
in the Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP: North and South Maragoli, Nyang'ori, Tiriki, and 
East and West Bunyore). The basic idea is to bring together producers 
(women's groups) and buyers (local institutions for produce, tourist shops for 
handicrafts) by organising production and collection on the one hand and supply 
tenders on the other. 
Women's groups in the Vihiga/Hamisi area, as elsewhere, have major 
marketing problems. The vegetable market is primarily a seasonal one, and it 
is either saturated or undersupplied, The local market for some of the handi-
crafts produced is quite limited and other items are oversupplied, since the 
groups are competing with one another and with private producers in general. 
Some effort to coordinate the commercial activities of women's groups and to 
provide better marketing channels (particularly for handicraft items, channels 
reaching outside of the District to tourist centres) would be welcome. 
However, the MANYATIBU proposal as it now stands is not at all promising, and 
while commending the local Co-operatives Officer for his initiative, we would 
recommend that either major revisions be made or the whole idea be dropped as 
impractical. 
The organisational effort for MANYATIBU started in November 1973, 
and the work to date has consisted of trying to attract sufficient numbers of 
women to make registration of the cooperative possible. The membership drive 
has been exceedingly slow. The Cooperatives Assistant feels this is due to 
transport problems: he has no regular transport for getting around to the 
groups to discuss the proposal. It is also likely that local women are not 
yet convinced of the value of the Cooperative, although the Cooperatives 
Assistant reports that there is enthusiasm for the idea, and we spoke with 
several group leaders and members who seemed to favour it. Furthermore, there 
are reports that some of those who have already paid to join the Co-operative 
(some long ago) are becoming concerned about the fate of their money since 
nothing has been forthcoming in return. In order to join the MANYATIBU organisa-
tion, a person must pay 20/- for one share plus 2/- as a membership fee. When 
the Cooperatives Assistant was interviewed in March 1975, he reported that a 
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total of 54- women had joined MANYATIBU- At the. same time, he expressed a 
belief that a membership of between 700 and 800 is required in order to make 
the organisation viable, Thus, in terms of the target membership, the effort 
to date is certainly not encouraging. 
Although the Cooperatives Assistant feels that there are very goods 
prospects for MANYATIBU to supply local institutions with regular shipments 
of vegetables, and claims that he has made inquiries and has determined that 
a strong local institutional market exists, his confidence is not shared by 
others who are acquainted with the situation. The Vihiga/Hamisi Project 
Adviser, as well as an official of Partnership for Productivity (both 
interviewed in March 1975), are both very pessimistic about the prospects for 
MANYATIBU in its present form Their pessimism seems well founded. 
Studies of produce marketing potential in the Vihiga/Hamisi area 
have been conducted, although the authors of the MANYATIBU proposal seem to 
have paid little attention to their findings. A USAID marketing specialist, 
M. Hanrahan, studied the area and submitted a report in December 1972. He 
concluded that any large-scale produce project would require substantial market 
development in order to be successful, and that Vihiga/Hamisi is generally not 
a hortlculturally deficient area, although there Is a shortage of a few crops 
and a problem of seasonal availability. According to the Vihiga/Hamisi Project 
Adviser (personal communication; March 1975) Hanrahan Invited experts from 
the Horticultural and Crop Development Authority to review the situation, and 
these people also concluded that large-scale production of vegetables was not 
feasible at the present time. In the Project Adviser's view also, the contracts 
for the supply of individual local institutions are largely taken up. The 
recent USAID Sponsored Evaluation of the Vihiga SRDP - Kenya (October-November 
1974) recommends that the vegetable sub-project be dropped from the Programme. 
It is noted that there is a potential for irrigated vegetable farming in the 
area: dry-season water' sources exist and dry-season vegetable production could 
deal with the current seasonal availability problem- As the report states, 
however, little has been done to exploit this potential. 
The Project Adviser reports that when the MANYATIBU Idea was first 
considered, a much smaller—scale organisation was urged by several of the 
parties who were involved in the discussion. At least one group of local 
farmers in the Vihiga area has shown that small-scale vegetable growing and 
marketing can be a successful enterprise. This group, organised and operating 
with the assistance of Partnership for Productivity (PfP) personnel, Is now 
supplying a major hotel in Kisumu with all of Its fresh vegetable needs. 
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Th.e logistics involved in organising a collection and marketing 
system on the scale envisioned in the MANYATIBU proposal seem impossible to 
realise. A lorry (or lorries) must be obtained, tenders secured, production 
to meet a consistent (not just seasonal) demand - which would involve 
the development of irrigation facilities. - and all of this on a scale that 
would assure participating groups of a meaningful return for their labour. 
The proposal as formulated is far too ambitious and it does not seem likely 
that it will actually be carried out. It would seem ill-advised to continue 
with the organisational effort in its present form. 
It may be possible to develop a far more modest project which would 
entail the organisation of a few of the stronger women's groups in each 
location into a vegetable production group. It does not require a great 
labour force or extensive amounts of land to produce substantial quantities 
of vegetables, as the experience of the existing vegetable group shows. Most 
important of all, there is simply no market to absorb prodigious quantities 
of vegetables at this time. The needs, of any local institutions could be adequately 
catered to by a far smaller group of producers than Is contemplated in the 
MANYATIBU proposal. A limited institutional market could perhaps be developed 
in the Kakamega area: the Rehabilitation Centre, the Kakamega Prison, an 
approved school and the hospital are reportedly being supplied, not always 
reliably, by Nairobi sources. However, any serious vegetable production 
project would still have to deal with the dry-season irrigation problem. 
In the area of handicraft marketing, planning should be carried out 
on a far more modest scale as well, at least for the time being. The prospects 
for handicrafts ever providing a major source of income for women's groups in 
Vihiga/Hamisi are not very good. It would be best to use the available 
marketing channels at present, fully exhausting this potential before 
embarking upon some more ambitious approach.. Local women's groups already 
market through PfP's Upcountry Crafts Shop In Kakamega, and the National 
Christian Council of Kenya's outlet in Nairobi. There is a new PfP-sponsored 
shop in the Majengo trading centre, and an effort should be made to inform 
women's groups of the existence of this new outlet. 
COMMENT: FISHERIES CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN MIGORI./KIHANCHA 
In the financial year 73/74, £1500 in SRDP funds was allocated for 
co-operative development activities in Migori/Kihancha. Of this total, £750 
was channelled through the Co-operative Production Credit Scheme (CPCS) to 
aid the Mohuru Fishermen's Co-operative Society (Mohuru Bay, Macalder Division) 
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in developing production capability. The Co-operative Bank provided an 
additional £250 so that the total CPCS loan to the Society was £1000. This 
money was mainly used for the purchase of fishnets. 
The CPCS project is one component of an overall strategy to increase 
production, reorganise marketing and eventually raise Incomes for the Mohuru 
area fishermen. The plan is to have the Society buy and bulk the catches of 
both members and non-members at either of the two fish bandas recently 
constructed with the aid of the Fisheries Department on nearby landing 
beaches. From the bandas, the catch will be shipped to inland markets such 
as Kisii. Alternatively, the catch can be put in cold storage (One of the 
bandas has such facilities.) to await better prices before shipment. Smoking 
facilities will allow fish to be smoked when catches are particularly heavy. 
In general the marketing effort will concentrate on fresh fish, as the price 
is much better. Distribution to markets inland Is to be done by the Society's 
own van. In the past, private traders have dominated the marketing of fish, 
buying low at Mohuru and selling high after transporting the fish elsewhere. 
The reorganisation of marketing through the Co-operative Society will enable 
the producers to obtain a better price for their catches. 
When members of the Mohuru Society's management committee and 
other Society members were interviewed In December 1974, they impressed members 
of the I.D.S. study team with their high level of commitment and enthusiasm 
for the co-operative. The Society is only a few years old, and has about 170 
members, who represent roughly a quarter of the total number of fishermen in 
the Mohuru area. Qualifications for membership are ownership of nets, payment 
of the entrance fee (shs,5/-) and purchase of one share in the Society 
(shs,20./-). According to the local Fisheries Officer, the Assistant Co-operativei; 
Officer and Society members, the local people were reluctant to join the 
Society at first, but now interest is increasing sharply. Members feel that 
the Society has brought them the following advantages:-
- It has opened employment opportunities for local people. The 
Society now provides employment for eighteen people, who would 
otherwise be looking for work in places such as Kisumu or 
Nairobi. 
- Now that fishermen are marketing their catches themselves, they 
find their incomes have increased, which makes it easier for them 
to pay school fees for their children and to buy produce from 
places such as Migori to supplement the poor and limited crops 
in Mohuru, 
9. See Chapter Two of this Report for discussion of other projects 
related to co-operative development in Migori/Kihancha. 
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- The co-cp has helped to bring local people together to exchange 
ideas 5 such as ways to improve business, and to benefit from 
collective action, such as getting better prices for nets, 
The Society's headquarters was built on a harambee basis, with 
mabati roofing and timber provided by the Provincial Commissioner In addition 
to serving as an office, the building is. used to store nets and repair 
materials for purchase by both members and non-members. The Society receives 
a discount on these Items when buying in bulk from Kisumu Fish Net Industries. 
Problems 
The strategy devised to develop fishing co-operative in the Mohuru 
area appears a promising one, not least of all because of the high level of 
commitment shown by the local people. An element of experimentation Is involved 
tlte attempt t© give the co-operative a role in the distribution and 
sale of fish catches. However, a s.erious obstacle has been encountered which 
threatens the success of the project. The Department of Fisheries originally 
donated an old Chevrolet van to the Society for use In determining the 
feasibility of Inland distribution. The van operated for eight months or so 
quite successfully, even though there were a number of mechanical difficulties. 
Then a fire in the engine, compartment put it completely out of commission. 
Because the trial operation was a success, the Society was promised the use 
of a new van by the Provincial Fisheries. Officer (Nyanza) and by the Assistant 
Director of Fisheries in a meeting at Mohuru in November 1974, As of May 1975, 
the van had not been delivered.. ("Personal communication with the Assistant 
Co-operatives Officer - Migori/Kihancha). It was reported to be still in 
Nairobi undergoing necessary modifications, When interviewed in December 
1974, the Society's Secretary/Manager said that profits had been halved due 
to lack, of a van. It Is obvious that the ability of the Society to meet its 
l.oan repayments easily and In good time is seriously affected by this state 
of affairs „ Without the van , the Society must rely on. the local bus service 
for shipments, and this means, a -slower and more limited distribution of the 
catch. 
Another problem which was noted by the study team in December 1974 
was that the fish banda which was supposed to be outfitted for cold storage 
lacked the necessary insulated door and ceiling,, It was therefore impossible 
to store fresh, fish- Even when complete, this facility cannot operate without 
the support of the van, as ice must, be transported into the area. It Is planned 
that the. van will bring ice to the store when making return trips, 
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COMMENT: CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH. KWALE 
There are four major co-operative development projects In the 
South Kwale SRDP. The first Is aimed at reorganising the existing Kwale 
Farmers' Co-operative Society for the purpose of efficiently transporting and 
selling sugar cane to the Ramisi Sugar Factory. The second project has the 
objective of establishing a co-operative society in Kikoneni Location to 
purchase and market various kinds of farm produce as well as to secure and 
administer farm loans. The third"project is to set up a fishermen's co-
operative at Msambweni for buying and marketing fish. The fourth co-operative 
development project is aimed at training members in management principles and 
practices of co-operative enterprise. Although it is listed as an SRDP project, 
this co-operative training does not receive any SRDP funds and is incorporated 
into the District co-operative education programmes. 
There are about 366 members of the Kwale Farmers' Co-operative 
Society, but very little sugar has been marketed. The purchase and marketing 
of sugar depends on the Ministry of Agriculture's sugar outgrowers project 
which has not been successful. (See Chapter Four of this Report.) The co-
operative is therefore mainly involved in developing marketing for cashew nuts, 
simsim and copra. The visible result of the SRDP effort has been to enable 
the co-operative to secure a £2500 loan through the Co-operative Bank to 
purchase a lorry. The District Co-operativas Officer was apparently not 
consulted or otherwise involved in the design and implementation of this project. 
During the 1973/74 financial year, the Kikoneni Produce Buying 
Co-operative obtained a loan of £2500' through the Co-operative Bank which was 
used as purchasing capital for deliveries of cashew nuts, simsim, bixa, maize 
and chillies from local producers. These purchases were aimed at improving 
local marketing services as well as earning the traders commission for the 
benefit of the 393 co-operative society members. The Society acts as local 
agent for the Maize and Produce Board and all produce is delivered to the 
Board's depot. This project has been successful as an experiment in ways to 
improve a co-operative's marketing activity. The Society had no difficulty 
in repaying the loan and in fact made a profit. A further loan of £3000 has 
been issued to the Society for 1974/75. 
The fishermen's co-operative was registered in July 1974 and was 
still in its infancy at the time of the I.D.S. study team's visit in December 
1974. The project shows promise but is threatened in two ways. Society 
members are renting fishing boats from commercial fishermen with whom they have 
to compete. Furthermore, the local hotel industry provides the largest single 
market for fish in the area, but there are indications that private traders 
are lobbying the hoteliers not to buy fish from the co-operative. 
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PART III: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
GENERAL 
1. Fundamental factors In the local environment In which co-ops operate 
often undermine effective co-operative organisation. The standard stock 
of administrative-technical measures applied up to now will be of limited 
utility unless means of coping with these influences can be found. 
Factionalism amongst local interest groups and the dominance of the 
elite tend to impede loyalty to co-operative organisations and to subvert 
their goals. 
2. Fuller participation of rank-and-file membership in the movement is a 
prime desideratum. But this requires that ordinary members should think 
of co-operatives as their organisations, which means that the co-operatives 
must bear more material and ideological relevance to their lives. 
3. Sessional Paper No. 14 calls for more educational opportunities to be 
directed towards the general membership In order to promote greater 
involvement. This policy should be vigorously pursued, and other steps 
should be taken as well. 
4. The proposed Co-operative Development Council should concern itself as 
a matter of priority with making co-operatives more relevant institutions 
for genuine smallholders. In the design, implementation and monitoring 
of credit programmes or other development activities, benefit for the 
less privileged must be the guiding principle. 
5. As one means of reducing competition between local solidarity groups for 
representation on society and union management committees, the size of 
the committees could be adjusted to ensure that all 'constituencies' 
in any locale are represented. This kind of flexibility In organisational 
structure should be encouraged in general, for the imposition of strict 
bureaucratic rules and procedures can hamper the ability of co-operatives 
to develop themselves in terms of circumstances peculiar to their local 
environments. 
6. The policies of centralisation of co-operative society functions into 
the district unions and amalgamation of smaller into larger societies 
should be implemented with caution. Such consolidation has not always 
yielded advantages even from a business point of view, and the risk of 
fostering alienation amongst members is high. Individual societies 
should be allowed a full voice in deciding questions of consolidation, 
and should not be pressured into joining larger units. 
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7. In the training of Co-operatives Department staff, especially those working 
at field level, attention ought to be paid to the subject of relations 
between the movement and the Government bureaucracy. Training should 
stress the costs associated with extensive Government control and 
supervision of the movement, particularly as regards member involvement. 
Staff should be made more aware of how their own behaviour as officials 
towards the co-operative members can be counterproductive if they adopt 
a hard bureaucratic posture. 
8. Serious consideration should be given to the Idea of allowing the 
executive staff of societies and unions to join the management committees. 
This would be an important step in reducing the conflict between the 
staff and leadership of the movement. 
9- Sessional Paper No. 14 promises measures to deal with personnel and 
management problems within the Co-operatives Department and in the 
co-operatives themselves, such as insufficient staffglack of qualified 
staff and poor terms of service. Attention to the question of the 
co-operatives' role in marketing is also promised. It remains to be seen 
when and how effectively intended measures In these critical areas are 
implemented. 
10. As a component of the SRDP, the co-operative programme has been 
disappointing in several respects. Projects have lacked a strong 
experimental element (e.g. Kapenguria), there have been cases of poor 
planning (e.g. Kwale and Vihiga/Hamisi, though in the latter case the 
association between co-ops and the SRDP is only proposed, not actual), 
and poor co-ordination between the Co-operatives Depajjtment and other 
Government agencies (e.g. with the Ministry of Agriculture in Kwale and 
Kapenguria and the Department of Fisheries in MIgori/Klhancha). Those 
co-operative development efforts in SRDP areas which were evaluated by 
tne study team have not yet demonstrated viable solutions to chronic 
problems in co-op development. So far, In spite of SRDP activities, the 
potential role of co-operatives in- rural development is an open question. 
KAPENGURIA 
1 Co-operative development activities within the Kapenguria SRDP for the 
most part lack a conscious experimental framework. Little has been done to 
test innovative strategies. This is unfortunate, as the area presents problems 
in co-operative development which exist widely in other parts of the country. 
For example, testing new measures designed to promote increases xn 
production, utilisation of local resources-, benefits for the poorer farmers 
and member involvement would have great relevance for other areas. The Pokot 
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F.C.S. in particular provides a good testing ground for strategies to 
revitalise near-dormant societies. 
2. It is possible to view the maize store and the proposed sunflower develop-
ment projects as potentially experimental. Both projects aim to put the 
Pokot F.C.S. in a better position to compete with private traders. Yet these 
projects lack a rigorous definition of the existing problem and the steps 
proposed for dealing with it, and careful monitoring and evaluation. 
3. The Co-operative Production Credit Scheme (CPCS) projects in Kapenguria 
are still young and cannot be evaluated conclusively. However, several points 
should be noted. 
In general, care should be taken In ongoing and future CPCS activity 
that a fair distribution of benefits be achieved. The scheme should not 
neglect those with fewer opportunities for income-generation and^employment. 
Arranging CPCS credit on a revolving basis appears worthwhile. 
Development funds are kept circulating locally, and this may incidentally 
encourage conscientious repayment since a certain amount of social pressure 
can be brought to bear on current recipients to keep the loan system alive. 
This idea may warrant consideration for replication elsewhere, depending on how 
it fares in Kapenguria. 
4. CPCS - Teleu 
If still more CPCS funds are being considered for the Teleu Co-
operative in the future, a determination of the Incomes and land holdings of 
Society members as compared with those of the community as a whole should be 
made first. It is possible that poorer farmers are not being included in the 
Co-operative. 
The Teleu CPCS project is being undermined due to short-comings in 
the supporting services. This indicates a lack of integrated effort among 
Government departments. Measures need to be taken to correct the situation 
- Teleu area cattle dips are not functioning properly. 
- The establishment of an artificial insemination service is long 
overdue and this should be started Immediately. 
- The quality of extension service to dairy farmers could be 
improved. Farmers do not fully appreciate the measures necessary 
for effective disease control. 
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The Teleu Society should develop a nucleus of trained members who 
can advise fellow members on dairy cattle husbandry, making the Society 
itself more involved in promoting proper management. 
5. Muruny CPCS 
The Muruny CPCS project must be carefully integrated with the older 
Ministry of Agriculture smallholder scheme for sheep development. The 
allocation of grade sheep throughout the Lelan area should be monitored closely 
to assure equitable and optimal distribution. 
The possibility of using the CPCS to help revitalise coffee 
production ought to be investigated. 
Further encouragement to pyrethrum farmers in developing plant 
stock from seed is desirable. Training of Muruny Society members in pyrethrum 
production should be emphasised. 
The Muruny Society might be encouraged to take over the English 
Potato bulking work of the Ministry of Agriculture. The development of 
English Potato production as another Society enterprise should be an objective. 
6. The eventual purchase of a lorry for collective use by West Pokot District 
societies warrants serious consideration. If a lorry becomes available, steps 
should be taken to ensure its exclusive use for co-operative business. No 
'commandeering' by Government officers ought to be allowed. 
7. The Pokot F.C.S. has had serious difficulties, mostly related to the sad 
state of coffee production in the Mnagei area. The maize store and sunflower 
projects will probably help the.Society considerably, but attention to the 
coffee question is urgently required. SRDP resources have not really been 
used effectively to encourage coffee production, and Government officers' 
efforts to promote coffee have not been particularly successful up to now. 
The current state of the 1963/64 A.F.C. loan needs immediate 
clarification. The case for waiving any outstanding amount is strong. 
The coffee factory at Tartar needs immediate renovation. The 
processing equipment should be repaired and subsequently maintained properly. 
A competent factory manager is an absolute necessity, and should 
be given a reasonable salary. The present manager has had no training. He 
should either be trained or replaced. 
The Pokot F.C.S. should drop out of the Sirikwa Union. It derives 
no benefits from membership, and in fact suffers because of delays in book-
keeping services provided by the Union. The 4,000/- spent annually on union 
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membership could just as well go to paying a competent Secretary/Manager to 
keep the books. The suggestion that the Society drop out of the Union runs 
against general Co-operative Department policy, but such an action is warranted 
in this case. A new Union could eventually be formed in West Pokot if necessary, 
once the co-operative movement in the area matures. 
Member apathy in the Pokot F.C.S. is very high. This may partly 
be attributed to weak leadership, and partly to lack of benefits in membership 
for reasons beyond the leaders' control. One way to encourage better member 
participation in Society affairs is through intensified efforts to promote 
coffee production, focussing on training the members in coffee husbandry and 
pointing out to them the importance of the efficient operation of their society. 
A new and/or more responsible leadership would emerge if the members became 
actively involved in the coffee business and Society affairs. 
Extension and training activities should not be wasted on those 
who have lost interest in coffee growing or were never really interested in 
the first place. If they continue to prove unresponsive, efforts should be 
concentrated on more recent growers who show more enthusiasm. Interest 
should increase once coffee growing reaches Its potential as a profitable 
activity. 
The Society itself should be encouraged, by the provision of advice 
and the means to implement it, to take more responsibility in promoting and 
disciplining coffee development activities. For example, the Society could 
organise teams to inspect coffee shambas and advise growers. (See point no. 
9 below.) 
8. Plans for a consumers' co-op shop at Makutano, to be operated by the 
District-wide Kiletat Women's Organisation, require early investigation by the 
Assistant Co-operatives O f f i n conjunction with the Assistant Community 
Development Officer in Kopen^urva Decisions need to be made as to the feasibi-
lity of the shop, what goods it might handle and how the Co-operatives 
Department can play a role. Firm plans and estimates need to be drawn up and 
a phasing for action worked out, 
9. SRDP funds could be used for training co-operative society staff, officials 
and members. Educational opportunities are not lacking. Many training 
sessions, seminars and correspondence courses are given through local Farmers' 
Training Centres and the Co-operative College. Using SRDP funds for this 
purpose could be justified under the SRDP principles of experimentation and 
development of existing resources, providing appropriate plans were devised. 
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- The possibility of establishing an education fund for each 
society, first with the help of SRDP finance and later maintained 
by the societies themselves, ought to be considered. The 
education fund would be used to meet travel expenses and 
entrance fees for training events. 
- The idea of society members organising themselves to take on 
extension duties has been mentioned in connection with both Teleu 
and Pokot co-operative societies. Teams of trained members could 
be organised. Alternatively, the Agricultural Village Committees 
method tried in Migori SRDP, or a variation of it, could be tested 
in West Pokot. In any case, use of SRDP funds for any 
necessary training would be justified. 
VIHIGA/HAMISI 
1. The progress of MANYATIBU to date has been most discouraging. The member-
ship drive has a very ambitious target, but there has been a marked lack 
of interest amongst local women. There Is apparently some concern on the 
part of those who have already committed funds to the project as to what 
will happen to their money. 
2. Those who have studied the feasibility of large-scale vegetable production 
projects in the Vihiga/Hamisi area see the prospects as very poor. A 
potential for dry-season vegetable growing has been identified, and some 
possibility exists for successful small-scale growing and marketing by 
smaller groups of producers. 
3. 'We would recommend that the MANYATIBU proposal as now formulated be dropped. 
A radically revised version of the proposal might be possible, involving 
the organisation of a few of the women's groups in each location rather 
than the comprehensive organisation now planned. 
4. Any attempt at large-scale marketing of handicraft Items does not seem 
advisable at this time. It would be better to work at a more modest level, 
fully utilising the existing markets and monitoring the results before 
attempting anything more ambitious. 
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MIGORI/KIHANCHA 
The strategy which has been devised for the promotion of production and 
marketing reorganisation in connection with the Mohuru Fishermen's 
Co-operative seems advisable and appropriate to the SRDP. However, its 
success depends upon the provision of two crucial inputs;- The new fish 
van should be secured -its delivery to the Society is long overdue. Also, 
the insulation of the fish storage facility at Mohuru Bay should be 
completed. 
SOUTH KWALE 
1 Co-operatives projects must be integrated with relevant agriculture projects 
to ensure success. This would avoid such fruitless efforts as the organis-
ation of a co-operative to market sugar which Is never produced. 
2. Experimentation in improving co-operative marketing in Kikoneni has been 
extremely successful and the project strongly warrants consideration for 
replication elsewhere. 
3. Positive Government policy is needed to protect new co-operative societies 
from heavy competition from private traders, who in the Kwale area may be 
using unethical methods to protect their interests. 
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SRDP AS AN EXPERIMENT IN DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the way in which the Special Rural Development 
Programme has been administered is discussed. Administration has frequently-
been cited as one of the shortcomings-of development policy in Kenya.1 This 
shortcoming is by no means peculiar to Kenya. It is now generally recognised 
that developing countries must respond to underdevelopment with administrative 
structures which are responsive and oriented to change. In other words, 
development administration is more than the sheer exercise of administering 
development projects: it must contain features which ®ak@ it developmental in 
its orientation. It is therefore commendable that an attempt has been made, 
as part of SRDP, to devise a system of administration that is itself experimental, 
with the intention of replicating it elsewhere in the country if it is judged 
successful-
Within the Ministry of Finance and Planning, certain officers have 
been designated to oversee the Special Rural Development Programme. From 1968 
until 1973, most of this responsibility fell to a British officer, but since 
his departure in early 1973, the work has been divided for the most part between 
one Kenyan officer and one U.N.D.P. advisor. SRDP operations in the field 
have necessarily involved a number of ministries besides the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, and in order to acquire a satisfactory level of interministerial 
coordination, 'Linkmen' have been designated in each relevant ministry. All 
SRDP matters involving their ministries are to come to them first. 
Outside Nairobi in the SRDP areas themselves, a new post of 'Area 
Coordinator1 has been created. There is one Area Coordinator in each SRDP 
area. District officers from the Office of the President have filled these 
posts, and although they now have responsibilities to the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, they remain officially within the Office of the President. As 
their job title suggests, their-task is to coordinate SRDP activities within 
their areas. In order to do this, a management information system has been 
devised which has become known as the Programming and Implementation Management 
System (PIM). Review of PIM and initiative in developing programmes devolved on 
a coordinating body known as the Project Committee. 
The question of evaluating this administrative experiment is a 
difficult one because of its interdependence with the experimental development 
1. See for example, the Ndegwa Commission Report (8). 
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projects being carried out simultaneously. It is impossible to evaluate these 
two types of experiments separately. Perhaps the' achievement of SRDP objectives 
should be the common and ultimate criterion for the evaluation of both. Howevers 
a short discussion of some of the general problems of development administra-
tion should serve as a background and a supplemental criterion for specifically 
evaluating SRDP administration. 
Development administration is the process of carrying out planned 
change in any sector of the economy or the social services, and not simply 
implementing decisions through routine behaviour. This involves formulating 
policies, programmes and projects and inducing only the necessary changes in 
people's attitudes and behaviour. In addition, and most important, a condition 
of scarcity of resources must be a built-in premise of the policies and 
programmes. In other words, the scope of the activity is not enough to dis-
tinguish development administration from traditional public administration.) for 
the environment of the activity is in many ways the most important distinguishing 
feature. 
Effective development requires an administrative system which 
incorporates broadly accepted values and norms so that its performance is to a 
large extent independent of time, place or any particular individuals. In 
other wordsj institutionalisation must take place. In pursuit of this inter-
mediate goal, most developing countries are forced to utilise external assistance 
in one form or another Sometimes, the nature of the assistance is such that 
it tends to militate against institutionalisation. The history of the original 
Programming and Implementation Management System (PIM), which was specifically 
designed for SRDP administration, illustrates one aspect of this problem. PIM 
became closely identified with, its creatoe® who left the country before the 
system was properly understood. At other times, inter-donor conflict and 
different goal perceptions when several donors are involved in one area can also 
nave an undesirable effect on the process of institutionalisation, 
A second prerequisite to development is an adequate level of expertise 
without negative side effects. Few people would deny the necessity of some 
expertise, especially when programmes of economic development are involved. 
There is a danger, however, that specialisation will bring two undesirable 
consequences; first, the administration is likely to become too great a drain 
on financial resources, and second, the administration is likely to become 
too complex. An administrative structure that is too complex easily leads 
no a one-way top-down pattern of communication simply because the local people 
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might not understand the system well enough to even consider making an input. 
The result could be lack of local enthusiasm or even outright non-cooperation 
at the project level. In this context, the structure of SRDP Project Committees 
is of crucial importance, and especially the role of the Area Coordinator as 
a general administrator. 
Another prerequisite of development is an administrative structure 
_ 2 
that facilitates reaching good decisions in a short time. This dual objective 
is not peculiar to development administration. However, in development 
administration the dual objective creates a dilemma-. . Speed can be achieved by 
a high degree of decentralisation, but to achieve both speed and quality in 
decision making requires a high calibre of staff at the periphery, which is 
not likely in a situation characterised by scarce resources. Given the premise 
of scarce resources, a priority of values must be established, and by accepting 
deconcentration, the SRDP administration seems to have opted for some speed, 
among other things. 
However, the choice between high quality implementation and immediacy 
of implementation need not be absolute. It is possible to make administrative 
arrangements which utilise the expertise at the centre during implementation and 
at the same time ensure that the experience of field staff is fed back to policy 
makers. Perhaps this is the context in which the role of the Linkmen should be 
understood. The onus is on policy makers at the centre to strike a balance 
between the necessary level of control and the equally necessary development of 
leadership, initiative and teamwork in the field which are classic concerns of 
development administration. 
Further, means must be found to involve the local population in the 
implementation process, not by manipulating local leaders, but in a meaningful 
way which allows local people to have a real say in the way their communities 
are governed. This community participation should help channel local energy 
and talent towards solving local problems without continuing dependence on 
Government administrative and financial resources so that these limited 
resources can be used as productively as possible. In this process, Govern-
ment officers may be subject to some degree of popular criticism, but this is 
by no means undesirable. Administrators cannot expect to be immune to criticism 
from outside the civil service. 
Emphasis on these concerns in the SRDP areas should enhance the role 
of the Project Committees. However, a thorough assessment of their functioning 
2. See Guy Hunter, (5). 
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must take into account such factors as the budgets available to them, their 
composition and recruitment policies, and in particular their relationship 
to the local communities, 
The evaluation of SRDP administration presented in this chapter 
is based on the study of as much documentation as possible, both in Nairobi 
and in the field, and on interviews with a number of SRDP officers, planning 
officers, project advisors and Linkmen, Finally, the discussion of various 
SRDP sectoral programmes in other chapters of this Report has pointed out the 
interplay of administration with other factors. 
In this chapter, the experimental administrative elements in SRDP 
are discussed in the following order: the Programming and Implementation 
Management System (PIM) and the Project Committees, the Field Staff Management 
System (F.S.M.S.), SRDP as a grant-in-aid mechanism and local participation. 
In the sections that follow, the Linkman system and the role of expatriate 
technical assistants and advisors are discussed. The net impact of resources 
channelled through SRDP and the administrative factors affecting this impact 
are assessed. Finally, recommendations are made for the administration of SRDP 
and for district development planning. 
THE PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE PROJECT COMMITTEES 
The PIM system originated largely from the work of two former I.D.S. 
research fellows, Deryke Belshaw, who worked on the project from 1971 to 1972, 
and Robert Chambers, from 1970 to 1973. In collaboration with the Area 
Coordinators and Nairobi officers, of the relevant ministries,, they drew up 
a plan for streamlining development administration, which they and many other 
observers had regarded as a critical weakness in Kenya's development programmes. 
A staff seminar was held at Kwale in 1973 where a number of officers from 
different ministries discussed PIM and suggested a variety of changes which 
have since been incorporated into the system, The present discussion largely 
deals with the revised system as it stood in late 1974 and early 1975. 
The basic components of this system are:-
1. A Project Committee which meets three times a year. In view 
of its importance we shall give special attention to this body; 
2. Informal meetings of Area Coordinators and SRDP staff; 
3. An Annual Implementation and Evaluation Review; 
3° _ For the background of the PIM idea, see E. Kulp (9), D. Belshaw and 
" and R. Chambers (3). 
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An Annual Programming Exercise; 
5, An Annual Estimate Exercise; and 
6, An Annual Re-plan and submission of new proposals. 
The Project Committee 
Suggestions as to the composition of the Project Committee are given 
in a Ministry of Finance and Planning document, EPD/sc 237/020, p. 5. 
The suggested membership is:-
1. The Divisional Officer of the Division(s) in which the SRDP 
is situated - chairman, 
2. The Area Coordinator - secretary, 
3. All divisional departmental officers associated with SRDP projects, 
4. Members of Parliament (M.P.s) whose constituencies embrace the 
SRDP area, 
5. Two representatives of local government in the area (It is not 
clear whether local government-officers come into this category.), 
6. Three prominent local leaders, 
7. One representative of the voluntary agencies operating in the 
area, and 
8. One senior Chief from each Division covered by SRDP. 
There is also an important provision that the District Commissioner (D.C.) may 
vary the membership at his discretion to meet local requirements. 
Chambers and Belshaw gave little attention to improving local 
participation in SRDP, and the whole programme has been criticised from time 
to time because of this. (See, for instance, the minutes of the Kwale staff 
seminar, p.9») A number of attempts have been made to overcome this weakness, 
one of which has been the strengthening of the Project Committees as avenues 
for effective local participation. This was done at the Kwale seminar, and 
the rationale is contained in a circular distributed afterwards:-
Experience within the six SRDP areas has demonstrated that 
full commitment and participation of the public, and optimum 
utilisation of local resources, can only be assured if local 
leaders are willingly and effectively involved in the 
development process.... It is important that SRDP Project 
Committees should be fully associated with all steps in the 
revised management system„ It is equally important that the 
normal planning machinery of government - particularly the 
District and Provincial Development Committees - should not 
be short-circuited in matters of policy formulation. (EPD sc 
237/020, p. 4) 
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The actual performance of the Project Committees has varied quite 
a bit in the different SRDP areas. The critical factors seem to be: 
the nature of local politics in the SRDP area, the attitudes and skills 
of the Area Coordinator, the turnover rate of Area Coordinators, and the 
attitudes of sectoral ministries towards local participation. 
In all the SRDP areas there have been difficulties in involving 
local politicians in the Project Committees. Part of the reason has been that 
participants are not paid expenses for attending meetings, and M.P.s 
who must spend a great deal of time in Nairobi have to travel long 
distances to attend. Secondly, the Project Committees have in fact tended 
to remain advisory, rather than policy- making bodies so that many non-officials 
do not see a great deal of point in taking part. Further, some politicians 
have had unrealistic expectations about SRDP. For example, one former M.P. , 
who lost his seat in October 19 74, wrote to the Area Coordinator for the area 
embracing his constituency to complain that no SRDP money had been made available 
for Harambee school projects in which constituents were involved. This shows 
his failure to fully understand the experimental nature of SRDP. Another 
M.P., whose contituency straddles SRDP and non-SRDP areas, argued that the area 
outside SRDP should receive larger Government contributions for self-help 
schools to compensate for not coming within SRDP, although in fact the part 
of his constituency within SRDP is relatively poor in terms of educational 
provision. His argument conflicted with the important principle that SRDP 
areas should be treated equally with other areas in all matters which do not 
pertain to SRDP, such as the funding of self-help schools which has never been 
a part of the Programme. Finally, the evidence suggests that a constant 
problem has been that some members of the Project Committees treat SRDP as a 
tool for political manipulation which they can use to improve their levels of 
support in their constituencies. Once it is made clear that they cannot do 
this, some politicians have lost their incentive to participate. 
The Functioning of Project Committees in Five SRDP Areas 
Although the Area Coordinators have generally done their best to 
encourage local involvement in SRDP, they have often confronted difficult 
situations. In Kapenguria, for example, local leaders show a good deal of 
suspicion towards SRDP. It has been very difficult to involve the Pokot 
County Councillors, whose political inclinations seem to be to have as little 
to do with central Government as possible. The KANU District Chairman also 
takes very little interest, but since the elections of October 1974, both 
M.P.s seem keen to play an active role. 
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In Vihiga, the Area Coordinator, in collaboration with the District 
Commissioner, allowed the Project Committee to grow much larger than the 
Ministry recommended on the grounds that any Councillors or Chiefs omitted 
would resent the exclusion and make SRDP activities in their areas more 
difficult. This expanded Committee has become unwieldy so that many decisions 
are taken by an inner circle, generally consisting of the Area Coordinator, 
the departmental heads and USAID officials. Thus in Vihiga, the Project 
Committee seems to have become a devise for 'formal cooptation' of local leader-
ship, with the real decisions being made by a smaller group. The M.P.s in 
the area have not been closely involved. 
In Kwale the Area Coordinator is not happy with the functioning of 
the Project Committee. While attendance is not a serious problem, the non-
officials on the Committee tend to bring major demands without seriously 
considering the implications of their requests, especially the financial ones. 
This places a burden on the members of the Committee who are civil servants 
since they must put a damper on the expectations and demands of the non-officials. 
In Mbere low attendance by non-officials has been a major problem, 
and they have complained bitterly about not receiving allowances to cover their 
expenses for attending meetings. However, the Area Coordinator has tried to 
build good informal relationships with some local leaders, and in this way they 
have been able to participate in SRDP planning and implementation. 
In Migori/Kuria, the Project Committee seems to have functioned quite 
successfully due to a number of factors. The Area Coordinator has supported 
the group by energetically helping members propose programmes for the agenda, 
by encouraging the Committee to take joint responsibility for decisions, and 
by giving the Committee full credit for successful projects. In addition, the 
attitudes of local leaders have been positive, and the area has probably also 
benefited from the progressive attitude of the Nyanza provincial administration 
towards local participation in development. Finally, the early withdrawal of 
expatriates from the programme no doubt encouraged the local people to take 
initiative and responsibility. 
The Project Committee in Migori has repeatedly involved local people 
in the deliberations, for example assisting in road planning, siting forestry 
and livestock holding areas and recruiting road gangs. There have been occasional 
misunderstandings between civil servants and local people, but the deliberations 
of the Committee have remained constructive and effective. The afforestation, 
roads and stockist credit projects have all involved the successful coordination 
of the activities of several ministries. 
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In Migorl, the Area Coordinator encouraged group problem-solving 
in the Project Committee and consensus as the basis for project selection 
and implementation. Even M.P.s were subject to the rule of consensus: one 
M.P. who made several self-serving proposals was subsequently ignored in 
replanning activities. With time, the Project Committee became an effective 
decision-making group, with both civil servants and local leaders actively 
participating. 
This discussion suggests that the Project Committees have a great 
deal of potential yet to be realised, and highest priority should be given 
to improving their performance. There is no doubt that the problem of local 
participation is one of the most difficult in development administration. 
If local involvement is crucial to development programmes, then the Project 
Committees, or something like them have to work well. It is perhaps most 
important that participation be more than mere 'coop-fcation' . A measure of 
real power may have to be given to the local communities if participation is 
to be truly worthwhile. Also, some improvement in the effectiveness of the 
Committees would be achieved by paying allowances. 
Other Aspects of PIM 
The Annual Programming Exercise involves a meeting of local officers 
and representatives of the appropriate ministries to choose a number of 
projects to be programmed for the following year. The component operations 
of each project are identified and listed in sequence with the date by which 
they should be completed. Specific officers are given the responsibility for 
carrying out each operation, and the operations are transferred to a phasing 
form and then a bar chart. 
Staff meetings are meant to take place monthly, but the emphasis 
is on informality. The Area Coordinator need not call a meeting if he can 
contact all the relevant officers informally and discuss with them whatever 
is required. 
All SRDP officers produce triennial reports to present to the 
Proj ect Committees, based on the project charts which are kept up-to-date 
throughout the year. If a project is delayed, this is brought to the attention 
of the Project Committee which decides what action to take. 
The central figure in the PIM exercise is inevitably the Area 
Coordinator. If his understanding of the system is weak or if he lacks 
interest, it is unlikely that it will work well. However, some Area Coordinators 
are quite enthusiastic about PIM as a management tool. For example, one said 
20-9 
IDS/Oir 12 
that PIM is "perhaps the best thing associated with SRDP. The conventional 
system of reporting is much less helpful because it gives very little informa-
tion which can be a basis for action." Few central Government officials 
involved in SRDP have expressed similar sentiments. 
Evaluation 
PIM has substantial advantages as a reporting system, if only 
because conventional reporting is so inadequate both as a source of informa-
tion and a basis for action. PIM makes it possible to identify problems 
quickly, as well as the action required. It also focusses administration on 
clear objectives, avoiding the problems associated with goal ambiguity. 
Having §aid that PIM has substantial merits, it is probably not 
inappropriate to spell out some of its limitations. It is a complex system, 
although the revisions made after the Kwale seminar in 1973 have simplified 
it so that it is now our impression that most officers in the SRDP areas under-
stand it and find it workable. However, some officers in ministry headquarters 
in Nairobi apparently still do not understand the system completely, and many 
senior officers at the provincial level still seem to prefer the conventional 
reporting system. This can cause .difficulties for the Area Coordinators who 
need support from the provincial administration, and furthermore the system 
must be made acceptable to Provincial and District Commissioners if it is to 
be used for district planning in the future. 
Even if the PIM system is followed correctly, it does not ensure 
that the various SRDP projects will be coordinated. It is perfectly possible 
to have a whole range of unrelated projects in an area where PIM is being 
used. Further, there is a danger that PIM breeds unnecessary formalism and 
inflexibility, but there does seem to be a reasonable awareness of this danger 
in the field. 
PIM does not eliminate the need for good informal relationships among 
various officers in the field. Maintaining these relationships is an important 
functi on of the Area Coordinator. Also PIM cannot eliminate central Government 
delays in the release of funds. PIM does indicate quickly and clearly where 
delays have occurred, and in this way some pressure is exerted, but this does 
not ensure that the ministry concerned will take appropriate measures. 
Although PIM incorporates an element of evaluation, this function 
is not yet being performed adequately. For one thing, sufficient reliable 
data have not been collected to assess the merits of ongoing programmes. An 
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officer in the Ministry of Finance and Planning has been appointed to look 
into this problem, and hopefully methods for data collection will be improved. 
A second factor hindering effective evaluation is the reluctance of SRDP field 
staff to be critical of a project. Instead there is generally the assertion 
that "all is going well". The problem of evaluation is certainly not confined 
to PIM, but more adequate methods of evaluation must be discovered, especially 
if the system is to be used for district planning, because evaluation is likely 
to be one of the primary roles of the new District Development Officers. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
1- The Project Committees are potentially valuable, but are not working 
well at present in all SRDP areas. They should not be allowed to become too 
big, and perhaps they should be given more effective decision-making power. 
2. Local involvement in decision-making is essential to effective 
programming by the Project Committee and should not represent merely a coopta-
tion of local leadership with decisions already made elsewhere. 
3- The revised PIM system is a useful planning tool which can be 
replicated for use in district development planning. 
Measures need to be taken to secure better understanding of PIM by 
central Government officers and acceptance of the system at the provincial 
level, particularly if it is to be used in district planning. 
There is a risk that PIM will be regarded as a panacea for all 
problems of rural development administration. Some problems such as the 
informal relations between officers, the allocation of power, and the timely 
rele ase of funds by central Government cannot be solved by PIM. 
A workable system of project evaluation has not been provided by 
PIM and is still very much needed. 
THE FIELD STAFF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
In 1971 Belshaw and Chambers, in conjunction with Ministry of 
Agriculture (M.O.A.) officers involved in SRDP and the Area Coordinator in 
Mbere, devised an Agricultural Extension Staff Management System for use in 
Nthawa Location, Mbere. Later this system was used in Evurori and Mavuria 
as well. At first a system was worked out for crops staff and later extended 
to home economics staff. Then a revised system was devised for livestock 
staff to suit their work activities which differ in a number of ways from those 
of crop production officers. This experiment was designed to remedy what 
were regarded as crucial deficiencies in the traditional management system 
for these types of field staff. These deficiencies included:-
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. 4-1. Top-down target setting which was often unrealistic, 
2. No systematic choices of priority among competing demands on 
staff time, 
3. No organised work planning for field staff, 
4-. Little feedback to supervisors on staff activities, and 
5. No standard reporting procedures. (See Chambers, 3, p. 67.) 
In fact, these criticisms, with some qualifications, probably apply to the 
management of other field staff as well, .such as Community Development 
Assistants, Chiefs and Veterinary Scouts. 
The new system deviled for crops staff included:-
1. A daily activities record kept by each staff member. This listed the 
activities carried out each day of the month and compared these with the planned 
targets. These activities included farmers visited, crop demonstrations 
carried out, and so forth. 
2. A location planning sheet on which the Assistant Agricultural Officer and 
locational Agricultural Assistant set out the priorities for the Location and 
planned how to meet them. 
3. A black book kept by each staff member showing the farmers he had 
visited. 
4. A farm visit book (red book) kept by each farmer who received a visit. 
The staff member recorded his visit in this book, the advice he gave and any 
other comments. 
5. A daily dairy also kept by each staff member. 
In each Location a monthly meeting was held for all extension staff. 
At this meeting, which was attended by the A.A.O., the information emerging 
from the staff members' records could be discussed. Failure to meet targets 
could be identified and explained. Another function of the monthly meeting 
was to plan together the work to be done the following month. The staff members 
then filled in the targets for the next month on their daily activities record. 
This system was subsequently simplified to reduce the amount of paper 
work involved. The livestock system followed the same principles but was also 
less complex. 
Did the system succeed? This is hard to measure. Certainly agri-
cultural production in Mbere did not develop rapidly, so that some senior 
This was not the problem in Mbere. Essentially there were no targets, 
either from the top or from the bottom. 
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M.O.A, officials considered the extension system a failure. Yet a good 
management system cannot bring about ecological changes, nor can it alone 
determine the appropriate pattern of crop production. What it can do is 
improve staff performance, and in fact this system operated well as an 
organisational device. 
A number of real improvements could be observed. For one thing, 
the A.A.O. obtained much more information about the activities of his staff. 
If a particular crop were being neglected, the system drew his attention to 
the fact. Also, joint target-setting enabled the A.A.O. to make sure that 
certain key extension activities were included in each month's plan. Earlier 
the field staff had set their own targets informally with little involvement 
of the A.A.O. Finally, it seems likely that the system, once it was properly 
understood, encouraged field staff members to be more committed to their work 
since they felt their views were being considered by the more senior officers 
in Mbere. 
A few problems did arise, however. The field staff found the forms 
complicated at first, but they seem to have overcome this initial difficulty 
fairly quickly. Certainly the complexity of the system is not a major 
defect. Some of the field staff were not particularly happy about the way 
the system allowed the A.A.O, to know what they were doing. We found this 
criticism more widespread than Chambers did. Finally, not all the information 
obtained was specific enough to be useful. Yet it seems this could not be 
rectified without greatly increasing the amount of paper work involved. 
Belshaw left Kenya in 1972, and Chambers in 1973. Chambers had 
recommended the replication of the system in Embu Division, but this never 
took place, and once the two researchers left the system was also abandoned 
in Mbere. A similar system was used in Vihiga under USAID auspices, but it 
seems to have been considerably less valuable. The information it produced 
was actually no more specific than that provided by the conventional reporting 
system. 
Although the Field Staff Management System was never replicated and 
was abandoned in Mbere by the end of 1973, virtually all observers and those 
who had participated in it considered it a useful extension management tool. 
A number of factors explain why it was dropped. For one thing, the initiative 
came from two expatriates who were outside M.O.A,, and the officers they worked 
with in the Nairobi M.O.A. headquarters were also expatriates. No senior Kenyan 
was significantly involved, so that when the expatriates left there was no one 
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available to keep things going in Nairobi. Senior officers in Nairobi tended 
to feel that the system had not beerf worthwhile since it did not give quick 
results in terms of improved agricultural production. Chambers and Belshaw 
apparently exaggerated the potential benefits of the system, so that when 
the results, in terms of production, proved disappointing senior officers were 
disillusioned. Furthermore, the system used large quantities of paper which 
were supplied by the I.D.S. researchers. We were not able to ascertain the 
cost of this paper, but after the researchers left the M.O.A. did not feel 
the cost was justified. Finally, a number of senior M.O.A. officers felt, 
though probably incorrectly, that the system was too complicated for the junior 
staff. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
As of January 19 75, there was no M.O.A. officer at Nairobi headquarters 
who was familiar with the Field Staff Management System. Yet in Mbere, officers 
who had experience with the system felt that it had value. Certainly there 
had been problems: often the information obtained was too vague to be useful, 
oft sn the field staff resented the opportunity the system gave for the A.A.O. 
to exercise closer "STi^eTVi^G® of their work, and sometimes staff members 
fabricated figures. Yet still this system is likely to be more effective than 
the conventional reporting system, and it could be used for field staff of 
other ministries as well. It is unfortunate that the system was allowed to 
lapse without being sufficiently evaluated. 
1. It is recommended that an M.O.A. officer in Nairobi be assigned to 
report fully on the Field Staff Management System experiment in Mbere. 
2. If the System seems to have been useful, it should be replicated in 
Embu or another SRDP area such as Tetu or Vihiga. 
3. If the system is replicated, machinery should be devised to ensure 
the involvement of both the planning and extension divisions of M.O.A. 
4-. The replication should be carefully monitored by M.O.A. officers in 
Nairobi and by field officers. 
SRDP AS A GRANT-IN-AID MECHANISM 
A grant-in-aid is a fiscal device which enables a recipient to 
obtain resources from a donor subject to specified terms. An open-ended 
grant is one in which unlimited resources are available to the recipient 
once the terms have been met. A matching grant is one in which the recipient 
must provide a portion of the overall resources himself. The size of an 
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open-ended, matching grant is limited by the recipient's ability to raise 
resources, and full fiscal responsibility is placed with the recipient. 
A closed-ended grant, on the other hand, is one in which the donor 
establishes the limit of total resources to be granted and retains the 
authority to accept or reject grant applications. 
Analysis of grants-in-aid in different parts of the world supports 
the following conclusions: 
1. The existence of a grant that is conditional on fulfilling specified 
objectives acts as an incentive towards focussing local attention on those 
objectives,, 
2. Open-ended, matching grants are likely to mobilise local resources. 
3. A closed-ended grant is unlikely to be appropriately adapted to local 
needs- Too large an allocation results in waste, while too small an allocation 
frustrates xocal initiative aroused by the grant availability. 
SRDP Experience 
SRDP experience validates each of these three generalisations. To 
see this clearly a distinction must be made between grants from donor countries 
to the Government of Kenya and the allocation of resources from the Government 
to the SRDP Districts. 
Kenya's grants from donor countries have been essentially closed-ended 
5 
and non-matching . While good performance under the grants may encourage further 
aid extensions, SRDP has been forced to plan within fixed resource constraints 
determined by the donors, rather than with an open-ended grant* or the donors' 
largesse has in some cases resulted in activities that were not replicable 
or that conflicted with locally determined priorities. Thus the Water Resources 
Survey in Migori and the large staff of technical assistance experts assembled 
in Vihiga both far exceeded any activities which could be replicated in other 
distri cts. 
Within Kenya, most of the SRDP funds were administered through the 
central ministries in Nairobi and involved additions to the district-level 
budgets, rather than a grant to the Area Coordinator. Thus for many SRDP projects 
local officers have responsibility for project decision-making without fiscal 
control, and this has created a number of problems. Area Coordinators must 
USAID required some matching resources, but these were not significant 
for motivating local resources because of the closed nature of the grant. 
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make tremendous efforts to secure inputs for projects which have already 
be en approved: Authorities to Incur Expenses (A.I.E.s) are not processed by 
the ministries on time, vehicles, petrol and other materials which must be 
requisitioned from the ministries are delayed or diverted to non-SRDP activities, 
seed and fertiliser are not delivered in time for planting. Under this system 
of central control of funding, the functioning of the Area Coordinators is 
seriously limited by lack of direct financial authority, lack of control over 
non-SRDP activities in the SRDP areas and the inability to assure that 
personnel and resources required for projects will be available at the required 
times. If grants were made to Project Committees, with the Area Coordinators 
chief executive officers, many of these delays and bottlenecks could be 
prevented by assuring delivery of materials and permitting local purchase of 
inputs as needed. 
The Ministry of Works was the one ministry which used a grant mechanism 
for SRDP projects. Funds for the labour-intensive roads projects were granted 
to the Area Coordinators in Migori and Vihiga. The Area Coordinators could 
set salaries, supervise local gangleaders and workers and requisition supplies 
at appropriate times. There has been no question of misuse of funds, and the 
success of these projects has exceeded all expectations. They have become the 
model for the proposed M.O.W. Rural Access Roads Programme. 
Although the roads grant was not envisaged as a matching grant, it 
was administered in Migori to produce much the same impact as a matching grant. 
Faced by a budget too small to permit construction of desired road segments, 
the Area Coordinator encouraged contributions of land and labour to augment the 
M.O.W. funds. 
In several instances, despite the central control of ministry allocations 
for SRDP, the Project Committees operated so as to match the available funds with 
local resources. In Migori, the efforts of the chairmen of the agricultural 
village committees matched those of "he Government extension officers. The 
privatemvestments in tobacco leaf production were matched with a Government 
programme to encourage afforestation. 
Lessons of the Experience 
Delegation of fiscal responsibility to the recipient of a grant 
assures effective coordination and avoids displacement of resources from the 
intended purpose of the programme. The Area Coordinators can control the 
personnel hired through a grant although their influence over ministry personnel 
is limited to goodwill created by intelligent leadership. 
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Locating fiscal responsibility in the Area Coordinators and Project 
Committees also implies that many of the counter-productive constraints on 
resource use imposed by the ministries could be avoided. For example, petrol 
and service for vehicles for SRDP has had to be requisitioned through ministry 
vouchers. The 'in kind' nature of this resource has limited the flexibility 
of SRDP and at the same time has failed ,to assure sufficient resources to meet 
SRDP objectives. The, shortage of.operable vehicles implies that non-SRDP 
activities have made claims on SRDP vehicles and supplies. In addition, conflicts 
between provincial engineers and SRDP personnel over tenders for water projects 
or use cf ministry equipment could be averted by giving the Area Coordinators and 
Project Committees more responsibility. Also protracted waiting for supplies 
(as in the case of furnishings for Ministry of Health dispensaries could be 
avoided by local purchasing, 
SFDP was not conceived as an open-ended grant nor was it administered 
as a matching grant. Yet the experience of SRDP may be viewed as an experiment 
that offers insights into the relative advantages of matching grant programmes 
and the likely limitations of programmes that are closed-ended and completely 
financed by the central Government. 
A basic concern of SRDP was to develop innovative projects that could 
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be replicated in other areas of Kenya with available resources. Minimising 
financial burdens on Government implies a maximum of self-help which in turn 
implies a local understanding and a local desire to participate in the develop-
ment programme that is based on a clear local perception that the programme is 
high priority. 
Thus the need for local resources implies that development projects 
have to relate to a local view of priorities - if roads or community water 
supply are perceived as the most important development programmes, maximum 
local involvement is achieved by incorporating the local interest in these 
projects as part of SRDP. (The local feeling that roads and water are -'3t" 
investments was voiced repeatedly by a variety of spokesmen.) A programme that 
tries to proceed according to another view of priorities would encounter local 
disinterest or resistance. 
The Migori fish marketing project is an example of a project developed 
to meet local interests - the consumers were eager to purchase fish and the 
Available resources was nowhere clearly defined, but the term presumably 
connotes the fact that Kenya has a limited amount of government revenue that can 
bo mobilised for development projects; and local communities have some available 
manpower, land, and other resources that can be added to a development programme. 
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fishermen were eager to extend their market and gain a better prices. SRDP 
organised a transport system that accomplished both. Thus attention to local 
desire stimulated some unusual programmes. 
The implementation of SRDP has also illustrated the value of making 
grants to the Project Committees. The rural roads programme, which was 
administered autonomously at the local level and financed by grants, was 
innovative and successful. In contrast, the complaint was often heard that 
some agricultural projects had to be abandoned because authorisations to 
incure expenditure were delayed by the Ministry of Agriculture so that seed 
and fertiliser could not be delivered in time for planting or other problems 
created. Such experiences clearly indicate the dangers of withholding financial 
responsibility from the Project Committees which initiate and coordinate the 
projects. 
When PIM was used effectively and the Project Committees functioned 
as problem-solving groups, constraints on implementation could often be 
overcome. Success depended in particular on the ability of the Area Coordinator 
to mobilise personnel to meet the needs of local projects, to secure the approval 
of new projects and the release of funds , and to ensure the timely delivery 
of needed resources. The Area Coordinator's effectiveness in these tasks was 
seriously limited by lack of control over development programming which did 
not come under SRDP, by lack of direct financial responsibility and by the 
inability to assure that the personnel and resources required for projects 
would be available on time. (See 6, p. 49.) All these difficulties could be 
averted by making the Area Coordinators the administrators of open-ended, matching 
development grants. 
Local Involvement 
For open-ended grants to function well, plans to use grant funds 
and motivation for committing local resources must be created through local 
involvement. The Project Committees appear to have been a key mechanism to 
accomplish these tasks. 
In addition to encouraging active Project Committees, a number of 
other techniques have helped mobilise community support. One effective technique 
has been the involvement of local leaders in project Implementation decisions. 
For example, Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs were successfully used to recruit 
gang leaders and labourers for road projects in Mbere, Vihiga and Migori; and 
Agricultural Village Committee chairmen have helped schedule the activities of 
extension agents. Another technique has been to make certain that, once local 
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resources have been mobilised for a project, the necessary Government support 
is forthcoming so that the project can be completed without delay. For example, • r" 
the Project Committee in Migori recognised that once land had been donated 
and cleared for the roads project., the roads must be completed without delay. 
n c 
Failure to do so would have caused a loss of public confidence which would 
seriously jeopardise local support of future projects. 
THE LINKMAN SYSTEM 
Soon after SRDP was initiated it was realised that an officer in 
the headquarters of each participating ministry was needed to receive, process 
and dispatch to the field information relevant to SRDP, so that project ideas 
and proposals could be communicated without delay. A decision was made in 
1970/71 to designate at least one officer in each participating ministry to 
perform this function, and these officers subsequently became known as 
Linkmen. 
Since its inception five years ago, the Linkman system has worked well 
in some ministries and much less well in others. In those ministries where 
the system has worked well, senior officers with a keen interest in SRDP have 
been, appointed Linkmen. In one ministry, the position has been held since 
its inception by two Kenyans who are enthusiastic about the kinds of activities 
which have been part of SRDP. In other ministries, officers were appointed 
Linkmen who had never worked in the rural areas and were not enthusiastic about 
their duties, or officers were appointed who were already fully employed and 
were not relieved of any of their prior responsibilities. 
The responsibilities of a Linkman include frequent visits to the SRDP 
areas, and in order to make these'visits, the officer must not be tied down to 
other routine duties in Nairobi. In addition, he must have access to a vehicle 
and the necessary allowances to enable him to travel to the field. In one 
important ministry, the designated Linkman was an undersecretary, and he had 
delegated his SRDP responsibilities to one of his officers without relieving 
him of his other tasks. This officer had not visited any of the six SRDP 
areas in a full year. He gave lack of transport as the main reason for this. 
In the same ministry, two young expatriate officers had previously acted as 
Linkmen, and they had been primarily concerned with collecting data for their 
own research activities. Thus they concentrated only on those SRDP activities 
which were of special interest to them personally. 
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Another ma;)or responsibility of the Linkmen is to handle SRDP-related 
problems for their ministries, and this requires close consultation with other 
operating ministries and with the Ministry of Finance and Planning. In fact, 
it appears that there is no horizontal communication concerning SRDP projects 
except between each operating ministry and the Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
If the coordination provided by the Ministry of Finance and Planning could be 
supplemented by consultation between the other relevant ministries, the SRDP 
decision-making process could be greatly accelerated. 
A third major responsibility of the Linkmen is to ensure the timely 
release of resources from their ministries for SRDP project implementation. 
This duty has been carried out effectively only in the Department of Social 
Services and the Ministry of Works. We found numerous instances in which Area 
Coordinators had identified the need to release funds in their Project and 
Implementation Management Reports, but action v/as not taken at headquarters 
for months-
Recommendations 
1- The system of Linkmen is a useful innovation which should be strength-
ened and replicated for development administration on a nationwide basis. 
Ministries should designate officers to be in charge of specific activities, 
and their names and responsibilities should be known to field officers so 
that they will know whom to approach when they have problems. 
2. Linkmen should be officers who have field experience in the relevant 
areas of activity and who are enthusiastic about their responsibilities. It 
is pointless to designate a senior officer as Linkman if he is not able to 
perform his duties effectively 
3. Linkmen should be allotted the necessary ransport and allowances 
to visit the field regularly. 
4. Linkmen from the different ministries should meet together periodically 
and communicate informally whenever necessary for the effective implementation 
of projects. 
THE ROLE OF EXPATRIATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS AND ADVISORS 
The focus of this section is mainly limited to the field activities 
of the expatriate technical assistants associated with SRDF. For a detailed 
evaluation of the role of technical assistance in SRDP administration in 
general, see Oyugi, (10), pp 102-123. 
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The Personnel Involved 
Ideally a project advisor should be highly regarded by those whom 
he is supposed to advise. This high regard emanates from a number of factors, 
including relevant qualifications and experience and the ability to deal 
with the problems at hand and to cooperate effectively with local colleagues. 
The men serving in the five SRDP are- s where expatriate personnel are employed 
have been stature in years Almost ai; of them have had high academic qualifica-
tions, and osost have had adequate rele ~ant experience. A number of them have 
seemed competent ana dedicated and apparently cooperated satisfactorily with 
their Kenyan colleagues, but a few have appeared to be ill-equipped for the 
roles they were supposed to play. 
Kapenguria and Kwale SRDP areas each have one expatriate advisor, 
and both of these men are highly qualified and experienced. They have both 
been with the Programme since 1971. In Mbere, in addition to regular expatriate 
field personnel, the Norwegian planning team attached to the Embu Provincial 
Planning Office participated in SRDP planning. Since the beginning of SRDP, 
about 15 different expatriate officers have been associated with the Programme 
in Mbere, all academically qualified and with some experience, though not in 
the third world 
Four Food and Agriculture Organic ot lcn t.F A 0- ) employees were 
associated with the SRDP in Migori in 19" 1, but or.e left after a short period 
and "he c~her three in August of that year Later they were replaced at the 
suggestion cf he xeryi Government by a single advisor whe is academically 
qualified and experienced At -he icegirr ..rg cf the Programme, two donors were 
involved, the Swedish Internationa: L'e\e,opmtni Agency (.SUA) which acted 
as the funding authoriry, and F-A-O whi^h acted as the executive agency. 
Projects prepared by the F A C team in Migori had tc be approved njf only by 
the Kenya Governniert- but also by SIDA ana by F A.0- headquarters in Rome. 
At times a project wou^d be approved by two of the parti'ipating organisations, 
only to be turned down by the third, which created difficulties fcr octh the 
Kenyan and expatriate officers working m the field. 
in "vihiga, about ten expatriate officers have been associated with 
the Programme. Of these, two seem to be more or less permanent and the others 
have served for an average of two years each. Of the four officers present 
when this Report was prepared, all had sufficient academic qualifications, but 
only two had relevant working experience before coming to Vihiga. 
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Recruitment of Expatriate Officers 
The recruitment of expatriate personnel was delayed at the outset 
because some of the donors were indecisive about adopting SRDP areas and the 
Kenya Government was uncertain about a number of policy issues associated with 
SRDP, Although SIDA had shown interest in the Migori area as early as 1968, 
expatriate officers did not arrive until 1970. Expatriates arrived in Kwale 
and Kapenguria early in 1971 and later that year in Vihiga. Because of these 
late arrivals, the launching of SRDP projects was also delayed, and since 
commodity prices increased in the interval, the actual costs of projects turned 
out to be higher than originally anticipated. 
During the course of the Programme the replacement of departing 
officers has also frequently been delayed, in some cases as long as six months. 
The initial request from the Kenya Government or a donor organisation for a 
replacement may be delayed, it may be difficult to find suitable applicants, 
and there may be delays in processing the credentials of prospective officers. 
All these factors have contributec in varying degrees to the late arrival of 
replacements. 
Job Descriptions for Expatriate Personne1 
Most of the problems concerning the activities of expatriate officers 
have arisen apparently due to inadequate descriptions of their duties. Nearly 
all the expatriates interviewed said they had never received clear instructions 
or any written statement about the nature of their work. As one officer put 
it:-
Terms of reference do not exist. I have open terms of reference. 
The only thing I have is a written piece ... from /his government/ 
which states my terms of appointment with them. Although I met 
some senior Kenyan officers before I went to the field, there was 
no briefing whatsoever. 
Another told us:-
Nobody explained anything to me. I had a very vague idea of what 
I was expected to do here when I arrived but having been here now 
for about one year, I know what I am supposed to do. 
As a result, many expatriate officers have played different roles 
from what their Kenyan colleagues had expected. A number of Kenyan officers 
were asked what role they though the expatriates were playing in SRDP, and 
they gave a wide variety of answers. One responded, "He is mainly here to 
plan. Implementation is for us Kenyans." Another said, "He is the eye of 
his government - seeing how the SRDP funds are spent." Two other officers 
replied, "They are supposed to plan and implement the programme," and "They 
are responsible to us for whatever they do." Thus it is clear that neither 
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expatriate nor Kenyan officers are certain about what specifically the expatriates 
are supposed to do, 
I 
In fact, expatriates have been actively engaged in both the planning 
and implementation of SRDP projects. In Kwale and Kapenguria, the project 
advisors have had a hand in all the documents which have been produced over 
the last few years and have also been actively involved in project implementa-
tion In Kwale the Kenyan Area Coordinator had been engaged at the 
District headquarters on routine administrative work when the I.D.S. researchers 
visited in January 1975, so the project advisor had performed many of the 
duties of an Area Coordinator. He had carried out feasibility studies, 
Initiated projects, written them up into a plan and coordinated their implementa-
tion. He was the only officer in Kwale who had a general grasp of the Programme 
in the area as a whole, certainly a much broader role than merely "seeing how 
the SRDP funds are spent". 
In Mbere , Norwegian advisors have been active in both planning and 
implementation since the beginning of SRDP, The initial plans were made in 
1969 by the Eastern Province planning team, then composed of Norwegians, in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and Planning. They planned the 
water project in detail, locating intake points and surveying for the entire 
pipeline system, and afterwards they supervised the construction. The planning 
of the roads project was less elaborate since most of the routes were deteriorated 
County Council roads and new routes did not have to be identified. However, 
Norwegi an roads engineers supervised all of the construction until late 1974 
when the present roads engineer was joined by a Kenyan assistant engineer. 
As in Kwale and Mbere, in Migori expatriate officers were actively 
involved in project identification in 1970 and 1971. However, the SIDA-F.A.O. 
planning team was unable to produce 'acceptable plans', for reasons to be 
discussed shortly, and when they left in August 1971 there were very few projects 
ready for implementation. Between August 1971 and October 1972, when another 
expatriate advisor arrived, the Kenyan Area Coordinator took most of the 
initiative in project planning and implementation, and has maintained this 
position ever since. 
In Vihiga, expatriate advisors have been actively involved in SRDP 
planning and have had a hand in all the documents produced in the area in the 
last four years. They have also been active in project implementation. They 
designed the roads project, including the experimental labour-intensive construc-
tion methods, and an expatriate roads engineer has been in charge of alignment 
and the overall supervision of the work. 
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Thus in all five SRDP areas where there are expatriates, they are 
playing active operational roles. They are not advisors operating behind 
the scenes and could never function in that way due to the nature of the 
work to be done. Yet even today some of these expatriates maintain that 
their role is 'purely advisory'. One explained to the I.D.S. researchers 
his active involvement in planning and implementation, but then added, "But 
all this has been in an advisory capacity. I am not an executive and never 
will be," The uncertainty on the part of both expatriate and Kenyan officers 
about who should play what role has led to a number of misunderstandings which 
in some case have greatly impeded progress. 
Organisational Machinery and Working Relationships 
In addition to lack of clear guidelines about the role of expatriates, 
proper organisational machinery for interaction between Kenyan and expatriate 
officers has also been lacking. Instances of conflict between expatriate and 
Kenyan officers have seriously reduced the effectiveness of the expatriates. 
One of the operational principles of SRDP stated in the 1970/74 
Development Plan is that "as far as possible the programme shall be planned 
and implemented within the existing machinery of Government". ( 6 ) Thus, the 
expatriate officers working in the Programme are expected to fit within 
Government machinery. Early in 1970, the National Rural Development Committee 
stated:-
In pursuance of the programme objectives it will be important so to 
arrange technical assistance in the field that the programme remains 
under Kenyan direction and control while providing scope and initia-
tive to technical assistance staff to play their full role. (EPD237/01) 
In October 1969 , the Secretary of the Committee wrote in another memorandum 
that, "In carrying out his duties a technical assistance officer should be 
answerable to the government head of department concerned." (EPD 237/010) 
These and similar instructions issued subsequently were interpreted by Kenyan 
SRDP officers to mean that the expatriates would be responsible to divisional 
heads of departments for their technical roles, since they were operating at 
the divisional level, and to the Area Coordinators for their more general 
administrative work. Generally speaking, the Kenyans' expectations have been 
disappointed for a number of reasons. 
For one thing, the expatriate officers are not employed by the Kenya 
Government, but rather by the donor agencies who expect to be kept fully informed 
and in some cases have to approve any plans before they can be implemented. 
The expatriate officers are thus faced with dual, and in some cases multiple, 
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loyalties and responsibilities. For example, in Migori officers were responsible 
to F. A. 0., SIDA and the Kenya Government, and in Vihiga to USAID, F A.0. and 
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University. Secondly, expatriate officers 
have generally had access to higher levels of the Kenya Government not enjoyed 
by their Kenyan colleagues in the field. The Kenyans have resented this, quite 
genuinely feeling that they are being by-passed in the decision-making process. 
In an attempt to assert their authority, and to remedy the fact that 
the expatriate advisors have received no clear set of instructions from the 
Kenya Government, a number of Area Coordinators have issued their own instruc-
tions to the expatriates. This has often only added to the confusion. Working 
relationships have also been hampered by the irreconcilable personalities of 
some of the officers involved, and in three areas we found cases of intense 
antagonism between the expatriates and some of the Kenyans. In Migori, it was 
this personal antagonism which led to the expulsion of the expatriate team in 
1971. Vihiga has been the exception, for here the expatriate team leader has 
been able to minimise conflict between his group and their Kenyan counterparts 
by encouraging regular dialogue and consultations. 
The I.D.S. team interviewed nearly all divisional officers involved 
in the administration of SRDP and found in general a hostile attitude toward 
the advisors. One Area Coordinator expressed views similar to those of many 
ethers we interviewed:• 
The man hexe dees not get along well. He pushes too much. He generates 
animosity amcrg staff. He does not a®aonmoidate other people's ideas, 
bosses people around and does not know how to play his cards As a 
result he is net liked. 
In the same area another officer stated:-
I have occasional professional disagreement with this man. He is 
arrogant and pushy. He tends to push very impracticable things 
which tend to confuse officers in the field.. 
In this particular area, the implementation of one project is being impeded 
because of the level of personal animosity which has been generated, and this 
area is not unique :.r this respect. We found similar evidence of poor personal 
relations elsewhere as well. 
Most of the Kenyans interviewed felt that SRDP would not suffer if 
the expatriates left since "there is nothing +hey are doing which we cannot 
do". Three officers being interviewed together stated, "If their presence 
here is being linked up with money it shcc'.d ..ntinue. Otherwise we do not 
see their use." In addition . to individta; personality conflicts, there is 
a general feeling among most Kenyan officers in the field, not just divisional 
officers, that, apart from watching the way aid money is spent, there is nothing 
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the expatriates are doing which Kenyans cannot do themselves if the Kenya 
Government will make the relevant job assignments. 
An Overall Assessment 
In the absence of any clear guidelines about the role of technical 
assistance officers in SRDP, their contribution to the Programme can only be 
assessed in terms of a general definition of technical assistance. Foreign 
technical assistance, strictly speaking, refers to any external efforts in the 
form of advice, demonstration or performance which are:-
1. Beyond the indigenous capabilities of the recipient country itself, and 
2. Designed to improve certain specific techniques of planning, communication, 
control or operation. Accordingly technical assistance aims at:-
1» The discovery of problems which are unknown or unfamiliar to the 
recipient country, 
2. The supply of solutions which are beyond the recipient country's 
technological or material capacity, and 
3. The provision of conditions for the self-generation of the skills 
and knowledge which have been acquired through technical assistance. (1) 
On paper, two types of technical assistance officers are supposed 
to be working in the SRDP areas, advisors and operationals, but in fact all 
the officers are actively participating in the Programme and none are merely 
giving advice. How effective have they been in performing functions which are 
beyond the indigenous capabilities of Kenya? 
It should be noted first that the appointment of expatriate officers 
to SRDP was not linked to actual manpower inadequacies within the Kenya civil 
service. As a result, a number of them are performing functions which Kenyans 
could perform, such as planning and supervising the construction of minor roads, 
working in mobile health clinics, doing woodwork or carrying out agricultural 
research, agricultural extension or sociological studies. On the other hand, 
we feel that the recruitment of a water engineer or an experienced expatriate 
to set up an agri-service centre or a rural industrial training centre was in 
order because of local manpower inadequacies in these areas. 
Some of the expatriates who have performed functions that could have 
been performed by Kenyans have also failed to get along with their Kenyan 
counterparts. Friction has caused delays in project implementation in Migori 
for example. In other cases, expatriates have devised projects which could 
not win local support, for example a proposed intensive extension programme in 
Kwale, 
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In the roads project in Vihiga, expatriate personnel have made a 
positive contribution to the indigenous level of useful skills and knowledge 
by devising labour-intensive road construction techniques. Although disliked 
by the politicians, these techniques are new to Kenya and have real potential 
value, and a Kenyan has been employed and trained as an Overseer so that he 
now supervises construction on his own. The hope is that this project will 
generate a level of organisation and skills sufficient to be replicated on 
a self-generating basis, without further need for foreign assistance. For 
more information on this positive contribution of foreign technical assistance, 
see the chapter in this Report on road construction. 
At the Siakago agri-service station in the Mbere SRDP area, a Kenyan 
who was trained as a counterpart to a NORAD officer has taken over and seems 
to be directing the station effectively. There have been other instances in 
which the work of expatriate officers has been useful. For example, in Kwale 
expatriates devised a number of maps and charts depicting development zones 
and potentials, though unfortunately only the Provincial Planning Officer at 
the programme level regards these as useful development tools. All in all, 
however, there seems to be little accomplished by expatriate personnel which 
could not have been done by Kenyans. 
Recommendations 
Despite this fairly critical examination of the role of technical 
assistance in SRDP, realistically we do not think that technical assistance 
personnel can be dispensed with as long as Kenya continues to receive financial 
assistance for development from abroad. To improve the present situation, 
we make a number of recommendations. 
A system should be devised so that when the employment of a technical 
assistance officer is being considered, reports about him can be received directly 
fr om the countries in which he has worked. This would reduce the possibility 
of employing incompetent or uncooperative off-.trs 
2. Whenever possible the +erms of reference of technical assistance 
personnel should spell out Nearly what they are meant to do, when and where. 
3° Expatriates should not be engaged to perform duties which Kenyans 
can perform. This car _rly demoralise he Kenyan officers. 
It should be stipulated in the technical assistance officers' terms 
of reference that the authority to operate development programmes resides with 
a specific group such as xhe SRDP Project Committee or the District Development 
Committee. 
±D£, OP 12 
19 - 27 
5. The Ministry of Finance and Planning should carry out its intention 
to monitor the activities of all technical assistance personnel serving the 
Kenya Government so that undesirable officers can be identified and eliminated 
before the programmes with which they are involved are adversely affec-ed 
THE NET IMPACT OF SRDP 
A Summary of the SRDP Budget 
Despite the enormous conceptualisation and plaining effort that has 
gone into SRDP, Government financial support for the Programme has been 
extremely limited. It is understandable that the ministries have not over-
turned their normal budgeting and planning procedures to accommada€etfche 
special needs of a Programme which covers only six Divisions. In fact, in 
no ministry did the SRDP effort represent over 5 per cent of recurrent 
expenditure in fiscal year 1974-75. SRDP accounts for 4 per cent of recurrent 
expenditure estimates in the pertinent ministries, and 7 per cent of the 
development estimates in those ministries. SPXP is so small in the larger 
context of development planning and implementation that key officials in 
Nairobi have not gi en the Programme very much attention. 
It nay not be appropriate to consider a large part of the SRDP budget 
as a development project, since funds have in fact been expended on providing 
current services in the form of agricultural extension, loan services, family 
planning and other activities. These activities are aimed more at building 
up human resources and a base of knowledge than directly In reasing the social 
capital available for production. 
It is a major oversight that neither development expenditures, nor 
recurrent expenditures are classified according to the district or division 
in which they occur. Thus it is impossible to compare SPDP expenditures with 
other ministry efforts in the particular divisicrs ^elected for SRDP. One 
estimate given by officials interviewed is that SRDP accounts for 3 per cent 
of district development budgets and less than 2 per cent of the total recurrent 
and development budget. Tabulations from the Ministry of Finance and Planning 
show only a small part of total development expenditure allocated to SRDP. A 
comparison of estimated SRDP expenditures in Table 2 with estimated district 
development expenditures in Table 3 suggests that 12 to 14 per cent of district 
development expenditures went to SRDP. 
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Table 1. Total SRDP expenditures from 1971/2 to 1975/6. (K£) 
Aotual Estimated Total Donors' 
Expenditure Expenditure 1971/76 contribu-
19 "1/72 1372 73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 tions 
Migori 69 ,289 &1,-99 126,075 155,674 89,210 521 ,729 620,000 
Vihiga 231,100a 
USAID 15 ^O CV 25,6x3 63 ,330 44,053 28,529 177 ,250 
G. O.K. 11 ,614 16,221 42 ,220 29 ,364 19,019 118 ,43 8 
Total 27 ,339 41,834 105,550 73,417 47,548 295 ,688 
Kapenguria 58 ,801 56 ,833 72 ,603 63 ,948 84,017 336 ,202 365 ,000 
Tetu 24 ,442 30,000 33,910 24,634 23,729 136 ,715 b 
Mbere 80 ,408 230,907 183,775 '200,367 245,434 93 9 ,891 5P0,000 
additional 
sums nego-
tiable 
Kwale 18 ,939 47,090 115,212 73 ,522 30,212 . 285 ,025 200,000 
TOTAL 279 ,268 488,163 636 ,107 591,562 520,150 2 ,515 ,250 1,916,100 
Headquarters - 10,000 10,000 - -
GRAND TOTAL - 601,562 530,150 
a. Excludes direct USAID contributions, to PFP. 
b. Government of Kenya financed. 
Table 2. Allocations by ministries to SRDP, recurrent and development estimates 
combined, (K£ OOP's) ~~ ~~ 
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 
Office of the President 26 27 27 
Agriculture . 212 273 296 
Commerce and Industry * 26 32 
Education - * 
Social Services 68 44 4.3 
Cooperatives 18 20 
Health 66 57 27 
Works (roads) 251 144 78 
Natural Resources (forests) 4 5 4 
Tourism & Wildlife (fisheries) 18 6 3 
* KJE10 only. 6 4 5 602 530 
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Table 3. Estimates of development expenditures in SRDP Districts. (K£ OOP's) 
1973/74 1974/75 
Nyeri 1225 1617 
Kwale 667 569 
Embu 214 172 
South Nyanza 382 750 
West Pokot 58 73 
Kakamega 733 1259 
Total 4283 4575 
Factors Reducing the Effectiveness of SRDP 
Interviews with Provincial Planning Officers, Area Coordinators and 
other officers working with SRDP have indicated that the real impact of even 
these limited SRDP resources has been reduced by a number of factors. In 
several cases, material and personnel assigned to SRDP has been diverted to 
ongoing ministry activities. Typically, an SRDP officer on taking up his post 
might discover that a vacancy in ministry field staff has not been filled so 
that he has to assume extra duties. Some non-SRDP duties have been formally 
assigned to SRDP staff: for example, the Area Coordinator in Mbere was made 
Deputy Returning Officer, which occupied most of his time during the six months 
prior to elections in October 1974. The Area Coordinators in Kwale, Tetu and 
Kapenguria were never relieved of their substantial duties assisting their 
respective District Commissioners. 
SRDP vehicles and other supplies have been similarly misdirected. 
For instance, as soon as the SRDP vehicle arrived in Migori (Macalder)* one 
vehicle was removed from the District Officer's post so that the Area Coordinator 
and the D.O. shared one vehicle. Undoubtedly other SRDP supplies have been 
transferred to local administration without the displacement appearing in the 
audits. 
Given the lack of financial reporting and the limited information 
available to the Area Coordinators, ministries can easily 'borrow' money from 
SRDP to ease fiscal crises in other divisions or districts. Despite the explicit 
earmarking of funds for the Migori SRDP roads project for example, the Area 
Coordinator discovered that the balance in his roads account was mysteriously 
expended - elsewhere in the province. Clearly, better and more timely financial 
reporting is called for, as well as more careful auditing. 
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A second factor which has reduced the effectiveness of SRDP has 
been the high turnover rate of staff in charge of the programme.^ Few 
officers have remained in their posts as long as two years, and no provision 
is made for overlapping appointments to smooth the transfers. In many cases 
there have been gaps between the departure of one officer and the arrival of 
the next. Because of this, time and resources have to be spent acquainting 
new officers with the characteristics of their areas, including past programmes 
and the relative value of alternative future programmes. In addition, 
participation of local people is discouraged when theyhave to become acquainted 
with a succession of different officers and styles of administration. 
Further, the effectiveness of SRDP particularly as an experimental 
programme, is diminished because many SRDP projects are merely replications 
of ministry projects which have already been carried out in other areas and 
would have been pursued anyway without special SRDP funding or inputs.(6, p.43) 
The grade cattle project: in Migori, tea planting in Vihiga, cotton in Mbere, 
sugar in Kwale ana livestock holding grounds in Kapenguria were merely replica-
tions of projects which had been successful in other places. In all these 
cases, sound environmental analysis and marketing studies would have shown 
that these projects might not be successful in the SRDP areas, or might not 
d©s«£»we priority treatment. 
Finally, the impact of SRDP on development has been limited by the 
general shortsightedness of both the Project Committees and the central SRDP 
administration. Important questions were almost never asked, such as: What 
will happen if the prices of crops change? or Is it possible that the market 
we envisage will be different in five years' time? As evidence of this short-
sightedness, it would appear that at the SRDP seminar held at the Kenya 
Institute of Administration in January 1975, the emphasis of the Programme was 
shifted to agriculture on the basis of extremely weak analysis. Further, in 
Migori, investments are being made in tobacco production with optimistic expecta-
tions about returns without any assurance that the sole purchaser, British 
American Tobacco (B.A.T.), will not lower prices once the crop has been established. 
Similarly, milk production is being expanded apparently on blind faith that the 
prices announced by K.C.C. are an appropriate indication of local demand, and 
without considering whether, regardless of local nutritional needs, local incomes 
will be sufficient to provide an adequate market These sorts of questions call 
for imaginative and skillful analysis of the programming of local areas by 
central SRDP staff. 
This criticism was stated eloquently in early memoranda from the Vihiga 
SRDP staff and was reiterated by the Ndegwa Commission, (8), paragraphs 187-188. 
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As this analysis has shown, various bureaucratic problems have 
tended to diminish the effectiveness of SRDP. These problems are not unique 
to SRDP and can be found in other development projects. 
Factors Enhancing the Effectiveness of SRDP 
A number of non-SRDP projects have actually complemented and enhanced 
the programme. The UNICEF water supply development programme and the UNDP/FAO 
Programme for Better Family Living were planned with some degree of coordination 
with the SRDP Project Committees. Where these programmes were implemented in 
SRDP areas, it was possible to use limited SRDP resources for other projects. 
The research on agricultural extension carried out by I.D.S. in Migori has also 
enhanced the impact of SRDP in that area. 
Project Planning and Cost/Benefit Analysis 
It is clear that the net impact of SRDP depends not only on the level 
of funds allocated, but also on the effectiveness with which these funds are 
used. In most cases, the data necessary to make a careful quantitative anlysis 
are not available to the SRDP staff making decisions about project priorities. 
As a result, programming decisions are necessarily forced into a mode of 
sequential decision-making: results from the early stages of a project must be 
c 
screened and evaluated to determine whether the project should be continued. 
There is little evidence that a sequential strategy has developed. 
Discussion with the Area Coordinators gives the impression that it has always 
been difficult to generate a sufficient number of viable projects to create 
real alternatives in terms of the overall development of the Programme. Further-
more, many projects of secondary importance were evidently kept alive largely 
to maintain the appearance of diversification. The women's horticultural project 
in Vihiga appears to have been of this nature, although it could have had a 
7 
major impact on the quality of the food available to Vihiga residents. As a 
result, most projects were not seriously scrutinised in terms of how they 
affected local incomes and living standards, and critical questions about better 
alternatives were seldom asked. The use of PIM forms to assign benefits to 
projects came as an afterthought imposed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
What kind of critical discussion did projects receive in place of a 
full cost-benefit analysis? This depended very much on the effectiveness of the 
6. Emphasis was placed on this in the 1972 SRDP Evaluation, (6) pp. 35-36. 
7. See Harmon and Zalla's comments in their evaluation of the USAID 
involvement. (4) 
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Area Coordinator. An ideal system of sequential project selection, which we 
believe was realised in two of the SRDP Project Committees, would proceed 
something as follows:-
1. The Area Coordinator acts as a catalyst by assisting division officers 
to conceptualise projects, to work out a timetable and to estimate costs. 
2. The Project Committee reviews proposals and rejects some primarily on 
the basis of perceived local receptivity, obvious defects in coordina-
tion and assessment of local capabilities. 
3. The ministries approve projects largely on the basis of their 
replicability, and to a lesser extent on the notion that a significant 
feature of the. socio-economic environment was disturbed - this was 
sufficient to label the project experimental. 
4. The Area Coordinator by reviewing the project timetable, is alerted 
to bottlenecks and brings the problems up for discussion by the Project 
Committee. 
5. Projects which are obviously not meeting a local need can be dropped 
or modified in the annual replan-estimates exercise. Supporting 
evidence from administrative records and feedback from the local 
population are vital at this stage. 
Deficiencies in the second and fifth stages of this process are most serious if 
appropriate priorities are to be set. 
Projects can fail if the local population is not involved in their 
planning or if all the implications of a programme are not understood. The 
contrast between the maize credit schemes in Vihiga and Migori exemplifies this. 
In general, the SRDP staff has not produced very much evidence of 
project performance. Officials involved in the Programme saw no need, and by 
and large foreign advisors or technical assistants did little, to enhance the 
documentation of ongoing activities in a way that would generate long-range 
measures of performance which would be useful in replicating the Programme. 
The notable exceptions are the agricultural and roads projects in Vihiga where 
information has been produced on performance and the relationship between 
inputs and outputs which could be the basis for assigning unit costs to new 
projects or, in some cases, a range of benefits. 
SRDP operating staff could do a great deal more in the way of 
observation and data collection without impeding the operation of their projects. 
For example, in roads projects Overseers or gang leaders could observe traffic 
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on completed segments in order to measure the benefits of the roads. However, 
the generation of other sorts of information would require the assistance of 
personnel trained in field data collection and cost/benefit analysis. 
To conclude this discussion, a well-functioning Project Committee, 
alert to the need to continuously review programmes and operations and 
thoroughly familiar with local needs and the potential for local initiative, 
appears to be the best assurance that resources are committed to high-priority 
needs. A little assistance from the Ministry of Finance and Planning staff 
would provide a framework for collecting performance data, thereby guaranteeing 
that pertinent information is generated to permit both a review of project 
experiences and generalisations which could lead to replication elsewhere in 
Kenya. 
Information on SRDP Finances and Personnel 
The lack of timely information on SRDP finances has made advance 
planning precarious and created a great potential for waste of resources at 
all levels of Government. In Nairobi, information on finances is seldom 
available until twelve to eighteen months after the actual expenditures are 
made, even though this information must be provided before the Kenya Government 
can be reimbursed by foreign donors. In the field, the situation is even worse. 
Area Coordinators and Project Committees must estimate budget needs without 
any data about the actual costs of past programme activity and the Area Coordina-
tors do not have the information necessary to ensure that resources earmarked 
for SRDP projects are not diverted to non-SRDP activities. Provincial Planning 
Officers do not have enough data to compare development in SRDP and non-SRDP 
areas in order to assess the impact of SRDP programmes. Without financial 
records, cost/benefit analysis is Impossible. 
Some sort of personnel information system is also needed. The contribu-
tion of administrators and field personnel is crucial to the success of SRDP 
projects, and it is extremely important that Area Coordinators be informed of 
pending transfers and allowed to exercise some flexibility in arranging and 
timing transfers to avoid crippling on-going projects. Also information on 
personnel should be collected from Area Coordinator" to be used as one basij 
for reviews and recommendations for promotion or salary increases. 
Management of Physical Resources 
Traditional administrative procedures do not always facilitate 
successful management of physical resources. For example, regular maintenance 
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of SRDP vehicles has often been neglected because of insufficient funds. 
Ways need to be found to achieve greater flexibility in obtaining supplemental 
funds for routine maintenance. An accounting system would be helpful which 
makes it possible to charge each project for its use of capital so that the 
proceeds can be used to pay for maintenance and replacements. In this way 
it would be possible to determine whether certain projects are making 
excessive use of resources such as vehicles and whether more resources should 
be made available to other projects. It would also help ensure that resources 
are not allowed to lie idle. Situations could be dealt with such as in Migori 
where equipment was purchased for the roads project, was found to be useless, 
but was not sold; land was acquired for livestock holding, was not used for 
this purpose, but was not put to any other use. 
Exchange of Information 
More attention needs to be given to the exchange of information among 
SRDP officers so that experiences in one area can be used to reinforce or 
correct work under way in other areas. In general, SRDP staff are not fully 
informed about the experiences of the programme or the materials available 
to them. For example, very few officers questioned in 1974 were familiar 
with the 1972 Evaluation Report. 
The annual seminars are a useful device for the exchange of informa-
tion among SRDP personnel but other avenues for communication are needed as 
well. The Nairobi SRDP office could make greater efforts to circulate project 
evaluations and other information among field staff, and could facilitate 
informal exchanges of idea, more frequently than once a year. Linkmen should 
visit the different S'RDP areas frequently enough to communicate useful informa-
tion from one area to another. Any additional transport costs incurred for 
these purposes would be worth while. We discovered one example of the value 
of exchanging information among the different areas: the Roads Inspector in 
Migori learned and applied the techniques for making culverts which had been 
used in -Vihiga. 
A Note on the Use of the 1972 I.D.S. Evaluation by Local. Staff 
I.D.S. researchers in Migori, Vihiga and Kapenguria used a short 
questionnaire as one method of collecting information from local SRDP personnel 
and from Government administrative personnel assigned to SRDP areas. Along 
with their views on the Programme as a whole and on the specific projects to 
which they were assigned, respondents were asked whether they were familiar 
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with the 1972 SRDP Evaluation Report. The exercise was greatly hindered by 
lack of response to the questionnaire. Only 34 completed forms were collected 
out of about three times that number which were distributed. The rate of 
return was satisfactory only where the researchers were able to distribute 
and collect the forms personally. 
Although the sample turned out to be rather small, the responses 
reinforced the general impression that the 1972 Report had not been effectively 
disseminated among officers responsible for SRDP at the local level. Two 
questions were asked concerning the 1972 Report: (1) Do you know about the 
1972 I.D.S. evaluation of the SRDP? and (2) Have you ever read it (in whole 
or in part)? The following tables summarise the responses to these questions 
in terms of total numbers and percentages for all staff, and broken down 
into senior and junior staff, SRDP and other Government officers at the 
divisional level are considered senior staff, and those working at the locational 
or sub-locational levels are considered junior staff. 
Table 4. Knowledge of the 1972 Evaluation." 
knows of Evaluation does not know of Evaluation 
number % number % 
All Staff 10 30% 24 70'. 
Senior Staff 7 31% 16 69% 
Junior Staff 3 27% 8 73% 
Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 
Table 4. Reading of the 1972 Evaluation.-
has read 
number 
Evaluation 
% 
has not read 
number 
Evaluai % 
All Staff 7 21% 27 79% 
Senior Staff 4 17% 19 83% 
Junior Staff 3 27% 8 73% 
Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 
A few additional observations should be made: 
1. In several cases involving both senior and junior officers, although 
respondents indicated that they knew about the 1972 Evaluation and had read it, 
the I.D.S. researchers gathered from conversation with them that this was not 
2. Many officers reported that the Evaluation had been brought to their 
attention once or twice by the Area Coordinators, but they had not been able 
to read it because copies were not available. 
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3. Several officers who had been posted to SRDP areas after the 1972 
Evaluation was issued said that they had never been informed of its existence. 
Moreover, they reported that they had never been fully briefed about the 
nature and objectives of SRDP and did not feel completely familiar with the 
Programme and its significance. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SRDP ADMINISTRATION 
1. The importance of the Area Coordinators as the key administrators in each 
SRDP area has been made clear. The effectiveness of the Area Coordinators 
would be enhanced by giving them authority commensurate with their responsibili-
ties, particularly more fiscal control in the form of financial grants as was 
done in the labour-intensive roads projects. Area Coordinators also need 
information on expenditures for their plan/replan activities, so that they 
can relate the level of resources used to the impact of projects in the field. 
So far, financial management has been a major obstacleand a number of 
projects have been seriously affected by delays in the release of funds. 
2. The SRDP experience has underlined the importance of local involvement in 
project planning and implementation. Where local involvement has been lacking 
the results have been selection of inappropriate or low-priority projects and 
project failure. 
3. The Project Committees in some areas have successfully encouraged local 
involvement and helped coordinate the activities of the different ministries 
involved in development projects. The techniques used by the more successful 
Project Committees should be documented so that they can be replicated in other 
areas, 
4. The revised version of the Programming and Implementation Management 
System (PIM) and the Field Staff Management System (F.S.M.S.) have both proven 
to be useful management devices. They should be retained and further modified 
as necessary. 
5. The Linkman system has proven useful when the officers serving as Linkmen 
are relieved of their other duties so that they can devote their full time 
to their SRDP responsibilities. It is also important that the Linkmen be 
enthusiastic about the goals of SRDP. Linkmen from the different ministries 
should meet together to work out their roles, coordinate ministerial activities 
and identify sources of funds. 
6. Technical advisors should be given clear terms of reference which indicate 
to whom they are responsible within the Kenya Government. The Ministry of Finance 
and Planning should carry out its intention to monitor.the activities of technical 
assistance personnel serving in the field. 
,19 - 37 
IDS/OP 12 
7. Rapid turnover of key SRDP personnel, especially Area Coordinators and 
Linkmen, has been extremely damaging to programme development and continuity 
and should be avoided. 
8. More emphasis needs to be given to the collection of data on SRDP projects 
and programmes to assist in evaluation and replication. 
9. Very little of the knowledge gained through SRDP experimentation and 
evaluation has been disseminated to SRDP personnel. The I.D.S. team found 
that few officers in SRDP areas had read the 1972 Evaluation Report, and 
measures should be taken to disseminate the present Report and other relevant 
information more thoroughly to staff in the field. 
10. SRDP central headquarters staff need to evaluate assumptions underlying 
proposed programmes to assure that prices, markets and policies taken as given 
by the SRDP Project Committees are realistic. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRICT PLANNING BASED ON THE SRDP EXPERIENCE 
Open-ended Matching Grants 
1= District Development Grants can be an extremely useful mechanism 
to enhance local development if they are made in the form of open-ended matching 
grants. Grants should be made by the ministries directly to the District 
Development Committees so that they can be sure of commanding sufficient resources 
to complete development projects without having to go back to the ministries for 
each specific expenditure. Open-ended grants will assure the District Development 
Committees that the projects they initiate can be completed, and will not be 
arbitrarily rejected at higher levels. Matching grants assure the involvement 
and cooperation of the local population demonstrated by the commitment of 
local resources to development projects. 
District Development Committees 
2. Those SRDP Project Committees which have been successful demonstrate 
that it is necessary to involve representatives of the local population, as 
well as administrators, in programme planning and review. If local involvement 
is to be maintained at a high level, the District Development Committees, like 
the SRDP Project Committees, will have to retain important decision-making 
responsibilities, and not function merely as an ornamental appendage to a 
system of 'top-down' decision-making. 
3. While it was possible for the Project Committees to include Chiefs 
and Assistant Chiefs, the inclusion of all these people on a district-wide 
committee would make the group too large and unwieldy. District Development 
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Committees will have to be made up of representatives of local groups who can 
report back to group members and elicit their ideas for development programmes 
to bring to the Committee. The Agricultural Village Committees which have 
been set up in Migori demonstrate how this system of representation might work. 
In order to assure that the District Development Committees will 
be able to implement the projects they have agreed upon, they must have final 
authority over the ministries concerning how their projects are carried out. 
Otherwise, a ministry could alter or subvert a project agreed upon by a 
District Development Committee. Where the Committees have control of funds 
through District Development Grants, this will be a strong incentive to the 
ministries to cooperate. The District Development Committees will hire services 
and rent resources from the ministries, so that the ministries can expect to 
profit from a cooperative relationship with the District Development Committees. 
District Development Officers 
5. If the District Development Officer is to be effective, he needs 
more information and authority than he has at present. He needs information 
such as timely accounts of expenditures made by the ministries in his district 
in order to keep track of their activities, and he needs authority to coordinate 
the different ministries' activities which are sometimes competing or conflicting. 
The experience of the SRDP Area Coordinators has shown that effective coordination 
is extremely difficult without the control over finances which would be provided 
by District Development Grants. 
The District Development Officer must also see the encouragement of 
local participation in development planning as his primary duty. Willingness 
to experiment and commit local resources will be stimulated by such involvement. 
The SRDP notion of replicable experimentation should survive in 
district development planning activities, and experiments should be monitored 
and reviewed to provide useful suggestions for projects or information on what 
to avoid. However, whenever suggestions for projects are passed from one 
district to another, it will be necessary to evaluate the local environments to 
see if they can actually be adapted with success. 
The District Development Officer should serve as the key individual 
for collecting information and disseminating it widely. He will also act as 
the chief executive for administering development grants and a gadfly encouraging 
local participation and effective decision-making by the District Development 
Committee. These roles have all been played by successful SRDP Area Coordinators. 
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Other Aspects of Distract Planning 
9= District Development planning should not be introduced into a 
district until a competent District Development Officer can be assigned 
and resources become available. District Development Officers should not 
be responsible for more than one district because their efforts cannot be 
successful if spread too widely.. It is also extremely important that 
District Development Officers, OT1C6 3.SS IL^iiSd. 5 remain in their posts long 
enough to be effective in carrying out their assignment. The rapid turn-
over rate that has been typical for District Officers and Area Coordinators 
is a severe impediment to their effectiveness. 
10. Labour-intensive activities Sm such areas as road construction, 
forestry and other piablic works, using underemployed local labour paid at 
the going local wage rates, can be successfully initiated and administered 
by the District Development Committees with the District Development Officers 
acting as executive officers. 
11. Where technical assistance personnel are attached to a district, 
the Kenya Government should make sure that they are given clear terms of 
reference stating that they will serve under the District Development 
Officer. 
IDS/OP 12 
19 - 40 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Amuzegar, Jahangir. Technical Assistance in Theory and Practise. 
New York, Praeger, 1966. 
2„ Belshaw, D. and Chambers, R. A Management Systems Approach to Rural 
Development. Discussion Paper No. 161, Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, 1973. 
3. Chambersj R, Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East 
Africa, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974. 
4. Harmon, Edward D. and Zalla, Thomas, A USAID Sponsored Evaluation of the 
Vihiga Special Rural Development Project. Nairobi, USAID, October 7 
to November 27, 1974. 
5. Hunter, Guy. "Development Administration in East Africa." Journal of 
Administration Overseas,. 4 1967. 
6. Institute for Development Studies- An Overall Evaluation of the Special 
Rural Development Programme. Occasional Paper No. 8. Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1972. 
7. Kenya- Development Plan 1970/74, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1969. 
8. Kenya. Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service Structure 
and Remuneration Commission). D.N Ndegwa, Chairman, Nairobi, 
Government Printer, 19'71-
9 Kulp, E, Rural Development Planning: Systems Management and Working 
Method. New York, Praeger, 1971. 
10, Oyugi, W. Ouma, "The Role of Technical Assistance in National Administra-
tion, The Kenyan Case." In Y, Tandon, editor. Technical Assistance 
Administration in East Africa. Uppsala, the Dag Hammarskjold Founda-
tion, 1973, pp. 102-123, 
CHAPTER TWENTY 
AN OVERVIEW OF PROJECT AND PROGRAMME 
FORMULATION IN THE SIX S.R.D.P. AREAS 
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In this final short chapter we attempt to present a brief overview 
of project and programme formulation in the six SRDP areas over the four years 
or so in which the Programme has been in existence, and to make a rough assess-
ment of its overall impact. What, first of all, would one hope might emerge 
from the Programme? 
1. The primary emphasis in the Programme is on experimental and replicable 
projects and activities: trying out new possibilities in SRDP areas with a view 
to replication elsewhere if they are successful. The first question to ask 
therefore is what success has been achieved in eliciting such projects. 
2. Apart from the experimental aspects, the hope would be also to produce 
better projects, or at least better formulated projects, together with better 
implementation of projects thus raising the 'success rate' among projects. 
This follows from the fact that the management system,with project phasing and 
tracking, has been a major element in SRDP. 
3° The Programme waS also intended to stimulate self-reliance and local 
initiative. 
We should hope also to find coordination of clusters of projects and 
perhaps integrated development of the SRDP areas as a whole. This would provide 
some guide as to how district planning should be organised, together with an 
indication cf its potential success. 
5- Finally, we would hope to find, partly as a result of integrated planning, 
some kind of development impact on the areas as a whole. With these objectives 
in mind, the current lists of projects for all the areas were examined. We 
begin, cn the basis of these, with a discussion of experimentrtion, continue 
with an evaluation of project quality, and of the extent of project coordination 
and integration, before concluding with some proposals for improved development 
planning which are suggested by the SRDP experience. 
EXPERIMENTATION AND REPLICABILITY 
Since one or more members of the I.D.S. team has inquired, into 
practically every SRDP project in each area, it has been possible, pooling the 
separate impressions gained of each project, to obtain a fairly broad under-
standing of the total SRDP activity. 
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Some projects and activities which were deemed experimental were 
as follows: 
All Areas 1. women's programmes 
2. functional literacy 
Vihiga 3. labour-intensive roads 
4. family planning programme 
5. maize credit scheme 
6. agricultural input supply 
7. tea expansion (credit element) 
Migori 8. stockist credit scheme for hybrid maize development 
9. group extension and agricultural village committees 
10. crop storage demonstration 
11. model dairy farms 
Tetu 12. dairy production experiment 
13. hybrid maize extension for less progressive farmers 
14. mobile family planning unit 
Mbere 15. health services extension project 
16. agri-service station (not strongly pursued) 
17. management and reporting system for extension staff 
Kapenguria 18. rural access roads 
This list is relatively short. Some of these have been minor activities, and 
some have not been particularly successful. It may be concluded that few 
projects have emerged from SRDP which Government has, been able to replicate 
or could consider now replicating in future in other areas of Kenya. 
Some explanation of the derivation of the list is necessary however. 
We might distinguish two categories of innovative projects: those which are 
purely experimental, in the context of Kenya as a whole, and which could, if 
successful, be copied elsewhere; and those which are innovative only in 
relation to the particular part of Kenya concerned. For example, the introduc-
tion of commercial pig breeding or groundnut production in Migori may be 
innovative for that area, but not in terms of Kenya as a whole. Similarly 
the introduction of sheep into Lelan is innovative for the area, though here 
there are some differences in the credit and supervisory aspects of the 
project. The chief criterion for the experimental/replicable category should 
be whether there is some element in the project itself or the way in which it 
is carried out which might be replicated in other areas, and it does not simply 
represent the exploitation of a resource limited to one area. 
19-3 IDS/OP 12 
Although only a limited number of projects are considered experimental 
and only a portion of these are deemed to have implications of more than local 
importance, nevertheless four of these projects have produced such significant 
findings that they alone are well worth all the expenditure on SRDP. These are 
the group extension and farmer training projects, the labour-intensive roads 
programme, the credit schemes and the Functional Literacy Programme. 
In the group extension and farmer training projects, it has been 
demonstrated that the effectiveness of extension officers can be multiplied 
by using group extension methods and farmer committees. Furthermore, it has 
been clearly demonstrated that the diffusion of agricultural innovations from 
most progressive farmers to the majority of the farm population is extremely 
limited. 
The labour-intensive roads programme has shown that underemployed 
rural labour can be effectively employed for major public works at less cost 
than would be Incurred using capital-intensive techniques. Moreover, it 
appears that a national cadre of labour-intensive road building and maintenance 
units can be formed and the necessary supervisory staff recruited. 
The SRDP credit projects have shown that credit is often less necessary 
than supposed in raising the agricultural productivity of small-holders, for 
large outlays on material inputs are frequently not essential. Furthermore, 
there are difficulties in securing repayment of loans to small-holders, except 
under conditions of effective loan administration and appropriate incentives. 
While credit facilities have a role to play, even more reliance than at present 
should be placed on the extension service, and in some situations temporary 
input subsidies to small-holders would be preferable to credit. 
Examination of the Functional Literacy Programme has revealed that 
if literacy is to be taught successfully on the national level the materials 
and teaching methods which have been used up until now will need to be re-
designed, A number of specific suggestions are made in this Report for an 
alternative approach to the teaching of literacy in Kenya. 
The results of the Women's Programme and family planning projects 
have been inconclusive. This does not indicate that these programmes are 
unimportant, but rather that the delivery system for Government services has 
not been developed adequately and that other approaches should be tried in 
future. 
PROJECT QUALITY 
If we turn from the number of fully experimental projects to the 
general quality of project formulation and definition, we can again obtain 
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some impression from the projects lists- The descriptions of the different 
SRDP projects listed are extremely poor. In many cases only general headings 
are given, such as livestock marketing in Kapenguria, adult education in Tetu, 
community development in Mbere, animal health and husbandry In Kwale and tea, 
coffee, pyrethrum, maize, dairy products in Tetu. The project lists do not 
in fact usually indicate what the specific activity or project is, let alone 
what aspect of it is innovative or experimental. Partly this is because the 
aim is simply to provide headings under which allocations of funds may be 
authorised by the Ministry of Finance and Planning. But it is also a reflection 
of a failure to clearly identify what constitutes a development project, and 
its effect has probably been to blur the distinction in the minds of the 
officers concerned between such projects and, for example, the normal activities 
of the department. The willingness of the Ministry of Finance and Planning 
to accept such poor definitions before allocating funds may also be indicative 
of a weakness in project formulation at the central level. 
If we examine the project lists we find a variety of items which 
fall outside the narrow definition oi development projects- We find some items 
of ordinary social expenditures such as a show ground in Mbere. There are a 
number of items which are listed separately as projects but are in fact component 
aspects of some other project or programme, and which themselves do not directly 
yield a stream of output or consumption benefits. Building cattle dips, for 
instance, may be part of a programme to prepare an area for the introduction 
of dairy cattle but cannot by itsejfcf be properly considered a project. The 
livestock staff build-up in Vihiga and the stock and milk census in Kapenguria 
are in the same category. Many other projects listed should more properly be 
considered to be part of the normal, ongoing activity of the departments concerned. 
These would include, for example, cooperative marketing in Mbere and Migori, 
water supply for domestic consumption in Kwale and Tetu, animal disease control 
in Migori and Mbere, artificial insemination services in Kapenguria, and 
expenditure on primary schools in Tetu. 
A number- of the programmes and projects, even if experimental or 
innovative, are not particularly confined to SRDP areas, and therefore cannot 
be said to have emerged from SRDP. This includes group ranching, village 
polytechnics, 4-K Clubs", day-care centres and poultry production. Other 
projects for which the Programme cannot claim credit are those which started 
in these particular areas before the SRDP itself was launched. Thus the 
Mi sreni Group Ranch project is listed under the SRDP although it was first 
mooted in 1967, Equally the Rural Industrial Development Programme, the 
operation of which does not coincide with the SRDP areas anyway, was planned 
and initiated before the start of the SRDP, 
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There are also a number of projects which are no longer being 
pursued, or perhaps were not in the end started, but which are nevertheless 
still listed. They include for instance a fruit nursery in Migori,.pig 
production and vegetable growing in Vihiga and a beef production experiment 
and "experiments in the promotion of commerce and industry" in Tetu. The 
expectation, in an active experimental programme, would be that the list 
content would change as projects are completed or deleted If unsuccessful, 
and new ones initiated. In contrast, the current list of projects in Tetu, 
for example, is identical with that of the original SRDP proposal put forward 
in December 1969. 
There are a number of good reasons for those rather unsatisfactory 
listJ to h&we emerged. There is a natural tendency for the local areas to 
attempt to impress headquarters with evidence of their activity by producing as 
long a list as possible. Contributing to this also has been the attempt to 
find SRDP projects in all sectors, that is in practically all aspects of social 
and economic development, even if in some fields it was not likely that any 
very new approaches might be found. Partly this was an attempt to involve all 
officers in the area in the exercise. Much more, it was an attempt by the 
Area Coordinator and his team to use the SRDP to obtain additional funds for 
the area, and for as many different developments as possible within the area. 
For example in Migori all the ministries are listed first of all, and then 
projects listed under each of these heads. Thus project lists do not attempt 
to identify specific activities but to provide sub-heads with the minimum 
description necessary for the allocation of funds. 
These factors partly explain the nature of the lists. But there is 
also another reason: a frequent ignorance of the supposed nature of the SRDP, 
or even of what can properly be defined as experimental, and perhaps more 
fundamentally an absence of ideas for useful experimentation. The Ministry 
of Finance and Planning appears to have insisted in only a mild way on 
experimental content in the projects which it was tun ring, but what is more 
surprising, considering that this has been Kenya's central rural development 
programme over the past four years, is that the central ministries did not 
take the opportunity themselves to suggest possible experimental innovative 
activities which the areas might take up.. The number of activities Initiated 
centrally rather than locally is not large. Women's groups and functional 
literacy are examples. While decentralisation of decision-making was one 
objective of SRDP, it seems that a greater effort should have been made to 
ensure sufficient experimental and innovative conten: in the programme. 
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In addition, the ministries have not been alert to the national 
implications of SRDP projectsjlocal SRDP officers need guidance on national 
markets and national policies which may be in conflict with their proposed 
projects. 
On the positive side, SRDP projects have had a considerable beneficial 
impact on local development. For example, more is known now about cropping 
strategies for medium potential areas such as Mbere and successful new crops 
have been introduced in several SRDP areas such as hybrid maize, tobacco and 
soya beans. These developments would probably not have occurred as quickly 
without SRDP planning and resources, Where projects have had less impact, it 
is likely that district or divisional administrators have not been fully committed 
to SRDP. In the chapter on SRJP administration it was observed that many SRDP 
officers, including Area Coordinators, have been tied down to other duties so 
that they could not devote their full time to the development and supervision 
of SRDP projects. Nevertheless, SRDP projects have not, on balance, been less 
successful than other Government development projects. It also seems that the 
integrated planning made possible by the Area Coordinators, the Project Committees 
and the plan/replan exercises has produced benefits which would otherwise not 
have been possible. 
INTEGRATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
The successful integration of development projects includes several 
different aspects. For one thing, development planning should have continuity 
over time and a clear planning horizon of several year's duration. To enhance 
the cumulative Impact of a project, planners and administrators must be aware 
of past accomplishments and long-run goals. From these considerations, the 
intermediate objectives and steps can be derived which will lead to small but 
positive incremental effects over successive time periods. 
A second aspect of project integration is the involvement of local 
people. Little of permanent value will be accomplished unless the people who 
are meant to benefit from a project can identify with the objectives and 
mobilise local resources. 
A third aspect is the division of tasks among the different field 
workers in a particular local area. For broad and comprehensive development 
efforts to be successful, field officers must understand their duties in 
relationship to the programme as a whole; they must be willing to cooperate 
and coordinate with officers from other ministMes. 
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Finally, the ministries themselves must integrate their development 
plans and programmes in order to achieve common goals. Otherwise, delays in 
some areas will frustrate efforts elsewhere. 
Sequential Development 
I.D.S. researchers found only limited attention to time-phasing in 
project planning and implementation. Rather than planning cumulative stages 
of a project which could reasonably be expected to be reached over a period 
of two or three years, Project Committees tended to set themselves unrealisti-
cally ambitious goals for the current planning period and give little or no 
thought to the steps which should follow present activities. 
Ea^jj SRDP project included a static list of elements, and little 
attempt had been made to determine how success or failure of one component of 
a project would affect the other elements. Nor was the time-phasing of the 
activities planned in advance. One example of the limitations of a short time 
horizon occurred in Migori where careful phasing would have made it possible 
to develop roads gradually using labour-intensive techniques, thereby creating 
local employment. However, since local enthusiasm for road construction was 
not anticipated or planned for, roads had to be built in a hurry, using capital-
intensive methods. Similarly, cattle dips were built in various areas without 
taking into consideration the long-run responsibility for developing mechanisms 
to assure that the dips would be maintained. 
Integration of Activities in the Field 
Several instances have been pointed out in this Report in which field 
workers from different ministries failed to combine resources to carry out a 
project successfully. For example, officers responsible for functional literacy 
programmes and women's programmes found it difficult to obtain the services of 
extension agents to assist in the development of demonstration plots or other 
activities. In Vihiga, it proved difficult to interest the local Agricultural 
Finance Corporation office in administering the loans which it had made through 
SRDP. Finally, there is no indication that personnel in charge of developing 
new products for rural industrialisation projects ever consulted other 
ministries or the local population to determine just which products were needed 
and would find a ready market. 
19 - 8 IDS/0P 12 
Integrated Development Planning 
There have been partial attempts in some areas to produce integrated 
development plans. In Kapenguria, for example, it was originally planned to 
develop a trade network between the lowland area, where livestock production 
would be put on a more commercial basis, and the highland area where crops are 
produced." In Kwale, a 'sequential master plan' has been devised, which, however, 
amounts to little more than a general proposal. In Migori, both a master water 
plan and a development plan have been formulated. While some examples of 
coordinated activities can be identified, there are perhaps more frequent 
instances of lack of coordination: in Mbere there has been little coordination 
among water development, land adjudication and range management activities, 
and in Vihiga the rural industry promotion efforts of Partnership for Progress 
and the Rural Industrial Development Programme have not been coordinated. 
Although in some cases it has proven difficult to coordinate projects to reach 
a common development goal, in other instances effective coordination has been 
achieved. For example, in Migori, officers from the Forestry Department and the 
extension service joined forces to promote the production of wood fuel, used 
to cure tobacco, at a rate consistent with the planned expansion of the tobacco 
crop. In Vihiga, the introduction of a papain processing plant was coordinated 
with the development of the papaya crop. However, the plant was introduced by 
a private firm from outside the area, not by the initiative of the Project 
Committee. The development of 'growth centres' in Kwale was coordinated to some 
extent with road construction and the development of water supplies; in Kapenguria 
the intensification of crop production, as a long-run concept, was coordinated 
with the soil conservation programme; and for the hybrid maize extension project 
m Tetu, farmers' training, extension, credit provision by the Agricultural 
Finance Cooperation and the provision of inputs through the cooperatives were 
all fully coordinated. 
It could be argued that the SRDP has fallen between the two stools of 
experimentation and innovation on the one hand, and integrated area develop-
ment on the other. While the available finance was hardly sufficient to 
support integrated programmes which might have a major development impact in 
each area, the absorption of a considerable proportion of funds into the normal 
ongoing activity of the various ministries operating locally reduced the amount 
available for genuinely experimental or innovative projects. Projects satisfying 
one of these two objectives are not likely to satisfy the other very directly. 
This plan was based on an overly optimistic view of the proposed 
commercialisation of the lowland area. See the 1972 SRDP Report, Appendix A. 
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Infrastructural projects such as roads may be basic to integrated area develop-
ment, but take funds away from experimental activities. Purely experimental 
projects being tried out with a view to possible replication elsewhere are 
by their nature not likely to have a large immediate impact. The kind of 
projects which may contribute more to integrated development at the local level, 
apart from infrastructural projects, are perhaps those which involve the introduc-
tion of activities new to the area but which have been successful elsewhere 
and are not of the purely experimental type. 
Examples also exist where the absence of integrated planning resulted 
in entirely inappropriate projects. In Vihiga, pigs were fed maize which was 
needed to feed the local population. Coordinated planning would have indicated 
that a livestock project dependent on the generation of local crop surpluses 
was premature. In Mbere, hybrid maize and cotton production were introduced 
before adequate experimentation had been carried out on a spectrum of crops 
appropriate for dry areas, and the results were not successful. 
In conclusion, we may say that integrated development is difficult 
to achieve, and the obstacles are not always easily identified. The SRDP 
experience has shown that more emphasis needs ^o be placed on the long-term 
coordination of the activities of the various change agents in the field. This 
requires that projects are phased over a period of several years, that the 
functional division of responsibilities among ministries is properly understood, 
and that field workers are informed about broad programme concepts and motivated 
to support each other:'s activities. 
These objectives have been partially met in some SRDP areas through 
innovations in administration. Area Coordinators convened Project Committee 
meetings in order to replan local programmes, and in some cases critical 
discussions took place which represented an integrated review of proposals. 
However, there was little integration of the day-to-day activities of field 
workers. In only a few cases the Area Coordinators were able to integrate 
these activities by meeting with the various officers who needed to work together. 
CONCLUSION: SOME REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
Experimental SRDP projects and the experience of decentralised 
development planning at the divisional level have produced some useful insights 
concerning successful development strategy and the nature of effective Govern-
ment support. 
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1. The number of genuine experimental and innovative projects has been 
somewhat circumscribed, and too large a proportion of SRDP funds has been spent 
on normal ongoing ministry activity, so that the conclusion to be drawn is 
that efforts to incorporate an innovative element into district development 
programmes should be increased, not reduced. In other wor J the problem is 
that the aims of SRDP have not been carried far enough. This implies that 
normal administrative arrangements are inadequate for this purpose and should 
be improved to incorporate the best Jglements of the SRDP approach. 
2. The importance of the role of a planning and coordinating officer 
at the local level has been made clear. The Area Coordinators have supervised 
development projects, identified and overcome problems and bottlenecks, and 
generally provided an extremely ivaluable broad perspective on development 
efforts and the role of different Government officers in the field. 
3. It has become obvious that more attention must be given to improving 
communication and mutual support among the various officers representing 
different ministries in the field. A series of short-term workshops might be 
held as an experimental training device to increase the awareness of Government 
officers of the interdependency of their roles. Workshops could be held to 
coordinate the roles of the various officers involved in the Women's Programme 
and in agricultural extension, and also workshops could make officers aware 
of the more complex relationships between livestock and crop extension activities 
With improved communication, the real contradictions and gaps in ministry policie 
tend to come to light. 
Local involvement is critical to the success of development efforts. 
In Migori, the enthusiastic efforts of local farmers committees achieved results 
which could not have been obtained by Government alone, even if financial 
support were very much greater than it has been so far. Local participation 
in the construction of roads and cattle dips has shown that valuable community 
resources can be mobilised for development if properly organised. The fact 
that lack of capital is still a frequent constraint, in spite of special funds 
available through SRDP, underscores the need for innovative projects, such as 
labour-intensive road construction, which utilise local resources. 
5. Strong Project Committees which are actively involved in decision-
making can provide the means for communication among different ministries and 
with the local people which is essential for coordinated planning. 
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6- More accurate time phasing of projects can be achieved if the 
directors of each project are required to report periodically on the implica-
tions of their progress for other related projects. 
7- Better coordination of projects which involve more than one ministry 
would be made possible by district development grants which place fiscal 
responsibility in a local administrator, such as the Area Coordinator, and by 
grants made on the basis of performance in an integrated task. 
The SRDP experience has made clear that no single development 
strategy is appropriate for all areas. Great attention must be given to the 
special features of each local area before cropping patterns, ranching schemes 
or other efforts at increasing production are introduced. Yet some general 
recommendations can be made for rural development strategies in all areas:-
1. Efforts should be directed to the average farmers rather than to the 
minority of most progressive farmers, 
2. Recommendations should be geared to the risk of drought and other hazards 
rather than assuming that the conditions for crop and aniaax production will 
be ideal. 
3. Attention should be given both to the economic return from innovations 
and to the effects on the wellbeing of individuals, families and communities. 
4. Thorough project planning, management of implementation and follow up are 
preconditions for the success of projects. Often specific projects must be 
coordinated with the programmes of different departments, ministries or 
institutions. 
5. Finally, given limited resources and the difficulty of increasing per 
capita incomes in the face of rapid population growth rates, it is clear that 
effective family planning activities must be an integral part of any realistic 
development strategy. 
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APPENDIX: S.R.D.P. PROJECT LISTS2 
KAPENGURIA 
Ministry of Agriculture 
1. Livestock marketing 
2. Group Ranching 
3. Dip construction 
I. Artificial Insemination services, Mnagei 
5. Fodder and ley establishment 
6. Sheep development, Lelan 
7. Bull camps 
8. Stock and milk census 
9. Minor rural water supplies 
10. Bee and honey development 
II. Maize demonstration 
12. Coffee demonstration 
13. Pyrethrum bulking 
14. English potato bulking 
15. Soil conservation 
16. Farmer training 
17. Home economics 
18. Rural youth development 
Department of Social Services 
19. S.R.D.P. training and education 
20. Women's groups 
21. Functional Literacy 
22. Community development self-help 
Ministry of Works 
23. Rural access roads 
Ministry of Lands and Settlements 
24. Land adjudication 
Department of Cooperatives 
25. Cooperative production credit scheme 
26. Cooperative maize store 
2. These lists are the ones which were in use in December 1974. 
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Ministry of Health 
27. Environmental health water supplies 
Administration 
28. Coordination 
VIHIGA 
Agricultural and Livestock Production 
1. Dairy cattle and milk production 
2. Livestock staff build-up 
3. Pig production 
4. Poultry production 
5. Agricultural credit 
6. Hybrid maize 
7. Agricultural inputs supply 
8. Demonstration plots 
9. Fruit and vegetable production for cash sale 
10. Crop extension experiment 
11. Coffee and tea expansion 
12. Fruit and vegetable marketing cooperatives 
Supporting Services 
13. Road 
14-. Telephone 
15. Water supplies 
16. Functional literacy and adult education 
17. Farmer training 
18. Land Adjudication 
Coordination and Publicity 
19. Coordination 
20. Community development 
21. Information services 
Other Programmes 
22. Rural industries development centre 
23. Village polytechnics 
24. Fruit and vegetable processing 
25. Medical services 
26. Family planning 
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TETU 
Agricultural and Livestock Production 
1. Tea, coffee, pyrethrum, maize, dairy products 
2. Beef production experiment 
3. Pig and poultry production 
4. Bananas and other subsistence and cash crops 
5. Intensive extension 
6. Agricultural credit 
7. Cooperative marketing 
8. Special 4-K youth training programme 
9. Dips 
Supporting Services 
10. Water supplies (a) Tetu, Thegenge (b) Zaina (c) environmental health 
water points 
11. Roads 
12. Farmer Training 
13. Adult education 
14. Information services 
Education 
15. Primary schools 
16. Nursery schools 
Health 
17. Medical services 
18. Environmental health projects 
Social Services 
19. Social halls 
Experimental Programmes 
20. Rural industrial development centre 
21. Village polytechnics 
22. Experiments in promotion of commerce and industry 
23. Community development 
24. Coordination 
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MBERE 
Livestock Production 
1. Livestock production 
2. Ranches 
3. Bee-keeping 
Dips 
5. Livestock improvement 
6. Disease control and supervision 
Agricultural Production Programme 
7. Cotton 
8. Cotton blocks 
9. Tobacco 
10. Mexico 142 pea beans 
11. Castor 
12. Katumani maize 
13. Ishiara irrigation scheme 
14. Agri-service station 
15. Trials and research 
16. Intensified extension 
17. Credit and inputs 
Supporting Services 
18. Land Adjudication 
19. Cooperatives 
20. Roads 
21. Water supplies 
22. Health services 
23. Post and telecommunications 
24. Farmer training 
25. Adult education 
26. Information services 
Industry, Commerce and Construction 
27. Rural Industrial Promotion Centre, Embu 
28. Building construction 
29. Quarrying 
30. Community development 
31. Coordination 
32. Evaluation and research 
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KWALE 
Ministry of Agriculture 
1. Mwereni ranch - development and economic evaluation 
2. Animal health and husbandry 
3. Central tree crop nurseries 
4. Coconut nurseries in S.R.D.P. area 
5. Sugar cane nursery in S.R.D.P. area 
6. Kikoneni Sugar outgrowers S.R.D.P. associated project 
7. Crop processing and marketing study 
8. Agricultural service centre 
9. Buildings 
Ministry of Health 
10. Health centre - Kikoneni 
11. Health education and environmental sanitation 
Ministry of Works 
12. Additions to classified road network 
13. Construction and maintenance work on minor and secondary roads 
Department of Cooperatives 
14. Reorganisation of the existing Kwale Farms cooperative 
15. Setting up of a Farmer's Cooperative Society at Kikoneni 
16. Setting up of a Fisherman's Cooperative Society at Msambweni 
17. Cooperative training 
Department of Social Services 
18. Training and seminars for local leaders 
19. Women's group leaders courses 
20. Functional literacy projects 
21. Community development self-help projects 
22. Day care centre projects 
23. Sectoral projects, i.e. self help on specific jobs such as cattle dips, 
access roads, clinics, etc. 
24. Students holiday programmes 
25. Housing and staff requirements 
Water Development 
26. Phases I and II (Bumbani, Mrima, Mwanai yamala); Phase III (Mwangunda, 
Mnasasini) 
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Land Adjudication 
27. Ongoing national level project: co-ordination of land adjudication work 
with programmes of other departments, especially agriculture in the 
S.R.D.P. areas. 
MIGORI/KIHANCHA 
Ministry of Agriculture 
1. Model dairy farms 
2. Livestock marketing (not phased) 
3. Pig demonstration 
4. Dips programme 
5. Animal disease control 
6. Water development 
7. Hybrid maize 
8. (i) Tobacco nurseries; (ii) tobacco 
9. Cotton production 
10. Groundnuts production 
11. Rice 
12. Fruits nursery 
13. Crop demonstration plots 
14. Harm management 
15. Farmers training 
16. Field days farmers and transport 
17. Stockist inputs 
18. Beans demonstration 
19. Agri-service centres 
20. Crop storage 
21. Home economics 
Ministry of Health 
22. Development of health centres 
23. UNICEF water scheme 
24. Vector control 
25. Mobile health clinics 
26. Housing (at Kihancha health centre) 
Ministry of Works 
27. Feeder roads 
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Department of Cooperative Development 
28. Cooperative reorganisation 
29. Cotton marketing 
30. Groundnut marketing 
31. Tobacco 
Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife 
32. Fisheries 
Department of Social Services 
33. Training 
34. Women's groups 
35. Adult education 
36. Nursery centres 
37. Self-help 
38. Youth centres and village polytechnics 
39. Completion of staff housing 
40. Sports and culture 
41. Stadium show ground 
Ministry of Natural Resources 
42. Nursery and depots 
43. Hilltop planting 
44. Demonstration plots | 
45. Forest farmers 
Ministry of Power and Communication 
46. Airstrips 
47. Telephones 
48. Electrification 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement 
49. Land adjudication 
50. Land registration 
51. Town planning and development 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry No projects listed 
Ministry of Home Affairs No projects listed 
Ministry of Education No projects listed j 
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Table 15. Economics of cotton production. 
1. yield in kg/hectare 
2. output @ 1/85 per kg. 
Production level 
low average high 
170 250 1,000 
315/- 463/- 1,8 50/-
3. seed 
4. fertiliser 
5. sprays and dusts 
6. other costs 
12/50 
10/-
12/50 
60/-
20/-
12/50 
300/-
360/-
40/-
total variable costs (3 to 6) 22/50 92/50 702/50 
8. gross margin per hectare (Z minus 7) 292/50 370/50 1,147/50 
9. labour mandays/hectare (average) 
seedbed preparation 60 
planting 40 
weeding and spraying 70 
harvesting 25 
other tasks 30 
total mandays 22 5 
10, gross r.arjin per manday (8:9) 1/64 
Remark: Yields among farmers are generally low but they could be increased 
considerably by good husbandry; 2,000 kg/hectare is possible. 
Cotton can be grown in the drier areas where many other 
crops with higher gross margins can not be cultivated. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CROP PRODUCTION IN TETU SRDP" 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the original SRDP draft, the Tetu agricultural programme 
was to emphasise extension, credit and marketing. (3, p. 22) The crop 
development project per se was supposed to consist of demonstrations of new 
crops.(4, p. 5) 
The 1970 District Annual Report had little to say about SRDP. 
(8, p. 48) The 1971 Report (9, p. 130-131) mentioned various 4-K projects 
and the extension and farm budget project. The 1973 Report (10, p. 76-77) 
mentioned 4-K projects, the extension, training and credit scheme, and the 
farm budgeting scheme.1 Through 1973, therefore, any crop development that 
took place did so by means of: (a) the 4-K club projects (b) the Home 
Economics (H.E.) Club kitchen-garden projects and (c) the hybrid maize 
extension, training and credit project. These projects all served as 
demonstrations to neighbouring farmers. The 4-K projects were supported 
by UNICEF funds. In general, these projects involved previously introduced 
crops such as hybrid maize, M 142 beans and vegetables. Only in 1973 did 
M.O.A. personnel try any new crops, and these were certified potatoes, 
capsicum and passion fruit. It was only in 1974 that the crop development 
project, as originally envisaged with new crops, was promoted by SRDP 
personnel. (See Table 1 for demonstrations actually Implemented.) 
A general description of Tetu Division can be found elsewhere, 
(1) Major crops mentioned for Central Province in 1963/64 with hectarage 
in brackets were: coffee (1191), tea (254), pyrethrum (400), macadamia nuts 
(64), tobacco (130, including local varieties), plums (40), hybrid maize 
(4,600), local maize (1,400), banana (950), beans (1,600), E. Potatoes 
2 
(750), grass (7,446) and fodder crops (930). (3, p. 20) If this list is 
then compared with crops grown in Tetu Division in October 1974 (Table 3), 
* The author is grateful to B. Johnston, S. Schonherr and E.S. Mbugua 
for their suggestions. 
1. There was no 1972 Report available in the M.O.A. library. 
2. There is some question as to the accuracy of these figures. Also, 
several food crops have been omitted. 
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or In Nyeri District as a whole (Table •+), the only new crop mentioned 
appears to be passion fruit. 
Considering Tetu first (Table 3). some increase has occurred in 
area undercoffee and tea since 1968 and under hybrid maize. For Nyeri 
district as a whole (Table 4), increases have taken place in tea, macadamia 
nutshybrid maize. E. potatoes and beans. Unfortunately, confirmation of 
the above trends using estimated marketed production (Table 5) was not 
possible given the poor quality of data available from the annual reports. 
Tea; wheat and milk production have definitely Increased and M 142 appears 
to have increased (Table 6). Looking at the number of growers involved 
(Table 7) gives some confirmation of these trends, especially in the case 
of coffee and tea. Further confirmation is obtained by looking at the 
estimates of total crops sold from Nyeri district (Table 8). The only data 
which appear reliable are for major cash crops ana milk, 
CROP PROGRAMMES 
Maize 
Hybrid maize has been a major concern of SRDP personnel since 
1972. In the Gathano rains of 1972 (mid-June), the hybrid maize extension, 
3 
training and credit project got under way, with 216 farmers out of a 
total of 225 selected low income farmers. (1, abstract and p. 3) This 
number increased to 582 farmers in the long rains of 1973, dropped to 189 
in the Gathano rains of 1973,and the number involved in the long rains of 
1.974 was not known by the Agricultural Land and Farm Management Officer 
F..M,0, ) 3 Tetu SRDP., 
Initial problems were encountered with a release of funds by 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (A-F.C.). Nonsecured loans were then 
made through SRDP to participants in order to purchase sufficient 
fertiliser and seed for one acre plots. As of the end of 1973, repayment 
This project is part of the intensive extension portion of Tetu 
SRDP, Detailed description and analysis can be found in (1) and (2) 
and in the section of this report on "Agricultural Extension and Farmers 
Training". 
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of these loans stood at 80 per cent. Given the fact that the Nyeri branch of 
the A.F.C. made no attempt to collect these loans in the field4 and that 
farmers had to travel to Nyeri to repay the loans, this repayment level seems 
very high. According to one annual report (9), farmers were initially 
confused as to whether they had to pay back these loans or not. 
In any case, hybrid maize acreage seems to have increased in Tetu 
since 1970/71 and in Nyeri District as a whole (Table 3 and Table 10), 
though the available data are of variable qualitjr, The number of bags 
marketed through the Maize and Produce Board has been quite small in Nyeri 
District 
as a whole (Table 5, 6), but this does not take into consideration 
marketing through local sales. 
This project is experimental in that it is directed towards low 
income farmers and gives unsecured loans. According to the Provincial 
Planning Officer (P.P.O.), Nyeri, a similar project is now underway with 
Napier grass in Kirinyaga District. It is thus being replicated elsewhere. 
It is not clear why it is not being replicated in Tetu SRDP or Nyeri District. 
One reason given is lack of SRDP funds for participant training at the 
Wambugu Farmer Training Centre (F.T.C.), but the real reason may be that 
SRDP personnel felt that the 80 per cent repayment rate was not high 
, 6 enough. 
Another reason stated by the A.L.F.M.O., Tetu SRDP, was that 
farmers wanted to shift from hybrid maize to E. potatoes or beans as the 
weather is too risky. This does not appear to have been the case in the years 
under review, i.e. 1972, 1973, 1D7W (Table 2). Other problems mentioned in 
the Annual Reports were: not enough seed available except through 
cooperatives, variable rainfall, and credit not available to buy seeds. 
However, maize seed supply through stockists should have been adequate, 
7 rainfall is said to be dependable for one good maize crop but not two, 
Information supplied by Mr. E.S. Mbugua, I.D.S., University of 
Nairobi. 
5. Even though they all had filled out A.F.C. application forms 
according to Mr. Mbugua. 
6. The Area Coordinator expressed this view point during my visit to 
Tetu SRDP prior to this evaluation exercise. 
7. According to Mr. Mbugua. 
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and credit needs would remain the same for any crop. Supplies of certified 
E. potato seed would also be a problem9 though present estimates of its 
gross margin/ha. for Nyeri District (Table 9) appear to be more favourable 
o 
that for hybrid maize. Beans do not appear to yield as well as maize with 
good rainfalls but they may give higher yields than maize when rainfall is 
light. Therefore, they would be a good alternative crop in rotation with 9 maize after the good rains, 
At present^ SRDP is completely subsidising demonstrations of M 142 
beans on one acre plots carried out by two farmers in Thegenge and three in 
Aguthi location, according to the A.L.F.M.O., Tetu SRDP. 
Passion Fruit 
The annual report for 1971 (7) does not mention this crop. 
However, the monthly report for October 1974 (5) mentions 6 ha. under 
passion fruit in October 1973, 5 ha. in October 1974 and an expected 20 ha. 
by the end of 1974. 
This sub-project was a combined effort: the D.A.O, initiated it, 
the SRDP Area Coordinator was involved in the planning stages and the A.A.O. 
carried out the implementation. In 1974, 344,000 seedlings were produced 
in four nurseries at the Tetu coffee cooperative. Through a combined 
effort of all J.A.A.s and A.A.s, farmers were being recruited In late 1974 
and early 1975 to plant passion fruit. Seedlings were thought to be 
sufficient for 190 ha. Effort are being concentrated on farmers In Aguthi 
location because this borders Mukurweini location where the M.O.A. is 
expanding passion fruit production. Marketing is through a juice extraction 
factory in Thika. 
According to estimates made by the A.L.F.M.O., Tetu SRDP, this 
crop has a favourable gross margin/ha. (Table 9, column 2) which appears 
Average yield for E. potatoes (95 bags/ha. at 43/~/bag); hybrid 
maize (28 bags/ha, at 65/-/bag): local maize (19 bags/ha, at 65/-/bag); 
beans (6 bags/ha. at U0/-/bag). (6) 
9' According to Mr. Mbugua, The Gathano rains are dependable in 
Muhoyas, Tetu, and upper Thegenge locations of Tetu Division and the 
long rains are dependable in Aguthi and lower Theg^nge locations. 
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to exceed that for hybrid maize. Yields range from 15,000-30,000 Kg/acre 
using 100 Kg. of single superphosphate per acre. Prices as of November 
1974 were shs 0/33 per Kg. 
Problems seem to arise from varied cultivation methods which 
result in a wide range of potential yields probably due to lack of 
familiarity with this crop. In addition, initial capital costs are high if 
trellis wire is used to support the plants. However, since 1972, the 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (H.C.D.A.) in Karatina has been 
providing loans for trellis wire. The availability of credit, an assured 
marketing outlet and an ample supply of seedlings should go a long way to 
help diffuse this crop. 
Other Crop: Projects Involving SRDP Personnel 
Beans: Pure stands are uncommon. Intercropping with maize is the norm. 
In 1974-j SRDP personnel began demonstrating pure stands of M 142 and 
soya beanso Yields presently range from 4-6 bags/ha., varieties are numerous 
and aphids and bean fly are the main insect problems. 
There is a need to know which varieties are best suited to what 
area and which are most productive economically and nutritionally. Prices 
are quite gooda varying between shs 100-200/- per 90 Kg. bag depending on the 
season and the market. 
Sweet Pepper (Capsicum): This is a new sub-project which began with some 
demonstrations in the short rains of 1973. In December 1974, 172 farmers 
were selected to plant about 100 acres. The A.L.F„M.0., Tetu SRDP initiated 
the project and it is supported by the Ministry of Agriculture. The objective 
is to take advantage of a newly developed processing plant in Kiganjo, 
Mount Kenya Agro-Industries Ltd. This firm is providing several services that 
are advantageous to the farmers: 
1. Extension advice on capsicums; 
2. Convenient small packages of seed and fertiliser 
sufficient for -J- acre plots; 
3. Convenient collection by lorry at milk collection points; 
4. Seed and fertiliser distribution on the collection lorry at 
favourable prices; 
3 - 6 
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5. Monthly payment from the collection lorry; 
6 o A fixed future price for the season, the same price for all 
grades; 
7, Farmer representative participation in management 
discussions at the factory. 
Estimated gross margins/ha. are shs 2,400/-, This crop 
bottom land that tends to be rather moist. Farmers in the area have 
experience with the crop as there used to be a processing plant in Karatina. 
English P ; ..j; Acreage is increasing in Tetu SRDP area and in Nyeri 
District as a whole. SRDP 4 c l u b s planted local varieties of this crop 
in 1973, The F.A.O. is doing very few field trials in Nyeri District, 
even though demand exceeds supply. In an attempt to overcome this deficit, 
the A,L,F,M.0., Tetu SRDP is trying to produce certified seed potatoes 
(B 53) with 50 farmers, each planting \ acre plots during 1974/75. SRDP 
is extending loans to these farmers for this purpose. 
The major problem is a shortage of certified (bacterial wilt-free) 
B 53 seed, Another problem is that there have been few experimental field 
trials in local areas. Other problems are susceptibility to fungal blight 
unless treated with fungicide,, and poor marketing arrangements. Marketing is 
especially difficult on settlement schemes (not in the SRDP area) where a 
greater part of production takes place, Gross margin/ha. appears very 
favourable (Table 9), especially as more certified seed becomes available. 
Fodder Crops: These include Napier grass, sweet potatoes, fflai>igbld, fxidder 
beet, lucerne, banana leaves, corn stalks and silage. 
SRDP demonstrations on these began in 1974/75. Certainly, some 
diffusion occurred prior to this without formal demonstrations, especially with 
Napier, sweet potatoes and the use of leaves and stalks. Sweet potatoes 
have been grown locally for many years as a famine food crop. With the 
expansion of the dairy industry and the high cost of purchased feeds, the 
tops are becoming a popular dairy feed. Banana acreage was estimated at 
500 ha. in 1973, yielding roughly 200s000 bunches per year valued at-around 
K£50,000. These stalks are commonly used for pig feed in the Far East and 
perhaps could be used for this purpose here. 
7 
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Recommendations for bananas include the stimulation of pure 
stands, the use of new varieties and the organisation of marketing and processing 
activities. Many varieties of sweet potatoes are now grown with generally 
poor cultural methods and low yields. More research is needed to pick out 
the better varieties10 and to experiment with pure star.'s. The advantages of 
sweet potatoes are that they can be used for both human and animal consumption 
and that they are relatively adaptable to erratic weather conditions. 
Other crops also used as fodder and famine crops are cassava, 
yam and colocassia. They also merit research attention. 
In 1974, some attempts were made to demonstrate the production 
of silage for dairy cows using Napier grass, maize stalks and Nandi 
Seteria, 
Projects not Involving SRDP Personnel 
Coffee: This is the major cash crop in Tetu und in Nyeri District. Recently 
there has been some slight expansion of acreage in Tetu. Average yields were 
733 Ks/ha.11 in 1973/74 and the gross margin/ha. was estimated at shs 1,160/ 
(Table 9). Most of Tetu Division is in the coffee zone so that there is 
room for more expansion. Present cooperative membership is 6,000 in 20 
sub-locations of Tetu Division. Production fluctuates quite widely, 
primarily due to erratic weather conditions. Thus production was: 
549,990 Kg. in 1970/71, 290,412 Kg. in 1971/72, 883,717 Kg. in 1972/73 
and 914,154 Kg. in 1973/74, all from the same acreage. Local marketing is 
through the Coffee Board of Kenya in Nairobi, and coffee factories in each 
12 location of Tetu provide credit to cooperative members. 
10. Very promising high-yielding varieties are available from the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (I.I.T.A.) in Nigeria, 
according to Dr. B. Johnston, I.D.S. 
11. 914,154 Kg from 1,245 ha. valued at K£274,590 in 1973/74. 
12. Contrary to some other coffee areas, farmers here are paid through 
the Nyeri Farmers' Cooperative Bank and thus delays in payment are minimised 
(Personal Communication from Mr. E.S. Mbugua). 
8 
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The main problems are: (1) variable quality and yields due to 
erratic weather and (2) congestion at the factories. Little can be done 
about the former, but better organisation can solve the latter. 
Tea: There has been a steady expansion in smallholdings since 1959. 
Vegetative propagation began in 1970. The Kenya Tea Development ut>ority' 
(l.T.D.A. ) fertiliser credit scheme provided 7,919 bags N.P.K.(nitrogen, 
phosphate, potassium) in 1971 and 7,729 bags in 1973 to farmers. Barazas 
to promote sales and good management, and field demonstrations are numerous. 
Production in 1972 in Tetu was 798,066 Kg, and in 1973,it was 837,716 Kg 
(on 1635 holdings or 523 ha., giving an average yield of 2,569 Kg. per ha.), 
but 1971 yields were affected by drought. Evenly distributed rainfall is a 
major problem. A ca:ra;'g:. to grow more tea initiated in 1973 seems to be 
having some results. Smooth leaf collection during the rains is hampered in 
some places by poor roads. 
Pyrethrum: Acreage seems to have remained fairly static. Average yields per 
ha. are around 250 Kg. The gross margin as of 1973 was comparable to tea, 
but the extension services of the K.T.D.A. seem to be more activ-. and efficient. 
The supply of high-quality seeding material is inadequate, and pyrethrum 
competes with fodder crops that are grown for dairy production, especially 
in the upper areas of the division. 
Given the excellent gross margin per ha. for milk production as 
compared to all other crops (Table 9), it would appear that fodder crops are 
at an advantage over pyrethrum. Yield of pyrethrum in 1973 was 74,242 
Kg. valued at K£ 2,648 compared to 24,478 Kg. in 1972 and 40,275 Kg. in 1971. 
Production appears to have been erratic over the last few years. Pyrethrum 
is marketed through the Pyrethrum Board in Nakuru. 
Macadamia: Acreage has remained constant in Tetu over the past few years. 
Marketed production was 926 Kg., valued at K£ 530 in 1973. The grades were 
poor due to poor drying techniques. Macadamia was started in 
Tetu in 1965, and by 1971 good yields were 4 Kg/tree from about 500 tree/ha. 
The nuts are graded from 1 to 5, and in 1974 prices varied from 11/- per Kg. 
to 3/50 per Kg. No disease problems have been encountered. 
The main problems appear to be: (1) Marketing, which is being "one 
through the coffee cooperativ- societies with sales made to the Kenya Nut 
20-25 IDS/OP 12 
Company, and 12) Quality control affected by poor drying techniques. Grafting 
of planting material is also expensive, and there are no credit facilities 
for smallhold ers The gross margin/ha. (after coming into production) in 
1973 was at least double that of coffee or tea (Table 9), the two leading 
cash crops, and labour requirements are much less.(11) It would be encouraged, 
possibly by providing credit facilities for planting and allowing delayed 
payments until production begins after four to five years. 
Vegetable Crops: Home economics (H.E. ) personnel have been responsible for 
encouraging women to grow kitchen vegetable gardens, and 4-K personnel have 
encouraged vegetable plots. Estimated acreage and production figures were 
unavailable, but acreages in Tetu, in 1973 were: onions (25 ha.), tomatoes 
(43,4 ha.), carrots (20.3 5 ha.) and cabbages (104.7 ha.). In addition, one 
or two farmers grew french beans. 200 H.E. Club members were assisted by SRDP 
in growing various vegetables In 1973 on \ acre plots. The crops grown were: 
cabbage, carrots, string beans, peas and tomatoes. 4~K club members in Tetu SRDP 
also grew 777 plots in 1971, 63 5 plots in 1972 and 526 in 1973. 
The main growing areas are Math Ira Division and on settlement 
schemes. In June 1972, the Horticultural Crops Development Authority (H.C.D.A.) 
Karatina packing and grading station was opened. In 1973, total production 
graded for Nyeri District as a whole was: tomatoes (831,253 Kg., shs 394,854/-), 
capsicum (24,138 Kg., shs 20,199/'-), cauliflower (10,095 Kg., shs 6,915/-), 
french beans (623 Kg,, shs 518/-), chillies (38 Kg., shs 36/-) and onions 
(10,052 Kg., shs. 5,973/-). 
Onion acreage has been limited to 20 ha. by the H.C.D.A. since 
1971. Yields vary from 7 - 12,5 tons/ha., and demand is greater than supply 
in the District, Cabbages and carrots have been common in settlement 
schemes, but poor roads have affected marketing. In addition, production 
is limited by lack of irrigation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Tetu SRDP crop development project was supposed to demonstrate 
new crops. Up to early 1974, little had been done in this direction. Only 
in the 1974/75 season was there any emphasis on new crops, especially cash 
and fodder crops. 
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However, crop development took place as part of other project?, 
These were the hybrid maize extension-training-credit scheme, the 4-K hybrid 
maize and M142 bean projectsand the H,E. club kitchen vegetable gardens in 
1972 and 1973, None of these crops were new to the area, and all projects 
were stimulated by outside funding. 
In terms of crop development, it is not clear just how successful 
these latter projects have been. The maize extension scheme exposed several 
thousand farmers to hybrid maize, using unsecured loans for about 1,000 
farmers over the duration of the project. It was experimental in being 
directed towards low-income farmers and in using unsecured loans. The 
repayment level was 80 per cent by the end of 1973. This project is being 
replicated in Kirinyaga District according to the P.P.O. , Nyeri, using 
district development grants for Napier grass. But it is not being 
replicated in Tetu SRDP. If it was successful, why not? 
The 4-K crop and vegetable projects initiated numerous plots, 
all of which produced fair harvests except for beans. But by the end of 1973 
219 out of 350 loans remained outstanding, giving a repayment level of 37 per 
cent.(10, p. 76) Funding was through UNICEFf -: the end of 1973, and no 
projects were planned by SRDP for 1974/7 
The H«E» kitchen gardens were experimental. Although the extent 
of the project was limited, vegetable production was enhanced. It is not 
clear whether this project has generated continuing, self-financed interest 
in kitchen gardens for 1974/75 since SRDP financial assistance ended in 1973/74. 
Nor is it clear whether the extra vegetables produced were used for home 
consumptions thus having a direct effect on nutrition, or whether they were sold 
locallyj thus having an indirect effect or possibly no effect on nutrition. 
In all three cases, no replication is taking place in Tetu SRDP 
itself. This seems to infer that unless funding from outside donors Is 
forthcoming, these projects are not considered worthy of replication by 
Tetu SRDP and might therefore be called unsuccessful.' 
Very little field work has been done with food crops such as beans, 
sweet potatoes, cassava, yarn, colocassia, local potatoes and local maize. 
Nor has much been done with tree crops such as macadamia, banana, mango, 
and citrus. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. More effort should be directed towards experimenting with and 
selecting new cash, fodder and food crops. 
2. More efforts should be made to select better varieties, optimise 
cultural practices13 and organise marketing for local food crops. This would 
diminish the risk attached to adopting cash crop production, or other 
commercial agricultural enterprises. 
3. The economics of crop production, pure and Intercropped, should 
be studied in detail for a representative sample of farmers In Tetu Division. 
Accurate, up-to-date data would be useful in making farm management 
recommendations, Thus it appears that hybrid maize should be grown during 
the dependable rainy season, and rotated with other crops in the less 
dependable rainy season. 
The maize extension-training-credit scheme should be replicated 
in Tetu SRDP using a variety of crops. The training element could be 
modified in order to' simplify the approach and lower the costs. 
e 5., Given the nutritive importance of beans in the local diet, 
a special effort should be made to select economic and nutritious varieties 
for each local area, 
6. The value of establishing more small agro-processing firms in 
Tetu Division, should be explored, 
7. High yielding varieties of sweet potatoes should be obtained 
from the I.LT.A, for field demonstrations, as well as any other Improved 
varieties which would be of value locally, 
8. Small holders should be encouraged to grow trees crops, 
Macadamia and a variety of bananas are the obvious choices, 
9 SRDP field demonstrations should be carried out under 
conditions which farmers can replicate. 
13. For example,, rainfall probability data might be used to make 
seasonal estimates of optimal planting dates for each crop in each local 
area. 
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10. SRDP field demonstrations should as far as possible emphasise 
the success rather than the number of plots. 
11. Replication of 4-K and H.E, projects should be encouraged, 
giving more attention to a smaller number of successful plots rather than tc 
large numbers of failures. 
12. A careful analysis should be made to see whether or not SRDP 
personnel are involved in too many duties. There is some indication that the 
location of SRDP headquarters in Nyeri, the district capital, has meant 
that SRDP personnel become involved in district c _. r". 
13. Given the multiplicity of crops and the shortage of research 
funds and research personnel, some method of selecting the most promising 
crops (cash, fodder, food) should be attempted. 
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Table 9. Estimated average gross margins/ha,, selected crops, Nyeri District, 
1973 (Kshs). 
GM/ha GM/ha GM/ha/yr 
Crops Per crop per year less labour 
H. Maize 558 l,116a 228 
All Beans 431 862 r Jl J 
Cotton? 210(?) 420(?) —375(?) 
Tobacco 3,445 3,445 1,945k 
Tomatoes 1,470 2,940 1,020 
Cabbage 1,693 3,386 1,378 
E. Potatoes 1,250 2,500 710 
Wheat 379 758 247 
Pyrethrum 1,300 1,300 926 
Coffee 2,600 1,160 
Tea - 1,330 925 
Macadamia - 2,555 2,390 
Passion Fruit - 1,130 485 
Dairy - 4,540 4,120(?) 
Source: M.O.A., Land and Farm Management Division, District Guidelines, 1973, 
p, 26-28. This was before the recent dramatic rise in fertiliser prices. 
a. It is improbable that two crops of H. Maize would lead to a doubling 
of GM/ha. This is due to the fact that often there is only one 
dependable rain in an area, for example, the Gathano rains in Muhoyas, 
Tetu and Upper Thegenge locations of Tetu Division and the long rains 
in Aguthi and Lower Thegenge location of Tetu Division. (Personal 
correspondence from Mr. Mbugua.) 
b. Assuming 300 man days at 5/- per day. 

IDS/OP 12 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CROP DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH KWALE DISTRICT SRDP: 
AN APPRAISAL AND GUIDE FOR ACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The South Kwale SRDP includes foup Locations, Msambweni (population 
20,113), Kikoneni (12,14-0), Mwereni (12 ,839) and Shimba South (13,631). This 
evaluation report deals with "chose projects in the Kwale SRDP coded as Ministry 
of Agriculture (M.O.A,) Projects which in one way or another are related to 
crop production. There are eight such projects on record: (1) The central 
tree crop nurseries in Mtwapa, (2) The coconut nurseries near Msambweni, (3) 
The sugar cane nursery in Kikoneni, (4-) The Kikoneni sugar outgrowers scheme, 
(5) The agricultural growth points and extension experiment project, (6) The 
crop processing and marketing 'projected' project, (7) The agriservice centre 
project and (8) The buildings project. The last four of these are service 
projects, meant to support the first four which are direct crop production 
projects. In this chapter reference will also be made to those cooperative 
projects that impinge on the success of the integrated crop production programme 
under discussion. The rest of this chapter contains a project by project 
discussion encompassing project descriptions and objectives, determinable 
benefits and assessable problems, No attempt is made to assess the economic 
or accounting costs as some of the inputs, especially personnel, are not 
uniquely engaged in SRDP and there is no record of what proportion of their 
operating time is spent on SRDP and what proportion is spent on the ordinary 
business of the Ministry of Agriculture, The last section contains a set of 
recommendations regarding whether or not to strip some or all of the projects 
of their SRDP status. This is done on the basis of the terms of reference as 
well as the known SRDP principles and objectives. 
THE CENTRAL TREE CROP NURSERIES 
Location and Description 
The nurseries are located in Mtwapa, North of Mombasa Island, out of 
the four administrative Locations where the SRDP is being implemented. The 
location of the nurseries is an old Ministry of Agriculture experimental site 
and what was done to accommodate SRDP here was to expand the site and increase 
the range of seedlings as well as to provide more irrigation facilities. The 
SRDP project includes specifically mangoes (900 seedlings), apples (460), 
sweet oranges, mandarin oranges, ]emons, coconuts, limes and seedless grape-
fruit (actual numbers were not obtained for the latter six categories). 
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Project Objective 
The major project objective was to increase and improve the range 
and standardise the husbandry of fruit grown, on the SRDP farms as well as to 
lay a foundation for a future fruit canning and juice and oil extraction 
industry. 
Benefits 
Like other Ministry of Agriculture nurseries, the central tree crop 
nurseries have provided farmers with well bred planting materials, Mango, 
apple, coconut and orange seedlings are sold without any major sales promotion 
campaign. But, strangely, most of these are sold out of the District and 
therefore out of the SRDP area. Because this is so, the benefits have accrued 
to people and areas other than those in the SRDP. There is no record of which 
farmers pur-chased what seedlings 1 
Lim.es are a very new introduction in the nurseries, and so it is 
not possible to assess any of their benefits yet in the context of SRDP. 
Grapefruit, seedlings are not being marketed at all. They are new to most: farmer 
and., without an aggressive marketing and extension programme, the seedlings 
are becoming too old to be transplanted to the field.. Apart from the few 
labourers employed on site, one can hardly see any benefits that may have 
accrued from the foregoing project subcomponents. 
Some Problems and. Overall. Assessment 
Some of the seedlings, especially the lemons, are being attacked 
by a disease which affects the roots in particular and has not been identified. 
One SRDP principle, research and evaluation, has not been invoked to solve 
this problem. 
Beyond the environmental problems, the major shortcoming of this 
project is that it is not integrated into the general SRDP programme. From 
a purely production point of view, there is no question about its general 
success. Since it is not linked In any definite way to such SRDP projects 
as the agricultural growth points and extension experiments and it is not 
located in the SRDP area, this project has failed to meet SRDP principles and 
objectives. There is nothing experimental about growing more seedlings of 
already developed varieties on an. already developed site; replicating such 
a project would simply entail giving experimental stations more money, and 
it is difficult to see the extent to which this project in the SRDP area has 
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led to increased use of existing resources. The project has hardly had any 
perceptible positive output effect in the SRDP area. Nor can we say that 
it has reduced unemployment to any significant degree, especially since none 
of the labourers came from any of the Locations designated as SRDP areas. 
In addition extension aspects have been completely overlooked. Finally, 
although another SRDP objective is decentralisation of decision-making authority, 
such decentralisation should not be carried so far that the Agricultural 
Assistant based in Msambweni, who was knowledgeable about all the other projects, 
knew very little about the nurseries at Mtwapa, 
COCONUT NURSERIES IN MSAMBWENI 
Description 
This project consists of two adjacent coconut nurseries with a 
total size of about one acre. The nurseries are located just outside of 
Msambweni township. Project implementation began in June 1972. It hac been 
planned to begin in April of the same year, but funds were not released on 
time, Project implementation is still in progress. Since seeds are planted 
and seedlings are sold once a year., at the time of the evaluation (December 
1974) only the first phase had been completed, i.e. planting and selling the 
first output. 
Project Objectives 
The objective is to raise good quality coconut seedlings for sale 
to local farmers in. a nursery located centrally in the major coconut growing 
area- Since these seedlings are of superior quality (compared with those 
raised by individual farmers) it was hoped that their availability coupled 
with a good extension effort would lead to the replacement of old unproductive 
trees on the farms. In the long run, this could also lead to an overall 
expansion of acreage. 
Benefits 
At the time of the evaluation, 141.2 ha- had been planted with 
seedlings obtained from the nursery. This has formed a basis for improved 
husbandry in the area, although this effect tends to be neutralised by in-
adequacies in the extension system. This project may also have increased 
the number of those gainfully self-employed in the District. 
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More direct benefits have been, in the form of utilisation, of local 
resources. Ail planting materials were obtained locally and. labour was hired 
locally to carry cut the necessary production operations such as planting 
and weeding. There are five labourers, and watchmen. Local leaders have also 
been involved, along with M, 0.-.A., officers, in 'selling' this project to the 
people.-
Some Problems and Overall Assessment 
The. weather has created some marketing problems for the project, 
Because of an unexpected drought before the end of 1974, farmers had stopped 
planting and so had not bought up the second crop of seedlings 
All in all, the project has been successful, but it has not been 
fully integrated, with other agricultural projects which would have enhanced 
its success. This project: might have been treated as part of an overall 
experiment and linked with other projects such as extension experiments and 
the agriservlce centre.- As it is, only those farmers who find out about 
these nurseries on their own come to buy seedlings, and there is no systematic 
extension, follow-up. Following the SRDP experimentation principle, we should 
have a controlled experiment to see whether the availability of planting 
materials at the right planting time and at subsidised prices would improve 
husbandry and lead to the replacement of dead and unproductive trees with, the 
superior seedlings raised in the nurseries- As it is now, we only assume that 
since The seedlings were bought, these objectives were accomplished. 
SUGAR CANE NURSERIES AT KIKONENI AND THE KIKONENI SUGAR OUTGROWER SCHEME 
Description 
These are listed as two projects (the sugar cane nurseries and the 
K ikon en i sugar out grower scheme), but they are essentially part: and parcel 
of each other, as is indicated by their simultaneous failure. 
The nurseries are made up of mature sugar cane which is ready to 
process. They are located at the centre of a sugar cane growing area 
where existing small growers are being encouraged to increase their production 
and those nor yet growing sugar cane are being encouraged to adopt the crop. 
This extent!or. effort is the sugar cutgrower scheme. 
Objectives 
The project objectives were to overcome the shortage of planting 
materials and to bring the planting materials to the small-farmer sugar out-
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grower area near Ramisi Sugar Estate, From a longer term point of view, this 
project was to act as a stimulus for increases in acreage planted to cane for 
the production of white sugar, 
Implementation began in January 1972, six months later than planned. 
The project was subsequently held in abeyance after the seedlings were grown, 
in the nurseries due to problems which arose in the outgrower section of the 
project. 
Benefits 
Some local labour was employed (numbers not. specified) to prepare 
the nurseries, but only ten farmers received seedlings from the nurseries. 
Most of the sugar cane will be sold to Ramisi Sugar Factory by SRDP, and the 
proceeds will revert to the Programme^ but this is very different from the 
anticipated benefits. 
Problems and Overall Assessment 
The two subcomponents had to be effectively integrated to ensure 
success, and money should not have been committed to the nurseries until the 
potential problems in the outgrower section were resolved- These problems 
stem from the farmers' production decisions. 
Before planting sugar, a substantial outlay has to be made on land 
preparation, often including tractor hire services. This is one area in the 
production chain where farmers need credit, Unfortunately the A.F.C. dees 
not include land preparation in calculating the required sums to advance 
farmers for production, This problem was communicated to the highest officials 
in the Ministry of Agriculture, but no steps were taken to save the project. 
In addition, the donor representative and project advisor were never in favour 
of this project. One. wonders whether better cooperation with the local 
Ministry of Agriculture officials would not have saved the project. 
AGRICULTURAL GROWTH POINTS AND EXTENSION EXPERIMENT 
Description and Location 
Thirteen farms were selected in the SRDP area from different ecological 
zones as agricultural growth points for purposes of demonstration. They are 
located in Kikoneni , Kikombero and Mwenamanyala, 
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Objectives 
Agricultural growth points were designated as experimental foci for 
concentrated loan and extension effort to foster mixed farming and accelerate 
development, particularly employment and output per unit of cultivated land. 
These focal points would then serve as 'bush schools' for the rest of the 
farmers. 
Benefits 
So far only thirteen farmers have been involved in this experimental 
extension project, and there is evidence that all these have increased their 
output as a result But this project has been inequitable in some cases. 
For example, a very rich farmer in Kikoneni has been a beneficiary rather than 
the more needy small non-progressive farmers. We also seriously doubt that 
these selected farmers act as effective demonstrators for others. This 
problem, is discussed more generally in Chapter 8 of this Report which deals 
"with agricultural extension. 
Problems and Criticisms 
Project implementation started in September 1973, but had been 
planned for January 19"2 This was mainly due to the fact that no procedure 
had been specified for the selection of model farmers. The funds to be used 
in the experiment were not released as farmers could not qualify for secured 
loans without Title deeds. The selection of farmers has been completed and 
so has the farm survey and planning stage, but the provisions of funds (loans) 
to participating farmers has not been completed. So the project is still in 
progress, 
In principle, the evidence provided by the Agricultural Assistant 
indicated that 'progressiveness' or non-progressiveness of a farmer was not 
one of the criteria for selection. In actual fact, many participants in 
the project are well-to-do farmers, including one with a very modern farm 
in Kikoneni which is well over 20 acres„ Apart from the equity aspect, there 
should be objective criteria by which to chose participants in this experiment. 
Lack of farmer selection criteria has reduced the effectiveness of this very 
important project, which should include elements of experimentation and be 
aimed at improving the extension services. 
Several questions can be raised: 
1 Why did extension experiments devolve on more progressive farmers when 
that factor was not to be one of the selection criteria? 
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2, Does the growth points strategy imply a group approach - farmers being 
selected from one geographical area which Is designated as a growth point? 
3- Is there any empirical indication that concentrating extension, training, 
credits and other efforts on growth points (for a long period) will have a 
better impact on the whole farming community than other extension strategies? 
THE CROP PROCESSING AND MARKETING STUDY 
Implementation of this project has not started. 
Objective 
This project was meant to be a production and service project in 
the SRDP crop production programme. It was supposed to start with a feasibility 
study to determine whether a factory can be usefully set up to process the 
fruit that already grows at the Coast, as well as any new varieties of fruit 
introduced through the central tree crop nurseries. This processing would 
take the form of preparation for canning and/or extraction of juice and oil. 
Assessment 
The project has never been implemented and this has created a potential 
bottleneck in. the prospects for long-term output of the fruit industry, especially 
for new varieties of fruits such as grapefruit which may not easily find a local 
market. 
THE AGRICULTURAL SERVICE CENTRE 
This project has not yet been implemented. 
Objective 
The agricultural service centre is meant to be developed and equipped 
to provide services such as tractor hire and fertiliser. In the long run, it 
would also provide farming and cooperative training. 
Problems 
There has been lack of co-ordination in choosing a site for the 
agricultural service centre as well as releasing the necessary funds. 
THE BUILDINGS PROJECT 
Description 
Houses and offices are to be constructed, mainly at Msambweni. 
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Obj ectives 
The project objectives were clearly to provide accomodation and 
offices for SRDP staff based in Msambweni, 
Benefits 
Eleven staff members ha^e been housed. The project also provided 
some employment to local labourers in construction and preparation of building 
materials, especially breaking and grinding stone, The number of labourers 
employed was not obtainable. 
Problems 
The implementation of this project has been completed in spite of 
an initial delay because of late release of funds from the Ministry of Works. 
Transportation of materials was also delayed and contractors did not finish 
on time, • 
For the offices, the project subcomponents were not well integrated 
to facilitate provision of water for the sanitation system. The toilet facilities 
at the site constitute a health hazard. Poor co-ordination between the Ministry 
of Works and contractors also lead to the unnecessary involvement of Ministry 
of Agriculture officers in construction duties. 
Finally, there is no fund provided for building maintenance, so 
necessary repairs are not being carried out:, 
ADMINISTRATION 
The Kwa ie SRDP has clearly suffered from a history of inappropriate 
administration, The Area Coordinator was diverted substantially to non-SRDP 
activities. Furthermore, project planning has tended to be imposed from the 
top and from the donor adviser, without effective involvement of local people 
to determine their perceived needs and available resources. 
Attention to development of the Project Committee as an effective 
problem-solving group could do much to focus effort in this SRDP area on more 
truely experimental and high-priority activities. 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
By this assessment, only two out of eight projects have had anything 
ciose to success, and of these only one deals with crop production directly. 
Two have actually never been started and two were abandoned. It would not 
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make sense, therefore, to judge the results of an experiment which has not 
yet really begun. It Is recommended that the SRDP crop programme be main-
tained and reactivated. The recommendations to reactivate it on the basis 
of the foregoing analysis are in two categories: those specifically renting 
to each project and finally those relating x 0 the agricultural programme as 
a whole. 
Specific Project Recommendations 
There is nothing especially experimental about the central tree 
crop nurseries in Mtwapa or the coconut nurseries in Msambweni, The Ministry 
of Agriculture has always operated agricultural experimental stations with 
nurseries,ana it is difficult to see what is special about these- As noted 
earlier, the central tree crop nursery is located very far- north of the SRDP 
area. This makes the transport costs of potential purchasers from the SRDP 
area unnecessarily high and may explain why all the output of the nurseries 
has not been purchased and why . ost of the purchased output goes out of the 
SP.DP area- Nevertheless, the provision of superior seedlings to improve the 
future stock of t 2 T S S S I S COrQTT16nCLa.D le, It is therefore recommended that:-
1- The central tree crop nurseries be retained as an SRDP project; 
2r These nurseries be relocated in the SRDP area and the seedlings 
sold to farmers in this area only. Extension service should be 
provided to keep up with the progress of the farmers who purchase 
these seedlings; 
3, The Horticultural Crops Development Authority should be urged 
to market the newly introduced varieties, especially grapefruit; 
In order to make long-term plans for the fruit industry at the 
Coast and to provide a larger market for fruit, a feasibility 
study should, be undertaken immediately to establish the 
viability of the projected SRDP crop processing plant; 
5, The coconut nurseries should be retained within SRDP but should 
be integrated with the current (but relocated) central tree crop 
nurseries to form one project; and 
6. Research, should be carried, out to prevent future disease attac] s 
on seedlings in the nurseries. 
The sugar- cane nursery in Kikoneni together with its projected outlet, 
the Kikoneni sugar outgrewers project, needs to be continued, but with the 
following stipulations:-
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1= The planning and timing of the two related projects must be 
strictly co-ordinated. The seedlings must be ready and marketing 
well planned when the potential outgrowers are ready to plant; 
2, Previously, farmers spent their meagre capital funds for land 
preparation for which they could not get credit under the 
loan terms prescribed by the Agricultural Finance Corporation. 
Land preparation should be regarded as an essential input, 
just as fertiliser , and farmer credit should explicitly be 
calculated to include this cost; 
3. The Kwale farms co-operative project (D,0C, 1) must be 
strengthened, especially, to provide a tractor pool and 
fertiliser inputs, and at a later stage transport of cane 
to the Ramisi Sugar Factory 
The agricultural service centre project should be implemented as 
part of SRDP, but closely integrated with the agricultural growth point and 
extension project, 
1, The SRDP authorities must obtain the necessary authority to 
purchase land on which to develop the site; 
2, This site should be located in as poor and unprogressive an 
agricultural area, as possible so that it can function as an 
agricultural'growth point'; 
3, The agricultural growth point and experiments project should 
be restructured to be explicitly directed to the less progressive 
smallholders. 
The buildings project, though now completed, must be provided with 
allocations for recurrent expenses and possible capital development, Buildings 
should be maintained in good order and toilet facilities should be made 
operational,. 
P^ecommen.dations for the General Agricultural Programme 
1. Project objectives and implementation procedures should be 
brought into line with SRDP principles and objectives even 
if this entails additional costs, . This would avoid the type 
Of project implementation strategy such as that adopted for the 
central tree crop nurseries. 
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2„ Better integration of projects is called for. At present the 
agricultural service centre and the growth points projects on 
the one hand, and all four crop production projects on the 
other hand, are implemented in isolation. All these must be 
implemented to reinforce one another in order to generate the 
desired critical minimum effort to uplift less progressive 
farmers in the District. 
So far the Programme has not had much impact on rural development. 
If these recommendations are followed, perhaps the SRDP agricultural programme 
in Kwale could be more successful, . . .-ever, should Government decide to terminate 
these projects as part of SRDP, their integration into the Ministry of Agri-
culture's ongoing programme poses no problem. The entral tree crop nurseries 
project and the growth points project are already manned by Ministry of Agri-
culture officers who can continue their work, and the sugar cane nurseries and 
outgrower scheme and the agricultural service centre are already not being 
implemented. The buildings can be given to the District administration and 
they can be maintained by the Ministry of Works. 
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APPENDIX: FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION ON COORDINATION AND PLANNING PROBLEMS., 
The Central Tree Crop Nu-series 
Information gathered in Kwale in October 1975 indicates that this 
project is suffering from further administrative and planning problems. 
Shs x95j500/- were allocated to this project in 1972/3 and Shs 127,880/90 were 
actually spent, However, this money was spent on the SRDP Central Tree Crop 
Nursery at Mtwapa outside the SRDP area, and on the Ministry of Agriculture s 
settlement project at Lama, 150 miles north of Mombasa with no relationship 
to SRDP whatsoever. 
Due to poor planning, Shs 8,000/- were provided to dig a borehole 
to supply irrigation water for the nursery at Mtwapa, but no additional 
funds were provided to construct a casing to protect the borehole walls. 
As a result the borehole collapsed in early 1975.- There were no plans as of 
October 1975s either to dig a new borehole or to move the nursery to a 
more suitable site within the SRDP area. 
The Sugar Cane Nurseries at Kikoneni and the Kikoneni Sugar Outgrowers Scheme 
Poor coordination of efforts to Increase sugar production in this 
area has had serious consequences. A number of farmers (more than the ten 
original participants in the pro ect) ploughed a considerable acreage for 
planting sugar, using private tractor hire services or hiring tractors from 
the Ramisi Sugar Estate. When it came time to plant, it was discovered that 
the planting material available in the nurseries was not nearly sufficient 
for the acreage ploughed. Neither SRDP nor Ramisi personnel were able to 
help the farmers find enough planting material, so the farmers decided to 
plant maize and sesame (simsim) instead. 
There are also problems concerning the transport of harvested cane 
to the factory. The cane is transported by private lorry operators and by 
the Ramisi Sugar Company, but many farmers consider the transport charges 
so high that sugar production is unprofitable. 
Finally, there have been problems concerning the grading policy 
at the Ramisi factory, A farmer must send a sample of his cane to the factory 
for grading In order to receive a permit. A number of farmers have been 
refused permits, which means that their whole crop is lost. Farmers and 
agricultural officers interviewed are of the opinion that the Ramisi Sugar 
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Company wants 10 discourage small farmers from growing sugar cane and would 
prefer to enlarge Irs own estates. Those interviewed proposed that all cane 
should be accepted and that an impartial inspector shouJ.d be appointed to 
grade the cane. 
Agricultural Growth Points and Extension Experiment 
A number of farmers were given loans to buy grade cattle and poultry, 
and farm layouts were drawn for them. However, the farmers in the Mbamba part 
of Kikoneni do not have water, and the water supply at Kikoneni does not 
reach them because water is inadequate at the source. This has created 
serious problems for participants in the project from this area. Some farmers 
have used their own ingenuity to cope with these difficulties: for example, 
one farmer used his loan money to buy goats since they require a minimum 
supply of water; he Is also growing two acres of maize and sesame. From the 
proceeds of these crops he hopes to repay his loan. Another farmer bought 
drought oxen and a plough, and he plans In this way to grow maize and sesame 
on an increased acreage and thus co repay his loan. 
Other farmers at Mwenyamanyala were selected to receive loans, but 
they cannct raise grade, cattle because their area is Infested' with tse-tse 
fly. If the project is to succeed in this area, bush clearing to eradicate 
tse-tse will have to be carried out first. 
Still other farmers were given loans with which they bought poultry 
feed and constructed poultry houses. Then no arrangements were made for them 
to obtain chicks, so all their efforts were in vain. 
Concluding Remarks 
According to information received in the field, some SRDP personnel 
in Kwale have been reluctant to coordinate their activities with the office 
of the Provincial Director of Agriculture. As a rerult, the PDA Is not 
Informed about many SRDP activities, Some of the officers interviewed were 
of the opinion that the provincial headquarters was not involved in the 
planning and administration process because certain officers, especially the 
programme advisor, wanted to carry through with their own ideas without any 
outside interference. 
in general, planning seems to have been carried out with little 
actual knowledge of local conditions, More local participation in the planning 
process could have eliminated many of the problems which were created. As a 
minimum, consultations with the officers of various departments would have led 
to more appropriate project planning. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CROP PRODUCTION IN MBERE SRDP 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Mbere Special Rural Development Programme" was initiated in 1971. 
Several houses were constructed, three expatriates hired, three vehicles and 
Ministry of Agriculture (M.O.A,,) personnel appointed and programming and phasing 
of projects and subprojects was carried out. (4) During 1972, the agri-service 
station was constructed and some equipment purchased. (5) However, little was 
done in terms of agricultural projects except for some demonstrations (Table 1) 
due to a delay in implementing a loan scheme by the M.O.A. Thus at the time of 
the Review/Replan in 1973, the authors stated that achievement of one of the 
immediate original objectives, increasing agricultural production, was "almost 
insignificant" (13, p.2), and that should the SRDP be discontinued on schedule 
in 1973/74-, "it will leave the area largely without any anticipated results at 
all", (13, p.15) The SRDP was then extended to 1975/76, and crop programmes 
were rephased for the 1973/76 period.. Demonstrations had been made in 1973 
but were total failures due to poor rainfall in the long and short rains (Table 2). 
One of the primary objectives of SRDP was to increase agricultural 
production. The agricultural programme got off to a bad start as shown above. 
In spite of this, however, cash crop acreage has increased for Katumani maize 
and M14-2 beans (Table 3). Cotton acreage has been highly variable, while castor 
acreage does not include uncultivated hedges. The only new cash crop is sun-
flower, which was introduced In 1973, 
Some confirmation of the increase in maize and M142 beans Is obtained 
from estimated marketed production figures for Embu District as a whole over the 
past 10 years (Table 4-).. Major cash crops of concern to SRDP are numbers 1 to 6 
in this table, The trend In sales for Mber-e Division was probably similar to the 
district-wide trend. 
Special Problems for Mbere Division and other Medium Potential Areas 
This is definitely a difficult environmental area primarily due to the 
erratic rainfall pattern. Few research results are now available which relate 
specific crops to optimal local planting areas. Some work has recently been done 
in this regard by NORAD agronomists attached to Embu Research station. Definite 
efforts must be made to devise local moisture conserving practises which would 
also serve as soil conservation practises. In addition, greater emphasis should 
I. See D. Hunt (1) for a description of the area in terms of physical and 
economic potential. 
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be placed on understanding local variations in resource potentials and con-
straints that would influence the comparative advantage of alternate crops. 
In particular, systematic trials with crops adapted to such areas as this, 
especially sorghums and millets, should be quickly launched. Plant materials 
may be available from ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics, Hyderabad, India). 
CROP PROGRAMMES 
Cotton 
In 1971, 5 cotton blocks of 4-0 hectares (ha.) each were to be prepared 
using the tractor hire service of the M-O.A. ; '70 ha, were actually prepared but 
only 18 ha- were planted. This project was then discontinued., (11, p.60) An 
attempt to re-start the block approach was made in 1973 when SRDP was meant to 
manage a 95-acre block, This block was ploughed but not planted. The reasons 
2 for discontinuation have not been clarified,, 
Cotton had been grown in Mbere Division for many years prior to SRDP. 
Projected acreage for 1974/75 was somewhat less than that planted in 1969/70 
(Table 3). Problems specific to 1974/75 were red spider on 70 acres, poor boll 
ripening during the year due to long rains extending late, and drought on 
demonstration plots. Another major problem was poor availability of loans 
for small farmers growing one-half to one acre plots, 
There are few data available on how labour requirements for cotton 
compete with those required for food crops. Present estimates attribute higher 
labour requirements to cotton than to most food crops, a higher gross margin/ha-
than sorghum or millet, but a lower one than grams, M14-2, or Katumani maize. 
Average returns/ha,, on the other hand, were higher for cotton in 1972/73 than 
for maize, pigeon peas, or cowpeas (Table 5), while in the 1973 short rains 
Hunt (1) found that from a sample of 201 households the average return/ha. was 
717 shso, 567 shs. and 505 shs« for a maize mixture, millet mixture and cotton 
respectively. Rainfall was inadequate for this period (Table 2), Recent price 
increases in 1973/74 raising A.R. grade from 1/3 5 to 2/- per Kg. and B.R., from 
0/67 to 1/- per Kg., should help increase planted acreage. Unfortunately 
erratic rainfall patterns and lack of applied local research on optimal planting 
methods and dates have resulted in rather static production acreage"3 in the 
recent past, 
2» A detailed discussion of the cotton block project can be found in 
the first I„D,,S, evaluation of SRDP (3, p. 26, and appendix C-l). 
3- Higher cost of fertiliser has affected availability and use in local 
areas for all cash crops. A 50 Kg, bag of double superphosphate cost 43/- in 
Nov. 1973, but 153/- in Nov., 1974 in Embu town. 
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Since there is little potential for growing irrigated cotton in Mbere 
SRDP, greater production would appear to depend on optimal planting methods and 
finable planting dates based on rainfall probability figures, on development 
of labour-saving ox-drawn implements or the use of more labour from local 
resources, on more extensive cultivation, i.e. planting larger acreage, or on 
variety improvement and selection. 
Katumam Maize 
This project has few innovative elements. Demonstrations and adoption 
began prior to 1966/67. In 1967, the Oxfam Katumani maize project supplied 
seeds for 250. one-acre demonstration plots which gave an average yield of 10 
bags./acre. (.6, 7) Acreage planted to local maize seems to have declined in 
Embu District between 1969 and 1973 (Table 6) while that of Katumani maize, 
grown mainly in the middle and lower areas of Embu District, seems to have 
increased (Table 3 and Table 6). F.A.O., SRDP and 4-K demonstrations of 
Katumani maize have been numerous in Mbere Division since 1971 (Table l). 
These have used fertiliser and insecticide when few local farmers can afford to 
use either of these inputs. 
Several problems stand out. Stockists in Mbere Division had no 
Katumani seed for either the short rains of 1973 or the long rains of 1974. 
Shortages also existed in the preceeding year. Certainly gross margin per ha. 
for Katumani maize compares favourably with that for other food crops such 
as beans and grams and is higher than that for sorghum or millet. However, 
erratic rainfall patterns cause rather frequent high losses due to drought. 
Thus, when rains are adequate, return per ha. for maize mixtures (i.e. inter-
cropped) is around 717 shs - compared to 567 shs. for millet mixtures, and 
return/hour is 0/79 shs. compared to 0/36 shs. (1, p.17) But what are the 
returns when rains are nor adequate? And how would returns compare if improved 
varieties of sorghum and millet were tested against Katumani maize? Applied 
research on sorghum and millet would be worthwhile also because of their higher 
nutritive value and higher drought resistance than maize. In addition, this 
would better serve the needs of the smaller, low income farmer. 
Mexico 1^2 Beans 
There is little new in this project as the 1967 annual report (7) 
mentioned 700 acres of M14-2 which then rose to 1227 hectares (Table 8) in 1969/70. 
The Annual Reports seem to report effective acreage, while the A.A.0. 
in Siakago has reported total acreage. 
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Numbers of growers appear fairly static over the last few years in Embu 
District as a whole. In Mbere SRDP, a definite expansion has occurred 
since 1969/70 as follows: 
1969/70 S.R. 189 acres 1973/74 S.R. 726 acres 
L.R„ 144 " L.R. 1129 " 
1970/71 S.R. 967 " 
L.R. 538 " 1974/75 1680 acres 
projected 
1972/73 S.R, 1000 " 
L.R. 670 " 
However, over the last few years since 1970/71, planted acreage has remained 
fairly constant even though MPB prices per 90 Kg. bag have increased from 70/-
in 1972/73 to 147/15 in September 1974, 
The major problem seems to be drought prior to harvesting which has 
affected yields dramatically. Applied research into optimal planting time 
and planting methods is required. 
Castor 
Acreage figures(Table 3) seem to show a rather static to declining 
situation for castor in Mbere SRDP. There has been a decline in number of 
growers and average income per grower since a peak in 1967/68 (Table 8). The 
gross margin/ha, is lower than that for other cash crops and only higher than 
it is for sorghum and millet, (10) 
Part of the problem is that SRDP demonstrations have been using hybrid 
seed (Hezra 22) with fertiliser, but no hybrid seed has been available for 
farmers. In any case, the local variety is more drought resistant than the 
hybrid. (2, p,61) Applied research is required to determine the optimal 
interaction between rainfall, planting time and method, and to explore the 
economics of pure compared to intermixed stands, using local and hybrid varietes. 
Given the adaptability of this crop to local conditions, there is every reason 
to stimulate its production. In addition, labour requirements are low and 
very similar to those required for Katumani maize, millets and sorghum and, 
like these crops, two crops can be obtained in one year, (10) 
Tobacco0 
Tobacco production i. Mbere Division has declined since 1967/68 (Table 
10), The SRDP project began in June of 1973 when British American Tobacco (B.A.T.) 
A P a r t this section is based on data collected by Dr. G. Alibaruho, 
I.D.S., University of Nairobi. 
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handed, over i - n rseries to the Nthawa-Evurori Farmers' Cooperative Society Ltd. 
The number of growers has remained rather static since 1969/70, and average 
yield,'ha., has declined since then ".Table 10). The average gross income per 
grower has aiso declined while gross ..ncome per ha, has increased as prices/Kg, 
have gone up Total Kg, sold have declined as has total gross income since 
1969/70, 
The main problem appears to be mismanagement of the cooperative society. 
Several things point to this conclusion. Whereas B.A.T. provided credit for 
purchase of seedlings and fertiliser, only 60 cut of 700 registered members 
received credit in 1973/74-, (9) Nurseries were watered by hand in 1973/74. 
SRDP had provided a pump but had not released it to the society as the pipes 
for the necessary irrigation system had not been purchased by the society. 
Poor weather at transplanting did not help matters.. In addition an attempt was 
made to put: in another crop over the long rains (rather than only the one crop 
over' the short rains), but it was washed out except for five acres which per-
formed badly. The society appears unable to implement the B.A.T. grading 
system and pays a lower price than previously obtained from the B.A.T. For 
this reason, there has been some quarreling between the society and the 
growers, (5, p.17) B.A.T, has continued to provide two Agricultural Assistants 
concerned with leaf marketing but little extension advice is available on the 
production side, 
There are three experimental aspects of this project. The first is 
the administration of credit and leaf collection from the farmers by the 
cooperative society. This has been only partially successful. The second is 
the attempt by the cooperative society to initiate nurseries for a second crop. 
This failed due to an excessively wet season The third is the holding of 
public barazas where extension personnel and farmers can exchange views, but 
there has been little follow up to those discussions. 
The average return/ha. for tobacco was shs. 990 for Eastern Province 
in .1.9 73 compared to shs,400 for all maize, shs. 651 for cotton and shs. 1,120 
for M14-2. (. 2) in Mbere SRDP, the return/ha, in 1973/74 was estimated at shs. 
1,820 for tobacco, and in 1972/73 shs 325-925 for cotton, shs. 620-1,620 for 
hybrid maize (Embu District), shs,, i"0-540 for Katumani maize and shs.245-925 
for M142, (10) Of course tobacco comes just afxer coffee and tea in terms of 
labour requirements. It therefore competes for labour which is a scarce resource 
in this area and probably competes with food crops in this respect. 
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Furthermore, there is a shortage of firewood in the area which is 
used for curing, which has been aggravated by the process of land adjudication 
and individual property rights. 
Pigeon Peas 
Until 1973/74, this crop was not of any interest to SRDP. In that 
year, 20 x-acre plots of hybrid pigeon peas were put in, but only forage was 
obtained- The seed was obtained from the K.F.A. depot in Machakos. 
Farmers generally grow local varieties, scattered among other crops, 
which appear to be adapted to local climatic and soil conditions. As this is 
commonly a food crop, no estimates of acreage were available from the annual 
reports. However, as average return per ha, for dry peas compared favourably 
with Katumani maize in 1972/73 (Table 5) and return for the gresicrop compared 
favourably with M142 beans, it would seem that this crop should be encouraged. 
While labour requirements are somewhat higher than for Katumani maize, sorghum, 
millets, castor, coriander or grams (10), gross margin/ha. in 1972/73 compared 
favourably with that from Katumani maize. Only one crop can be grown a year, 
but prices since 1970 have been around 0/70 per Kg. or 63/- per 90 Kg. bag and 
reached 106/- as of August 1974 (MPB price). While the average yield obtained 
has been low at four bags/acre, this crop is a low risk crop for the Mbere area. 
It is also highly nutritive. The only constraint, therefore, would appear to -
be lack of applied research to determine the optimal varieties, time and method 
of planting for local conditions. 
Sunflower 
This crop was initiated by the community development department (CDD) 
with 20 1-acre plots, of which 15 were in Mbere SRDP, in the long rains of 1973 
(Table 1). The ' Censis' (or 'black' ) variety was used with fertiliser (1 bag 
double superphosphate per acre). Average yields were under 5 40-Kg. bags per 
acre at U9/35 p er bag (and 42/10 for the 'grey' variety), Maize and Produce Board 
(MPB) prices as of August 1974. A further 18 4-K plots planted in the long 
rains of 1974 dried up. SRDP was planning to put in 40 1-acre demonstration 
plots with the 'grey' variety during 1974/7 5. 
The major problems are confusion over optimal planting dates, avail-
ability of seed in 40 Kg. bags only, while farmers require 2 to 4 Kg. per acre, 
and lack of applied research results for Mbere Division. Given the recent rise 
in fertiliser prices, gross margin/ha. appears to be rather low if fertiliser is 
used, and yields remain around five bags per acre. 
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The primary tool of the crop dev:Iopment projects has been demonstra-
tion plots where ploughing was by tractor, where fertiliser and sprays were 
applied and oft en hybrid seeds were used. Most farmers in Mbere Division 
follow none of these practices due to low income, high cost of inputs or 
unavailability of hybrid seeds. The malfunction of loans to stockists has 
meant that availability of inputs at the local level has been rather erratic. 
Demonstrations and farmer education have generally been limited to 
those farmers who have been willing to cooperate. All materials however funded 
were controlled by the Assistant Agriculture Officer (A.A.O.) Siakago who in 
turn was supervised by the District Agriculture Officer (D.A.O.) and SRDP co-
ordinator. Staff in 1974 consisted of 23 Junior Agriculture Assistants (J.A.A.s) 
and 3 Agriculture Assistants (A.A.s) who were M.O.A. and SRDP personnel 
concurrently in Mbere Division. 
Crop programmes were planned by the D.A.O. in Embu after receiving 
his alloted budget for crop development as a whole. This budget was shs. 20,000/-
for June to December 1974., not separated by crop. Some crop development and 
extension education has taken place through 4-K and Home Economics (H.E.) lub 
activities but results have generally been poor due to uncertain weather 
conditions. UNICEF funding of 4-K projects was discontinued in 1974/75. 
The objective of increasing agricultural production in Mbere SRDP does 
not seem to have been realised as of the end of 1974. Projects have included 
very little experimentation over and above that normally associated with 
demonstration plots. Only two new crops have recently been introduced, and 
these were hybrid pigeon pea and hybrid sunflower. Emphasis remained on cash 
crops grown in the area prior to the advent of SRDP, The conclusion seems to 
be that SRDP personnel have continued their normal M.0,A. work. 
Demonstration plots can be replicated. The point is that the number 
of plots per location seems to be minimal. Costly inputs were used and crops 
frequently failed for various reasons. One might argue that this approach, in 
this area of highly uncertain climate, has not been very successful in the 
diffusion of crops. 
With regard to evaluaiion of research or trial demonstration results, 
little data has been either collected or evaluated by SRDP personnel. 
Emphasis has bee** directed towards cash crops. Little has been done 
with regard to applied research with local food crops such as sorghum, millet, 
local maize, pigeon peas and the various beans and grams. Should risk be reduced 
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and yields improved with these crops, then adoption of new cash crops and 
accompanying technology would probably be enhanced.^ The shift away from more 
drought resistant and nutritive local food crops should be questioned,. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1„ Overall uncertainty of farming conditions in Mbere due to unavailability 
of inputs or credit, erratic climate and weak extension services based on 
insufficient applied research needs to be diminished in any way possible. 
2 One approach is to attempt to determine optimal planting times for each 
crop in relation to seasonal ralnfal patterns. E.R.T.S. Satellite imagery 
such as currently being used by the Soil Survey of Kenya might be used for 
this purpose . 
3. Tobacco production is a problem. Several recommendations are relevant: 
improve nursery management and production extention services; improve cooperative 
management and in particular seedling and fertiliser credit facilities; 
centralise tobacco curing in the cooperative headquarters in order to reduce 
deforestation and soil erosion problems and look into the possibility of using 
charcoal instead of wood for the curing process,' 
4. As discussed by Hunt (2 J, scope exists for applied research work with tree 
crops, such as citrus, mange and cashew nut, and with castor in specific areas 
and possibly extending local castor varieties in hedgerow cultivation. Another 
crop that might be tried is the olive tree and various other oil crops suited 
to dry climatic conditions. Art present, research on tree crops appears either 
unorganised or artificially restricted tc specific areas. 
5,. Applied research in terms of selecting better varieties for each area and 
determining optimal planting time and method should be carried out with local 
food crops such as local maize, sorghum, millets, pigeon peas, cowpeas, bean 
varieties and varieties of gram. This should include pure and inter-cropping 
comparisons. 
6. More efforts should be made to locate optimal growing areas for cash crops 
such as Katumani maize, M142, cotton and sunflower. To do this it is necessary 
to map the location of all demonstrations and evaluate the results. Perhaps 
more effort should be put into planning and organising the demonstration 
projects The objective would be a rather detailed map showing optimal crops 
See D. Hunt (.2) for further discussion along these lines. 
' A local Kenya firm has recently perfected machinery which converts 
coffee husks (.and shortly, other crop husks) into charcoal. This should soon 
increase the availability and. lower the cost of charcoal in Kenya. The firm 
is Edmund Schluter and Co. (Kenya) Ltd. 
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for all areas of Mbere Division. This would necessitate the production of 
an accompanying detailed soil map -
7. The A.A.O, in the field should be given more direct control over his 
field budget and supplies. This would save a great deal of time, petrol, 
frustration and money., 
8. Detailed analysis of cropping patterns and labour use nould be made for 
Mbere Division as well as accurate cost and yield data for all crops. Aerial 
photography could be used to make accurate area estimates and to gain 
information on cropping patterns. 
9. Comparisons between Katumani maize mixtures and local maize mixtures, 
millet mixtures,and sorghum mixtures should be made in good and poor seasons 
using improved varieties of millet and sorghum. 
10. Since few Mbere farmers can afford to use fertiliser, demonstrations in 
which synthetic inputs are used are of dubious benefit. More efforts should 
be made to have demonstrations that duplicate actual farming conditions in 
the local area except for planting methods, time or variety. In addition, 
efforts should be made to locate effective levels of fertiliser usage that 
are below the economically optimum level, and to usage alternative non-syntheti 
fertilisers. These would be particularly useful under Mbere conditions as 
they improve moisture retention and soil structure. 
11. In all cases, the interrelationships between crop/tree development and 
soil and water conservation should be emphasised. This would entail greater 
research efforts to devise entire farming systems which are moisture utilising 
and conserving. 
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Table 2. Rainfall quality in Embu District and Mbere Division, 
(Source: Annual Reports) 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74-
1971/75 
S o R e 
L o R e 
S.R. 
L.R. 
S.R. L.R. 
S.R. 
L.R. 
S.R. 
L.R. 
S«. R o 
L.R. 
S„ R„ 
L.R. 
S.R. 
L.R. 
S.R. 
L.R. 
Poor, especially in middle and lower area. 
"Enough and well distributed" (p. 7). 
Heavy rains stopped mid-November. Drought in 
lower areas. 
Adequate. Well distributed all over district. 
Adequate. Well distributed all over district. 
Poor in Mbere. 
Poor in Mbere. 
Normal. 
Late. Jan./Feb. 
Partial failure. 
Good-Normal. 
no rains. Water stress. 
Late. Inadequate. 
Adequate in upper and middle zones. Inadequate 
in Mbere. 
Heavy in upper zone. Very adequate in lower areas. 
Upper areas adequate. Inadequate in middle and lower 
areas. 
Inadequate in middle and lower areas. 
Started late. Extended too long in Mbere. 
Inadequate. 
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Table 3, Estimated acreage for major cash crops in Mbere SRDP. 
Crop 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 
Tobacco3 275 360 280 398 252 484 171 213b 3 50p 
K. Maize'' 
Sr R. 317 986d 664 1,324 oe 811f 2,140 3,000 3,9 54p 
L.R. ? ? 477 1,032 1,116 - 2,444 2,877 -
Tofal 317 986 1,141 2,356 1,116 811 4,584 5,877 3,954 
M142 
S.R. 48 140h ? 189 967 1,000 726 1,680p 
L.R. 8 140h 219 144 538 ? 670 1,129 -
Total 8 188 359 144 727 967 1,670 1,855 1,680 
Cotton 1,900 252 278 2,0661 2 ,212"' l,684k 1,744 1,609 1,977p 
Castor ? 
Sunflower 
S.R, = short rains 
L.R. = long rains, 
p = projected. 
132 124 155 156 120 
5 15 
lOOp 
60p 
Source: Annual Reports, Eastern Province, Embu District; 
AAO, Mbere Division. 
a. Flue-cured. In addition air-cured was 28 acres in 72/73, and 52 acres in 73/74. 
b. 52 acres air-cured included. 
c'. 68/69 - 71/72 data on Embu District as a whole. 
d. Increase due to Oxfam Katumani Maize Project and subsequent farmer to farmer 
sales, 
e. No hybrid or Katumani maize seed was available locally. 
f. Separate figures unavailable. The L.R. were nearly a complete failure. 
g. Introduced into Western Province. (7) 
h. Estimated on basis of 1969 figures when Mbere grew 7.5 per cent of whole 
district acreage, i.e. 219 out of 2,887 total acres (8, p.25), or 0.075 x 3,736 
acres. 
i. Effective acreage was only 2,013 acres. 
j. Effective acreage was only 1,080 acres. 
k. Effective acreage was only 1,272 acres. 
1. Data for castor are estimated and do not include uncultivated acreage. 
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District , 1970/71, 1971/ 72, 1972/73, 
Year 
Crop 70/71 71/72 72/73 
1. Cotton 350 400 651 
2. Maize 700 700 400 
3. M142 774 716 1,120 
4. Castor 
5. Pigeon Peas ( Dry ) 450 450 420 
( Green ) 1,890 1,400 1,050 
6. Tobacco 710 875 990 
7. Sorghum 288 240 -
8. Millet 208 120 150 
9. Green Gram 680 680 720 
10. Potatoes 3 ,600 3 ,600 2 ,400 
11. Cowpeas 330 330 310 
12. Mixed Beans 462 528 560 
13. Onions 17 ,000 12,000 12,000 
14, Chilies 6,650 6,650 6,000 
15. Wheat 600 675 1,050 
Source: Annual Reports. 
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Table 8. M142 in Embu District, 1969/70 - 1972/73. 
Item Year 
69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 
1. Ha. planted 1,227 2,648 4,376 4,200a 4,830b 4,374^ 
2. Total production 701( ?) 2,217 3,736 1,980 2,274° 2,060d 
3. Sales to MPB (K£) 2,909 1,675 3,001 1,980 ? ? 
4. Gross value (K£) 90,107 75,483 166,755 99 ,000 138,963® 166,595f 
Source: Annual Reports, Embu District. 
a. 695 Ha. in Mbere. 
b. Embu District as a whole. Mbere had 16% of this figure in 1972/73. 
On this basis, it would have had 733 Ha. in 1973/74 and 700 Ha. in 
1974/75. 
c. Assuming the same average yields as in 1972/73, 0.471 tons/ha x 4,830 '.a. 
gives 2,274 tons. 
d. Assuming the same average yields as in 1972/73, 0.471 x 4,374 Ha. 
gives 2,060 tons. 
e. Assuming 110/- per 90 Kg bag. 
f. Assuming 147/- ;er 90 Kg bag. 
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Table 10. Flue-cured tobacco production in Mbere Division of Embu District, 
1967/68 - 1973/74 
Item Year 
67/68 68/69a 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 
1. Hectares 
planted 150 116 165 105 202 72b 67° 
2. No. Growers^ 200 274 3 50 456 400 232 395 
3. Av. Yield/ha.Kg. 228 300 358 189 189 - 328 
4. Av. Price/Kg. 4/09 4/40 4/78 4/05 4/44 - 5/59 
5. Av. 
per 
Gro^ .s Income 
Grower (. £) 13. 9 28.5 h6.3 8.4 21.2 - 15. 5 
6. Av. 
per 
Gross Income 
ha. (£) 46,6 66.6 85.7 36.5 41.9 - 91.8 
7. Total Sales Kg, 18,4-79 35,513 59,450 18,944 38,304 - 22,008® 
8. Total gross 
Income (.£) 3 ,7 7 8 7 ,812 14,219 3,832 8,498 - 6,156 
Source: Annual Reports, AAO Mbere SRDP. 
N.B. Flue-cured grown mainly in Mbere and air-cured 
in Embu. 
a. Cooperative Society was begun in this year. 
b. Excluding 28 acres air-cured; quarrel between growers and cooperative 
resulted in little acreage or data. 
c. Excluding 52 acres air-cured. 
d. This is the estimated number selling to B.A.T. This number is less 
than the total number of growers and more than the registered number 
of growers in the Cooperative Society. 
e. Air-cured production was 6,291 Kg. valued at K£ 1,322. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CROP DEVELOPMENT IN RAPENGURIA SRDP 
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE CROPS PROJECTS 
The Kapenguria SRDP area covers a high altitude, high potential 
area as well as large areas of the low, arid northern'plains, A belt of marginal 
lands lies between the plains and the highlands, and the crop envelopment 
projects cover the highlands and parts of the marginal lands, The SRDP crops 
projects focus on maize3 sunflower, coffee, pyrethrum and English potatoes, 
and an extensive soii conservation programme is meant to support the crop 
production projects, 
The nigh potential parts of the area are suitable for all five crops, 
but significant expansion has occured only with hybrid maize and sunflower,, 
No expansion worth mentioning has been achieved with coffee„jyrethrum and 
English potatoes,, According to the officers Interviewed, almost all farmers 
in the highlands now grow hybrid maize. Sunflower was introduced only recently, 
but is being adopted very rapidly- The adoption of both crops was supported 
by demonstrations (SRDP spent about shs 20,000/- on maize demonstrations,), 
and their diffusion now is considered self-generating. 
It may be asked why the expansion of the other three crops, coffee, 
pyrethrum and English potatoes, has been so limited.1 One general answer is 
given by a look at the economics of these crops, as shown in Table 1. 
H. Maize Sunflower 2 Coffee 
3 Pyrethrum English Potatoes 
labour mandays average lower very high higher higher 
(per hectare) (108) (93) (480) (190) (180) 
capital input average very low very high very high very high 
(per hectare) in K shs (310) (70) (1,910) (2,650) (1,230) 
In Kapenguria there is still much more land available than the local 
farmers can cultivate, but this situation will probably change within the next 
ten years because there is a very high rate of in-migration, Most farmers practise 
shifting cultivation, especially with maize, and In this way they minimise the 
need for fertiliser and thus reduce expenditure on capital inputs considerably. 
Cultivation is commonly done by tractor, reducing the labour mandays needed per 
acre. Since seasonal labour bottlenecks and to some extent capital are the main 
I- SRDP funds were set aside for coffee demonstrations (shs. 15,000/-), 
pyrethrum bulking (shs, 15,000/-) and English potato bulking (shs. 26,000/-). 
2. According to M,0,A, recommendations, calculation for coffee should be 
made from the high production level only, 
3, First year. 
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constraints on crop production, farmers can achieve the highest incomes by 
concentrating on hybrid maize and sunflower which require relatively little 
labour or cash„^ 
Yet there is good reason for planning crop diversification now, 
If the present rate of in-migration continues, and officers who are familiar 
with local conditions believe that it is even likely to increase, trie 
availability of land will be limited within the next few years• Once land 
becomes a constraint, farm incomes will depend more on labour-and -capital-
intensive methods of cultivation.. Then coffee, pyrethrum and English 
potatoes will be desirable crops, because witn higher inputs of capital ana 
labour they can bring considerably higher gross profit margins per a-re than 
maize or sunflower, 
If these three crops are very weil cultivated, production levels 
will be high and they will become extremely profitable, hit this requires that 
trie farmers have well developed skills and the financial resources to purchase 
Inputs, Thus, in Kapenguria at the present time It is appropriate to direct 
programmes to the majority of farmers which will enhance their incomes under 
present conditions and to focus projects for the development of coffee, 
pyrethrum and English potatoes on the more progressive farmers who have the 
skills and financial resources to grow these crops profitably. 
Another prerequisite if coffee, pyrethrum and English potatoes are 
to be grown more profitably than maize or sunflower is that the necessary inputs 
be available and that extension, credit and marketing be well organised. It 
seems that organisational deficiencies in these areas are the main reason that 
these three crops have not been taken up more widely among progressive farmers 
m Kap.ng.,ia 
THE COFFEE PROJECT 
Coffee has been grown in Kapenguria for a Ions- time, and according 
to observations and grading reports from the Kenya Coffee Board the soil and 
climate in Kapenguria are suitable for coffee- Yet at present, out of 300 
coffee growers only 60 actually deliver coffee to the cooperative society 
and the other 2-0 farmers neglect their coffee shambas completely. 
Ira-tors are s^ciaiiy Drought from Trans N;-ya, and their availability 
at the appropriate times seems to be a constraint which prevents even more 
extensive cultivation of maize and sunflower, 
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The local officers concerned with coffee .development in Kapenguria 
found that farmers reported having lost interest in coffee growing because 
of heavy losses from Coffee Berry Disease (C.B.D.). SRDP initiated a spraying 
campaign to counteract C.B.D. with.-the ultimate objective of mobilising 
farmers to grow coffee again. 
Evaluation of the Project 
In fact, the incidence of C.B.D. is not as serious as had been 
imagined. The disease is more visible on neglected coffee in the field than 
on coffee which has actually been harvested and delivered "to the factory. 
Grading reports on coffee delivered to the Kenya Coffee Board do not mention 
diseased beans, 
A major cause of C.B.D. is poor husbandry, and spraying is being 
introduced to compensate for this, However, the cost of spraying materials 
is very high and the operation requires large labour inputs. Farmers also 
do not have enough spraying pumps. Given the cost of spraying, it has not 
proven very effective in eliminating the disease and it is suggested that 
the spraying project be discontinued. 
The poor quality of the coffee delivered to the Ifenya Coffee Board 
can be attributed to pocr management at the coffee factory. The factory 
manager had practically no training and was not able to maintain the tanks 
and drying trays in good condition. He had also failed to adjust the machinery 
properly so that the skin of the beans was destroyed causing a bad flavour. 
This means that the quality of coffee delivered by farmers is 
lowered considerably by poor handling at the factory, and the profits to 
farmers are thereby reduced. In addition, the cooperative organisation had 
failed to pay its members for the 1973 crop as of the end of December 1974. 
Given these problems, farmers will neglect their coffee with good reason and 
concentrate their labour and capital inputs on maize aid sunflower which are 
more profitable under the circumstances, 
THE PYRETHRUM PROJECT 
Although pyrethrum has been introduced in Kapenguria, officials 
agree that the local farmers do not yet realise the potential profitability 
of this crop. This is due to the inadequate way in which it has been 
introduced. It seems that 15,000 pyrethrum splits were purchased from the 
Pyrethrum Board out of SRDP funds and distributed to ten farmers on credit 
or planted at a Government plot for further splitting (bulking). 
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Very few of the ten farmers planted at all, and those who did planted only 
between 1/16 and \ acre, 
A few other farmers have adopted pyrethrum without SRDP assistance, 
but the total area planted has never exceeded twenty acres, and each farmer 
has such a tiny plot that the potential profitability of the crop is not 
apparent even when yields are high, 
Further, the crop must be transported 25 miles to the next cooperative 
society for marketing, and this reduced profits considerably due to lack of 
communication, high transport costs, delays in payment, and so forth. 
Suggestions for Improving the Project 
1, It makes no sense for farmers to plant less than \ acre of 
pyrethrum, A minimum of at least \ acre should be set. 
2 It is planned to establish a pyrethrum cooperative society 
closer to growers to facilitate marketing. This is an important precondition 
for any further development of the crop, 
3. To show farmers the advantages of pyrethrum growing, two-day 
training and discussion sessions should be held in the villages. Experts from 
the Pyrethrum Board should be asked to assist the local crop and extension staff 
in carrying out these training sessions, 
THE ENGLISH POTATO PROJECT 
Potatoes are grown in Kapenguria as a food crop already, but they are 
highly susceptible to disease. Certified English potato seeds were introduced 
because they are more resistant to disease than the varieties already used, but 
they also require very high capital and labour inputs and skillful cultivation. 
Farmers are generally not able or willing to invest a high level of inputs into 
a crop grown only for home consumption, so that efforts to introduce certified 
English potatoes would be more appropriate for farmers who would like to grow them 
as a cash crop. This requires marketing arrangements first of all. Furthermore, 
5 
recent studies' reveal that the main demand for potatoes in Kenya is not for 
English potatoes but .for 'red' potatoes, Unfortunately there are no certified Seed 
programmes in Kenya for 'red' potatoes-
The proper target group for the introduction of English potatoes would 
be the progressive cash crop farmers who have the skills, cash and labour necessary 
to grow them, successfully. But it would be by far more promising to promote the 
cultivation of 'red' instead of English potatoes. 
5- Prof. G. Lorenzl, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Nairobi, Economic 
Analysis of Potato Industry in. Kenya, (forthcoming). 
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SOIL CONSERVATION IN KAPENGURIA 
The objective of the soil'conservation programme is to protect the 
high potential land In the very hilly areas of Kapenguria, These areas are 
just now being opened by local farmers who do not seem to worry about soil 
conservation because If one area becomes eroded they can simply shift to 
another. However, shifting cultivation will not be possible for many more 
years due to the high rate of in-migration into the area, and proper soil 
conservation will become crucial. 
Present soil conservation activities are carried out by the Govern-
ment Soil Conservation Unit at Nakuru. The major conservation method is 
terracing, and about 5,000 acres have been terraced in the area so far. In 
financial terms, this is one of the largest projects in the Kapenguria SRDP 
area, with £5,700 spent so far and plans to. spent another £6,500. 
The soil conservation project faces some serious problems. For one 
thing, the 'tractors used for terracing can only work up to a 12 .(maximum 15 ) 
declination. Work on steeper slopes has to be done by hand, but It seems that 
Ministry of Agriculture staff have not taken over the responsibility for this 
part of the work. In addition, when an area is terraced, a water outflow 
system Is created as shown in the sketch, This outflow area is in particular 
heavy soil erosion 
danger of becoming eroded, and its protection is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, not the Soil Conservation Unit, As a minimum, this 
area must be protected by planting permanent vegetation, but neither the 
Ministry of Agriculture staff nor the local farmers have assumed the responsi-
bility for this task. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
lo Given present conditions in Kapenguria, hybrid maize and sunflower 
are the most attractive crops for promotion among the great majority of farmers, 
(except in the very high altitude areas). 
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2, Coffee, pyrethrum and English, potatoes do not give any relative 
advantage to average farmers compared with hybrid maize and sunflower so long 
as land is abundant and labour and capital are limited. However, they could 
profitably be introduced to more progressive farmers. In the very high altitude 
areas pyrethrum and potatoes are more feasible than the other crops. But their 
economics of production should be compared with those for livestock. 
3- The major constraint on coffee development seems to be organisa-
tional problems, rather than disease as was assumed. We recommend that the 
spraying project be dropped and that priority be given to hiring a highly 
qualified factory manager, upgrading the machinery at the factory, paying 
farmers promptly, and training them in improved cultivation methods. 
u A marketing cooperative for pyretbrum needs to be established 
in the area. All pyrethrum plots should be at least \ acre, 
5, Certified potato seed requires too great a capital input to be 
adopted as a food crop. Efforts should be made to improve marketing and promote 
potatoes as a cash crop. It would also be much more promising to develop 'red' 
potatoes instead of English potatoes, 
6 Short training and discussion courses should be held in the 
villages to inform farmers about pyrethrum and potatoes. An expert on each 
crop should be asked to assist with these courses. Farmers should not be asked 
+ o plant new crops about whir . they have been given little information. 
7, Systematic crop development experiments should be carried cut in 
the marginal belt of the Kapenguria SRDP area, 
8. Soil conservation activities should be continued, and priority 
should be given to coordination within the Ministry of Agriculture to solve 
erosion problems produced by incomplete conservation work. 
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Table '4- Economics of coffee production. 
(Data represent mature coffee) 
Production level 
Low Average High 
1. yield in kg of cherry 550 2 ,200 7 ,000 
2, output @ —/70 per kg 385/- 1,540/- 4,900/-
3. seed - - -
4, fertilisers 15/- 60/- 750/-
5 spray and dusts 20/- 180/- 900/-
6. other costs e.g, transport 20/- 160/- 260/-
7. totai variable costs (3 to 6) 55/- 400/- 1,910/-
8. gross margin per hectare (2 minus 7) 330/- 1,140/- 2,990/-
9. labour mandays per hectare 
(high production level) 
picking and sorting 2 30 " 
transport 50 
weeding 120 
pruning 50 
spraying 30 
total mandays 480 
10. gross margin per manday (8 : 9j 6/25 
Remarks: Price received for cherry will vary considerably. Labour mandays 
given above relate to the high production level. Ticking Jar cur ;'s based on 
30 kg cherry picked per day. Since adequate picking labour is a major factor 
in determining yields, labour should normally be budgeted for at high levels 
to ensure proper picking. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RURAL CREDIT AND CROP PRODUCTION IN VIHIGA/HAMISI 
Out of a list of 26 SRDP projects listed for the Vihiga/Hamisi 
area on November 15, 1974 (ADM, 15/3/B/28), 7 are directly concerned with 
crop production. These projects, which are described as 'on-going', are 
listed as follows, with the funding organisations in brackets: 
vegetable product ion (SRDP), cooperatives (GoK), fertiliser demonstrations 
(FAO), extension (GoK./SRDP), tea credit (SRDP), stockist credit (FAO) and maize 
credit (SRDP), The training of farmers and of extension staff is listed 
separately, but these projects could also be subsumed under extension. Two 
additional projects could also be added to the list, the sunflower and Mexican 
142 extension projects, but they have not been in operation long enough to 
permit evaluatIon, 
The three credit projects are considered in separate sections of 
this chapter. The maize credit scheme is treated most fully, and the general 
problems affecting all small-holder credit schemes are considered with 
reference to the maize credit project. The tea and the stockist credit 
sehemes-are treated much more briefly. 
The greatest attention in this evaluation is given to credit schemes 
for a number of reasons. First, there is presently a good deal of interest 
and debate concerning che effectiveness of credit projects in assisting the 
development of small-holder agriculture. Second, the other crop production 
projects in Vihiga/Hamisi are of less general interest for various reasons. 
Third, the extension programme, although certainly an important aspect of 
efforts to enhance crop production in Vihiga/Hamisi, is examined thoroughly 
in another chapter of this Report. Finally, an evaluation of all SRDP projects 
In Vihiga was completed In October-November 1974 by two USAID consultants, 
and the findings of the present evaluation have been much the same as theirs. 
The most important conclusions concerning the credit programmes are also 
similar in the two reports, but a more extensive discussion of the maize 
credit scheme is presented here, 
VEGETABLE PRODUCTION 
The major constraint on the expansion of vegetable production in the 
Vihiga/Hamisi SRDP area has been that existing demand is already met by 
supplies available in season, and there is no way demand out of season can be 
met except by irrigation, A Horticultural Officer was posted to Vihiga in 
1974 whose main task is to assist women's groups In developing kitchen gardens 
through the Home Economics Programme. SRDP funds have been used only to buy 
vegetable seed. 
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Another project frequently mentioned under vegetable production 
was a scheme to bring a new variety of bananas into the area. Trees were 
obtained in Uganda, but they were found to be infected with nematodes, so 
they have been quarantined in an agricultural research station. 
COOPERATIVES 
There has been even less activity in the Vihiga SRDP area in the 
field of cooperatives than in vegetable production. When the SRDP was 
initiated, the Provincial Cooperative Officer felt that there was no need 
for cooperatives in the area. His successor would have liked an SRDP 
cooperative project, but considered it too late to initiate one. 
This may not have been a serious omission. The Assistant Cooperative 
Officer for Vihiga mentioned a need for a vegetable marketing cooperative, but 
the constraint on increased vegetable production seems to be the lack of 
irrigation or a larger seasonal demand, not insufficient organisation of 
marketing. The coffee cooperatives in the area are said to be functioning 
well and have apparently not suffered from the absence of SRDP assistance. 
There is no other apparent need for cooperative development in the area. 
FERTILISER DEMONSTRATIONS 
In line with similar projects in other areas, fertiliser demonstra-
tion plots are scattered throughout the Vihiga SRDP area at points where 
they are likely to be viewed by large numbers of farmers. The first demonstra-
tions were set up by F.A.O. in 1971, with one plot fertilised with nitrogen 
and phosphates, a second with phosphates only and a third control plot. 
Additional demonstrations were set up as part of SRDP, with one plot fertilised 
with both nitrogen and phosphates and a second control plot. Reports on 
numbers of demonstrations vary, but it seems that there have been a little over 
one hundred each year, counting the F.A.O. and the SRDP demonstrations 
together. 
The plots have successfully demonstrated the.large increases in 
yield made possible by the use of fertiliser, and local farmers have evidently 
learned this because they have become unwilling to provide land for control 
plots. However, a survey of 300 farmers carried out in 1973 by an SRDP advisory 
team revealed that only 40 per cent of the farmers were using fertiliser. 
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If the impact of the fertiliser demonstration plots has been 
less than the extension personnel believe, this is probably due to the 
high cost of fertiliser which hinders adoption by farmers. As of early 
1975, the recommended amount of nitrogen and phosphate fertiliser for one 
acre of hybrid maize cost shs 450/-. Even though fertiliser prices were 
lower in previous years, they were still high enough to present many farmers 
from using fei ", ilisei . 
EXTENSION SERVICE 
An effective extension service is probably the most important 
single means for encouraging small-holder agricultural development. Un-
fortunately, the extension service in the Vihiga SRDP area was not evaluated 
fully, but it was round that there has been no real experimentation to find 
alternative extension strategies The .SAID advisor has apparently 
suggested some specific improvements, anc the A A 0. expressed his 
appreciation for this advice, but the traditional extvnsun approach 
has not been altered in any fundamental way. The chapter of this Report 
on SRDP extension experiments describes significant improvements to be gained 
from new extension approaches, and it seems that an opportunity has been lost 
in the Vihiga area to learn through experimentation how extension services 
can be carried out most effectively. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VEGETABLE PRODUCTION, COOPERATIVES, FERTILISER 
DEMONSTRATIONS AND EXTENSION 
1. The ege1 ab.ue anci cooperative projects are not sufficiently important 
to be listed as SRDP projects. Vege':ab.,.e prod-CT ion might be encouraged as 
part of the Home Economics Programme, but not as a separate project 
2. The value of fertiliser demonstrations could be enhanced if 
different sorts of tests are carried out. For example, alternative methods 
for enriching the soil could be demonstrated, such as the application of 
compost and manure. Also trials could be carried out with smaller applications 
of fertiliser, and different yield increases measured and compared. This 
would help farmers judge the economic impact of different levels of fertiliser 
application. These types if experimen s are mentioned in the discussion of 
the maize credit scheme, 
3. Similarly, the value of extension efforts co.,ld oe increased if a 
genuinely experimental approach is adopted. Innovative extension approaches 
have been carried out successfully in the Tetu and Migori SRDP areas, and 
these approaches could be tried in Vihiga or different new approaches developed. 
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CREDIT FOR SMALL-HOLDER TEA PRODUCTION 
The purpose of this project is to increase tea production to 1,500 
acres and thus provide farmers with an opportunity to earn a cash income. The 
availability of credit is publicised through Chiefs' and Sub-Chiefs' barazas, 
and applications from farmers are then considered by a committee including 
the District Tea Officer, the Divisional Officer and the SRDP Area Coordinator. 
The criteria for eligibility are that:-
1. The farmer should have at least two acres, one for tea and one 
for subsistence crops; 
2. The farmer should demonstrate that he actually needs credit. 
An earlier limitation that applicants could not have any off-farm employment 
has been dropped; and 
3. The farmer should demonstrate competence in farming and a real 
interest in producing tea. 
Credit is provided to purchase materials necessary for setting up 
nurseries for tea plants. Five nurseries with 1,200 plants in each nursery 
are started for each proposed acre of tea, this number having been proved 
necessary because of the low survival rate of the plants. Each nursery costs 
shs 56/-, so that the total loan for one acre of tea comes to shs 330/—. 
Few farmers have taken loans for more than one acre. 
Repayment is not due until the tea is marketed, and then the amount 
due is deducted from the farmer's sales made through the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (K.T.D.A.). In addition to the loans, farmers are provided with 
extension advice from agents with special training in tea husbandry. In the 
Vihiga SRDP area there were seven Agricultural Assistants (A.A.s), one from 
the K.T.D.A. and six from the Ministry of Agriculture, and eighteen Junior 
Agricultural Assistants (J.A.A.s). 
Evaluation of the Project 
According to figures supplied by the Assistant Tea Officer, 878 acres 
were already under tea at the end of 1974. The response of local farmers has 
been good, so that the target of 1,500 acres under tea is almost certain to 
be exceeded. Because of this high response rate, the tea project is considered 
one of the most successful in the Vihiga SRDP. Since plants purchased with 
loans have not yet begun to produce, the question of loan repayment has not 
yet arisen. 
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Two rather serious problems have oecured, however. First, money 
was not available through the K.T.D.A. in time to establish the nurseries 
on schedule. This meant that the plants were not sufficiently mature when 
they were transplanted to the fields, and as a result the survival rate has 
been low. This will lead to a small initial harvest, which will make loan 
repayment more difficult. 
The second problem is that the extension service seems not to have 
been successful in instructing all farmers in proper tea husbandry. Although 
the A.A.O. showed "us one shamba where tea was apparently growing very 
successfully, most of the other tea fields which were observed were 
in much poorer condition. Although a thorough survey was not made, a number 
of farmers interviewed mentioned that they did not know what husbandry 
techniques would improve their tea. Further, the Provincial Tea Officer made 
a survey of the area and concluded that the number of poorly established tea 
shambas was a serious problem. 
The K.T.D.A, prides itself on its extension services, and every 
tea grower is supposed to be carefully supervised. However, in Vihiga many 
plants have died, and the survivors are spaced unevenly and often far apart. 
To the extent that this is due to late establishment of the nurseries, the 
situation could have been remedied had farmers taken cuttings from their own 
plants, but they did not know this was possible. One farmer had lost his 
entire nursery except for two or three plants which stood at the edge of his 
maize shamba. This loss would not normally exempt him from repaying the loan, 
but in this case the Provincial Tea Officer planned to remedy the situation. 
Although the K.T.D.A. is responsible for the tea extension service, 
it is surprising that the SRDP extension personnel did not know about the 
problems which have occurred. They seemed to feel that the project was doing 
well, although evidence to the contrary was within one mile of the SRDP and 
extension service offices. This failure can apparently be attributed to the 
perennial extension problem of concentrating on the most successful farmers 
and paying less attention to the rest. The SRDP experiments to discover new 
extension approaches, as described in another chapter of this Report, are 
intended to help remedy just this problem. 
Recommendations for the Tea Project 
1. The tea project should be continued since tea growing is 
feasible in the area and many farmers are willing to grow tea. 
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2. However, steps should be taken to see that extension is directed 
to all farmers, especially the majority who are not the most progressive and 
who are in greater need of assistance 
THE VIHIGA CREDIT SCHEME FOR MAIZE INPUT STOCKISTS 
It was pointed out in the 1972 SRDP evaluation report that stockists 
were bearing much of the burden of the maize credit programme because they were 
obliged to supply maize inputs (fertiliser, hybrid seed and D.D.T,) to farmers 
before being paid- They experienced delays in receiving reimbursement from 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (A-F.C), and later they were reimbursed 
by wholesale suppliers only by replacement of the goods which they had sold 
to farmers. Extension personnel also said that due to a shortage of transport, 
the stockists did not always obtain sufficient quantities of inputs in time 
to meet demand.. Finally, stockists were sometimes able to obtain higher prices 
than the amounts specified on the loan recipients' coupons from other customers. 
The suggestion was made in the 1972 evaluation report to provide 
the stockists with credit to remedy this situation. Whether or not the I.D.S. 
report was the source of the initiative, arrangements were made for local banks 
to provide stockists with credit during the short rains of 1973 and the long 
rains of 1974. About ten stockists were approved for loans during the second 
season, but only three actually took loans out It seems that the other 
stockists were well enough established to either be self-sufficient financially 
or to have access to credit through normal channels., (In Migori loans were 
also given to stockists, who responded in greater numbers, but there, unlike 
Vihiga, the inputs had not been available locally until credit to stockists 
was provided) 
Because the difficulties experienced by stockists in providing inputs 
for the maize credit scheme have not been resolved, the SRDP staff in Vihiga 
wish to arrange for wholesale suppliers to deal with loan recipients directly, 
selling the inputs to them at specified times and places. In this way the 
local stockists will be by-passed completely. This new approach raises the 
question of whether large companies are not benefiting at the expense of local 
entrepreneurs, but the SRDP staff feel that local businessmen are only losing 
a small portion of their clients and are sufficiently developed not to require 
assistance in the form of credit. It was not possible to Investigate these 
new arrangements more thoroughly. 
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Recommendation 
1. It is recommended that the SRDP staff at Vihiga be allowed to 
continue with this project as they see fit.. 
THE VIHIGA SMALL-HOLDERS' MAIZE CREDIT SCHEME 
This report on the Vihiga maize credit scheme begins with a 
description of the project followed by a look at the project's aims and the 
extent to which it has conformed tc the four basic principles of SRDP. Next 
the benefits and costs of the project are assessed as far as available data 
allow and the argument is put forward that the deficiencies of the Vihiga 
project are those to which small-holder credit schemes are generally prone. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn concerning the proper role of small-holder 
credit, alternatives are considered and recommendations are made. 
It should be emphasised that although this evaluation contains 
criticisms of the Vihiga maize credit project, there is no intention to 
underrate the work of either the Kenyan or expatriate SRDP personnel in the 
area. They have shown a commendable willingness to evaluate the project and 
modify it in the light of their findings, It is hoped that they will regard 
this ev-aluation as one further contribution to help solve some of the problems 
of small-holder agriculture which builds on the efforts they have already made, 
Description and History 
This credit scheme grew out of a proposal in the 1970 Outline 
Programme for the SRDP effort in Vihiga which aimed at bringing about increased 
agricultural production through an improved extension and demonstration 
programme. Maize was identified as the most important crop on which to concentrate 
because the supply of this basic food was estimated to be insufficient in the 
area. The question of credit arose because it was calculated that a large 
proportion of farmers would require credit if they were to pur-chase the fertiliser 
and hybrid maize seed which they would be encouraged to use- As the implementa-
tion of the general maize project got under way and the difficult questions 
of how to allocate and administer the loans had to be faced, credit became 
central to the project and the main issue became the effectiveness of small-
holder credit in raising the level of maize production. 
The Loan Record: The way in which the project has evolved has been well documented 
in both the I.D.S. Overall Evaluation of the SRDP of 1972, Appendix F, and the 
recent USAID-sponsored evaluation by Harmon and Zalla Here only the basic facts 
will be repeated. 
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The maize programme was supposed to be directed to a group of 600 
randomly chosen farmers, who were first surveyed to obtain baseline data 
Loan recipients were required to grow two acres of hybrid maize and to be 
creditworthy. These requirements eliminated all but 54- of the original 600 
farmers. Others were sought and 22 more approved, so that 63 ultimately 
received loans. No interest was charged and the repayment rate was 82 per-
cent . 
In 1972 the number of loan recipients was increased with 383 
farmers approved and 323 accepting loans. The criteria for selecting loan 
recipients were the same as in 1971, but an interest charge of 10 per cent 
was added. 
In 1973 the project was expanded and loans given to 920 farmers. 
This was achieved by changing or removing the two greatest obstacles to 
qualifying for a loan. The minimum acreage to be planted was reduced from 
two to one acre, and the creditworthiness criterion was dropped. On the other 
hand, a 2 per cent penalty interest rate was imposed on all outstanding amounts 
not repaid by the loan expiration date. 
Unfortunately, as the number of recipients went up the repayment 
rate fell off precipitously. In 1972 it was 65.6 per cent and in 1973 it was 
only 27,6 per cent. In 1974 an attempt was made to find ways of encouraging 
repayment without changing the terms of the loan. The farmers were divided 
into four sets. In one set they all had title deeds and gave their land as 
security for the loans. In the second set the purpose was to develop social 
pressures to repay. The farmers were divided into groups, with the stipulation 
that no member of a group could obtain any more loans until all members of 
his group had repaid. The third set contained farmers who had unsecured loans 
but had repaid previous loans and thus might be expected to do so again. The 
fourth set was made up of farmers new to the project, and their loans were adminl 
tered in the same way as all loans had been administered in previous years. 
They had no repayment records, offered no security and were subject to no special 
group pressure. The results of this experiment are not yet available, but the 
overall repayment by the end of November 1974 was around 20 per cent. 
SRDP personnel felt that some farmers were not repaying loans because 
they did not understand the loans and thought they were gifts. For this reason, 
credit barazas or seminars have been held to educate farmers concerning the 
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mechanics and uses of the loans. These meetings have been led by the A.F.C. 
Loan Officer for Vihiga, extension agents and USAID advisors, and loan recipients 
have been required to attend. The response has been encouraging, with 76 per 
cent of the recipients actually attending, and some farmers have come forward 
at meetings to repay their loans. It is planned to hold these meetings 
every month in each location, and the scope has been broadened to include 
farmers who are not loan recipients and to discuss other farm development 
topics n 
Table 1- Number of loans and repayment rates, 1971 - 1974. 
Year No, of loans 
1971 63 
1972 323 
1973 920 
1974 320 
Total K.Shs. 
17,062 
73,551 
248,557 
84,048 approx 
Repayment" 
82.0% 
65.6% 
27.6% 
20°0% 
"Repayment refers to the volume of money recovered as a percentage 
of the total sum lent. 
Source: A.F.C. branch, Kakamega, 
The Organisation of Loan Disbursement and Repayment: The maize loan applications 
are processed by a committee comprising the A-A.O.s, the Chiefs and a representa-
tive from the A.F-C. Loan applications have been processed smoothly and quickly, 
though some difficulties have been reported due to the A.F.C. Loan Officer not 
appearing on schedule 
In the first year of operation each recipient was given an Authority 
to Incur Expenditure (A.I E.) of up xo Shs 105/-. He could then purchase inputs 
from stockists in varying proportions up to set limits. The stockists claimed 
reimbursement through the A.F.C. Unfortunately there were delays in obtaining 
this refund and the stockists were subsequently reluctant to accept A.I.E.s 
from farmers. 
In 1973 a different system was adopted« The A.Fi-6. provided recipients 
with coupons on which were stated the precise quantities of the goods to be 
purchased and also the prices of the goods. The coupons could then be passed 
on by the stockists to the wholesale distributers who woulld then be reimbursed. 
This system resulted in two further difficulties. One was that the distributors 
wanted to re-supply the stockists only with the goods named on the coupons 
even though the season for selling them might have passed, and would not accept 
the coupons as payment for other commodities which the stockists might have 
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preferred. Second, the stockists could get higher prices than those specified 
on the coupons so that the loan recipients sometimes could not purchase the 
inputs without supplementing the coupons with cash from their own pockets. 
The SRDP personnel propose now to arrange for the distributors to 
bring the inputs directly to the loan recipients on designated days at 
specific places. This would circumvent the stockists altogether, The idea 
has not yet been approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, however. 
The procedures for collecting repayments have also caused some 
problems. The A.F.C. office is in Kakamega, which is a journey of about 
20 miles for farmers in Vihiga, Nevertheless, in the first two years of 
operation farmers were required to pay back their loans at that office, and 
they were sometimes disappointed to find on their arrival that the A.F.C. 
officers authorised to receive repayment were out on other business. 
In 1973, one of the A.A.O.s in Vihiga was appointed by the A.F.C. 
to collect loan repayments, and he performed this task until November 1974 
when he refused to collect any more because it took too much time away from 
his extension duties. The A.F.C. has now agreed that the Loan Officer who 
covers Vihiga will go there to receive repayments. The A.F.C. has made this 
gesture with some reluctance, because since these loans are not made from A.F.C. 
funds, the Corporation does not wish to bear the primary responsibility for 
their recovery. 
Evaluation of the Maize Credit Scheme's Aims 
The aims of the Vihiga maize credit project have been: 
1. To raise the level of production of maize in Vihiga so as to 
make the area self-sufficient in this crop, with a particular emphasis on 
assisting small-holders to raise their standard of living. 
2. To conform to the four SRDP principles of experimentation, 
evaluation of results, use of local resources, and replicability. 
This second aim is obvious and hardly questionable, but the first 
received considerable attention in the 1972 evaluation report. The report 
pointed out that'self-sufficiency'is a concept which requires both more 
justification and more clarification than it received. One of the fundamental 
conclusions of economic analysis is that an area should concentrate on producing 
those goods for which its resources are most suited, and it cannot be assumed 
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that Vihiga would necessarily be best off if it became self-sufficient in 
maize. Perhaps other crops should be produced in Vihiga, some of which could 
be sold in order to purchase maize. Furthermore, should self-sufficiency mean 
that every farmer in the area should produce enough maize to meet his family's 
needs, or that some farmers should specialise in maize, leaving others to 
produce other goods and buy at least part of their maize needs in the local 
market? 
The 1972 evaluation recommended that the objective of self-sufficiency 
be reconsidered. In fact, there was apparently no significant reappraisal 
until a proposal for a farm development loan was drawn up in 1974. This omission 
has probably not been very serious in this particular case because conditions 
for growing maize may be better in Vihiga than in most other parts of the 
country. Dr. Weisel, the USAID evaluator for the project, has calculated from 
survey data that an appropriate medium yield for the area is 18 bags per acre, 
while a low yield would be 10 bags and a high yield 30 bags. This compares 
favourably with yields assumed elsewhere in this Report of 10 bags, 6 bags and 
18 bags respectively. (See the tables appended to the chapter on SRDP experimenta-
tion and farmers training.) 
Nevertheless, a project such as this, which is meant to serve as a 
model, should have given explicit consideration to this question before committing 
a large amount of resources. And certainly, even if the area as a whole should 
be self-sufficient, there is no reason why every family should be. Resources 
are used more productively when farmers can choose to concentrate on those 
crops for which they have the greatest interest and ability. 
Evaluation of the Scheme's Conformance with SRDP Principles 
Experimentation and Evaluation: These two principles can be treated together. 
In the 1972 evaluation, the researchers pointed out that the criteria being 
applied for loan approval (in particular the requirements of credit-worthiness 
and a minimum of two acres of hybrid maize planted) eliminated the project's 
experimental content. Second, there was nothing in the design of the 
project to allow the testing of different hypotheses. 
These criticisms have been met in several respects. The credit-
worthiness criterion was dropped and the minimum acreage of hybrid maize 
lowered from two acres to one. This allowed the concept of unsecured credit 
to be tried out. The division in 1974 of the farmers into four separate sets 
to test different incentives for repayment should also yield valuable information. 
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An important piece of evaluation was carried out in 1973, in the form of a 
300-farmer survey to follow up the baseline 600-farmer survey made in 1970. 
The most serious criticism of the project's experimental component 
•is that no extension experiment has been devised to compare the results of 
improved extension radLtfr'tSese of the credit scheme. USAID has maintained an 
extension advisor in the field who has apparently developed close and friendly 
working relationships with the local extension agents. A few specific ideas 
have been tried out on an ad hoc basis, such as the credit barazas, but no 
general plan for extension has been thought out. This same criticism was made 
in the 1972 evaluation report, and it is not clear why it has never been 
acted on. 
Use of Local Resources and Raplicability: The primary suggestion made in the 
1972 evaluation report concerning use of local resources was that the credit 
scheme should be integrated more effectively with local commercial institutions. 
It was suggested' that local input stockists be given credit facilities, but 
when this was tried in 1973 and 1974 it was found to be unnecessary. 
The importance of the full participation of the local population 
has been illustrated by the Vihiga maize credit scheme. Experts determined 
that the farmers needed credit, so the project was initiated without consulting 
the farmers themselves. There is evidence that the farmers did not always 
understand what was expected of them,, which has contributed to their poor 
repayment record. This situation is now being remedied by means of the credit 
barazas, where SRDP personnel have learned more about the wider needs of the 
farmers, and a newsletter, eventually to be written by local extension 
personnel and farmers, has also been initiated to improve communication. 
Concerning replication, there are no special features of this project 
or of the Vihiga area which would limit its relevance for the rest of the 
country. Thus, the experience in Vihiga fully supports the general recommenda-
tions made at the end of this chapter concerning a national unsecured credit 
scheme. 
Evaluation of Credit as a Stimulus to Agricultural Production in Vihiga 
The Benefits: As the object of the maize credit scheme has been to encourage 
the use of hybrid maize seed and fertiliser, the adoption rate needs to be 
examined. This is done in Table 2. 
7 IDS/OP 12 
Table 2, Percentages of farmers using hybrid maize seed and fertiliser 
in Vihiga° 
Year Hybrid Seed Users Fertiliser Users 
1969 43.6% 30.0% 
1970 46.6 30.4 
1971 49.0 32.4 
1972 58.7 37.7 
1973 64.8 39.7 
Source: Survey of 300 farmers taken in 1973 by P. Weisel, et al. 
On the face of it, this is a good record. The proportions of 
farmers using hybrid seed and fertiliser rose substantially between 1970, the 
year before the project began, and 1973. However, it would be rash to 
attribute the entire increase to the credit programme. One would expect to 
see some increase in the use of these inputs even in the absence of a credit 
programme because some farmers would be able to purchase inputs without 
credit. Unfortunately it is difficult without much more detailed data to 
be precise in distinguishing the impact of the credit programme from this 
independent tendency. There are, however, reasons for supposing that the 
impact of the credit programme was not terribly great. 
First, the project reached only a small number of farmers in the 
area. In 1974, the estimated population of Vihiga division was 340,000. Assuming 
8 persons per family, there are, as a rough approximation, 40,000 farms in the 
area.1 By comparison, the total number of loans given from 1970 to 1973 was 
only 1,306. Even allowing for a 'demonstration effect', whereby other farmers 
would have been inspired to grow maize by seeing the success obtained by the 
loan recipients, the impact of the loan scheme on the overall production of 
maize in Vihiga cannot be supposed to be large. 
More importantly, the loans were not distributed in a manner most 
likely to achieve a large impact, in that most of the farmers who received 
the assistance had already grown hybrid maize and used fertiliser before. 
In 1973 it was found that in a random sample of 300 farmers only 7 per cent 
of the loan recipients (outside East and West Bunyore) had not grown hybrid 
maize before and only 24 per cent had not already adopted fertiliser. The 
corresponding figures for farmers who did not receive loans (outside East and 
1. As the Vihiga area is about 551 square kilometres, this would give 
an average farm size of the order of one hectare which is a reasonable estimate. 
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West Bunyore) were 22 per cent and 64 per cent respectively. Thus, far 
from concentrating on the laggards to assist them to rise to the level of 
the more progressive farmers, the scheme in fact benefited farmers who 
2 were already more progressive. (12) 
This same point was raised in the 1972 I.D.S. evaluation. At that 
time, the basis for criticism was that the requirement that all loan recipients 
be credit-worthy and grow at least two acres of maize was bound to result 
in a prejudice in favour of wealthier farmers. Both of these criteria were 
changed, credit-worthiness was abandoned and the minimum acreage of hybrid 
maize was reduced to one, but-still the bias remained. In 1973 there were 
the greatest number of loan recipients, 920, so that the chances of obtaining 
at least a fair cross-section of farmers was greatest, but this was not 
achieved, Not only was the direct impact of the loan scheme on hybrid maize 
adoption low, but also the demonstration effect was low since most loan 
recipients provided the initial demonstration prior to receiving the loan. 
The evidence thus suggests that the benefits of the maize credit 
programme were low In terms of increased production. The increase in 
adoption shown in the figures quoted in Table I must, according to this 
interpretation, be due to other factors. Moreover, the project cannot 
be said to have been very effective in improving income distribution by 
raising the level of income of the the poorest farmers,for the project 
benefited them less than the more progressive farmers, 
The Costs: In a successful credit scheme the costs of the project are very 
small and are recovered in the form of service charges added on to the interest 
rate charged. Costs which cannot be avoided are those arising out of 
processing loan applications, disbursing loans and collecting repayments, 
including the extra costs of following up loan recipients who fall in arrears 
and writing off a small proportion of bad debts, An additional cost arises 
when the interest rate is subsidised. 
In the case of the Vihiga project interest was free in 1971, but 
since then interest rates of 1 per cent a month or 10 per cent a season have 
been charged which is close to the commercial rate. A 2 per cent penalty 
2- These percentages do not tally with those given In Table 2 because 
these excludeEhst and West Bunyore where adoption rates are low. 
The USAID sponsored evaluation cites other figures which are less drastic 
but still show that a higher proportion of previous adopters received loans 
than the average for the division. We have not found the source of the 
USAID evaluators' figures. 
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rate levied monthly on late repayment not only adds an incentive to repay, 
but also should cover part of the costs of pursuing recalcitrant loan 
recipients, assuming they finally repay 
The difficulty has been, that the number of recipients who have 
failed to repay has been large. This inevitably raises costs in one 
or both of two ways: 1) there is a high proportion of loans which is never 
recovered, and 2) efforts must be made to follow up recalcitrant loan 
recipients to solicit repayment. 
Figures on the costs of this project are not available other than 
the sums of money tied up in unrepaid loans, Yet it seems that the costs have 
been high due to poor repayment, and they must be set against the benefits 
which have been described here as low. Whatever the numerical benefit-cost ratio 
is, it must be considerably less than was originally expected. 
The General Limitations of Credit Schemes 
The Tendency Towards Low Benefits: The usefulness of credit provision as 
a means to stimulate agricultural production is often exaggerated, and the 
Vihiga project is not exceptional in producing disappointing results (See 7 for 
other examples.). The reason for this Is that credit is provided to remedy 
a problem which is often not as serious as is supposed, and this diverts 
attention from those problems which are truly important. 
The case for creating a small-holders' credit scheme runs along the 
following lines. To raise agricultural production it isrecessary for 
farmers to begin to use new seed types, fertiliser and insecticides, all of 
which must be purchased with cash The farmers who are most In need of 
increasing their production are subsistence farmers who are by definition 
short of cash . Credit must therefore be made available» but banks and other 
commercial institutions do not regard small-scale farmers as good risk, even 
where they have title deeds, since it Is expensive to foreclose and the 
banks do not want to become involved in the real estate business. The 
conclusion follows that special credit schemes must be created. 
Some of these assumptions are not always correct. To begin with, 
the large part of credit received is used to purchase fertiliser, and it is 
not always necessary for farmers to start off by using large amounts of 
fertiliser or even any fertiliser at all, because yields can often be quite 
good without fertiliser, at least for a long enough peric ; to enable the 
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farmer to build up a cash surplus. 
There is good evidence for this in a detailed study carried out 
in Western Kenya. (1) It was found that the determinants of high maize yields 
were, in order of importance: 
early planting (50%) 
hybrid (as against local) seed (40%) 
optimum plant population (30%) 
proper and timely weeding (23%) 
phosphate fertiliser (13%) 
nitrogen fertiliser (4%) 
The figures in brackets show by what proportion yield was increased by 
each variable in the trials. Clearly hybrid seed is important, but fertiliser 
is much less important than many people would have guessed. The trials were 
carried out in a variety of areas, and in some places fertiliser was more 
important than in others. Nevertheless, the point remains that this expensive 
input is generally not as important as the good husbandry practices listed. 
The significance of this can be seen in the proportion of the value 
of the credit package which is accounted for by fertiliser. In 1975 the 
proportions of the various inputs are: 
Seed 23/-
DDT 10/-
Fertiliser 210/-
Top dressing 240/-
483/-
In previous years the situation was not so extreme because the price of 
fertiliser was not so high, but the most essential input, hybrid seed, has 
always been a small proportion of the total cost. 
To-the extent that Allan's study holds, therefore, the need for 
credit by small farmers is not nearly as great as night have been supposed. 
The proportion who cannot afford the Shs. 33/- required for seed and D.D.T. 
is likely to be quite small. 
It must be acknowledged that in some areas fertiliser may be 
necessary if hybrid maize is to yield satisfactorily, but it would be 
a serious waste if it is merely assumed to be necessary for all areas. 
The question was never raised in Vihiga, but figures already quoted from 
the 1973 survey of 300 farmers show that most farmers in the area had 
already adopted hybrid maize without credit, Specifically 98 per cent of the 
loan recipients and 78 per cent of the other farmers outside East and West 
Bunyore were already growing hybrid maize without credit. A smaller 
proportion had adopted fertiliser (76 per cent of loan recipients and 36 
per cent of the other farmers). 
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It is accepted that fertiliser is often necessary to prevent soil 
depletiono In parties it, farmers whose plots are too small to leave some 
fields fallow may neea fertiliser to maintain high yields. Even in these 
cases, however, not as much fertiliser may be needed as is commonly supposed. 
It is possible to enrich the soil with compost or animal manure, 
or to interplant or rotate maize crops with beans to preserve the fertility 
of the soil. These practises may not completely replace synthetic fertiliser, 
but their potential advantages should certainly be fully investigated, especially 
now that the price of fertiliser has increased so drastically. Yet extension 
agents are still generally concerned only with the use of fertiliser. 
Finally, synthetic fertilisers can be used, but in amounts less 
than the level which produces maximum increases in yieids. Given the high 
cost of this input, the use of smaller quantitites may actually maximise 
the farmers' profits even though yields would be slightly lower. Simple economic 
analysis shows that in general when the cost of an input increases, less 
should be used. Usually agricultural research stations only give figures 
for maximum yields, but farmers need to know how yieids vary when different 
quantitites of fertiliser are used so that they can make the best economic 
decisions, 
Actual fertiliser needs may be zero when a farmer first plants 
hybrid maize; they may be fully met by the use of compost or manure; or 
they may be met with modest amounts of synthetic fertiliser. As production 
and incomes rise, farmers will be able to Increase their purchased inputs 
including fertiliser, but initially there is no need to increase the 
financial burdens or to raise the costs of a maize development project by 
insisting on the purchase of large amounts of synthetic fertiliser. 
Another limitation on the effectiveness of credit provision 
sometimes overlooked is that credit tends not to reach the farmers who need 
it most. This has teen the case in Vihiga, as shown by the fact that a greater 
proportion of the loan recipients had had the initiative and funds to grow 
hybrid maize without loans than was the case for other farmers. This is a 
problem likely to affect most credit projects unless steps are taken to 
prevent it, One factor is almost unavoidable: that even a one acre minimum 
limit on the amount of maize grown would eliminate the porest farmers, and 
any lower limit might be uneconomical. 
A more tractable problem is that the most needy of those farmers 
who can qualify for loans may not be sought out by the responsible loan 
and extension officials. Two studies are available,cne carried out in 
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Vihiga and the other in Tetu, which show that extension officers tend to focus 
their attention on the more progressive farmers, at the expense of the less 
progressive. (6, Tables 75 and 76, and 2, Tables 11 and 12) This could be 
a result of the traditional extension strategy of concentrating on most 
progressive farmers and hoping for a 'trickle down effect', or it could be 
due to a natural inclination for extension agents to concentrate their efforts 
where they bring the most rapid results. In any case, this attitude can be 
corrected through training and supervision, so that when the agents search out 
potential loan recipients they look for the poorer farmers rather than the 
'safe risks'^ 
The Tendency Towards High Costs: Small-holder credit schemes are liable to 
face high costs even in the absence of subsidies to keep interest rates down. 
For one thing, it is inevitably expensive to service a large number of small 
loans. This is one of the rg-HSaoriff banks do not like to cater for small 
businessmen and farmers, and when Government agencies enter this,.field they 
must recognise and weigh the costs when considering alternative ways of 
developing agriculture. 
The second reason for high costs is low repayment rates, for which 
a number of explanations can be offered. Farmers .may not always fully understand 
the way in which credit operates, or their own obligation to repay. This 
was found to be the case in Vihiga when the 1973 survey of 300 farmers revealed 
that they often considered the money they had received more a gift than a loan. 
This problem can be dealt with through education, as is being done in Vihiga 
through the credit barazas. 
3. One possibility which is not considered here is that there is no need for 
credit because, contrary to common belief, there are sufficient funds available 
in rural areas already. Factors which have been cited as evidence for this 
are: 
The availability of funds for the purchase of former European 
farms in the early 1960s; the phenomenal collections for harambee 
projects; the extent of investment in trade, transport and other 
non-agricultural businesses in the rural areas; the growing amount of 
investment in urban property; the experience of the post office, 
commercial banks and cooperative societies receiving rural savings 
deposits. (5) 
Although this question is very important, it is not pursued here 
because it is highly contraversial and the evidence available is not conclusive. 
Finally, although there may be funds available in the rural areas, these are 
generally not accessible to the poorest farmers with whom this evaluation is 
most concerned. 
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Where -the credit programme is successful in reaching lower income 
farmers, the repayment problem is likely to become more severe. It has 
been found in Vihiga that those farmers who have repaid all their loans have 
a significantly higher level of financial resources than those farmers who 
have not repayed at all. (12) Some farmers, even after harvesting hybrid 
maize, may have little or no excess to sell above their consumption needs 
so they cb not earn the cash necessary to repay the loan. If the average 
yield is 18 bags from one acre of hybrid maize and the. average family 
consumption is 15 bags (quoted in the 1972 evaluation report, p. F-7), 
then enough cash could be generated to repay the loan. However, many 
farmers fall below the average, and they will be unable to repay unless 
they have other sources of income. Empirical evidence to support this view of 
the problem is provided in a sample of 1972 loan recipients in Vihiga. 
Those who had repaid their loans in full had sold on average 7.5 bags of 
maize and most of the funds to pay off the loans had come from this source. 
Those who had repaid nothing had sold on average only 3.5 bags. (12) 
Another reason that some loans were not repaid in Vihiga was 
apparently that they were not secured by title deed or in any other way. 
Aside from a sense of personal obligation, the only reason a farmer would 
-j have for repaying an unsecured loan would be in order to establish a good 
reputation with credit authorities in the event "that he might want another 
loan in the future, but a number of farmers probably do not foresee a need 
for further loans. According to the A.F.C. Loan Officer for Vihiga, after 
a certain period of default each defaulter is sent a letter saying that 
"action" will be taken if he fails to repay. After a further period of 
default, another letter is sent saying the same thing. The increasing rate 
of default from year to year suggests that farmers have learned from earlier 
defaulters that no action will be taken for nonpayment. This is pure specu-
lation, but some evidence will be available when the chta on 1974- loan re-
payment are compiled, breaking down recipients into the four sets described 
earlier. 
Should it turn out, however, that loans made on the basis of title 
deeds are more likely to be repaid, still no small-holder credit scheme 
could rely exclusively on this factor. For one thing, the cost of obtaining 
a title deed would discourage a number of potential applicants, and also 
it is too expensive to enforce repayment by foreclosing on land to allow 
this sanction to be applied in very many cases. Thus "the security provided 
by title deeds is not generally effective in the case of small loans. 
The only practicable security for small-holdfer loans is a system 
of marketing cash crops through one organisation which can deduct loan 
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repayments from: farmers' sales- This is the case for tea, which can only be 
marketed through the K.T.D.A,, and also for coffee and pyrethrum, though 
cooperatives officers can sometimes be persuaded to cfelay the deductions. 
Where there is a local market for the crop, loan repayments cannot be 
secured in this way, 
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF CREDIT PROVISION AND ALTERNATIVE WAYS 
TO DEVELOP AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
The objectives of providing credit to small-holders are in general 
to increase agricultural production and enhance the incomes of poorer farmers. 
We have seen from experience in Vihiga that unsecured loans to small-holders 
are not terribly effective in reaching these objectives. For one thing, 
benefits are low because fertiliser, on which most of the loan is spent, is 
not as essential to raising yields as has often been thought, and further 
credit is often not given to the farmers most in need, Given the limited 
benefits, costs are high, particularly because defaulting is likely to be 
high. 
Still, small-scale farmers need assistance, but assistance through 
improved extension services and in some cases subsidised fertiliser prices is 
likely to be more successful than oredit schemes. Ways to improve extension 
are discussed in the chapter on S.R-D.P, experimentation and farmer training 
in this Report and include improved training for extension agents and the group 
approach to farmers, 
A far larger number of farmers can be assisted by an effective 
extension service than by a loan scheme, and all farmers can be reached, 
even those who would not qualify for an unsecured loan. In addition, 
improved husbandry methods as taught by extension agents can reduce the 
need for fertiliser and can raise yields for many crops even higher than the 
application cf fertiliser alone. 
When fertilisers are shown to be necessary for crops with local 
markets, it is preferable to subsidise small-holder fertiliser purchases 
rather than offering loans. As is the case with extension, subsidies can 
reach even those farmers who could not qualify for loans, Costs would vary, 
of course, with the extent of the subsidy, and they could be substantial, 
but they should not be greater than the costs of a nationwide small-holder 
credit stheme with large administrative overheads and probably a high 
defaulting rate. The cost of a subsidy could be planned for in advance in 
a way that is not possible with a loan scheme where the precise defaulting 
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rate cannot be predicted. 
Small-holder credit is still an attractive alternative for crops that 
are markeied through one organisation, such as a cooperative or the K.T.D.A., 
which can collect repayments automatically from theiarmers' sales. Yet even 
here the role of extension must not be underestimated, As the experience with 
tea in Vihiga has shown, crop production will not be enhanced if farmers are 
not taught how to use the inputs which are provided through credit, and they 
will not increase their incomes sufficiently to repay the loans without undue 
hardship, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE VIHIGA SMALL-HOLDERS MAIZE CREDIT SCHEME 
1. This project, having provided the information for which it was 
set up, should not be continued, 
2- The efforts of the S.R.D.P. team in Vihiga should be directed 
towards properly designed experiments to improve the effectiveness of the 
extension service. 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE REPLICATION OF SMALL-HOLDER CREDIT 
SCHEMES 
1. Attempts to increase agricultural production and improve the incomes 
of small-holders by granting unsecured loans should be discontinued, except 
where crops are marketed compulsorily through one organisation such as a 
cooperative society or the K T.D.A. 
2. The extension service should be regarded as the chief instrument 
for increasing agricultural production and raising farm incomes, Recommendations 
for improving the extension service are contained in the chapter on S.R.D.P. 
experimentation and farmer training in this Report. 
3. Research should be undertaken to establish just when synthetic 
fertilisers are necessary and the amounts which are economically optimal. 
The Maize and Produce Board is currently carrying out a survey on 
maize production in various parts of the nation. The primary objective is to 
develop a means of forecasting total maize production. However, as the data 
gathered will include variables affecting yield, such as times of planting, 
weeding, and fertiliser use, the survey will be valuable in shedding light 
on the Importance of fertiliser relative to other factors. The results of this 
survey should be closely followed. 
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4« Until the results of such research are available, a moratorium 
should be declared on all projects designed to encourage the use of synthetic 
fertilisers among small-holders, 
5»Improved seed and, where the need is established, synthetic ferti-
lisers should be distributed to small-holders at subsidised prices, Any 
farmer with less than four hectares (ten acres) of land should be allowed to 
obtain subsidised inputs up ro the amounts sufficient to plant one hectare. 
The farmers' eligibility would last for a maximumcf three years. The extension 
service could issue vouchers to farmers who qualify. 
This system of eligibility would result in some unnecessary subsidies 
to farmers who could afford the full price, but the administrative costs of 
sorting out the truly needy would be very great. Some farmers might choose to 
resell the inputs they obtain at subsidised prices, and it should be left up 
to them if they want to realise the benefits of the scheme in this way. However, 
part of the role of the extension service would be to convince farmers of the 
value of using the inputs on their own farms. 
A small-holder could bring an amount of local seed to a trader, or 
Its cash equivalent at official M.P.B. prices, together with a voucher issued 
by the extension service. The trader would give him in return an equivalent 
amount of improved seed and would be reimbursed according to the number of 
vouchers collected. Fertiliser could simply be sold at reduced prices on 
the presentation of vouchers, and the traders reimbursed. Neither seed nor 
fertiliser should be handed out free of charge, because people generally make 
better use of what they have paid for. 
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AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND FARMERS TRAINING 
RESULTS OF S R.D-? EXPERIMENTATION IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION 
Introduction 
Experimentation to improve agricultural extension was carried out 
In Tetu with a project to assist less progressive .farmers.;..In Mbere where an 
extension staff management system was tried and m . Ui^yf i where 
extension was directed towards groups of farmers and local participation 
was encouraged through Agricultural Village Committees., Further, two 
experiments were planned but not implemented, m the early stages of SRDP 
in Migorip the 'Master Farmer Project' and the '630 Farmers Project'. 
In Kwale an intensive extension approach has been planned but not 
yet implemented., A series of further extension experiments were devised by 
I,D.S. researchers, - using SRDP funds - under the normal district development 
administration of Kisii and South Nyanza for the purpose of replication and 
further development of results achieved under SRDP conditions. 
In this section we evaluate these extension experiments with a 
view to learning whether their results can help to solve the most serious 
problems of the present agricultural extension service in Kenya, 
Efficiency Criteria for Extension 
Probably for most agricultural innovations it would be far too 
expensive to establish extension services that are so well staffed and 
mobile that each and every farmer could be reached directly and thoroughly 
supervised;, trained^ etc. 
Reaching every farmer directly seems unnecessary. Farmers have 
a great potential for learning (adopting) from each other,, If this potential 
is activated the function of extension basically remains to introduce 
innovations to certain areas and certain communities. Eventually extension 
may also give 'infrastructural' assistance for the self-generating 
3~1? 
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diffusion process; e g= by improving marketings the availability of inputs 
and the communication flow, etc. 
From this concept of extension we can derive two efficiency 
criteria: 
1) the success of extension activities In introducing agricultural 
innovationss. and 
2) the-.success of extension activities in promoting' diffusion of agricultural 
innovations among the farmer community. 
These two criteria are Interrelated because the way an Innovation is 
introduced has a strong effect on Its diffusion, 
Basic Problems of the Present Extension Services 
We shaj .1 discuss first a general problem related to the efficiency 
criterion of diffusion. Then we shall go into specific constraints related 
to the introduction of innovations. 
The Problem f^ Generating Diffusion of Agricultural innovations among Farmers: 
Within the existing extension machinery, an agent can directly reach only a 
few farmers in his area (due to the low extension-worker-farmer ratio) in 
order to introduce an innovation Who should be selected to start with? 
Conventional practise is to choose the wealthier farmers.,, those who are 
better educated; more receptive to innovation or more ready to accept 
experimental risks„ etc. - those farmers wno in fact (in the absence of 
extension) are the more innovative ones already3 for whatever reason 
In the more recent literature., and also among politicians and 
development administratorss one finds a growing awareness and concern for 
the long term results of this approach: developing societies which have 
adopted this approach have found that their agricultural extension aggravated 
dualistic development. This conventional extension approach does not take 
into account the communication and identification gap between the most 
progressive farmers and the masses of the others which is typical for the 
rural areas of developing nations. Agricultural innovations usually are 
too sophisticated to be adopted by less progressive*- farmers just by 
looking at a field belonging to someone else,, and most progressive farmers 
are too busy or are not interested in teaching less progressive farmers. 
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They even may be afraid that too many adopters will reduce the income they 
derive from an exclusive innovation, Lastly, less progressive farmers 
usually feel that the farming conditions of progressive farmers are quite 
different from their owns and that the innovations adopted by the more 
progressive farmers are perhaps not relevant to their own situation. 
Most progressive farmers adopt income generating innovations in 
a way which leads than to further- innovations, which of course is desirable, 
but they have not been effective in transferring these innovations to others. 
We therefore have to distinguish clearly between the contribution most 
progressive farmers make in the economy^ which can be valued positively, 
and their role as multipliers or modelss which has been widely overestimated. 
The extension worker - even If he does not know the conventional 
extension philosophy - will tend to follow the conventional strategy since 
he has to show results from his work,, He can do this best by working with 
the 'best1 farmerssince these adopt new Innovations with the least 
difficulty. 
Thus the most progressive farmers accumulate income generating 
innovations more cr less exclusively. In economic terms,, this is not 
efficient, The success of accelerating development among a small farmer 
elite will be eclipsed by the slow progress of the neglected majority. 
Bringing the majority of farmers into a process of accelerated 
development would result in high economic benefits: it would reduce the 
costs of resolving social and other problems (e.g. unemployment, unwanted 
rural-urban mIgration9 illiteracy? mainourishment and disease) on the one 
hand& and on the other it would mobilise the economic potential of millions 
of farmers and their millions of acres of land for the national economy. 
Extension should reach those farmers first of all who form the rural 
majority and who tend to be the less progressive farmers. 
Efficiency Constraints as Perceived by Extension Officers: Most officers 
and agricultural experts when asked about the major constraints on 
extension mentioned the following: 
1) There are not sufficient numbers of agents in the field; 
2) The field staff is often not sufficiently qualified or motivated to 
give good extension services; and 
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3) There are almost no transportation facilities for the field staff and 
transportation is a serious problem to the officers in charge as well. 
These problems exist in all SRDP areas and even more severely in 
the non-SRDP districts. But SRDP experimentation and research have shown 
that there are ways to reduce these problems without raising the costs of 
extension- These experiments will be described later1. The implications of 
the three problems mentioned above will be discussed first. 
Insufficient Extension Staff; In Kenya the extension worker-farmer ratio 
is around 1:500, This is very high compared with other countries (i,e. 
Tanzania 1;1,500; Uganda 1:1,800). (Roling, et. al, 11) As long as the 
existing extension personnel Is generally considered inefficient, we see 
little rationale for expanding the number of staff, 
The efficiency of the existing staff can be Improved tranendously 
if they work within an appropriate extension programme with well planned and 
organised activities, if they approach groups instead of individual farmers 
and If they promote and utilise the innovative initiative which can be 
found in the farming community. 
For example, three extension workers could barely convince twelve 
farmers to adopt soya beans with traditional extension methods in Kisii, 
South Mugirango Location- The same number of agents managed easily and 
very successfully to convince 200 farmers to adopt soya beans by following 
an appropriates, well planned programme and using groups and the farmers' 
own initiative in South Nyanza, Kanyamkago Location, This may indicate the 
potential for improving the efficiency of the existing number of extension 
staff, 
Lack of Qualifications and Motivation Among the Extension Staff: Agricultural 
instruction requires a minimum qualification," At least the majority of 
extension workers In Kenya seems to have received training providing 
this minimum qualification, 
However, for each extension project certain specific training is 
required, The type of training depends on the innovation and the relevant 
agricultural, social, economic and infrastructural conditions of the project 
s - 5 IDS/OP 12 
area. These specific training requirements, we think, should be part of 
each extension project. 
Studies in Kenya and other countries show that there is very 
little correlation between the general education of the extension staff 
member and his job performance. There are even studies showing a negative 
correlation. (S ee Leonard, 9S 10,14.) It seems that motivation is the one 
crucial factor for job performance. Motivation cannot be explained solely 
In terms of personality. Motivation is to some extent a result of certain 
conditions under which a person works, Most Interviewees agreed that a very 
typical feature was that extension staff in the field did not have well 
planned and organised working programmes, They sometimes have general or 
specific targets such as to promote agriculture, to promote hybrid maize, 
to induce twenty farmers to start growing Mexican 142 pea beans, to prepare 
four demonstration plots for fertiliser trials, etc. Sometimes the 
extension staff member is able to meet such targets, but • ' reaching targets 
often has little effect on the adoption of innovations-, for example 
repeatedly in SRDP areas fertiliser demonstrations were conducted where 
farmers had refused to give control plots because they knew very well 
about fertilisers and considered control plots a waste of land, They were 
only interested in the fertiliser 'demonstrations' (free of costs), The 
field staff met certain quantitative targets in this case which had no 
relevance for agricultural development, The risk of irrelevant target 
setting is high if extension is not carried out as part of a well devised 
programme. Most extension workers have no specific programme to help them 
carry out .their more general tasks. 
It is to be expected that extension workers who do not have an 
adequate implementation programme will fail to a great extent in bringing 
about an innovation process among farmers. This will In turn tend to 
undermine the motivation of these workers. The situation would be 
different if the extension worker were integrated into a well planned and 
implemented extension programme. Then he could perceive whether or not 
he was successful. He would see his own contribution more clearly. 
A further point often made concerning the motivation of 
extension workers was that there is no official reward for good extension 
performance and that even if an extension officer performs very well for 
many years he still finds that his chances for promotion have not improved. 
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This is a serious problem. A number of unofficial encouragements do 
exist; for examplean instructor's prestige among the community and among 
the officers depends to some extent on his performance. However, this is 
hardly an adequate solution to the problem of professional rewards. 
Lack of Transportation Facilities: It has to be acknowledged that travelling 
is necessary to carry out extension work. A.A.O.s must see their staff in 
the field regularly, and the field staff should be able to travel to the 
A.A.Os* Cor district) offices from time to time to settle project matters. 
Each field staff member at a locational or lower level should have a 
bicycle. 
Yet there is little evidence that allocation of vehicles, 
motorbikes or petrol beyond the minimum requirements would significantly 
improve the efficiency of the extension service under its present conditions. 
We are of the opinion that .if there is a shortage of transportation facilities, 
extension should initially be organised In line with the facilities available. 
If there is a shortage of facilities, one response would be to organise 
extension activities in such a way that travelling is minimised. This can 
be achieved by directing extension efforts to groups of farmers. Using 
groups in extension is widely recommended in the literature for many reasons, 
not least of which is the advantage of reduced travelling. The typical 
extension approach of visiting scattered individual farmers is surely far less 
efficient than an approach which would have extension staff visit, say, a group 
of ten farmers in one part of a sublocation and a group of twenty farmers 
in another part. The particular groups contacted could be changed from 
season to season or from innovation to Innovation to avoid giving too many 
services to the same people. 
There are wide possibilities for improving efficiency without 
increasing travel. A sublocation comprising3 say, 500 farming households 
could be organised into two dozen groups, each having its own chairman. 
The extension worker could even ask those chairmen to come to him, perhaps at 
the central market place, for certain instruction purposes. Good extension 
is still possible with limited transportation facilities. 
SRDP Experiments to Reduce Extension Inefficiency 
In all six SRDP areas, the efficiency of the extension service 
was considered by officers concerned to be a crucial factor for the 
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promotion of rural development. And in all areas more or less systematic 
efforts had been made to improve the efficiency of the extension 
service. 
We stated the two basic efficiency criteria for extension 
earlier: 
1. The extension service's ability to introduce Innovations to certain 
people and certain areas, and 
2. The ability to promote the spreading (diffusion) of innovations 
among the people. 
We then discussed the most important constraints as perceived by the 
officers concerned, which affect the efficiency of extension: (1) the 
shortage of staff, (2) staff members' lack of qualifications and motivation, 
and (3) very limited transport facilities. 
We shall now turn to the instruments or methods which have been 
tested to overcome these constraints. The methods tested for increasing 
extension efficiency come under four headings: 
1) Methods to improve the individual working performance of the extension 
staff; 
2) Methods to make the extension structure (especially communication between 
staff and farmers) more efficient; 
3) Methods to mobilise and utilise the farmers' own initiative for 
ext ens ion; and 
4) Methods to directly approach those farmers who guarantee the most 
efficient spreading (diffusion) of innovations. 
The fourth category of methods, which is basically directed towards the 
second efficiency criterion of promoting the diffusion of innovations among 
farmers, is described and evaluated in the second half of this chapter. 
Experiments to Improve the Individual Working Performance of the Extension 
Staff 
The Agricultural Extension Staff Management System (Mbere): One of the 
systematic efforts to improve the performance of extension staff was carried 
out at Mbere in the early stage of SRDP. This project encompassed both 
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crop and livestock extension,1 The implementation was monitored by 
researchers, (Chambers, 17) 
The project had two components: 
1) A detailed (but not'sophisticated) reporting system for the lower 
extension staff was designed to improve the communication flow within the 
extension staff. This was thought to be a precondition for better decision 
making (planning), setting realistic targets,, identifying constraints and 
providing better control and supervision of the activities on the sublocational 
and locational levels. 
2) Monthly management meetings, held in each location, had the purpose of 
extension planning. The reporting system could be utilised for this. 
Furthermore, the participation of the lower- extension staff in planning 
aimed at improving the motivation of the lower staff for better- work performance. 
The researchers who had monitored the project stated that it appeared 
to bring about the following beneficial results: 
Close operational control of staff work, 
More realistic target-setting. 
Better knowledge by supervisors of their subordinates and 
of what they are doing3, 
Better motivation through participation in preparing work 
programmes and setting targets9 
A clear idea of who is reached by extehsion work through the 
accumulation of records of farm visits. 
The stimulation of farmers 8 interest through the farm visit books 
which have been in demand by farmers, and 
Harder and more effective work by junior staff. 
Unfortunately there was no further monitoring and evaluation in Mbere and 
the project has withered away after the research Input was withdrawn. 
Generally we believe that this experiment was a very appropriate trial 
to reduce supervisory and communication problems which are an important 
factor in the lower extension staff's work performance. 
The system is discussed in more detail in the chapter on S.R.D.P, 
Administration in this Report. 
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The Master Farmer and 630 Farmers Projects in Migori and Intensive Extension 
Projects in Kwale: Some other projects, aimed at improving work performance, 
were based on the concept of allocating the services of the junior 
extension staff to a few most progressive farmers. Those farmers would 
be known to the senior staff so that extension activities could be controlled 
much more easily. This approach was used in the early 'Master Farmer Project' 
and the more recent '630 Farmers Project'. Each of the 63 extension workers 
was supposed to concentrate on 10 farmers in Migori, but. neither project 
'" 2 
was implemented. The 'Intensive Extension Project' devised for Kwale 
(but not yet implemented) seems to follow a similar concept although it is 
not yet clear whether only most progressive farmers are supposed to be 
recruited. We do not consider the concentration on most progressive farmers 
to be efficient for the reasons discussed earlier. But there are also 
other reasons for being sceptical about an approach which concentrates 
advice, training, inputs, credits, pest and disease control measures, 
special marketing arrangements, farm management devices, etc. on a minority 
of farmers - irrespective of whether they are more or less progressive. 
It may be possible to improve the agricultural practises of 
these farmers significantly, but this occurs under rather artificial 
conditions, under protection and intensive assistance. Once protection and 
assistance have been removed, there remains the risk that the once favoured 
farmer can not keep up the standard he has reached. One should keep in mind 
that helping a few farmers improve does not change the administration, 
communications and marketing facilities of a whole area, and these 
facilities are often inadequate to maintain a high general standard of 
farming. However, the so-called most progressive farmers, no matter how 
they have attained this status, usually do not depend on the general 
administrative, communications and marketing channels. Typically under 
dualistic economic and social conditions, they have channels of their own. 
2. The reason for not implementing the 'Master Farmer Project' was 
described in the first I.D.S. Evaluation Report (1972). In short, it 
failed due to uncoordinated planning activities between the expatriate 
team (then stationed at Migori) and the Kenyan officials. The farmers for 
the '630 Farmers Project' never were recruited. The recruitment was 
supposed to be done by a special committee chaired by the DAO, but the 
DAO never took action to start the proj ect. 
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But even if the minority of specially assisted farmers achieve 
a lasting high standard of farming, this standard can hardly spill over to 
other farmers2 because the various Innovations and far-reaching changes in 
economic and social behaviour are too complex and new for an average farmer 
confronted with them all at once, and lacking special assistance. 
These two factors far outweigh the fact that innovation can be 
achieved more easily the greater the advantage of the innovation. (Rogers, 
18) No doubt in terms of incomes innovative farming methods show great . 
advantages compared with the income of the ordinary farmer. Most probably 
the common farmer would realise this. But the accumulation of a number of 
innovations necessary for a high standard of farming took years of concentrated 
extension effort among a few farmers. This is perceived as a highly 
complex entity, and it is usually impossible for the average farmer to see 
the various components of the innovation entity and their-slitionshipd» 
The whole system of innovation (called 'high level farming') becomes 
impossible to adopt due to its complexity. 
Further research revealed that when a particular innovation is 
compatible with the conditions of a potential adopter, the probability of 
actual adoption increases. (See Rogers, 18.) High level farming methods 
involve so many changes that an, average farmer will not consider this entity 
of innovation relevant to his own situation. If the same farmer were 
confronted with the single components of the innovation system, he would 
be much more likely to consider these relevant to his own farming conditions. 
From this we have to conclude that the step-by-step approach 
(successive introduction of less complicated innovations) is more efficient, 
for diffuslng-'innovations among the majority of farmers. The farmers who are 
just a little more innovative than the others have the highest chance to 
function as models or reference persons for the others. Innovations spread more 
effectively from the marginally more innovative farmers than from those who 
are far ahead of the general farming practises. 
Coming back to the original purpose of this approach - the improvement 
of the work performance of the field staff by concentrating their work on 
improvements for a few farmers - one is forced to conclude that this working 
performance is irrelevant if the economic effects are low by definition 
compared with the potential effects of other extension approaches. 
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Field Staff Inservice Training for Project Preparation: In recent experiments 
in SRDP areas in Kisii and South Nyanza, the I.D.S. researchers in cooperation 
with district agricultural staff and the Institute of Adult Education 
attempted to determine how the working performance of the lower staff 
could be improved by means of inservice training. During a one-week 
training session at the Farmer Training Centre(F.T,C.) to prepare extension 
staff for organising a soya bean extension projects emphasis was placed on 
increasing the motivation of staff members for better performance. This 
was based on the widely accepted theory that the motivation to carry out 
a particular job will be improved: 
(1) If a person expects that the outcome of his work will be of value, 
(2) If he knows exactly how to carry out this work3 and 
(3) If he himself has some responsibility for planning this work 
(participation for identification). 
The first step of the course was to discuss the advantages of the 
innovation for the farmers as well as the Advantages of the different 
components of the extension project such as farmer recruitment patterns, 
farmers' field training, demonstrations3 etc. The second step was to 
equip the staff with the practical skills they would need to introduce the 
innovation and ensure its extension*. The third and probably most important 
step was to involve the extension staff in programming and planning the 
extension project for its implementation at the locational and sublocational 
level. The staff members had to draft their own outlines for instructing 
the farmers and conducting demonstrations on the farmers' fields. They also 
had to prepare their own action programmes for extension, which3 of course, 
were discussed and coordinated afterwards. These action programmes were 
precisely specified and timed and then officially accepted or amended by 
the senior staff. The adoption results were extremely good. (See Table 1.) 
This Inservice Training Programme as well as the Extension Staff 
Management Programme described earlier had very similar objectives but used 
different instruments to achieve them. There are arguments showing 
advantages for both instruments. Inservice training cannot be held 
very frequently. It is not suited for handling day to day extension 
problems. The Staff Management Programme3 although most helpful for day 
to day management, probably is inadequate for extension projects which 
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need more derailed preparation than what is possible in a management meeting. 
Therefore we recommend that new extension projects or changes in extension 
strategies (and methods) should be introduced to the staff by means of 
inservice training including the motivation . component described. Implementation 
can be controlled and supervised efficiently by the Staff Management Systefa. 
Experiments to Make the Structure of Extension Work (especially Communication 
between Staff and Farmers) More Efficient 
The group approach in extension is already practised by some 
extension staff. A common practice of the more active extension workers is to 
address farmers during Chiefs' and Assistant Chiefs' barazas, and this method 
is closely related to the group approach. But we are not aware of any 
systematic or regular arrangements by which extension agents approach farmers 
in groups. 
One of the problems articulated by extension staff members themselves 
is that they are simply unaware of techniques for establishing group 
extension systems among farmers. There is usually not much response among 
farmers if an instructor merely goes around and tells a number of farmers 
to form a group. To our knowledge the only experiments with the group 
approach which have been carried out were those made.during the SRDP 
replication experiments in Kisii and South Nyanza in 1974 and still ongoing. 
With the creative involvement of some experienced officers (D.A.O., 
Kisii, A.A.O., Migori, Locational Instructor of Kanyamkago (Migori) and 
Wanjare (Kisii) Locations)9 a simple but effective group recruiting pattern 
was developed with the following organisational steps: 
1. Extension staff informs Chief and Assistant Chiefs about 
the recruiting pattern, Then Assistant Chiefs are 
requested to call sublocational barazas for the purpose 
of forming farmers groups for agricultural extension. 
2, Sublocational baraza; 
a) Farmers get detailed explanation about the groups; 
b) Farmers have to choose by voting a rather small initial 
area with no interterer.ee from administration or extension 
staff; 
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c) Farmers have to propose farmers from the selected 
area to be members of the group,, Only neighbouring 
farmer's can be selected, Finally farmers select 
by voting a specific number' of the nominees to 
form the group, 
3, The group members select by voting their chairman and secretary. 
The most important elements are area-based selection and the 
popular selection procedure, Area-based selection guarantees firstly that 
group members represent the average farmers0 and secondly that the supervision 
by extension staff is easy and efficient. Popular selection promotes not 
only community control of those who are chosen to initiate an innovation,, 
but also provides a social basis for the selected farmers to form a 
cohesive group. 
This group recruitment pattern was altered in connection with 
the establishment of Agricultural Village Committees (which will be discussed 
later) in the Mlgori SRDP area. The community first selected the group 
leaders who later formed the area-based groups on their own. 
Both patterns resulted in functioning groups. The latter pattern 
has administrative advantages if many groups have to be established within 
one sublocation, 
Communication between the extension staff and the farmers is 
conducted through the group's representatives and/or the group of farmers 
in toto. For example,, the instructor might arrange the date for a planting 
demonstration with the group chairman. The chairman in turn communicates 
this message to his farmers,, selects a demonstration plot and asks all 
farmers to come at the appointed time. The instructor then carries out the 
demonstrationj and afterwards the group leader supervises Implementation 
of the demonstration on the plots of the group members, 
a 
© « 
3. In the rural areas of Kenya more and less progressive farmers are 
distributed rather normally over an area. One seldom finds geographic 
concentrations of either more or less progressive farmers. 
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During the first stage of experimentation with groups in Kisii and 
Soutn Nyanza during the long rains of 1974- 9 one instructor was allocated for 
each group of twelve farmers„ During the second stage in tne short rains 
of 1974 s one instructor had to look after several groups (up to about eight). 
The results from the first stage are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1„ Successful adoption of soya beans by group and individual extension 
Area Number of 
farmers 
recruited 
Allocation of 
extension staff 
Number of 
farmer-s who 
planted 
Number of 
farmers who 
marketed 
Kxsii 72 (6 groups) 6 (one for each 
group) 
72 (100%) 12 (100%) 
South_ 
Nyanza 
O 
22 (2 groups) 2 (one for each 
group) 1 
22 (100%) 22 (100%) 
Control 
Unit 12 (indivi-
duals ) 
3 (one for four 
individuals) 
12 (100%) 7 (58%) 
Although the extensionist-f'armer ratio was three times higher in the control 
area (tnis ratio was considered necessary by the extension staff of the 
project there. )8 more than 40 per cent of the individual farmers failed compared 
with 100 per cent success of the groups. Furthermore only 2 (less than 20 per 
cent) of the individually approached farmers had yields above 7 bags per hectare 
(highest yield: 15 bags/ha)9 whereas about 50 per cent of the 94 farmers 
organised in groups achieved this result (highest yield: 19 bags/ha). 
Twenty-seven of the extension workers8 all of whom had experience 
with the group approach during the first and/or second stage of the soya bean 
project9 were interviewed about their experience in working with groups of farmers. 
They were asked to comment on the advantages and disadvantages of this method. 
Of the 27 Interviewed8 25 mentioned only advantages. The following advantages 
were mentioned most often: 
14 extension workers said that more people can be reached 
than with the individual approach9 and information spreads 
quickly among the farmers; 
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13 stated that the work is easy or quick and saves time; 
9 mentioned that supervision and follow-up were easier, and 
they had better control of problems; 
2 responded that the extension results are better; 
1 said that teaching and instruction is more thorough; 
and 
1 gave no answer. 
This means that the field staff - once used to it ~ clearly recognises the 
advantages of the group approach. 
Experiments to Mobilise and "Utilise the Farmers' own Initiative for 
Extension 
Some extension work can be carried out by farmers themselves if 
the extension service succeeds in mobilising them for this task. The group 
approach has a built-in mobilising component, since the groups and their 
leaders organise a substantial part of the extension work themselves. 
The extension service does not fully exploit the potential for 
utilising the farmers themselves for extension when only one or two groups 
are formed in each sublocation. This was realised by officers in the Migori 
SRDP area. On the initiative of the AoA.O, from Migori Division, Agricultural 
Village Committees were introduced.- an institutional innovation meant to 
mobilise the population for extension. Agricultural Village Committees were 
established in all 23 sublocations of Migori and Macalder Divisions in mid-
19 74. They are meant to be established in Kihancha Division of the Migori/ 
Kihancha SRDP area as well. Asked about the background of this project, the 
AoAeO. quoted his earlier experience during land consolidation and sugar 
extension for outgrower-s at Muhoroni where village committees had played a 
useful role in mobilising the people. Agricultural Village Committees aim 
to reach everybody, at least everybody interested since the whole organisational 
set-up is based on the following rules: 
1. The sublocational community elects committee members at Assistant Chief's 
barazas who will be the leaders of area-based groups from different 
parts of the sublocation. 
There are more than 27 responses since many interviewees gave more 
than one answer. 
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2. Committee members then form area based groups in their home neighbc 
hoods. Membership is voluntary. 
3. Agricultural Village Committees meet weekly. They decide about 
extension matters and watch the farmers' " - cultivation practises es 
well as the performance of extension staff. 
The Village Committee member, who is chairman of his neighbourhood 
group, or his deputy keeps a book where he enters all extension-related 
visits and activities of the group. 
A comprehensive evaluation of the Agricultural Village Committees 
is not yet possible, but there are already indications which show that this 
method for mobilising farmers for extension is very promising. During the 
short rains of 1974, these Village Committees had mobilised 1200 farmers in 
the Migori and Macalder Divisions for growing soya beans. Unfortunately, 
seed was available for only 310 farmers but all 310 planted and harvested. 
Furthermore, about 100 farmers adopted Mexican 142 pea beans. Here as well, 
the seeds were the only limiting factor. 
Early in December 1974, it was decided to emphasise adoption of 
tobacco strongly In Migori Division. All who have experience with tobacco 
extension know how difficult it is to convince farmers to build the big 
curing barns necessary for treatment of the tobacco leaves after harvesting. 
In the second week of January 1975, more than 300 farmers had 
started building the barns, and most of them were already thatching the 
roofs. This tremendous organisational achievement'with'in Such a short ' 
period of time was only possible because the farmers were mobilised and 
partly supervised through their Village Committees. The extension service 
merely gave technical advice. 
Another advantage of Village Committees is that they have reported 
irregularities or negligence of extension staff to superior officers, showing 
that they can also function as a control institution for the extension staff. 
The officer who introduced these committees views them as another form of 
Harambee oriented towards agricultural development. 
The central section of Figure 1 shows the basic problems facing 
present extension services in Kenya. The top section shows the various 
approaches directed towards extension staff which have been tested with a View 
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lv educing the basic problems- The arrows indicate which approach is 
directed towards res saving which ^roolem. The bottom section shows the 
approaches directed -owards "he farmer; Again the arrows shev. which 
approach is directed towards whirh problem area. 
Finances 
Tne experu.t.enwhich were found to oe successful followed the 
principle of be- ;er ut_i isation of existing resource.:.- ±no> ai.uea especially 
at more efficient utilisation jf the existing exte.isun staff of the 
initiative .1 the farmers« Effective intensification of extension activities 
was combined with methods for very considerably reducing the costs per 
farmer The o y .minor addiiional costs occurred in connection with the 
Management and. Reporting System because some additional stationery was 
necessary, Credit schemes as components -f extension such as in the Tetu 
Extension Project, should be considered ordinary agricultural finance 
activities and not specific extension costs (see also the chapter on credit). 
S,R,D,P, PILOT TRAINING PROJECTS FOR EXTENSION INVOLVING LESS PROGRESSIVE 
FARMERS IN 1'ilU AND OTHER TESTING AREAS 
This section oeals with farmer training and equitable rural 
development in the context of extension, in particular with the project 
carried out in this area in Tetu. This evaluation is reported separately in 
line with the request of the Kenya Ministry of Finance and Planning. In this 
section we shall refer frequently to 'less progressive farmers', meaning 
those farmers who do not belong to the minority elite who are fully involved 
In the agricultural development process, In most parts of Kenya three 
quarters ..r more of the farming population can be considered less progressive. 
Basic Objective and History 
The basic objective of this project was to accelerate rural 
development by mobilising the economic potential of the masses of small-
holders lagging behind in agricultural development. The same objective was 
sometimes formulated 'n other terms, namely to promote more equitable rural 
development involving the less pFOgPOSS 3.V6? I" armers in the Income-
generating agricultural development process with a high benefit-cost ratio. 
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The project was started at Tetu In 1.972. A special training 
programme combined with an input credit and input supply system was 
designed to encourage less progressive farmers to adopt hybrid maize. These 
experiments were continued in Kisii and South Nyanza in 1974,, and are still 
going on. In these places less progressive farmers are encouraged to 
adopt soya beans. All these experiments were implemented by government 
staff within and outside the SRDP area, and continuously followed up by 
action research (carried out by I.D.S. researchers) which was financed by 
SRDP funds. Thus, in terms of research, all these experiments are part 
of the SRDP, but in terms of implmentation the experiments are partly 
SRDP, partly replication of SRDP and partly ordinary district projects. 
Strategies and Project Components 
Selection of Less Progressive Farmers: Quite a number of experiments had 
to be carried out to find a workable pattern for recruiting less progressive 
farmers for extension activities (training, as demonstrators, for farm visits, 
etc.). These experiments can be divided into three stages:-
Target group: below average farmers. The intention 
was to reach those farmers who were below average in 
agricultural progressiveness, 
Selection method: below average farmers were 
identified by a survey (farm record cards). The 
extension staff was supposed to carry out this 
survey and finally to establish a farm record 
card cabinet. 
This method worked well with a great deal of assistance from I.D.S. 
researchers, but it was too sophisticated for replication by locational 
and sub-locational staff. Therefore, it was later recommended to discontinue 
this method and search for alternatives. 
Stage 2: Target group: below average farmers. 
(Tetu) Selection method: below average farmers were identified 
by the absence of certain innovations (farmers never 
planted hybrid maize and never raised grade cattle). 
This method was more practical, but there were still problems 
in controlling the selection behaviour of the extension staff. Replication 
Stage 1; 
(Tetu) 
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In other areas would probably require different items of innovation whose 
absence would identify below average farmers, A further problem is that 
many progressive highly specialised farmers (e,g, mono-cash-crop growers) 
could fit under the same selection criteria as below average farmers. 
Stage 3: Target group: average farmers, 
(Kisii/ Selection method: groups of farmers selected in clusters 
S, Nyanza) by the sublocational community. 
The reasoning behind the change in the target group from below 
average to average farmers was an efficiency argument: the benefit/cost ratio 
of extension was considered to be highest if those farmers were approached 
who form the majority of the peasant community - the average farmers, (For 
the theoretical reasoning behind this concepts see 12,) This is the largest 
fairly homogeneous group, and the diffusion process among these farmers 
can be expected to be rapid. Groups'of farmers - all farmers being neighbours 
as far as possible - were selected by the sublocational community. Clusters 
of farmers were selected because area-based groups generally represent 
average farmers since more and less progressive farmers are fairly normally 
(randomly) distributed over an area, • Any intentional bias in favour of more 
progressive farmers is therefore not possible. Besides being a very simple 
selection method which can be controlled easily, the selection of clusters 
of farmers facilitated the exploitation of group extension methods. The 
selection of the potential first adopters and demonstrators by the community 
(and not by staff) aimed at social mobilisation (more communal interest 
and communal pressure for adoption), :' Further details were discussed in the 
section on results of SRDP experimentation in agricultural extension. 
In conclusion, the most efficient selection method for agricultural 
extension was the orientation towards average farmers selected in area-based 
groups„ 
Training: Training in F.T.C.sis criticised widely in the literature and 
among officials. The basic points of criticism are: 
This is quite different from urban areas where different social 
groups are concentrated in certain areas. 
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1, The training often is not appropriate to the farmers' needs 
It is too general and not oriented toward solving the farmers 
specific problems. Often there is no curriculum, and 
usually farmers are treated as students and not as adults, 
2, Fewer farmers attend F,T,C- "ourses than expected, , Many 
F,T,C,srun courses very much below capacity. Further it is 
argued that E.T.C.'S are rather costly institutions in terms 
of the number of farmers who are ctually trained within a 
y ear. 
3c There is consensus among the officers concerned with farmers' 
training that the efficiency of most .of these training 
institutions must be raised very significantly to justify 
their existence. 
The SRDP experiments contributed towards finding more efficient 
ways to utilise existing training facilities and staff. These experiments 
were based on the concept that the purpose of farmers' training should be 
basically to motivate and enable less progressive, average farmers to 
adopt agricultural innovations. 
The development of efficient training methods as part of the 
SRDP experimentation took place in stages: 
Stage 1; Three days of training, for farmers in an F.T.C. 
(Tetu) The experimental'aim of the training had two components 
First.to develop an efficient teaching method for 
training less progressive, often illiterate farmers. 
This teaching method was based on group discussion 
with farmerss rather than lecturing in its narrow 
sense, • The function of the teacher was to guide the 
farmers who discussed step by step all the course 
cont ent = 
The second component was a standardisation of training 
programmes for agricultural innovations. It was 
considered that each course should have the followifig 
standardised structure: 
t 
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To create an economic motivation among the course 
participants to adopt the innovation by clarifying the 
advantages of the particular innovation. 
2. To give the farmers a thorough knowledge about all aspects 
of the innovation (husbandry, seeds, marketing, credit 
availability, etc.). 
3. To practice certain skills required for the innovation with 
which the farmers were not previously familiar. 
This standardised structure was filled in with a detailed 
curriculum for each innovation. The farmers were considered the teachers' 
partners, and it was stressed that they had a great deal of practical 
agricultural experience which the teacher needed to mobilise for the course. 
The curriculum focussed on: (1) economic motivation to, adopt the innovation 
(hybrid maize), (2) all aspects of husbandry related to the.innovation and 
(3) understanding of the credit and input provisions. 
In 1972/73, the training was monitored by researchers, and 798 
less progressive farmers were trained. In 1973/74, another 210 received 
the training, but as of 1974/7 5 all SRDP training programmes have been 
suspended in Tetu due to lack of SRDP funds, according to the' explanation 
of the local officers interviewed. The effectiveness of this course was 
evaluated by researchers in 1973, and they rated it highly in the sense 
that farmers adopted the innovation and precisely followed the instructions. 
The final recommendation of the researchers, however, was that 
the role of farmers ' training for accelerating rural development should not 
be restricted to F.T.C. training only. F.T.C. training is rather costly 
and has ser ... . s limitations related to the F.T.C.s' limited capacity for 
reaching many farmers quickly. Furthermore, many farmers have reservations 
about attending en F.T.C, course. The researchers recommended that farmers 
be trained in the villages whenever the more sophisticated training facilities 
of an F.T.C, are not necessary. This approach was later followed in Kisii 
and South Nyanza, 
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Training of farmers in the field. 
Besides the limited capacity of the F.T.C s, the F.T.C. 
teachers could only train a limited number of farmers in the 
field. However, in any district there are usually dozens and 
sometimes hundred? of field instructors (extension staff of the 
Ministry of Agriculture). If these field instructors could 
be mobilised to carry out systematic training, the scale of 
farmer training could be enlarged very considerably. 
Since the basic activity of the extension staff is to instruct farmers, they 
have extensive informal teaching experience which should qualify them to 
conduct two-day formal trainingeeurses based on a standard curriculum. 
In early 1974 the extension staff member's of selected areas in 
Kisii and South Nyanza were trained to carry out two-day field courses in a 
one-week inservice course at the F.T.C.' in Kisii. The curriculum for this 
inservice course was prepared jointly' by -Ministry of Agriculture staff, the 
Institute of Adult Education and the Institute for Development Studies. 
(See 7.) During the first experiment, F.T.C. teachers were seconded to the 
extension staff during the field teaching. In one location 6 instructors, 
assisted by 2 F.T.C. teachers, trained 240 farmers within 8 days to adopt 
soya beans. 
In mid-1974 a second course for instructors was held.in the F.T.C. 
at Homa Bay. The formal training of farmers in the field which followed was 
carried out by extension staff only. Within one month they trained more 
than a thousand farmers to adopt soya beans using the discussion method 
and following a curriculum with teaching handouts which had the three 
standard components. 
Finally It should be mentioned that these particular inservice 
training course played a very important role in generally improving 
extension efficiency, as described in the first section, Results of SRDP 
Experimentation in Agricultural Extension.. 
Credit: Cash for inputs was believed to be a major constraint in Tetu 
preventing less progressive farmers from adopting hybrid maize. Therefore, 
credit provision was considered an important part of the package approach 
Stage 2: 
(Kisii/ 
South 
Nyanza) 
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in Tetu. For the later experiments with soya beans, credit was considered of 
little importance. Loans were made as part of the hybrid maize project in 
Tetu, granted unsecured and without contract for all capital inputs plus 
the fees for the training course in the F.T.C. 
The credits for the first group of farmers were financed by 
special funds and administered by the Area Coordinator; credits for the 
second and third groups were administered through the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (A.F.C.). Only farmers who had attended the F.T.C. training 
course could receive loans. The incentive for repayment was supposed to 
be the granting of another loan. 
The amount loaned each farmer varied slightly among the 
different groups. The third group received a total of Kshs. 120/- each. 
Ten per cent interest was charged per.year so that Kshs. 132/- had to be 
repaid. About 98 per cent of the trained farmers purchased the inputs 
for.hybrid maize on credit. 
The loan repayment rates are shown in the following table. 
Table 2. Reparment of hybrid maize loans in the Tetu Extension Pilot Project 
(up to July 1974). 
Administered Number of Full repaid Partly repaid 
by loans granted % % 
First group a Area Coordi- 217 . 8 3 % ? 
(1972) nator 
Second group11 
(1973) (1) AFC 362 82% 7% 
Third group^ 1973 (2) AFC 207. 70% 7% 
a. This information was received from the.Area Coordinator by 
telephone early in 1974. It is, likely that more farmers have repaid 
since then. 
b. The data were compiled from the AFC files in Nyeri and cover 
the period up to July 31, 1974. 
There was little organisational effort to collect the loan 
repayments for any of the groups. Two new Area Coordinators were transferred 
to Tetu during 1974 and both had little time to supervise repayment. 
Early in 1975 the Area Coordinator was transferred again. The A.F.C. 
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Branch Manager- in Nyeri explained that the Corporation is not interested 
in these 'little loans' since the amount loaned to each farmer would not 
justify serious administrative efforts for collection. 
He said that It was his impression that those farmers without 
title deeds were more likely to repay than those who had them, because 
the former had no alternative 'collateral' than a good repayment record, 
whereas the latter could always mortgage their land. This is an interesting 
observation which we had no time to investigate or verify. Conclusions 
and recommendations concerning smallholder credit are to be found in a 
separate chapter of this Report. 
Finances 
The extension Pilot Project in Tetu was administered basically 
by existing institutions. Special funds were only used for the credit 
component, which included the farmers' fees for the F.T.C. In Kisii and 
South Nyanza, no specific funds were involved in the Project. The 
Institute for Development Studies researchers who worked on this project 
were employed by the Institute independently of the SRDP. The cost of 
their activities was not charged to the Pilot Project. It could be 
argued that carrying out research for development is an ordinary activity 
of I.D.S. researchers. 
Some Indicators of Efficiency in Extension to Less Progressive Farmers 
The hybrid maize project in Tetu as well as the soya bean 
extension pilot project in Kisii and South Nyanza gave an indication that 
the combination of two objectives, acceleration of rural development and 
equitable development, is highly efficient. Furthermore a random sample 
survey showed that on average each of the 790 farmers who participated 
in the Tetu experiment influenced a further 2 to 4 neighbours, friends 
or relatives to adopt hybrid maize, although these neighbours, friends 
and relatives received neither loans nor formal F.T.C, training. This is 
an excellent diffusion effect. 
In Kisii and South Nyanzas the so.ya bean project oriented 
towards less progressive farmers was started only recently, but already 
there are very encouraging results. 
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Table 3. ' Soya bean adoption in Kisii and South Nyanza with extension 
oriented towards less progressive farmer 
Adopters 
long rains 1974 short rains 1974 
number of planters applications for seeda 
Kisii 
(only Wanjare and West Kitutu 
locations) 72 about 700 
South Nyanza (only Migcri Division) 22 about. 1,200 
a. The applications for seed are taken as an indicator of the 
diffusion process. Actual adoption depended on the very limited seed 
supply which could not satisfy nearly all the applications. 
Although extension has to be intensified, if less progressive 
farmers are to become first adopters of an innovation there is not necessarily 
any need for more finance. The Kisii and South Nyanza experiments have 
shown that extension can be intensified and the cost per farmer considerably 
reduced at the same time by training the farmers in the villages, utilising 
the field staff for training and using the group approach. 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXTENSION AND TRAINING 
For the improvement of the effectiveness of Kenya's 
Agricultural Extension Service we recommend considerable changes in the 
present extension patterns. The recommendations focus on four aspects: 
1. How agricultural development can be accelerated through 
extension without producing unwanted social and economic 
dualism. 
2. How more farmers can be reached by extension without 
increasing the costs. 
3. How the farmers' own initiative can be mobilised for 
ext ens ion „ 
4. How the working performance of the extension staff can be 
Improved. 
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Recommendations for Accelerating Agricultural Development Through Extension 
Without Producing Unwanted Social and Economic Dualism 
1. Agricultural extension should not focus primarily on the most progressive 
farmers. The average farmers should be the primary target group. This 
will generate a stronger diffusion effect. 
2. The most practicable method for identifying average farmers for extension 
is the group or cluster method: Extension activities are concentrated on 
an area-based group of farmers who all, as far as possible, are neighbours. 
3. Making a few average farmers, or any other group, the best farmers 
by concentrating (intensifying) extension efforts on them is inefficient 
as well as inequitable. Agricultural innovations offered for adoption 
should be as simple as possible and as compatible as possible with the 
farmers' present conditions so that they can be widely adopted. Those 
farmers function as models who are marginally mor><= innovative than the 
average farmers. From the 'best' farmers hardly any spill over can be 
expected. 
4. For generating agricultural development among average farmers, unsecured 
loans were considered. Further considerations on this subject are 
discussed in the chapter of this Report on the Vihiga Small-Holders ' 
Maize Credit Scheme. Cash constraints usually are less important than 
generally anticipated. The provision of unsecured loans must be restricted 
to conditions guaranteeing a high repayment rate. The repayment rate is 
expected to be considerably above 80 per cent in the first instance of 
repayment due if: 
1.) Only those farmers get unsecured loans who need loans urgently but 
have no security and no Other loan resources, 
C 2.) The farmers get specific training on the nature and use of 
the loan, 
(3.) The loans are given in a formal contract or document which gives 
a legal basis to enforce repayment, 
The repayment collection is organised and 
administered carefully, 
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Repayment is rewarding to the farmer, e.g. entitles 
him for another loan, and 
(gy Defaulters are never written off. 
Warning: Development projects based on provision of unsecured loans 
have a high risk of total failure.(accumulative defaulting) and additional 
bad side effects such as spoiling the relations between farmers and 
development authorities. If the very careful handling of such a loan 
provision cannot be guaranteed It is better not to start with it and 
utilise the funds for alternative programmes promoting the development 
of average farmers (e = go subsidised input supplies for a trial period,etc.) 
Recommendations to Reach More Farmers by Extension Activities Without 
Increased Extension Costs 
Group Approach 
1. The basic method for initiating innovations (demonstrating, teaching, 
informing, mobilising) should be the group approach. 
2. Exceptions from the group approach should be made only for innovations 
which are not feasible for average farmers, e.g. very sophisticated 
enterprises, innovations with very high cash inputs (without sufficient 
credit provision), innovations which have very limited markets or 
innovations which pay only with extraordinary cultivation skills, 
3. To exploit fully the effectiveness of the group approach the groups 
should have leaders and the extension staff should communicate with the 
groups primarily through their leaders. 
Farmer Training 
H. A much greater proportion of farmers should receive training, 
Th is can be achieved if the farmer training which is usually done at 
F.T.C.s is taken to the farmers in the villages. This applies only to 
subject matter which can be taught without the specific teaching facilities 
provided in F.T.C.s, 
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5. Farmer training should be made more appropriate for the average farmer. 
One important change in training technique should be that the teacher 
considers the farmer not a student but an adult and experienced partner. 
Information should be transferred to the farmers basically by the discussion 
method. Two-day courses lasting from noon until late afternoon and taught 
in the villages proved to be successful. 
6. Training courses should be standardised with the following three 
components: 
"(1) Stimulation of economic motivation for adoption through 
discussing the advantages of the innovation, 
(2) Discussion which provides information about all relevant 
aspects of the innovation, and 
(3) Practise in certain skills required for the innovation. 
7. Farmer training should not be exclusively the responsibility of 
F.T.C. staff. The extension staff should be used for training farmers 
as well. Enabling extension staff to teach farmers in the villages can 
raise the number of farmers trained tremendously. 
8. For each training task the extension staff has to be prepared specifically 
and provided with teaching outlines (curricula). We recommend one-week 
inservice courses at the F.T.C. to prepare the extension'staff for their 
teaching programme. 
9. If farmers training in the villages is carried out by extension staff, 
it should be done jointly by two or three staff members. This reduces the 
risk of poor teaching performance by least qualified extension staff 
members. If F.T.C. teachers can be seconded, the risk of poor teaching 
will be further reduced. 
Recommendations to Mobilise and Utilise the Farmers' own Initiative for 
Organising Extension 
1. We very strongly recommend that the farmers' own initiative be utilised 
for extension. There are indications that this will be extremely effective 
in improving extension. Farmers' own initiative can be organised in 
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different ways. We recommend the organisation of farmers through group 
systans and through Agricultural Village Committees. 
2o Only one or a few groups per sublocation can be formed,, or, if it is 
considered appropriate to organise all or most of the sublocational farm 
community, Agricultural Village Committees can be set up, 
3, Organising the farmers" own initiative for extension needs the 
voluntary committment of the farmers. Therefore, the group as well as 
the Agricultural Village Committee systens must be based on voluntary 
membership and voluntary leadership. Leaders must be selected by the 
farmers concerned, never appointed by extension staff or administration, 
4, The following patterns for forming groups or Agricultural Village 
Committees are recommended: 
Forming Groups 
a. The farming population of a sublocaticn meets in the 
Assistant Chief's baraza where they get a thorough 
briefing by the Assistant Chief and M,0,A. staff about 
the purpose of forming a group for an extension project, 
b. The farmers select a rather small area within the sublocation 
where the group should be recruited. 
c. The farmers suggest names of potential group members from 
the selected area. Priority for selection will be given 
to those neighbouring each other. No exception should be 
allowed. The size of the group should not be less than 8 
and not more than 20, 
d. The farmers who form the group select their group chairman 
and secretary. 
e. Group leaders should be farmers working permanently as 
agriculturists in the respective areas (not pastors, 
teachers, shopkeepers, etc.). 
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Forming Agricultural Village Committees 
a. The farmers meet at an Assistant Chief's baraza with 
a senior administrative staff member and an extension 
staff member, 
b The sublocational baraza elects the Village Committee 
members (about one to two dozen). The menbers are supposed 
to represent'the various areas of the sublocation. 
c. The selected committee members elect their chairman and 
secretary, 
d. After this baraza the committee members form groups in 
their respective areas. Each member will be the chairman 
of one group, 
5. The group leaders organise the farmers to attend demonstrations 
(which, of course, have to be carried out by M.O.A. extension staff), 
they organise the seed distribution and they take part in controlling 
the individual group members in regard to the extension project. The 
Agricultural Village Committees should have greater responsibilities. 
They decide about the allocation of inputs (e.g. new seeds) within the 
sublocation together with the extension staff, 
6. Group leaders and Agricultural Village Committees should be entitled 
to report about the working performance of sublocational instructors to 
their superior officers, 
7. The functions of Agricultural Village Committees should be carefully 
restricted to agricultural development issues. No mandate for political 
or other issues whatsoever should be given. 
8. Since forming group systems is a community affair, the administration 
should be involved: administrative representatives must know about the 
purpose and must be present during the barazas. Without recognition of 
the group system by the administration, the groups and their leaders will 
be weak and unstable. 
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Recommendations to Improve the Working Performance of the Extension Staff 
1. The extension staff member should be an extension generalist. 
2. It should not be left up to him how he performs his day to day 
extension work. Rather, it is strongly recommended that the extension 
work be programmed. For each innovation to be promoted there should be 
a well organised programme precisely defining the roles of the staff members 
and the sequential implementation steps5 giving a detailed time table and 
incorporating a practicable system of supervision, communication and 
control as well as methods for identifying and resolving any problens 
which may arise during implementation. 
3. Each extension project'should be started with specific inservice training 
for all divisional and subordinate staff members involved to prepare them 
for their specific tasks within the project. 
This inservice course should have the following components: 
a. Staff should be prepared for teaching farmers in the 
village (as recommended above already). 
b. Staff members should-be briefed about all aspects of the 
particular extension project. 
c. Staff member's should participate in the detailed planning 
for the locational and sublocational level. 
d. A senior staff member (D.A.O, or Crop Officer) should 
participate in the course at least part of the time since 
he must approve the plan details drafted by the extension 
staff. 
5. A simplified Extension Staff Management System should be adapted for 
the group extension system. It should function as a day to day supervision 
system for the extension exercise on all levels up to the District. 
6. All locational and sublocational extension staff members should have 
bicycles. This should be controlled regularly. There should be control 
of the use of bicycle allowances as well. Staff members should be 
encouraged to purchase bicycles. If Agricultural Service Centres are 
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established to serve Agricultural Village Committees, Government-owned 
bicycles could be posted in these Centres for the use of extension staff, 
7, The rewards to individual extension workers for good work performance 
are not adequate. We recommend that this situation be improved, although 
no specific proposals are presented here. An upgrading system combined 
with further- training or some sort of achievement bonus could be considered, 
among other alternatives, 
8, The problem of identifying good or weak extension staff members can 
be reduced by the introduction of group extension. Control of the field" 
staff's work performance -
Recommendation for Replication Procedures 
1- Extension should be considered as a package consisting of a number of 
components. Replicating just one improved component will not show high 
benefits, even for that component. The various components are highly 
interdependent - they influence each other. Therefore we recommend 
replication of a whole package of improved extension methods. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
IMPROVEMENTS IN KENYA'S LIVESTOCK ECONOMY: 
LESSONS FROM THE SRDP 
Kenya's livestock economy is extremely heterogeneous. Physical 
environments vary through the whole spectrum from semi-desert to rich 
agricultural areas and thus farming systems vary from pastoral nomadism to 
intensive mixed farming. The cultural backgrounds of farmers and pastoralists 
are equally disparate. We shall therefore discuss separately the general 
problems of livestock economy and, in another chapter, those of the ranching 
areas. 
THE ' SPECIAL' ELEMENT IN SRDP LIVESTOCK PROGRAMMES 
There Is very little 'special' in the SRDP sense (i.e. experimental 
and potentially replicabie) about efforts at livestock development in the 
SRDP areas,and in some respects we should not expect there to be. In the 
case of livestock, the general requirements of a development programme are 
fairly clear and have been so almost from the outset: increased interest by 
pastoral peoples in commercialised operations, the introduction of proper 
range management and regulation of livestock numbers In the range areas, 
control over disease, upgrading of livestock and Improvement of marketing 
facilities. The problem has been rather one of Implementation, together 
with lack of funds. It follows that improvements under SRDP have been 
largely within the confines of this framework, and are more difficult to 
distinguish from what could be considered a normal development programme 
than in the case of, say, crop experimentation. 
Table 1 gives the livestock projects listed under the SRDP In 
each of the six areas at the time of our evaluation. The comments made 
concerning project descriptions in the overview chapter at the end of 
this Report apply with particular force here. There are still listed 
projects which are in fact no longer in existence. Some of these are 
failed projects, such as the idea of bull camps In Kapenguria, which 
nevertheless were not deleted^ others are projects which never got 'off 
the ground', such as fodder and ley establishment in Kapenguria, and pig 
production in Vihiga - either because they were ultimately not approved, 
or funds proved Inadequate, or because the local officers themselves 
realised at some point that they were impracticable. In the case of the 
beef production experiment in Tetu, the Area Coordinator (admittedly new) 
could not specify the content of the project, and it turned out to be one 
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Table 1. Livestock projects listed for the six SRDP areas. 
Migori SRDP 
1. Livestock marketing 1. 
2. Model dairy farms 2. 
3. Animal disease control 3. 
Dips programme 
5. Pig demonstration 5, 
Mbere SRDP 6. 
1. Ranches 7. 
2. Livestock production 8. 
3. Livestock Improvement 
Disease control 1. 
5. Dips 2. 
Tetu SRDP 3. 
1= Dairy products *+. 
2. Beef production experiment 
3. Dips 1 
Pigs and poultry production 2, 
Kapenguria SRDP 
Livestock marketing 
Group ranching 
A.I. services, Mnagei 
Bull camps 
Fodder and ley establishment 
Stock and milk census 
Dip construction 
Sheep development, Lelan 
Vihiga SRDP 
Dairy cattle and milk production 
Livestock staff build-up 
Pig production 
Poultry production 
Kwale SRDP 
Mwereni group ranch 
Animal health and husbandry 
listed In the original SRDP proposal of 1969 which had simply been 
carried forward. 
There are, secondly, what may be termed 'non - projects', activities 
which cannot properly be termed projects. Some consist of very general 
titles, such as livestock production (Mbere), animal health and husbandry 
(Kwale) and livestock marketing (Kapenguria). Others are at most component 
parts of an Integrated programme such as dip construction and 'disease 
control' and 'livestock Improvement' (Mbere), which are only supports to 
productive activities. In the case of dips, a special element is the offer 
of 50 per cent funding by the Government from SRDP funds as an incentive to 
self-help: but this assistance cannot really be described as a project. 
Finally there are activities which may be new to the area but 
which are already In practice elsewhere. These may be experimental, 
but are not replicable as they are already replications - the experimental 
aspect Is to see whether the activity may be replicated in this particular 
area. This would be true of artificial insemination services In Kapenguria 
and Vihiga, and of pig and poultry production. 
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Thus the livestock projects actually In existence under SRDP 
turn out to be either part of what would be a 'normal' livestock develop-
ment programme in Africa, or part of an Integrated or larger-scale effort 
to Improve the livestock economy, or are simply new to the area rather 
than of the experimental/replicable type. This does not mean that no 
general lessons may be drawn from the livestock experience under SRDP: 
indeed we shall attempt, by reviewing the experience of these areas"'", 
to indicate some elements of a possible strategy for livestock develop-
ment outside the ranching areas. 
THE EXAMPLE OF TETU AND NYERI DISTRICT 
An interesting approach to dairy production extension was carried 
out under the Tetu SRDP. Credit was given through the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation for the purchase of grade cattle, and the procedure was to 
start by selecting 300 farmers on a randomised basis for a single week's 
training in farm management and dairy production at the local Wambugu 
Farmers' Training Centre, initially during March 1970. None of the 
farmers selected owned grade cattle. Those who were less keen to proceed 
and those less obviously suitable were eliminated and the remaining 100 -
25 from each of 4 locations - were offered credit for the purchase of just 
one or two grade cows each. The average acreage owneu by the farmers was 
only slightly higher for the sample group than the average of 4.8 acres 
for Tetu as a whole. Later, because of the scarcity of pasturage, credit 
was made available for fodders, apparently with success, and even zero 
grazing (with stall feeding) has been successfully carried out in some 
cases. The scheme has since been multiplied, and now about five times 
the original number of farmers are said to have obtained cattle, partly 
by purchase from the first group, and have passed through the short course 
of instruction at the F.T.C. This would suggest that management problems 
can successfully be surmounted, in favourable conditions at least, without 
favouring large farmers and even when assistance is spread thinly, includ-
ing to those who are newcomers to the particular activity In question, 
While conditions in Tetu might be considered special, the experiment is 
potentially of considerable significance for dairy extension strategy, 
1. In the case of Mbere, only ranching Is considered, in Chapter Ten 
of this Report. 
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and we suggest below that partial replication in Kakamega District 
should be attempted. 
Apart from this dairy project, there are pigs and poultry pro-
duction projects which will be discussed separately, and "dips" which was 
listed as a project in Tetu as in other SRDP areas. The only other live-
stock project listed is in beef production, which originates from the 
1969 list of SRDP projects but has never been pursued. 
Nevertheless, it will be instructive to examine briefly the salient-
features of livestock development in Tetu, as representative of Nyeri 
District. Livestock management on small farms in Nyer-i has reached an 
advanced stage in comparison with most other areas and should offer some 
guidance for the long-term development of other regions and for a national 
strategy for the development of smallholder dairy production. 
While other SRDP and non-SRDP areas are experimenting with the 
Introduction of grade cattle on a small scale, often to progressive or 
'model'farmers as in Migori, in Tetu Division most or all of the cattle 
will soon be grade animals. Table 2 shows that the percentage of grade 
animals In Tetu Division was approximately 85 per cent in 1974 and is 
likely to equal 90 or 95 per cent in 1975. 
Table 2. Grade and Indigenous cattle in Tetu Division, 1969-74. 
1959 1970 1371 1372 1973 1974 
Grade cattle over 15 years 3 ,410 15 ,297 12 ,164 8 ,961 13 ,651 14 ,723 
Grade cattle under 1«5 years 12 ,451 4 ,681 4 ,550 8 ,530 6 ,650 7 ,339 
Total, grade cattle 15 ,861 19 ,978 16 ,714 17 ,491 20 ,301 22 ,062 
Indigenous cattle over 15 years 2 ,673 7 ,205 o ,909 4 ,365 4 ,109 3 ,146 
Indigenous cattle under 15 years 7 ,055 1 ,488 1 ,473 1 ,643 335 928 
Total, indigenous cattle 9 ,728 8 ,693 8 ,382 6 ,008 4 ,444 4 ,074 
Percentage grade animals, over 
15 years 56 68 64 67 77 82 
Percentage grade animals, under 
1.5 years 64 76 74 84 95 89 
Percentage grade animals, all ages 62 70 67 75 82 85 
Note: Figures for earlier years especially may be Inaccurate. 
Source: Tetu Division Annual Reports. 
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The percentage of grade animals in Nyeri District as a whole is not quite 
so high, but not far behind, as shown in Table 3: in 1970 the percentage 
of grade animals was 59 in Nyeri District as a whole compared to 70 in 
Tetu Division. An indication of the benefits from the conversion to 
grade cattle can be observed in Table 4. Despite an already high production 
level of nearly four million kilogrammes of milk in 1972, production of 
milk in Tetu Division was nearly doubled within two years. 
Table 3. The increase in grade cattle population, Nyeri District, 1955-1970. 
1955 1959 1961 1965 1970 
Grade cattle 
All cattle 
Percentage grade animals 
1,000 4,500 8,650 30,000 53,000 
65,000 76,000 74,000 75,000 90,500 
1.5 6.0 11.7 40.0 58.6 
Source: (2 ). 
Table 4. Milk Production in Tetu Division, January-November, 1972-74. 
1972 1973 1974 1972-1974 
Quantity ('000 kgs) 3,855 6,678 7,450 93 
Value (shs. '000) 2,598 4,592 6,697 158 
Source: Tetu Division Annual Reports. 
Price rises assisted in bringing revenue from milk in 1974 to almost seven 
million shillings. The contrast with the low production levels possible 
with Zebu cattle is striking. 
At the same time, while many areas are struggling to introduce 
artificial insemination services for the upgrading of cattle the problem 
of the Veterinary Service in Nyeri is not to obtain acceptance of A.I. 
services, but to satisfy demand. Table 5 shows the recent expansion in 
the number of inseminations in Tetu Division. The number has more than 
doubled within four years, and is now averaging 80,000 per annum. Currently 
nine daily A.I. car runs, three motor-cycle runs and five static point 
services are in operation in Nyeri District. 
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Table 5. The number of artificial inseminations carried out in Tetu Division 
1970-74. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Total 
1970-74 
Grade cattle 33 ,708 42,644 66,277 75,362 74,415 292,406 
Zebu cattle 2 ,632 3,719 4,996 5,058 2,893 19,298 
All inseminations 36 ,340 46,363 71,273 80,420 77,308 311,704 
Source: Veterinary Division, Nyeri„ 
It might be argued that this very substantial progress in livestock 
development has been achieved over a very long period. Certainly the Intro-
duction of improved stock started as long ago as the 1930-3., (2,p. 14) There 
were also some special factors in the area, particularly access to Improved 
stock by purchases from the estates, starting in the late 1920s but most 
importantly from the 1950s. The early introduction of A.I. services was 
also very significant. According to Cowen, "The main thrust, from 1956, to 
introduce purer grades of stock came from A.I.", although "the most immediate 
source of upgrading was to come from the purchase of pure grades from the white 
estates." (2, p. 56) 
It was also the case that Nyeri District was well-endowed with 
entrepreneurs, and the high level of farm management in the area was noted 
as early as 1948. (2, p. 36) There Is, however, no reason to think that 
Kakamega and many other districts are not equally well endowed now, although 
Nyeri has had the advantage of relatively rich, intensive agriculture. This 
has had two effects: given the small size of plots, cows have had to be tethered, 
making the control of disease easier, particularly for farmers who sprayed 
conscientiously; and profits from cultivation could be used to pay for fencing, 
dairy equipment, and to purchase the grade animals themselves. 
However the main points to notice about Table 3 is the relative 
recency of the expansion in grade cattle numbers, its speed and its 
comprehensiveness. In 1955 only 1.5 per cent of cattle were grade animals. 
After an Initial Increase to 12 per cent in 1961, a major acceleration 
took place in the early 1960s, reaching 40 per cent in 1965. This has 
since continued, up to about 90 per cent, so that conversion to grade animals 
will soon be virtually complete. 
A crucial factor In this has undoubtedly been the disease situation. 
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Despite early interest in and access to grade cattle, numbers were not 
likely to expand rapidly until disease was under control. While progressive 
farmers (athomi) favoured compulsory dipping and stringent health measures, 
the mass of farmers, owning Zebu cattle, which are largely immune to East 
Coast Fever and other tick-borne diseases, were less interested in dipping. 
Thus Tetu and Thegenge Locations in North Tetu Division were declared cattle 
cleansing areas in 194-5, but a year later the application of the cattle 
cleansing ordinance had to be abandoned. (2, pp. 38-9) According to Cowen 
progressive farmers needed a broader acceptance of improved cattle in order 
to further the improvement of their own stock, and "this acceptance was 
dependent upon the acquisition and survival of improved cattle by the 
wider range of households". C2, p. 78). 
This indicates the existence of what we may call an 'indivisibility' 
in livestock (dairy) development centred on the disease problem. This is 
associated with the fact that grade cattle in Kenya are highly sensitive to 
tick-borne diseases. As a result, the efforts of 'advanced' farmers to 
maintain grade cattle may turn out a costly failure, due to the spread of 
disease from surrounding plots. At the same time farmers owning Zebu cattle 
and without the same investment will have little incentive to support cleansing 
ordinances, if these exist, or to dip conscientiously. Only if a large pro-
portion of farmers In the area have a private interest in improved cattle 
and disease control will the social interest be pursued. Thus a comprehensive 
or frontal assault on livestock development in a particular area appears 
likely to be much more effective than piecemeal attempts. This would be 
based on an effort to come to grips with the disease problem, achieving a 
so-called 'clean area', or something approaching it, together with securing 
a basis for mass support by giving a majority of small-scale livestock owners 
an interest in its maintenance (involving, for Instance, an emphasis on an 
artificial insemination programme capable of reaching a large number of 
farmers). In contrast, piecemeal experiments with progressive dairy production 
in advance of disease control are not likely to have much success. 
THE GRADE DAIRY CATTLE PROGRAMME IN KAKAMEGA DISTRICT 
If we come to discuss animal production in Kakamega District, we shall 
be mainly concerned with dairy cattle: as a result of overpopulation and 
very small farm sizes, beef production is not likely ever to be feasible, 
and this District can be expected to be a permanent deficit area for beef. 
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At present Kakamega is an important market for Nandi beef, which is brought 
in on hoof direct, for sale in County Council auctions. However, there is 
a high demand for milk, which can be produced on small farms, as demonstrated 
elsewhere in Kenya; although the Vihiga-Hamisi Divisions alone are estimated 
to produce 1,700,000 gallons of milk per annum, another 700,000 gallons, nearly 
half as much again, are imported. (1) 
It is not surprising therefore, that the main livestock development 
In the District, Including Vihiga-Hamisi, is the grade dairy cattle programme. 
This programme, and related aspects such as grade cow mortality, have already 
received the attention of several investigators(See ls 3 and 5.); but because 
of their contradictory conclusions and recommendations, as well as the import-
ance of the programme, further careful examination is required. 
The programme is based on an International Development Association 
(I.D.A.) credit scheme channelled through the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
In Kakamega, which issues loans covering the purchase of cattle, fencing and 
dairy equipment, as well as water development and pasture Improvement. Though 
the project was begun in the 1960s substantial financing became available in 
the 1970s. It was incorporated into the SRDP in 1970, but loans are distributed 
throughout the District and not confined to the Vihiga - Hamisi Divisions, as 
Table 6 shows. The plan in Vihiga-Hamisx was to introduce 100 grade cows In 
1970 and subsequently 300 each year during the period 1971 to 1976. Loans 
were issued at 8 per cent interest, repayable in 5 annual installments, with 
an Initial 15 - month period of grace before the first installment. 
The prima facie case for high returns from grade cattle is the 
differential milk yield as compared to local Zebu cattle. A specific survey 
carried out in the area by Bellamy covering 12 grade and 28 Zebu cattle showed 
daily yields per cow of 1.5 gallons and 1.5 pints respectively. Data quoted 
by Weisel showed an advantage for grade cows of three to four times the daily 
output of Zebu cows. Harmon and Zalla refer to "impressive" milk yields in 
the area, of 500 gallons per lactation. 
The main problem has been the Incidence of tick-borne diseases 
resulting in the deaths of expensive animals. Bellamy calculates a 
mortality rate of 61.4 per cent up to 1974 among animals purchased 
2 between 1968 and 1972,(1) This is Itself not a very meaningful figure, 
2. There is an arithmetic error in Bellamy's table, however, and the 
mortality rate may be nearer to 50 per cent. Table 6 implies a corres-
ponding figure of about this value. 
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Table 6. I.D.A. loan approvals in Kakamega by Division, related to grade 
cow population. 
n. . . _ _ . . , Estimated Grade Division I.D.A. Loans Approved _ „ , ^ . Cow Population 
1973 1974 1970 1974 
Lurambi 208 173 550 950 
Mumias 64 11 200 200 
Central 47 106 250 300 
Vihiga/Hamisi 52 47 300 600 
Note: loans include all items, not just grade cattle;- the grade cow 
estimates are extremely rough. 
Source: (3). 
Table 7. Mortality among I.D.A. financed grade cattle in Vihiga-Hamisi, 
1968-1974. 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
No. of animals alive 
at start of year 27 47 108 208 196 204 180 146 
No. of deaths during 
year 3 7 15 31 37 37 34 
Percentage dying during year 11 15 14 15 19 18 19 
Source: Derived from figures provided by Weisel, supplemented by Harmon 
and Zalla. 
since deaths are cumulated above a period of several years, and a more 
accurate picture is given in Table 7. This shows that the mortality 
rate, although actually increasing over the period, is currently just 
under 20 per cent a year, compared with what Harmon and Zalla consider 
as "reasonable" under competent management, 10 per cent. The existing 
rate implies a life per cow of around S5 years. 
Weisel, the Programme Analyst in the area, carried out farm- • 
level research in order to estimate the gross margin per acre (value 
of output less total variable costs, but including depreciation of the 
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cow) for 'average' farmers in grade cattle and in alternative farm 
activities. These he found to be as follows:-
Table 8. rs-rogg margins per acre for grade cattle and other activities, 
Vihiga-Hamisi. 
Gross margin 
Activity per acre (shs) 
Grade cattle (for a stocking rate of 
1.25 acres) 856 
Maize (one hybrid, one local variety crop 
p.a.) 774 
Maize (two hybrid crops p.a.) 1,040 
Sunflower (two crops p.a.) 980 
Hybrid maize and sunflower (one crop each) 1,010 
Source: P. Weisel (5). 
On the basis of this data Weisel concludes that grade cattle are not the most 
profitable farm activity for the area. 
It has been pointed out, however, that Weisel's figures exclude 
from the cash returns the value of the offspring (one calf per year) of the 
cow. Given the small difference in gross margins calculated of around 
shs 150, this itself would cancel out the advantage of the other activities. 
There may also be other errors of calculation which bias the results. Just 
before presenting his gross margin results, Weisel calculates average milk 
production per year over the 6 years of the project as 27,940 gallons, 
assuming 375 gallons per cow year of production. The error may be related 
to the mortality rate assumption, as Weisel refers to Bellamy's somewhat 
misleading figure of 61 per cent: using the data of Table 7, the number 
of cow years of production during 1968 to 1974 would be 803, or more 
accurately, if acquisitions and deaths were assumed to be evenly spread 
over the year, 734 years. These give estimates of average annual output 
of 43,000 and 39,000 gallons, respectively, about 50 per cent above Weisel's 
estimate. If this error in respect of the mortality rate is carried over 
into the gross margin calculations (this is not clear from the information 
provided), it would reverse the results in favour of grade cattle as an 
activity. Even if Weisel's figures are accepted as they stand, however, 
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his estimates are based on partial analysis, whereas the case for the 
introduction of grade cattle made here is based on the simultaneous 
adoption of a number of measures, particularly relating to disease 
control. Given the relatively small difference in gross margins cited, 
the effect of reduced mortality associated with a major reduction in the 
incidence of disease would easily reverse these results. 
Harmon and Zalla dispute Weisel's results, stating that:-
Incomes to farmers from grade cattle under average management 
conditions are considerably better than expected average incomes 
obtainable from hybrid maize, sunflower, or Mexican 142 beans 
In any combination, when poor crop years and reduced yields 
during the short rains are considered. This is in spite of 
current very high mortality rates. 
If the mortality rates are reduced, as we should envisage, the difference 
is even greater, for:-
A farmer who is able to hold cow and calf mortality to 10% 
and manage his cows so as to calve every 14 months can obtain 
a gross margin of 1500/- per acre under current average stock 
rates and 1800/- per acre at one cow and calf per acre. Many 
farmers are already achieving this,(3) 
Our view is, therefore, that grade cattle should be considered 
a priority farm activity both in terms of short-and long-term objectives. 
A separate question has been raised by other investigators, however, 
regarding whether a credit programme is necessary or desirable for the 
achievement of this goal. Details of the credit programme and its impact 
on the numbers of cattle are given in Tables 9 and 10. These show that 
despite the mortality problem the numbers of grade cattle in the area have 
continued to expand: over 500 cattle were purchased during the six years. 
The number of grade dairy cows in the same area increased from 94 in 1968 
to 491 in 1974. The importance of the grade dairy cattle programme within 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation's programme of agricultural credit for 
the District is shown by the fact that 2.5 million shillings out of 3 
million for 1970-74 were used for cattle-related investment, about 83 per 
cent. The amount of funds invested has been maintained at a high and 
rising level over the five-year period, particularly expanding in 1973 and 
1974. 
One important question which has to be considered is the impact 
of this credit programme on income distribution in the area or, at least, 
its equity aspect. From Table 10 (sic) it may be calculated that the 
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Table 9, Purchases of grade cattle In Vihiga-Hamisi9 Kakamega District, 
1968-1974, 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Total 
Total no, of grade 
cattle purchased 41 ' 42 77 129 86 112 n.a 500+ 
No, of grade cattle 
purchased with I.D.A, 
loans 27 23 68 115 19 45 13 310 
No, purchased without 
I.D.A,loans 14 19 9 14 67 67 n.a 190+ 
No, of farmers receiving 
loans 11 10 28 55 10 20 5 139 
Total I,D,A, loan funds 
expendedC'OOOshs) 42.0 31.3 112,3 178,3 28,6 84,4 30, 4 507, 
Table 10. I„D=A. credit approvals for Kakamega District » 1970--19 74, (Kshs, ' 000 ) 
1970a 1971 1972 1973 19746 Total 1970-•74 
No, of applications 127 131 63 173 231 725 
Loans for cattle 249 264 .107 435 603 1,657 
Other livestock-
related loans cd 166 138 91 216 255 865 
Total livestock -
related loans 415 402 12(8 651 857 2,523 
Totals all loans 420 450 242 809 1,159 3,079 
a From April only, 
b Until November only. 
c For dairy equipment, fencing, water development and pasture Improvement, 
d Excluding poultry. 
Source: A.F.C,, Kakamega, 
average loan per applicant during the period 1970-74 was shs, 4,285,and 
if a number of small loans for purposes other than grade cattle were left 
out, the average figure for livestock loans would be greater still. The 
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tendency to favour richer farmers was accentuated by an A.F.C. policy of 
not offering loans to applicants without the title deeds to a plot of five 
or more acres in Vihiga-Hamisi, where the average farm size is three acres, 
or even less. This requirement may not in fact have been crucial, because 
loans actually went to farmers owning much more than five acres. Weisel 
refers to a survey of 350 farmers in Vihiga-Hamisi which showed the following 
average holdings for recipients of grade-cattle loans and a random sample 
of other farmers:-
Table 11. Bias in A.F.C. loans towards larger farmers. 
average farm average non-farm 
size (acres) income (shs per 
annum) 
Grade cattle loanees 11.1 234 
Other farmers 3.1 138 
For this reason the recent omission of the five-acre requirement may not 
bring a significant change unless a deliberate effort is made to assist 
smaller farmers. Weisel, impressed by the high level of animal husbandry 
required for grade cattle and conversely by the high cattle mortality 
rate without proper husbandry, suggests "the dropping of the existing 
objective of equity in income distribution in order to ensure only skilled 
farmers receive grade cattle". Yet, it should be pointed out that grade 
cattle are being kept very successfully in Central Province on no more than 
five acres. What is required is a comprehensive attack on the disease 
problem in the area in order to reduce the risks to grade cattle drastically. 
Apart from the equity aspect, the advantage of securing as wide a distri-
bution of grade cattle as possible throughout the area is to improve nutrition 
by making cheap milk direct from the cow widely available. Milk is already 
fetching one shilling a litre in the local market in Vihiga, and farmers 
with a milk surplus are able to sell to neighbours. In fact, according to 
Harmon and Zalla, "most of their milk is sold to neighbours". This 
substantially reduces the price of milk by eliminating middlemen and the 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries. In a heavily populated area such as Vihiga-
Hamisi, this nutritional benefit from the wider distribution of milk is 
potentially of the greatest importance. 
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Tetu's dairy production project, which was conducted as part of 
the SRDP, might provide the right model for Kakamega District as a means 
of overcoming the management problem, thus achieving the SRDP objective 
of replication. As described in the section on Tetu this project involved 
giving credit for the purchase of only one or two grade cows to farmers 
whose holdings were not especially large and who were not necessarily 
experienced in dairy production. The loan recipients were carefully 
selected and trained for one week In farm management and dairy production 
at the local Farmers' Training Centre. The project appears to have been 
highly successful, and is being widely enlarged In Tetu. 
One negative aspect of the I.D.A. credit scheme in Kakamega is the 
high rate of default: in March 1974 the loan repayment rate was equal to 
only 31 per cent. This is just one of the factors underlying the Harmon/ 
Zalla recommendation that the I.D.A. credit programme be dropped from the 
Vihiga SRDP, and presumably elsewhere. This Is an extremely surprising 
conclusion (shared, however, by Weisel) in view of their assessment of 
the returns from milk production. Tne conclusion is based on:-
1. The default rate, 
2. Their view that management (including dips and back up), 
not finance, is the obstacle to expansion, and 
3. The notion that farmers do not need the loans, and that 
"farmers are no longer coming forward to take up the loans 
in any significant numbers. Most are getting animals on 
their own." 
Weisel further suggests, with regard to the first consideration, that finance 
is not the limiting factor and that the high default rate may suggest the lack 
of "need" for credit. However, it is difficult to see the connection 
between failure to repay and lack of need for credit. Failure to repay may 
be due either to Inability to repay (which may arise out of the premature 
death of the grade cows) or unwillingness to repay (which is a function of 
inadequate supervision of loans and insufficient pressure to repay). To 
separate these two elements, it would be useful to calculate default 
rates separately for borrowers experiencing and not experiencing serious 
mortality of cattle. 
The second argument against providing credit is that management 
and standards of animal husbandry are the real constraints, rather than 
credit. This view is based on the high mortality rate: however Harmon 
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and Zalla's calculations show that, despite the mortality rate, returns 
from grade cattle have been relatively high, and this no doubt explains 
why quite a number of grade cattle have been acquired even without loans 
(67 in both 1972 and 1973). The Tetu extension experiment described above 
In any case suggests that the management bottleneck can be overcome or 
reduced. If a comprehensive attack on the disease problem were to be 
adopted, as proposed below, the mortality rate should be considerably 
reduced. 
The third argument is that credit is no longer needed, that "fewer 
farmers are coming forward for loans", and that "the people getting the 
loans are not those in need of credit". While it is true that in 1972 
and 1973 only 64 grade cows were purchased with I.D.A. loans, compared 
to 134 without loans, this is not a reason for slowing down the conversion 
from Zebus to grade cows. The percentage of grade animals is still small, 
and the need Is to increase It over time towards 100 per cent. The equity 
argument would be met by making the loans to farmers with smaller holdings, 
as was done In Tetu, 
It Is Important therefore not to abandon this credit scheme, but 
rather to expand Its scope and place it within a wider framework of extension 
and disease control activity. Weisel criticises the use of a subsidised 
rate of interest, and recommends that a commercial rate be applied (and to 
all smallholder credit, not merely dairy cattle). However the present rate 
of 8 per cent does not appear unduly low, and since finance for development 
projects in large-scale manufacturing and other sectors is frequently 
available at this rate, Weisel's suggestion might bias investment against 
rural development. In fact, the current balance of opinion is very much 
of the view that credit availability is biased against the rural sector 
and is in favour of attempting to offset this in various ways. The much 
greater subsidy, and the most inequitable, arises out of a failure to pursue 
defaulters, who may be relatively well-to-do. Efforts should be concentrated 
on reducing the default rate. At the same time the credit programme should 
be related to the extension and training effort aimed at improving the 
management constraint. 
The Case for Making Kakamega District a Priority Dairy Development Area 
It will appear odd, perhaps, to livestock specialists and officials 
to single out Kakamega District as a priority area for dairy development. 
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One might sooner look to areas with plentiful grazing and a substantial 
surplus of cattle, whereas Kakamega is a deficit area in both beef and 
milk supplies. In fact, however, Kakamega is a suitable area for a 
comprehensive effort to eliminate disease, followed by intensive dairy 
development following the pattern of Nyeri District, 
The area is contiguous to the disease-free area of Kitale and 
the aim would be to extend this belt southwards to include the more popu-
lated parts of Kakamega, and later on to expand the area further to the 
west and south in the direction of Busia and Kisumu. Already, according to 
one observer, "it is almost impossible to move animals out of this District", 
because of the strict quarantine required of not less than 28 days in a 
Government holding ground, and an additional 20 days for movement from 
Kakamega to Moi's Bridge. The area is well-designed for an effective 
disease eradication campaign in that cattle are generally not mobile, if not 
actually tied, as in Nyeri District; and with plots mostly demarcated and 
adjudicated, unnecessary livestock movements are reduced to a minimum. The 
heavy population in the area creates a need for cash-generating activities 
which do not require large areas of land, and small plots and intensive 
agriculture afford the greatest guarantee that grade animals will be 
properly looked after, 
The potential economic benefits of substituting grade for 
local cattle appear tremendous. According to Bellamy's estimates for 
Vihiga-Hamisi in 1974 only 1,333 out of 40,000 cattle or 3 }3. per cent 
3 
are grade cattle. (1, p. 2) Weisel gave the figure for the number 
of grade cattle in Vihiga-Hamisi in December 1973 as 1,304. Of these, 
491 were cows, compared to 23,400 native cows, a ratio of only 2.1 per 
cent. 
A legitimate question is whether the market would be adequate 
for the increased milk supplies associated with a large-scale substitution 
14. of grade cattle. Weisel calculates that 'Import - substituting' production 
3. We have assumed the figure of 85,430 for local cattle in North Maragoli 
is a misprint which should read 5,430. 
4.^ It is of course not necessary that the present number of cattle be 
maintained. With the introduction of grade cattle, the total number 
could be substantially reduced, releasing land for other purposes. 
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of the present 700,000 gallons deficit would require only an additional 
1,865 grade cows. This itself, being five times the present level, 
indicates scope for considerable expansion of the existing programme, but 
would not support the large-scale transformation envisaged here. The 
primary objective however would be to substantially increase local 
consumption of milk per head by increasing its availability and lowering 
prices. The scope for this is large. Once local demand is fully satiated, 
however, the Kenya Cooperative Creameries could no doubt intervene to 
purchase milk for export outside the area,particularly to Kisumu. At the 
same time, if milk prices are to be reduced, it would be useful to reduce 
production costs also, in particular the cost of grade cows: this suggests 
much greater emphasis on the upgrading of the existing stock through arti-
ficial insemination services, as compared to expansion of the present 
A.F.C. loan programme for the purchase of grade cows. A less expensive 
programme also has advantages in terms of equity. 
There are a number of promising indicators of progress in the 
area which encourage optimism. The number of grade cows in Vihiga-Hamisi 
has increased from 94 in 1968 to 491 in 1974. Cattle sold through 
auctions in Kakamega District have increased by 40 per cent in four years, 
from 23,733 in 1970 to 33,074 in 1974 (although this includes imported 
animals and is an index of consumption rather than production). The 
dipping programme in Vihiga-Hamisi has been disappointing, both in respect 
of the numbers of dips built, compared to the targeted figure, and the 
standards of maintenance and operation. However, it must be said that 
whereas in 1972 only one private dip was operating in Vihiga-Hamisi, by 
the end of 1974 thirteen had been built, of which eleven were in operation. 
The success of the artificial insemination programme in Vihiga is 
also encouraging. Before the first run was started in 1970, there was 
already considerable interest in A.I. services, especially in the 
eastern area, with farmers bringing their animals to the Veterinary 
Office for service. The East Run now comprises 45 servicing points in 
the space of some 250 kilometres, an average of 1 servicing point every 5 or 
6 kilometres. The inauguration of this run stimulated interest elsewhere, 
and the West Run, which was started in 1972, now comprises 33 servicing 
points over a distance of some 120 kilometres. A.I. works well in densely 
populated areas for a number of reasons: lack of grazing means that farmers 
cannot afford to keep bulls and are willing to castrate. More generally, 
they will be interested in the quality and productivity of animals rather 
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than increasing their numbers. It will also be possible with a limited 
number of runs to reach a relatively high proportion of the animals In 
the area, increasing the effectiveness of the programme; and It will be 
possible to operate at lower costs by servicing a reasonable number of 
animals per kilometre traversed, tapping economies of scale. We recommend 
therefore that there should be a concentrated effort to expand A.I. services 
throughout Kakamega District and that this should be seen not simply as 
a separate project but as part of an integrated livestock development plan 
for the area with the upgrading of the cattle population associated with a 
simultaneous effort at disease eradication. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT IN KAPENGURIA 
The most important livestock proposals for Kapenguria relate to 
the establishment of group ranching for beef production in the lowland 
area, prospects for which are discussed in Chapter Ten of this Report. 
Partly related to this proposed development was a major proposal for a 
system of stockroutes passing through the area from the north and comprising 
a series of holding grounds and smaller outspans to be equipped with water 
and other facilities and used as staging posts for the shipment of cattle. 
These stockroutes can usefully be seen as part of a planned national system 
for which considerable World Bank finance has been made available. They 
are discussed in detail in a separate section of this chapter. 
The Introduction of Grade Dairy Cattle 
A high potential for dairying is said to exist around Kapenguria, 
where it is thought that the number of cows "could be increased to 5,000 
within five years". At present there are about 1,300 to 1,500 dairy animals 
of mixed exotic stock (especially Guernsey) concentrated in Mnagei 
Location around Kapenguria, The quality of the animals is poor because 
of the low quality of the founding stock (often culled cows from Trans 
Nzoia), as well as poor management. 
The main obstacle to development is disease. Kapenguria is at 
the junction of the two major stock routes converging on Mwisho Farm. 
This is an area in which there is a continuous movement of Zebu cattle 
back and forth under the traditional Pokot system, as well as a considerable 
amount of stock theft which spreads disease. Although grade cattle owners 
fence and use spray pumps, mortality among grade cattle has been estimated 
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as high as 30 to 40 per cent. 
Credit for the purchase of dairy cattle has been quite limited 
so far, although 34 Ayrshires were recently obtained by members of the 
main cooperative society on a special Cooperative Credit Production Loan, 
to be repaid through milk delivered to Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
(K.C.C.) at Kitale. Difficulties in obtaining title deeds have hindered 
the expansion of loans, though recently twelve out of eighteen farmers 
aPPlying had loans approved for the purchase of two or three cows each, 
subject to membership in the cooperative and improvements.in fencing and 
paddocking. Title deeds will be given to these farmers. The fact that 
the farmers had an average of ten grade cows already raises a serious 
question of equity. The loans may be justified in this case because of 
the particular need for careful management and protection against disease, 
but the possibility of a wider distribution of grade cattle within the 
cooperative society should be investigated. 
At present the Kitale K.C.C. send a vehicle daily to collect milk. 
Although the local price for milk is higher, cooperative members prefer 
the more reliable market (in periods of excess supply) which this provides. 
Despite the disease problem, therefore, there is a case for pursuing 
efforts to expand milk production within a circumscribed area because of 
the K.C.C. market and because of the absence of major production alterna-
tives in the area. 
Bull Camps and Artificial Insemination 
Bull camps were introduced by a 1973-74 project for the purchase 
of fifteen pure-bred bulls. Only five were actually bought, at a cost of 
shs. 2,000 each, and one died. 
Two factors contributed to failure. First, although bull camps 
may have in theory an advantage over artificial insemination in more 
remote areas, the disease problem and form of livestock organisation in 
such areas makes returns from upgrading uncertain, Secondly, the purchase 
was made without adequate consultation among SRDP officials so that no 
satisfactory arrangements were made for the effective utilisation of 
the bulls by farmers. To ensure some degree of utilisation, the bulls 
were sold to farmers at shs. 800 each, a subsidy of 60 per cent, with the 
intention that each would be shared among four farmers and other 
neighbouring farmers charged for bull services, an arrangement which appears 
to have proven problematic. 
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While further bull camps are not planned in Mnagei, there is a 
current proposal for one in Lelan Location, which should be re-examined. 
In general the problem of managing high grade bulls, the problem of 
transmitting breeding disease, the mobility problems of such bulls, and 
the relative ease of an artificial insemination point suggest that bull 
camp development should be abandoned in favour of artificial insemination. 
Apparently five Aberdeen Angus beef bulls have already been ordered for 
Lelan Location for breeding purposes. It is intended to group farmers for 
communal use of bull services. With each bull serving 40 to 80 cows a 
year, it is hoped to produce 300 half-bred calves in the first year. 
Eecause of poor communications, the plan is to start with beef cattle, 
introducing dairying later. Though artificial insemination would appear 
a superior method, it certainly seems important to Investigate in a cautious 
way the livestock potential of Lelan Location. There is considerable 
local interest in obtaining loans for grade dairy cattle, and this 
extremely compact area of high potential land would, as a highland 
'island', be unusually easy to protect from disease. 
Development of Sheep Production in Lelan Location 
An extremely promising project is the sheep smallholder credit 
scheme in Lelan. Although Corriedale sheep were Introduced into the area 
in the early 1960s, failure to look after these properly and lack of 
credit for the purchase of new stock led to a high degree of inter-
breeding and a decline in the quality of the stock and volume of wool 
production. At present there are about 2,500 woolsheep and local hair-
sheep in the area. 
The scheme, which was initiated with eight farmers in October 
1972, is for the supply on credit of new pure-bred Corriedales from Molo. 
Each farmer receives one ram and ten ewes. All necessary drugs are 
supplied during the first year, together with supervision in ' dipping, 
foot-trimming and general maintenance. Lambs are not to be disposed of 
without consultation, and to avoid inbreeding, rams are to be circulated 
among participants every two years. After one year each farmer is to 
return one ram, after two years a second, and after three years he is to 
return the capital in kind of one ram and ten ewes. Cash is not involved. 
By September 1974, 98 sheep had been supplied under this SRDP project. 
The plan was to supply 24 farmers by 1974 (8 farmers a year) with 264 
pure bred sheep. 
If wool prices are maintained, the prospects appear very good 
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for this development in view of the excellent pasture in the area and 
improved access now provided by a new road. Proceeds from wool sales 
increased from shs 19,000 in 1972 to shs 81,000 in 1973. One farmer 
visited had earned shs 1,350 the previous year. In view of this potential 
for success, the scheme is quite conservative in a number of ways. If 
we count a ram as equivalent to two ewes, the farmer must, in addition 
to paying off his loan within three years, pay a rate of interest equivalent 
5 
to approximately 12 per cent. These are quite stringent terms for rural 
smallholder credit. Secondly, it is not clear why there should be the 
degree of self-sufficiency envisaged in the provision of new stock: at 
the planned rate new stock would equal only 10 per cent of the total after 
three years, despite the low productivity of local sheep, the large 
average size of holdings (of 200 to 400 acres) and the high degree of 
understocking. Finally, it may be pointed out that the farmers selected 
so far all had forty or more sheep already. How far this restriction is 
necessary, and what the possibilities are for assisting new and less 
well-established farmers, might be investigated. 
PROBLEMS OF LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT IN MIGORI/MACALDER 
It is estimated there are about 100,000 cattle in the two divisions 
of the Migori SRDP, mainly Zebu with only a few grade cattle. The Zebu 
exhibit the usual features of the traditional livestock economy of low 
milk yield and wide calving interval. The general plan at the outset 
of the SRDP in 1970 was to promote dairy production in the highland area, 
comprising the Kanyamkago Hills and part of the Kuria Hills, and beef 
cattle In the lower zones extending towards the lake shores, the latter 
on a cooperative ranching basis. 
In particular it was thought that 400 square kilometres of 
"moderately good ranchland" in the central Migori River valley and 300 
square kilometres of sandy ridges in the western area of Muhuru Kadem 
might sustain viable ranches for fattening stock. These suggestions, 
however, do not appear to have been taken further, nor the plan for sheep 
development in Mohuru Kadem also made in 1970. 
5. This is obtained by application of standard discounted cash flow 
methods to derive an internal rate of return. 
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Livestock development in the Migori area faces two major problems: 
that of disease, associated in part with the transit trade in livestock 
from Tanzania, and that of stock theft. Tickborne diseases are endemic 
and remain almost totally uncontrolled. In addition, it is said that the 
attitude of the local Luo farmers towards livestock is unfavourable to 
commercial development. 
The project area straddles an important traditional trek route 
for cattle, passing from Tanzania to Uganda or to the Kenyan market in 
the Kisumu area, and the large numbers of cattle passing through are 
considered to constitute a serious disease t threat. To control disease, 
a system of stockroutes and holding grounds was planned, with one holding 
ground constructed in Macalder and a second under construction at Lichota. 
However, cattle traders have failed to use the Migori holding ground, 
apparently because it is located away from the traditional route and because 
by using it they would considerably increase costs and delays. This 
problem will.be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section on stock-
routes and livestock marketing. Whatever the benefits of the trade from 
Tanzania, it has made control of contagious stock diseases, particularly 
foot and mouth disease, extremely difficult. The area has been frequently 
closed for quarantine periods of up to nine months. 
The problem of cattle theft Is an extremely serious one. Thefts 
occur largely between tribes, provoking what has sometimes almost amounted 
to local warfare between the Kuria and Luo. This appears to be a major 
disincentive to cattle-keeping and in particular to cattle improvement. 
The strength of this disincentive is reflected in the farmers' reluctance, 
already remarked upon elsewhere, even to keep two oxen for the purposes of 
ox-cultivation. 
The importance of the supposed lack of interest of the Luos .in 
cattle-keeping, or their reluctance to sell cattle, is difficult to 
determine. Certainly the bride-price in the area is high - 40 beasts 
is mentioned. It is more likely, however, that this lack of interest in 
animal husbandry reflects opportunities for cultivation together with 
the combined disincentive effects of thefts and disease. 
Milk Marketing 
Constraints on dairy expansion are in the areas of output, 
markets and marketing organisation. As far as markets are concerned, 
the absence of the Kenya Cooperative Creameries in the area is a dis-
incentive. Lack of marketing facilities means that most the area.^ s 
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output is marketed in the form of ghee. This itself is a constraint on 
the purchase of grade dairy cows. A study of marketing was proposed in 
1970, but there is no sign of its having been carried out. Since 22 
dairy cooperative societies do now exist, this study would appear to be 
justified. Later the establishment of a central milk cooler was mentioned, 
from which milk could be sent to the K.C.C. at Sotik, but in 1974 there 
was "nothing to report" on this proposal. At the moment, however, the 
area is not even meeting its own demands for milk. 
Model Dairy Farms 
The main livestock production project is therefore the 
establishment of model dairy farms, of which four now exist for demon-
stration purposes. The aim is "to demonstrate clean milk production 
and skill, records and bookkeeping, disease control practices, calf rearing 
techniques (particularly artificial insemination) and grazing management". 
The model embraces the establishment of one acre of mixed grass/legume ley, 
a dairy shed, including milking space and a store for feed, a calf pen and 
a relatively elaborate crush. 
However, these farms do not appear to be appropriately scaled 
either from the point of view of equity or of demonstrating and replicating 
the model throughout the area. The model farms would be 25 acres in size, 
representing a substantial holding in such an area. The estimated cost 
of shs 10,000 plus shs 1,000 for pasture improvement has already forced 
the abandonment of the plan to scatter such farms throughout the area. 
VI:.„c the level of subsidy enjoyed by these model farms there is not 
likely to be much emulation. We may compare this with the average 
Agricultural Finance Corporation loan for grade cattle in Kakamega District 
of around shs 4,000, which we criticise as being too large. The construc-
tion in any case appears unnecessarily elaborate, apart from the crush 
mentioned, with mbati roofing ( a relative luxury even on a house) over the 
milk shed, and concrete flooring. As with a great many model farms, the 
demonstration is of what can be done with the subsidy, not what can be done 
without it, and this point is not lost on unsubsidised local farmers. 
The other, even more serious doubt is whether the promotion of 
grade dairy cattle in the area will go very far in the face of the endemic 
disease problem which exists. Even the grade cattle on the Government 
farm at Oyani did not look especially healthy. If dairying is to make 
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a substantial contribution to*the local economy, it needs to be taken up 
by a relatively large number of farmers. To achieve this, the expansion of 
artificial insemination services at a suitable time is to be preferred. 
While Oyani farm is not an SRDP project, its extremely anachronistic 
nature deserves mention as a clear case of a high-cost and ineffective 
method of promoting dairy cattle in an area such as Migori. The farm 
contains very high grade and pedigree livestock, much of it imported. 
Sophisticated management and feeding systems are practised, albeit 
unsuccessfully, and the farm receives continuous financial subsidies even 
for its running costs. The idea is that the farm should demonstrate the 
technology and the advantages of high grade dairy cattle management and 
make such cattle available at somewhat subsidised prices to local farmers. 
The fact that 80 per cent of the cattle thus sold have died of tickborne 
diseases on the farms of their new owners, imposing very high costs on 
the owners and a totally unacceptable level of waste on the economy, is 
the final comment on the scheme and the approach. There are times when 
the importation of improved cattle into an area is called for, but, 
especially in the early phases, cattle upgrading through artificial 
insemination permits the development of local expertise and local disease 
control facilities, without the unacceptable levels of loss encountered 
by introducing high grade cattle in areas where the level of expertise 
and disease control necessary to keep such cattle alive does not exist. 
Artificial Insemination Services 
Although artificial insemination is not currently listed as a 
project, it was listed as project MOA 16 in the 1972-3 Programme. The 
present service is centred on Oyani Farm, and it consists of one 
inseminator, without a car (The purchase of a Volkswagen was approved 
but not effected.) , who carries out only about 180 inseminations a 
year, compared with 40 per day on a single 'run' in Tetu Division, and 
80,000 per year in all. This is indicative of the constraint imposed 
by transportation: however it is doubtful whether economical runs could 
be established without clearing the area of disease to a substantial 
extent and a major widening of interest in upgrading cattle. At the end 
of September 1973, there were just _57 grade cattle in the area, owned by 
16 farmers. This, again, compares with 22,000 grade cattle in Tetu, and 
illustrates the major indivisibility which exists in livestock development. 
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Cattle Dips 
Although the dips programme is listen in Migori as a project, 
response has been significantly less than in most of the other SRDP areas. 
Of the total number of 28 dips planned, 9 have been completed and only 
6 are working. This does not reflect any weaker promotional effort, but 
ail indivisibility is effective: because cattle in the area are largely 
Zebu, more or less resistant to tick-borne diseases, there is very much 
less incentive to construct or maintain dips. 
Migori as a Non - Priority Livestock Area 
The experience in Migori demonstrates the difficulties associated 
with the piecemeal establishment of livestock projects in an area where 
the disease problem has yet to be dealt with and emphasises the indivi-
sibility in dairy production. Yet there are sound reasons for delaying 
an all-out effort in Migori. In the first place even if the disease 
problem were dealt with, there remains the serious additional one of 
cattle theft. Secondly, there Is good sense in permitting the transit 
trade from Tanzania to continue as it is for the present. Such movement 
is as essential to the East African common market, to which Kenya Is 
committed, as trade in manufactured goods, A more direct consideration 
perhaps is that it provides important supplies of beef for Kisumu and 
the Surrounding areas. It is very doubtful also whether efforts to stem 
this trade could be effective at this time- Finally, while it may be 
necessary to grapple with these problems in Migori at a later date, It 
seems better to concentrate livestock development efforts where returns 
will be more Immediate, and to re-double efforts here later when success 
has hopefully been achieved in extending the disease-free area further 
south towards Kisumu. 
LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE KWALE SRDP 
Excluding the major ranching proposal which we discuss at 
length in chapter ten of this Report, there is only one specific 
livestock project listed for the Kwale SRDP; animal health and husbandry 
listed as MOA. 8, We did not discover the content originally proposed 
for this project, which appeared dormant. 
Livestock activities are Included in proposals to develop the 
mixed farming areas of Kwale including proposals for agricultural 
extension. These proposals are still extremely tentative. A detailed 
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plan §}rj;&t§: for the KikonenI area for a 94-acre model farm (38.-34 .£.,), 
of which 30 acres would be allocated to livestock and include a dairy-
farm. In an area in which the average farm size Is 20 acres, according to 
one estimate, this development appears to be undesirable from the equity 
point of view. The proposed costs for cows and fencing alone of approxi-
mately shs 16,000 are far too high, and out of line, for instance, with 
the loans of shs 4,000 being given by the A.F.C. in Kakamega for this 
purpose, which we have already criticised from an equity point of view; 
yet this would be only a part of the proposed financial assistance 
offered. A costing has also been made, and included in the SRDP Review/ 
Replan, for a small-scale dairy unit designed for a 10-acre farm. Such 
a unit, estimated to cost shs. 2,400, appears much more appropriate, 
though we were not able to investigate this further. What does appear 
to be lacking in support of the proposal, however, is evidence of research 
or data collection on local farm economics or, despite the importance of 
the Mariakani milk scheme, on the milk industry. The majority of stock 
in the SRDP area are in fact In the mixed cropping zone, and it seems 
possible that the attention accorded to group ranching In the ranchland 
area has been partly at the expense of research In the mixed cropping zone. 
On the whole, this coastal area would appear not to deserve 
a high ranking in terms of livestock development. Very few grade cows 
are owned, and there Is a lot of tse-tse and tick-borne disease. At 
one time, a considerable numJoer of grade animals were kept in the Shimba 
Hills, mainly by Wakamba settlers, but most of these died in 1970-71 
as a result of drought and an outbreak of East Coast Fever. Moreover, 
the Dlgos, who constitute the main part of the population in the coastal 
strip and mixed farming area, are much less interested in livestock than 
the Durumas who for the most part live further inland. The potential, 
however, remains largely unexplored, and the main need seems to be for 
more farm-level research relating to both livestock and crops. The 
most favourable element Is the potential of the coastal milk market 
which should increase in importance. 
THE DIPS PROGRAMME: A MAJOR PROPOSAL 
The Importance of dealing with the disease problem as a 
precondition for the improvement of livestock Is clear from our discussion 
of the development of dairy production in five SRDP areas. Recognition 
of this importance is reflected in the proportion of SRDP funds allocated 
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In all the areas to the dips programme. Under this programme the government 
provides 50 per cent of the construction cost on condition that the other 
half comes from self-help. To some extent therefore the experimental content 
of the programme lies in the method used to elicit a self-help development 
effort. An indication of success in this direction is given in Table 12. 
In the case of Tetu, Danish assistance was obtained for the construction 
of twelve dips. The performance in Tetu is impressive even considering 
the early start made there: this no doubt reflects the much greater incentive 
to build and use dips when the majority of people in an area own grade 
cattle. In contrast, progress in Migori in particular has been relatively 
slow: in 1970 when the programme was launched, sixteen dips were under 
construction, but only six of these were operating in 1974. The response 
in Kapenguria and Vihiga has been quite encouraging in view of the small 
number of dips functioning prior to the programme (in Kakamega only one 
in 1972). 
Table 12. Progress in self-help dip construction in four SRDP areas. 
Total number 
of dips 
No. of dips 
operating 
Dips complete Dips 
but not working planned 
or being 
built 
Tetu 
Kapenguria 
Vihiga 
Migori 
44 
30 
32 
28 
41 
17 
11 
6 
1 
5 
2 
3 
19 
19 
The main problems, however, have been in the effective maintenance 
of the dips after completion. As the Table shows, in the three areas 
excluding Tetu, 10 out of 34 completed dips were not functioning at all, 
usually because of lack of acaracides and only in one or two cases because 
of faulty maintenance. But in addition, a large proportion of dips through-
out Kenya are understrength, even if functioning. Thus even in Trans Nzoia, 
one of the disease-free areas of Kenya, the District Animal Husbandry 
Officer recently reported that due to understrength dips in particular, 
tick-borne diseases had been a serious problem during the year. (District 
Animal Husbandry Officers' Conference, Nakuru, September 1974.) Over 
50 per cent of dip samples analysed at Kabete, from all over Kenya, are said 
to be understrength. Even this is likely to be a considerable underestimate, 
since it is reported in Tetu, for example, that the 'doctoring' of samples 
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by the dip caretakers is a widespread practice (with cost savings presumably 
pocketed by the employee). Thus even in Tetu, despite the numbers of dips 
operating and conscientious dipping by stock-owners, 34 animals died 
of East Coast Fever in 1974, and 8 of anaplasmosis. In Vihiga owners 
of grade cows are said to be unable to rely on local dips because of under-
strength mixtures, and are forced to use spray pumps. Apart possible 
immediate losses due to disease outbreaks, the more serious long-term 
danger is that the ticks will develop increasing resistance to acaracides 
rendering the entire effort ineffective. 
The same causes for this state of affairs are reported in all 
the areas: weak management committees and generally poor organisation; 
lack of 'working capital', that is a shortage of ready funds with which 
to buy acaracides; and most frequently in all areas, misuse of funds 
or materials by the committee or dip caretaker. 
Apart from the question of the incentive to build and maintain 
dips, there is the question of the incentive to use dips that are 
operational. In this regard, there is a classic divergence between 
social and private benefit. If an individual owner decides not to dip 
his cattle, say, because of the dipping charges, not only will he bear 
the possible consequences^ the cattle of other owners in the proximity may 
be affected. As we have seen if a majority of owners in an area do not 
dip, maintenance of grade cattle may be impossible altogether. l.i Vihiga 
and Kapenguria, grade cattle owners must purchase spray-pumps foi? t&i'S 
reason. This divergence between social and private benefits (caused by 
external diseconomies in this case) is reflected in requests by grade cattle 
owners, as in Kapenguria, for the introduction of compulsory dipping, 
and by the disappearance of the problem (and the need to persuade 
people to dip) once most owners have grade cattle. External diseconomies 
are particularly great here because indigenous Zebu cattle are highly 
resistant to tick-borne disease^ and exotic and mixed cattle highly 
sensitive to it. As a result, Zebu cattle owners have much less incentive 
to dip, though this may impose serious diseconomies on grade cattle owners. 
There is considerable evidence that dipping charges have a signi-
ficant effect on the inclination to dip as well as on the proper main-
tenance of dips. The cost of acaracides is mentioned in Vihiga as a 
reason for not maintaining dips. In Migori it is said that "where dips 
are complete, they are used only half way or sometimes not at all", 
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especially because of dipping charges. In Kapenguria it was suggested 
that the use of dips might double if charges were abolished. A practical 
one-day experiment in free dipping at Bukuga village in Vihiga is said 
to have attracted a thousand cattle; whereas the average number of cattle 
using a dip weekly in this area is estimated at around 60. (Numbers using 
the dips in this area are normally small in part because the overall 
number of cattle is low.) In Kongelai, where special incentives might 
be needed, cattle are said to be dipped little more than once a month, 
a frequency.which is not likely to be very effective. 
Accordingly, we recommend that throughout Kenya £3the budget 
allows, but initially in selected areas as specified presently, dipping 
charges be abolished for a minimum transitional period of three years and 
that maintenance of the dips (only in respect of supply of acaracides) be 
taken over by the Veterinary Department. The costs of this service will 
be fairly substantial but not necessarily high in relation to other develop-
ment programmes or to the real costs of not instituting this change, since 
in the absence of this measure investments in a number of other proposed 
projects may be lost. Apart Bro^ r dairy cattle, an immediate loss of invest-
ment exists in the form of misused dips: without drastic steps to ensure 
that the dips which have been built can be used, the labour and financial 
investment embodied in the dips are wasted. There are also signs in Migori, 
for example, where self-help dip building was energetic in the early stages, 
that, as one would expect, failure to maintain existing dips seriously 
undermines interest in other self-help efforts, implying a further loss 
of investment. There is also considerable competition for self-help efforts 
from other projects in health or education, so that incentives must be adequate 
if these efforts are to be attracted to dip construction. 
However, the main argument for this proposed measure is that in 
the case of livestock development, a massive 'indivisibility' exists: 
livestock projects require interrelated investments in disease control, 
loans to farmers or artificial insemination for livestock improvement, 
and marketing facilities. Strictly speaking there are two indivisibilities, 
since partial efforts at disease-control may fail, and partial efforts 
at establishing the livestock activities themselves may fail, if disease 
is not first brought under control and other investments made. It was also 
mentioned in relation to Tetu that widespread interest in bringing cattle 
disease under control only occurred when a wide stratum of farmers 
obtained access to grade cattle. 
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Free dipping need not imply a subsidy to one small section of the 
community at the expense of the rest. In most areas where this would be 
applied, cattle are owned by a large proportion of the community anyway. 
And the outlay could be retrieved from the livestock owners in other ways 
in the same way as the cost of other 'public goods' is frequently met. In 
.Tetu, for instance, the incidence of tick-borne diseases is estimated 
to have been reduced by two-thirds since 1968: the extra income generated 
would much more than pay for the cost of dipping subsidies. 
A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING DAIRY CATTLE IN KENYA 
The existence of the 'indivisibilities' identified above points 
to a policy of focussing dairy development in particular areas, rather 
than pursuing projects on a piecemeal basis in all districts simultaneously. 
Which areas snould these be? Table 13 gives rough estimates of the 
percentage of grade cattle to total cattle numbers in all districts of 
Kenya for 1970. These data ar® plotted in Fig. 1 which shows the areas of 
concentration of grade cattle In Kenya. The degree of concentration in 
the former 'White Highlands' shows up clearly but in addition intermediate 
areas are also indicated. It can be assumed that the distribution of 
grade cattle in Kenya is closely related to the geographical incidence 
of disease. An obvious strategy would be to consolidate the existing 
disease-free areas and to extend them outwards in the most convenient 
directions. This would suggest (a) Bungoma, Kakamega, Nandi and Kericho 
in the West (with southern parts of Elgeyo Marakwet and Baringo), and 
(b) Meru, Embu and part of Machakos in Central Kenya. Mujh later extension 
into Kisumu, Kisii and South Nyanza could be considered. The map tends to 
confirm our suggestion that of the present SRDP areas, Kwale and Migori 
should hot be considered priority areas for dairy production, but that 
Kakamega should. This overall strategy would not of course exclude attempts 
at initiating small disease-free areas in specific locations such as 
those discussed in this chapter, or major developments less directly affected 
by tick-borne disease in the ranchlands and other livestock areas. A 
general strategy for improvement in the beef-producing areas is not considered 
here, but needs urgent attention. However, we shall consider the important 
livestock marketing and stockroute system, especially in' two of the SRDP 
areas we have discussed, Kapenguria and Migori. 
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LIVESTOCK MARKETING AND STOCKROUTES FROM THE RANGE AREAS 
A major development effort is underway in Kenya to provide 
marketing facilties for livestock, particularly from the more remote 
range areas where the potential for commercial production is thought 
to be high but constrained by the lack of marketing channels and facili-
ties. There Is general agreement that, while livestock is principally 
used for subsistence purposes in these areas at present, given appropriate 
institutional changes, certain strategic inputs into their production 
systems and an outlet for their stock, these regions could become significant 
breeding areas, responsible for the production of large numbers of meat 
animals. The proposal is for the movement and marketing of livestock to 
be accomplished through a chain of stockroutes and holding grounds provided 
with adequate grazing, watering and disease control facilities. This system 
is a principle responsibility of the Livestock Marketing Division (L.M.D.), 
and considerable finance has been made available by the World Bank. Stock-
routes have been established in two of the SRDP areas which have been 
discussed in trhig chapter, Kapenguria and Migori. 
The Stockroute System in Kapenguria 
Kapenguria Division borders on the TrailsNzoia 'disease-free' 
zone and serves as a gateway into that zone for an extensive dry-land 
range area in North-Western Kenya including Karapokot and Turkana, via a 
major collection centre at Mwisho Farm. Figure 2 indicates the location 
of the stockroutes and the various holding grounds and outspans to be 
provided. One of the most significant problems in moving cattle from the 
pastoral areas is the transmission of disease, and a substantial part 
of the L.M.D. investment in Kapenguria is designed to provide quarantine 
facilities so that cattle can move from the areas where foot-and-mouth, 
contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) and other diseases are considered 
endemic into the 'clean'Kitale area and on,either to slaughter or to finish-
ing and fattening operations. 
A second, very important aim of the stockroute system is to 
stimulate local sales of cattle, especially from the lower part of 
Kapenguria. For this reason, the establishment of stock routes was to 
be combined with energetic campaigns to persuade owners to sell. The 
1972 I.D.S. evaluation of SRDP described the proposal as follows:-
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To help facilitate Increased marketing of cattle the Programme 
calls for the acquisition of a large holding ground/sale 
yard (Mwisho Farm), reorganizing existing holding grounds and 
sale yards and Improving facilities on each, and the establish-
ment of new holding grounds. In addition an intensive effort 
to organize regular livestock markets in collaboration with KMC 
buying agents was to take place. (p.A.5) 
Apart from the physical amenities offered for facilitating 
the movement of cattle, and perhaps for the fattening of cattle at 
holding grounds (little was said of the detailed mechanics proposed for 
cattle fattening), protection would be offered against the periodic 
paralysis of the whole marketing system when auctions need to be cancelled 
as a result of disease outbreaks, since cattle would always be free to 
enter quarantine at holding grounds and to be sold immediately on arrival 
there. Quarantines would be much more effective than in the past when 
owners retained their cattle and were supposed to keep them in isolation 
for 21 days after inoculation. 
Problems Encountered in Establishing the Stockroutes: The new system, 
taking over from the old County Council salesyards, came into operation 
in June 1972, although some holding grounds were not fully equipped. This 
is still the situation, and many of the other specific problems in 
establishing the system described by C. Barnes in the 1972 I.D.S. evaluation 
have not yet been resolved. At Nasukuta, the major holding ground near 
Kapenguria is said to have been "deserted by L.M.D. (Livestock Marketing 
Division) staff as a result of a misunderstanding between L.M.D. staff 
and the population". (Annual Implementation and Evaluation Review, 
Kapenguria, 1974.) The same report describes the acquisition of Kacheliba, 
the main holding ground for the western stock route and for the group 
ranching area, as "deadlocked", together with that at Pkopoch, also near 
the Pkopoch ranching area. At Kacheliba where the people had agreed to 
release 8,000 out of an original 10,000 acres of very low carrying capacity, 
they are now unwilling to give any. At Pkopoch, which is intended to 
serve the local Riwa area, the Land Adjudication Department has allocated 
only 500 acres out of the 2,500 wanted by the Livestock Marketing Division, 
and people are still living in this small area who are reluctant to move. 
Some problems remain at the Sigor holding ground, and even at Mwisho Farm 
construction is not yet complete. 
Especially in areas where there are no clear Individual land rights, 
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the establishment and alienation of holding grounds and other links in 
the stockroute chain present severe problems, Mwisho Farm, the final link 
in the chain of stockroutes is now half technically in Kapenguria District 
and half in Kitale for quarantine purposes. The farm was purchased out-
right from individual owners and presents no conflicts or difficulties 
of this sort, In most of the other holding grounds or outspans, by contrast, 
there is a seemingly never-ending dispute over the right to alienate the 
land. The results of these disputes can seriously hamper the development 
of the holding grounds, even to the extent of physical Interference with 
the process of installing the necessary fencing and other infrastructure. 
Chronic grass-paching, Intimidation and harassment, and a high incidence 
of stock theft are all further consequences of the local antagonisms 
created by disputes over land rights. 
It must be realised that these problems are completely inimical 
to the logic and requirements of a functioning stockroute. This logic 
requires that holding grounds must be completely sacrosanct, that the 
grazing and other resources be preserved for the cattle using the route, 
and that contact with other livestock be minimised for purposes of avoiding 
the transmission of disease. The other point that must be realised is 
that a weak link can compromise the efficacy of the entire stockroute 
chain,, If grazing or water or adequate security is not available in one 
of the links, the rest of the links in the stockroute chain can be rendered 
unusable despite the substantial investment and work already committed. 
A case of the extreme difficulty of establishing L.M.D. rights 
to holding grounds Is the Kacheliba holding ground project on the border 
between the Karapokot and the Po'kot, the last Karapokot link in the route 
from Lodwar. Sales yard facilities already exist (though in need of some 
repair),, and it is planned that the holding ground should play a crucial 
role in the quarantine programme to contain CBPP. The Pokot areas are 
regarded by the veterinary authorities to be clear of CBPP, but the Turkana 
and Karapokot areas are not (We will comment on this topic shortly,). 
The problem is fundamentally one of establishing ownership of land 
that has not previously been owned by an Identifiable group or individual. 
It has been particularly hard, under these circumstances, to find or 
identify a recipient for a lump sum payment that would allow the ownership 
issue to be resolved. The L.M.D, argues with some justification that pay-
ments to anyone under these circumstances would merely complicate the issue, 
since it would hardly be feasible to compensate all the people who might 
be able to come up with some sort of claim to the land. Since the L.M.D. 
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expressed interest in the land, there have been accusations that the local 
politician who represents the area has been moving additional people onto 
the land to try to establish their claim to any payment that might be 
made. The L.M.D.'s position is that since the land is not owned, no one 
is to receive payment and that the L.M.D. can simply enfence and alienate 
the land without recompense to anybody. In view of the fact that the 
holding ground is designed to serve the population right up the stockroute and 
not primarily those in the local area, this position appears -1 to justify. 
There is evidence, furthermore, that this solution is unacceptable to the 
people of the area, with all the consequent problems to which reference has 
been made. 
Without any attempt to underplay the difficulties involved in land 
negotiations in circumstances of communal land ownership, some principles 
should clearly be established to guide the negotiations. The first is that 
communal land ownership should not be equated with the absence of ownership 
rights to land. The land may not be alienable by any one individual but it 
is a significant economic resource (in fact the most basic of economic 
resources in these areas) for the community, and there are in fact clear 
notions as to who has access to it and who does not. (These notions may 
not be very explicit in the abstract, but they can quickly be discovered 
when they are infringed.) For the L.M.D. to come in under these circumstances 
and enfence and alienate the land does impose significant costs on specific 
individuals. These individuals may be hard to identify, but the principle is 
valid, and it suggests that land alienation should not take place without 
recompense. 
The second principle is that the recompense for the land should 
go to those on whom the cost is imposed, in other words, those who 
would have otherwise used the land. If the land, following alienation, were 
to be used in a fashion that would benefit those who bore that cost (and 
in at least equal measure), no problem would arise. At the top end of a 
stockroute chain, this argument offers some support for the position that 
no payment is called for, on the grounds that the benefits from establish-
ing the holding ground or outspan are distributed approximately in proportion 
to the costs imposed. Those with the greatest prior access to the land 
will presumably be the greatest beneficiaries from the marketing facility. 
However, at the bottom end of the stockroute, which has the characteristics 
of a funnel that gathers livestock from a wide area and feeds them through 
a narrow neck, this logic does not apply. In this case the beneficiaries 
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of the holding ground, which must necessarily be large enough to accommodate 
all the stock that Is passing through from the whole area served by the 
funnel, are only to a very limited extent the people who bear the cost of the 
land alienation. Unless those whose land is alienated are compensated, 
they are in effect being taxed in order to subsidise the population served 
by the entire funnel. Transfers of this kind are unlikely to meet with the 
approval of those from whom resources are being transferred and, as we 
have argued, unless there is broad local approval for the transaction, 
severe problems arise. 
In summary, L.M.D. acquisition of the land for the establishment of 
links in a stockroute should not in general be undertaken without recompense, 
and the distribution of that recompense should be, and should be seen to 
be, to the people who would otherwise have had access to the land. 
The natural recommendation that emerges from these arguments, 
and from the severe difficulties of finding appropriate recipients for 
a cash payment, is that the recompense be of a non-monetary sort, i.e. 
some desired service to the local people. It seems likely that the specific 
service to be offered should be the subject of negotiation at the time of 
establishing the holding ground. It is possible that a health facility, a 
livestock health facility, a school or a water point might each be a candi-
5 
date for the quid pro quo to be explicitly offered in exchange for the land. 
The location of the service would ensure that it was indeed accessible to the 
community that formerly had rights to the land, and the ongoing nature of the 
service is particularly appropriate in view of the continuing income stream 
that the community has forgone in its denied access to the piece of land. 
We would strongly reiterate at this point that land alienated for the estab-
lishment of stock routes must be sacrosant. It is essential that the adminis 
tration and all agencies of Government appreciate this and ensure the inviola 
bility of the stockroute land units. 
Problems Assocaited with the Functioning of the Stockroutes; As indicated in 
Fig. 2, there is considerable illegal movement of cattle towards the south-
east which ignores the new system. This passes through Kapcherop and 
down the eastern side of the Cherangani Hills to Elgeyo Marakwet. One 
Such an offer should however be clearly seen to be over and above 
the normal 'entitlement' of the area to such facilities, and not merely sub-
stituted for what they might in any case have received. 
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estimate put this at about one-third of the total movement, this third 
coming mainly from Sigor Division, Lelan Location and perhaps half of 
Kapenguria. Since redesigned stockroutes in Migori have also failed to 
accommodate the natural flow, it seems worth suggesting that more careful 
study by the L.M.D. of traditional trek routes is needed as part of the 
planning of improved routes. 
Another aspect of the same situation is the apparent paucity of 
cattle owners or traders willing to use the facilities which have been 
provided, particularly at Mwisho Farm. Of course a contributory factor 
is that the group ranches proposed in the area have yet to "get off the 
ground", but these should not in any case be expected to increase sales 
very quickly. The north-south traffic through Mwisho Farm does not appear 
to have materialised, so that, because of the cost of upkeep, there was 
a Project Committee suggestion in January 1974 of "handing over the farm 
to West Pokot" or otherwise disposing of it. 
The traders' reluctance to use the holding ground is apparently 
motivated by the inconvenience of the quarantine period, which imposes 
very substantial costs on their operations. The first expense, particularly 
for the smaller trader faced with limited financial assets, is the cost 
of tying up his working capital. Quick turnover is vital to the profita-
bility of these trading operations. During the period in which a mob 
of cattle is held up for quarantine purposes in a holding ground, the 
trader might have utilised the money to bring two more mobs into the 
market. The risk of the trading operation, furthermore, is directly 
related to the time that the livestock are in the traders' hands. Death 
from various causes, theft, and other possibilities of loss are all 
significant elements of risk, and the longer the trader owns the stock, 
the greater are the chances of such loss. The final cost item Is the 
traders' time and transport. Instead of being able to complete the 
transaction in a single trip, a minimum of two trips has to be made, with 
herding and guarding also required for the period of quarantine. Dipping, 
vaccination and sometimes grazing fees are also payable by the trader, 
and while these are relatively small they are an additional irritant and 
a disincentive to use the facility. 
A significant effect of the delays and costs incurred in using 
a holding ground is that trade becomes restricted to the largest and best 
financed traders. Because of the lack of competition, these traders are 
then in a position to reap inordinate profits, to the detriment 
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of the initial producers and of the buyers. 
Moreover, since the appearance of traders in the area is usually 
erratic.and their numbers small, it is difficult to organise auctions 
in conjuction with the routes. The number of cattle available is also 
erratic, so that there may sometimes be a great many cattle and few traders 
or vice versa. 
The Stockroute System in Migori 
The Migori SRDP area straddles an important traditional trek 
route for cattle passing from Tanzania to Uganda, as well as to the 
Kenyan market in the Kisumu ~rea. In 1970 for instance, permits were 
issued for the movement of some 20,000 cattle, well In excess of the 
estimated offtake and indicating a substantial trade. Whatever the 
benefits of such trade, it has made control of contagious stock diseases 
in the area, particularly foot and mouth disease, extremely difficult, 
and the area has frequently been closed for quarantine purpose for periods up to 
nine months. Since the trade would be difficult to stop, even if this 
were desirable, the sensible idea was formulated of trying to channel 
it through a controlled system of stock routes and holding grounds along 
which movement would depend on vaccination together with adequate 
quarantine periods. Ranches for fattening stock might also be incorporated 
into the system for additional commercial benefit. 
Two holding grounds were planned, for Macalder in the centre-west 
of the area and for Lichota in the east. The Macalder holding ground is 
a substantial one of some 6,000 acres. Only one consignment of 35 cattle 
has stayed there so far. Even threats to withhold traders' licenses 
if they do not utilise it have been ineffective. A spray race for cattle 
which was erected had to be dismantled for fear of theft, since it was 
not in use. 
There appear to be a number of reasons for the failure to use 
the holding ground at Macalder. For one thing, although it was 
designed to absorb cattle passing along the traditional route to Uganda, 
it is some distance to the east of the actual route, wi.Ich passes more 
directly to Homa Bay from where the cattle are shipped. Traders do not 
appear to be willing to make the required diversion or to alter the 
location of their traditional auctions. This unwillingness, however, 
may be due to a second reason, which is that they would have to leave 
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their cattle in quarantine at Macalder for a minimum of 28 days, a major cost 
and inconvenience, and pay charges of shs 9/10 per head. What has to be 
remembered is that traders, unlike farmers, are only transient owners of 
the cattle and have little incentive to vaccinate unless they are actually 
prohibited from moving or delivering livestock to their destination. But 
neither Uganda nor the local butchers at Ahero or Kisumu require vaccination 
certificates. Another factor, of course, is the lack of substantial local 
supplies of cattle for sale which might otherwise have used the holding 
grounds. 
•A final reason for the failure to use the Macalder holding ground, 
according to several local reports, is a persistent dispute and considerable 
local acrimony over land rights, similar to the situation in Kapenguria 
already discussed. The land formerly helonging to the old Macalder mine 
was purchased and turned into a holding ground, but a number of the 
employees of the mine and other local residents were squatters on the land. 
Their removal was accomplished in a fashion that apparently left a 
number of them considerably antagonised, and some of these disgruntled 
would-be landowners have made it their business to mount a campaign of rumour 
and intimidation that has inhibited local livestock owners who might 
otherwise have made use of the holding ground. 
Had there been substantial use of the Macalder holding ground, the 
absence of water supplies would have been a major problem, though there 
is a river from which pipes could have been installed at a cost. What could 
now be done is to calculate the cost of installing water supplies to 
permit grazing throughout, and thus estimate the viability of establishing 
a small ranch either as a state or cooperative enterprise. 
The second holding ground located at Lichota in the east was meant 
to accommodate the more easterly stream of traffic heading for Kisumu., and 
also to be near to the cattle-owning Kuria who were "more interested in 
cattle than the Luo" and reluctant to bring their cattle right into the 
Luo area for fear of conflict or theft. At Lichota compensation had to 
be paid to landowners, at a cost of over £K 16,000 and another £K 3,000 
was to be used for a spray race, fencing (2,500 cedar posts were purchased) 
and paddocking the area. While this holding ground is not yet operational, 
optimism is not high in view of experience at Macalder. 
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PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DISEASE CONTROL 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease: The infective organism involved in foot-and-mouth 
has a number of-different strains and a remarkable ability to mutate. Compre-
hensive vaccination campaigns are technically feasible, but as revaccination 
is necessary every six months or one year, the cost of a continuing vaccina-
tion programme is very large. Since the disease does not, furthermore, have 
a very significant effect on the.productivity of local Zebu stock, such a 
vaccination programme is hard to justify. Three strains of foot-and-mouth 
(A, 0, and SAT 2) are major problems in Kenya, with two further strains (C, 
and SAT 1) presenting more minor problems. A separate vaccine for each of 
these strains is necessary (but they can be combined for innoculation) and 
a constant monitoring is required to keep up with mutations and develop 
relevant vaccines. 
In view of the costs and difficulties in mounting an eradication 
campaign in the whole of Kenya, the next best interim measure is the 
containment of foot-and-mouth In those areas where eradication cannot be 
justified economically or presents particular problems of feasibility. 
While complete containment is probably not realistic (The organism can be 
transmitted in slaughtered meat, on the tires of vehicles, by wild game 
and on the soles of human feet.), the principal method of transmission 
is by the movement of infected stock. To avoid this, areas where outbreaks 
occur are quarantined and an additional period of quarantine is required 
for any cattle moving from what are regarded as the endemic areas. The 
incubation period for the disease is relatively short (about one week), 
but cattle car be asymptomatic carriers for up to 8 months after recovery 
from an acute attack. A policy of compulsory vaccination areas and the 
classification of zones between which cattle movements are severely 
restricted is the current Kenya strategy for controlling the disease. In 
the meantime, eradication efforts in certain of the endemic areas are 
proceeding. 
The requirement for a quarantine period during which any cattle 
to be moved out of an area are held, observed and vaccinated imposes the 
need for large holding grounds. The cattle must be fed, watered and 
dipped while the various veterinary observations and procedures are being 
carried out. 
6 
Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia : In the case of CBPP, the situation 
is substantially different. Unlike foot-and-mouth, which is sometimes 
For technical information on this disease see J.R. Hudson (4). 
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hardly noticed by the stockowner, this disease is a very serious one 
which can spread rapidly and lead to a large number of deaths in a 
short time. CBPP also has the severe complication that a beast can be 
an asymptomatic carrier for many years, and can then be the source 
for a new round of acute infection within a herd. The incubation period 
for the disease can also be long, with up to six months between infection 
and the outbreak of the disease. In many ways, however, the disease is 
far more susceptible to eradication. With good reporting techniques 
including systematic lung examinations in abattoirs, with rigorous 
quarantine and movement restrictions when the disease is identified, 
and.with comprehensive and regular field testing, slaughter and Vaccina-
tion. programmes, eradication is a realistic possibility. This is not 
to minimise the problems of eradication in areas such as Northern Kenya 
where substantial cattle populations are widely dispersed at low density, 
where herd ownership patterns are complicated and difficult to establish, 
and where cattle movements over long distances are hard to predict or 
control. Nevertheless, very significant progress has been made with the 
control of the disease in Kenya and in the entire Rift Valley Province, 
for instance, there has been no reported outbreak of CBPP for the last 
five years. 
CONTROLLING DISEASE WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE MARKET: A PROPOSAL 
The problem arising out of the existence of such diseases is 
how to restrict or control movement in order to minimise the transmission 
of disease, with all the costs imposed by disease outbreaks, while 
inhibiting as little as possible the efficiency of the marketing of 
cattle. The marketing system is the commercial and economic lifeline 
for the range areas and unnecessary or excessive interference with that 
system imposes significant costs. The present situation may be said 
to combine the worst of both worlds. 
For example,in the case of CBPP, a three-month quarantine period 
is imposed while the cattle are tested, observed and vaccinated. However, 
if there had been an outbreak of the disease in the area served by the 
stockroute, this period would not be long enough to ensure that CBPP 
was not transmitted through the supposed barrier. (As has been mentioned, 
it is possible for a cow to contract the disease up to six months after 
the initial infection.) If, on the other hand, efficient reporting systems 
existed in the production areas (and the disease is relatively easy to 
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spot according to the veterinary authorities) and these showed that 
there had been no outbreaks, then.a three-month quarantine period, at 
some arbitrarily chosen line, would clearly be unnecessary, or at least 
excessive. 
If the problem is that reporting systems in the production areas 
are not adequate, then clearly investment and effort should go into 
improving them. Such measures are warranted not merely from the point 
of view of containing the disease, but also as an absolutely essential 
step in its eradication. There is a clear need to monitor abattoirs, 
not because there is any danger of infecting humans with the meat, as 
is the case with anthrax for instance, but purely because this is an 
important way of identifying herds In which the disease exists. 
In Kenya's border areas the international reporting of scheduled 
diseases assumes particular importance. The principal reason why 
Turkana and Karapokot are treated as endemic CBPP areas is not because 
of any incidence of the disease in the cattle from those areas, but 
because there Is considerable movement back and forth across the border 
among the Karamojong, and the Kenya authorities do not have confidence 
that outbreaks in Uganda will be immediately identified, reported and 
contained. 
What is needed Is proper reporting and disease identification 
when there are outbreaks, together with adequate and comprehensive 
quarantine impositions related to those outbreaks. Arbitrary and fixed 
requirements, imposed regardless of whether or not there has been a 
local outbreak or an outbreak over the whole of the area from which 
cattle are being funnelled, engender disrespect for the system and 
encourage its bypass. The present system Is unrelated to actual 
disease reporting and may severely Inhibit the movement of cattle 
without reducing the spread of disease. Beyond this, cattle are diverted 
into non-legal and illegal channels about which it is hard to get 
information, and which are particularly hard to control should the 
need truly arise. The result is the ironic situation that in the 
event of a significant outbreak of a particular disease, the authorities 
ar ' less able to bring about the necessary movement restrictions than they 
would have been if the regular system had been less restrictive, and had 
attracted the bulk of the trade through it. The advantages of having the 
system used, at least by the great bulk of the livestock moving from these 
areas, are that the monitoring process is facilitated and that the flow 
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can be temporarily stopped when it proves necessary. 
The importance of making sure that the stock route system catches 
the natural flow of livestock is thus underlined. It must be acceptea 
that there is probably no completely safe way of moving cattle; bur the 
risks, while they are significant, should not be seen to the exclusion 
of the benefits of the marketing system. In general, the diseases 
discussed here do not lend themselves to successful containment by reliance 
on holding grounds, especially if these are such that traders and others 
who move livestock make efforts to avoid them. 
INTERVENTION OF THE L.M.D. AS PURCHASING AGENTS: A PROPOSAL 
As mentioned above,the intention in instituting the stock route 
system was not merely to permit the sals of livestock, in the face of the 
disease threat, but also to positively encourage the selling of cattle 
in overstocked and non-commercialised areas locally, as well as from areas 
further north, by providing improved marketing facilities. In this second 
aim, the system appears also to have had little or no success, and a 
different approach may well be required. 
It appears that in the area as a whole, Including the north, 
the number of traders is small and their appearance erratic, and they are 
reluctant ' to pass cattle through quarantines and thus to use the routes 
provided. Consequently livestock-owners may have to travel long distances, 
with adverse effects on the cattle moved, to reach highly unreliable 
markets, involving a risk which must act as a considerable disincentive 
to sell at all. In the case of maize and other food or cash crops, it ]nas 
often been accepted in East Africa and elsewhere that incentives to producers 
can usefully be improved by institutionalised marketing arrangements or 
guaranteed minimum prices. 
Consideration might be given nere not to comprehensive state 
marketing, but to intervention through buying agents to guarantee sales 
at scheduled auctions at seme pre-announced 'floor' price, which might 
vary seasonally or from year to year. Such prices would be fixed low 
enough so that traders attending auctions and offering reasonable prices 
would be able to make successful bids, but owners would be guaranteed a 
sale for beasts of 'fair average quality' (The problems of grading and 
valuation would obviously have to be investigated extensively,) without 
having to return with their beasts from an auction. At the same time, 
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the buying agents could attend auctions arranged in the northern areas 
and could bring cattle down through the scheduled stock route system, 
performing all necessary inoculations, thus ensuring that benefits 
from this system are obtained. This suggestion does not represent a 
departure from principle since the L.M.D. is already empowered to act 
as marketing agents and indeed was intended in the original proposals 
for Kapenguria to commit itself to a much more direct marketing role. 
The need is for the L.M.D., or failing the L.M.D. a new agency acting 
as an intermediary for this particular purpose, to adopt a specifically 
development-oriented role in the pastoral areas, not taking over but 
supporting the marketing system with some form of 'minimum intervention'. 
SOME COMMENTS ON PIG AND POULTRY PRODUCTION 
The promotion of pig and poultry production is included among 
the projects in several of the SRDP areas: pigs in Migori, Vihiga and 
Tetu, and poultry in Vihiga, Tetu and Kwale. Livestock officers in 
the other areas are also involved in promoting pig and poultry production, 
if not afe SRDP projects. There is very little to report regarding the 
actual projects, but a number of observations can be made on the develop-
ment of pig and poultry production. 
Pig Production 
In the case of pig production, a tendency exists for livestock 
officers In each area of Kenya to ascribe the difficulties faced in 
promotion to the special problems of the locality or to associate them with 
the local people. This was observed in several of the SRDP areas. Thus 
in Migori, where a demonstration unit was started in September 1973 
at Oyani Farm, It is stated that "the main constraint is the farmers' 
lack of interest In pigs" and also that "people are not used to eating 
pork". There is reference in Migori to the "very successful" production 
in Kakamega District, which is contrasted with their own experience. If, 
however, one inquires in Kakamega, it is difficult to trace this success. 
In Vihiga it is stated that "only two farmers produce good porkers", 
of whom one is a missionary farmer and one is the former head of a 
Farmers' Training Centre. 
In fact there appear to be some very rational, economic reasons 
for the restriction of both production and consumption. The first is 
the availability and cost of feedstuffs. As mentioned in Migori, a pig 
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"needs one bag of maize a week or it is starving". The problem is, in the 
first place, that pigs are often fed much the same basic; food as 
in Kenya, maize, and this is not available as a surplus on small-scale 
farms. Likewise small farms do not generate large quantities of waste 
products, turnip tops for example, which can be fed to pigs. This is 
a major handicap to production in Vihiga for instance. As a result 
producers there are heavily dependent on purchased feedstuffs, the price 
of which is currently very high. Thus not only does the high price of 
feed relative to the price of pork make pig production a rather unattrac-
tive proposition at the moment, but the effect of costly feed on the sale 
price itself restricts demand. The second limiting factor is in fact 
the restricted local market which exists for pork especially at current 
prices. Local demand for commercial output in Kenya comes especially 
from institutions such as schools and hospitals which have a limited 
ability to pay, and Uplands which makes its purchases mostly from locali-
ties within range of its Rift Valley factory. 
A second observation is that the promotion of pigs in an area 
seems to be a cyclical or periodic activity. Thus, in Vihiga the 
local District Officer was actively engaged in the promotion of pig 
production, with considerable success, in 1956 - 58, nearly twenty years 
ago. At this time a great many farmers became interested in the project, 
growing cabbages in particular' and native potato leaves for feed. 
Estimates of pig production in Tetu show that the activity is by no 
means new. Table 14 gives, as an index of production, the number of 
sows kept by farmers. Since 1969 - 70, the number of sows has fallen 
Table 14. The number of sows kept by farmers in Tetu Division, 1967-74. 
Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Number of sows 623 n.a. 1971 1835 915a 599 703 572 
a. includes gilts. 
Source: Tetu Division Annual Reports. 
by two-thirds. Two factors apparently underlie this trend: the rising 
cost of feed over the period as a whole and lack of markets, especially 
in the period 1969 - 70, when there was obviously excess production 
on the established pattern of the hog cycle. During 1969, as revealed 
in a pig census in December, the total number of pigs in Nyeri District 
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rose by approximately 80 per cent, and the number of pig keepers by 50 
per cent. While some 10,500 pigs were ready for marketing outside the 
District in 1970, the cooperative union had a contract with Uplands for 
only just over 7,000. Producers wpEe apparently seriously discouraged at 
this time and, given also the unfavourable factors mentioned already, 
production has not recovered since. This experience indicates first, 
the importance of finding specific markets if pig production is to be 
expanded; and secondly, that "lack of farmer interest" in pig production 
is not an inherent constraint but rather the consequence of prices and 
economic factors. In particular, if production is stagnant in Nyeri, 
where there is good access to the main outlet, Uplands, the prospects 
elsewhere are not likely to be favourable. 
Despite this, there are periodic references in Ministry of 
Agriculture files all over Kenya to "the need to persuade people to 
eat more pork", with suggestions either for consumer campaigns or new 
drives to encourage producers. These can only have an adverse effect 
on the value attached to extension advice, as well as wasting the time 
of livestock officers, if they are not related to calculations demonstrat-
ing a favourable economic basis. Very largely, the economics of pig 
production involve knowledge of only two prices, the price of feed (input) 
and the price of pork (output). It should not be left to livestock officers 
all over Kenya to guess these: it should be routine for the Planning 
Division of the Ministry of Agriculture in Nairobi to monitor these two 
prices and inform local officers of the appropriate time to emphasise 
pigs. 
A second point worth stressing is the need to distinguish between 
commercial and subsistence production of pigs. The commercial market in 
any area is generally qalt# circumscribed, depending on the extent of 
interest by Uplands and the number of local institutions making purchases. 
Promotion should be extended to subsistence production, i.e. production 
for consumption at home: it may be easier for small farmers to sustain 
one or two pigs for their own consumption, using offal from their farm, 
with very little commercial feed supplement, rather than breeding and 
keeping larger numbers of pigs, an activity inevitably dependent on 
commercial feed. 
Finally, whether commercial or subsistence production is being 
considered, promotion should be concentrated in those areas where a large 
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proportion of the required feedstuffs is likely to be available on the 
farm, if possible as waste products. Government farm experiments appear 
chronically incapable of production methods of this sort, and generally 
themselves require heavy and unjustified subsidisation. 
Poultry Production 
The promotion of poultry production is a much more important farm 
activity than pig production because of its easy integration into traditional 
farm activities, the much wider local market (commercial and subsistence) 
for both eggs and broilers, and the important nutritional aspect. 
Poultry production is not listed as an SRDP project in Kapenguria, 
but comments made locally on the subject are revealing of the general 
position. Modern poultry industry in the District, it is said, "tends 
to be erratic", and "a farmer picks it up and either abandons it half 
way or goes to the end, then swears never to reestablish it again". The 
reasons for this are again the high cost of feeds, the high competition 
from local eggs and a limited market. The cost of eggs from high-grade 
birds on commercial feeds Is said to be higher than the ordinary 'local' 
eggs. This is again indicative of the need for the Ministry of Agriculture 
Planning Division to monitor the prices of inputs and outputs in poultry 
production, but also of the need for more careful appraisal of its economics 
than has been made so far. Beyond this, it suggests an even stronger need 
than in the case of pigs to examine the potential of traditional poultry 
production, which is clearly both important and competitive rather than 
simply to focus on a small number of 'progressive' or 'modern' poultry 
farmers. 
In Tetu, two SRDP poultry projects were planned for broilers 
and for layers (the latter consisting of sending interested farmers to 
the local farmers' training centre for training), but these were not 
implemented, mainly because of the unfavourable impact of rising feed 
costs. Despite this, some indications exist in Tetu of the potential for 
poultry production, as shown in Table 15. What is significant here, 
more than the increase in the total number of birds in the last year, is 
the increase in the percentage of exotic birds from a very rough 
estimate of 18 per cent to nearly 30 per cent in two years, indicating the 
possibilities for increasing productivity in poultry production as a whole. 
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Table 15. Recent trends in poultry production in Tetu Division. 
1972 1973 1974 
No. of exotic birds 
No. of native birds 
Total poultry 
Percentage exotic 
Source: Tetu Division Annual Reports. 
While poultry is an SRDP project in Vihiga, expansion has been 
assisted throughout the whole district by International Development 
Association loans through the Agricultural Finance Corporation as shown in 
Table 16:-
Table 16. I.D.A. loan approvals for poultry production, Kakamega District, 
1970-74. 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Total 1970-74 
Loans 
approved 
(shs '000) 7.7 6.9 18.0 50.3 179.0 261.9 
The local market for eggs is apparently very favourable, but is was not 
possible to make a detailed investigation of local production, or the 
impact of the loans issued. The aim should be to ensure as wide a 
distribution of poultry/eggs production among small-scale producers 
as possible: the extent to which the programme above is consistent with 
this aim might be examined. The SRDP project in Vihiga is for a 
central brooding house, which will cost K£2,500 and will be run cooperatively 
by farmers, to take delivery of day-old chicks for subsequent redistribution 
among farmers. Currently, because of the distance from the hatchery and 
lack of proper care of new chicks by farmers, there is a very high mortality 
rate. Both the ideas, of providing local 'wholesale' distribution 
facilit ies and of cooperative operation of the enterprise, appear to be well 
designed to have a very widely spread effect on poultry production. This 
4,151 
22,456 
26,607 
18% 
4,682 
21,419 
26,101 
22% 
7,245 
24,603 
31,848 
2955 
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1s therefore an important experiment which should be carefully monitored, 
but which will require considerable assistance and supervision during the 
early stages. 
The poultry industry in Migori has always been underdeveloped. Just 
before the SRDP started in 1969, there were only 270 improved birds in the 
Division. The local supply of eggs is still apparently small and subject 
to wide fluctuations. The eggs are small and often stale, pointing to a 
marketing as well as to a production problem. A 'poultry breeding and 
marketing' project was listed in 1972-3, to include setting up a nucleus 
poultry unit at Oyani Government Farm to supply day-old chicks to farmers, 
but this has not yet been implemented. In 1973-74, only three successful 
farmers were reported In the Division, with 266 laying birds, but with 
32 other farmers interested. Poultry production appears to have much 
greater potential than pig production in Migori. However, it requires 
simultaneous efforts to organise marketing, something which has so far 
been neglected. 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Dairy Production 
1. Grade cattle development in Kenya needs to be based on a strategy 
for consolidating and extending existing 'clean' (disease-free) 
and 'semi-clean' areas. This should indicate priority areas for 
major effort. 
2. Among the SRDP areas, Kakamega District offers a number of promising 
indicators and should be considered a priority, but not Migori or 
Kwale. 
3. The maintenance of cattle dips in the country as a whole is atrocious. 
Because of external diseconomies from non-dipping (social benefits 
from dipping), we recommend as a radical proposal free dipping, if not 
in all Kenya then in strategic development areas as the basis for 
a comprehensive approach to the disease control/dairy development 
problem. This would be for a minimum transitional period of three 
years. Testing and maintaining the strength of acaracides should be 
taken over by the Veterinary Department. Costs should be financed 
from taxation (perhaps on cattle sales) as with other public goods, 
such as roads, yielding social benefits. 
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Beef Production and the Stockroute System 
4. The appropriate strategy for improvement in beef-producing areas 
still needs consideration. 
5. It is essential that in the process of establishing holding grounds 
and other links in a stockroute chain the issue of land rights be 
resolved so that the land which is part of the stockroute is 
considered sacrosanct. The logic of a stockroute requires that these 
land units be as free as possible from trespass, grass poaching and 
stock theft. Resolution of land rights is particularly difficult in 
areas where land is communally held. It is recommended that the 
problem of recompense to the existing users of the land should not 
be ignored, but that the provision of some service that would be 
particularly desirable and accessible to those users would be a way 
of solving the distributional problem and minimising conflict. 
6.., The current emphasis on quarantining cattle in a final holding ground 
should be replaced by an emphasis on radically Improved reporting of 
diseases in the whole area from which the cattle are funnelled. 
Markedly liberalised movement along the stockroutes when quarantine 
restrictions are not necessary should be combined with far greater 
efforts to clamp down on stock movements when quarantines are 
warranted and such movements would involve unacceptable levels of 
risk. If movement along the officially recognised routes were 
liberalised, an additional advantage would be the relative ease with 
which disease problems could be monitored, with a minimum of policing. 
7. The questions of where to establish the CBPP 'boundary' and, indeed, 
the question of whether it is necessary to have such a boundary at all, 
should be immediately reviewed. If the area from which the cattle 
are drawn is known not to have had an outbreak for years (as is the 
case for the Rift Valley Province), a three-month delay at an arbitrary 
point for quarantine reasons is very hard to justify. Once again 
this approach should be replaced by improvements in the disease 
reporting system and by an ability to impose the necessary quarantines 
and cattle movement restrictions, along with the other CBPP control 
measures, should any outbreak occur. (We would emphasise the word 
"necessary"; an outbreak in Mandera does not make it necessary to 
impose quarantine restrictions in Karapokot, merely because both are 
in the "Northern Frontier".) 
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Tetu and Nyeri District 
8. The advanced livestock development here Indicates what can be achieved, 
and can be considered something of a model for other areas. The 
history of livestock development in the area points towards a compre-
hensive approach as the best strategy, rather than a piecemeal one, and 
an approach which incorporates the mass of farmers rather than only 
the most progressive. 
9. The credit/extension experiment for the promotion of dairy cattle 
appears to have been highly successful, and merits cautious replication 
elsewhere. 
Migori - Macalder 
10. The Macalder holding ground is unlikely to be used at this stage of 
livestock development in the area. The feasibility of some water 
investment to permit the establishment of a small cooperative ranch 
should be investigated. 
11. A study of milk marketing in the area, proposed some time ago, should 
be carried out. 
12. The model dairy farms are not appropriately scaled in relation to 
average farmers in the area. 
13. The disease problem precludes efforts at substantial grade dairy 
cattle development at this time. 
14. Artificial insemination services also cannot be profitably developed 
throughout the area as a whole. 
15. Provided that the recommendation for general free dipping is accepted, 
then an attempt to establish a small clean area around Oyani Farm 
could be made, including a grade cattle credit programme and an 
artificial insemination run. 
Vihiga - Hamisi 
16. There is contradictory evidence about the relative profitability 
of dairy enterprise (with existing mortality rates) and alternative 
farm activities in the area. However dairy production appear 
at least competitive, if not superior. The advantages of moving 
towards the long-term goal of a disease-free area, as well as the 
immediate nutritional benefits, appear to move the balance decisively 
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in favour of dairy enterprise as a complement to existing cropping 
patterns in the farming system. 
17. Dairy enterprise promotion should be combined with a frontal approach 
to the disease problem, based on a programme of free dipping. Promotion 
in the absence of effective disease control is likely to be disastrously 
wasteful. 
18. The attempt should be made to distribute cattle as widely as possible 
among smaller farmers, replicating the Tetu experimental extension 
method. 
19. Default rates should be calculated separately for borrowers losing 
cattle through disease and those not. 
20. The grade cattle credit programme should not be abandoned, but attempts 
made to expand its scope, with due attention to the management 
problem and in the context of an effective disease control programme. 
21. The eight per cent rate of interest should be kept, but an attempt 
should be made to remove the subsidy obtained by defaulters by 
more strenuous attempts to recoup loans and more careful selection 
of farmers. 
Kwale 
22. The 94-acre farm plan Is inappropriately scaled for the area. 
Extension.efforts should be concentrated on proposals which are 
more appropriate to small farmers and which would not create 
inequalities. The small-scale dairy unit for a 10-acre farm is 
much more promising. There might also be further experimentation 
with stall feeding with zero grazing. 
23. Much more farm-level research needs to be carried out in the mixed 
farming areas. 
24. The area has some severe problems which cast doubt on its potential 
as a priority area for grade cattle development, but more research 
needs to be done on milk supply and marketing. The coastal belt 
clearly offers a considerable market for milk, as the transportation 
of milk from upcountry involves very substantial costs. 
9-55+ IDS/OP 12 
Kapenguria 
25. Th'-, system of stock routes has been extremely difficult to establish 
and facilities provided so far have been largely unutilised. 
26. The possibility that the proposed system does not coincide entirely 
with the natural flow of cattle traffic should be examined. This flow 
should be more carefully studied before such routes are designed. 
27. The Livestock Marketing Division (L.M.D.), acting as an Intermediary 
between livestock owners and Kenya Meat Commission and other 
markets, has the specifically development - oriented function of 
encouraging sales and stabilising markets in pastoral areas. For 
various reasons L.M.D, has not yet established itself in this function. 
Either the L.M.D. should renew its commitment in this area or a new 
agency should be established which could act more positively as an 
intermediary in the pastoral areas, perhaps in the direction of 
establishing guaranteed outlets at some low reserve price. 
28. Disease control measures and dairy production should be concentrated 
in a small disease-free area within Mnagei Location. 
29. Neither bull camps nor artificial insemination services have been 
successful in Mnagei. The latter are largely premature. Possibilities 
for artificial insemination in the 'clean* area of Lelan should be 
examined, in preference to bulls. 
30. The sheep farming development in Lelan is extremely promising. The 
possibility of accelerating the implementation of the programme 
should be investigated. 
Pigs and Poultry Production 
31. Periodic and uncoordinated efforts at promotion of pig production 
in different areas of Kenya are a waste of time. Calculation of 
the simple economics should be made in Nairobi, to be updated 
continuously as the prices of feed and of pork vary, in order to 
determine favourable periods and locations for the promotion of 
production. 
32. Promotion of pig production should be extended to include production 
for home consumption of one or two pigs. 
33. Promotion should be concentrated where a proportion of the required 
feedstuffs are available on the farm. 
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Much greater emphasis should, be placed on poultry/egg production 
than on pigs, while the ease with which commercial egg markets can be 
, oversuppliad should be borne in mind. 
35. As with pigs, the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture 
should monitor the prices of inputs and outputs, and make a careful 
appraisal of the economics of poultry production. 
36. The potential within traditional poultry production, as opposed to 
the 'modern poultry industry', should be examined. 
37. The Vihiga project for a central brooding house should be carefully 
monitored to test the possibility of providing 'wholesale distri-
bution' of one-day-old chicks, and of cooperative organisation of 
the enterprise. Comprehensive assistance and supervision should 
be provided during the early stages. 
38. Poultry has a better potential in Migori than pig production, 
but will require simultaneous efforts to organise marketing in the 
main consuming areas. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
GROUP AND COOPERATIVE RANCHING 
INTRODUCTION 
Kenya has been attempting over the last few years to Implement 
a major programme of group ranching in the ranchlands and semi-arid areas, 
and large-scale investments have been made and are proposed for this 
programme. Group ranching programmes exist in three of the six SRDP areas, 
and in view of the importance of the programmes, and the complexity 
of the issues they raise, we discuss here developments in these three 
areas, West Pokot, Kwale and Mbere, in considerable detail. Cooperative 
ranching societies are less important in these particular areas, but 
there are many common problems and general issues to be discussed 
affecting the institutional forms appropriate for development of the 
ranchlands as a whole, so that cooperative ranching societies are also 
discussed in part. Fuller discussion of cooperative ranching societies, 
in Machakos District particularly, is made in a separate I.D.S. Working 
Paper"'" which also incorporates much of the material in this chapter. 
GROUP RANCHING IN WEST POKOT DISTRICT 
Like many areas of Kenya where ranch projects are planned, there 
is in West Pokot District a long history of government proposals and 
plans, and very little that is established and functioning. While fresh 
and enthusiastic government officials (and expatriate advisors?) frequently 
put forward a project as if it were completely new, a long hard look 
at the history of development attempts in the area, and their wider 
framework, is essential: this would certainly appear to be true, in this 
case» 
1. I, Livingstone, Cowboys in Africa: The Socio-Economics of 
Ranching in Kenya, Working Paper No. 220, Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, 1975. 
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A Brief Description of the Project 
Six areas are proposed for conversion to group ranches s all 
situated contiguously in the hot, dry lowland area in the west of the 
District, towards Uganda. The main focus of attention at present is 
the Kongelai ranch and the others, although awaiting formal land titles, 
are not likely to be thoroughly investigated or pyrsued until some 
progress is made first with K^ngelai. In Kipkomo = for instance, there 
is considerable opposition' so far to the concept of a group ranch, though 
elsewhere there is some interest. Kongelai is-the renamed Riwa Scheme, 
and comprises an area with long experience of officially promoted grazing 
schemes. It was forroally adjudicated as a group ranch in September 
1972. We can therefore concentrate on the Kongelai Group Ranch, focussing 
attention on the main objectives to start with, and looking at the 
detailed financial proposals later on 
The intention is to cut up the Icwiand range area as a whole 
into six blocks, each to form a separate group farm, with no movement of 
cattle between blocks or from outside the area into the blocks. Livestock 
management within each ranch is to be improved by a system of rotational 
grazing to conserve grass and to allow it to regenerate, and by volunt: ry 
destocking to reduce stock numbers to the officially estimated carrying 
capacity of the land, permitting improvement i; the quality of animals, 
and thus opening up commercial possibilities as well oo implying the 
quality of subsistence. There are proposals for complementary investments 
in water supplies, but^as is recognised, "there is no use in improving 
the watering facilities for livestock, if no destocking will be done at 
2 the same time". 
In contrast to many other schemes based especially on bought-
in cattle,the present focus is on the introduction of improved rotational 
grazing and destocking. It is proposed also to supplement the 
development effort in animal husbandry with measures to improve living 
2• S.K. Chesang, A Report on a Socio-ecological Survey of Riwa 
Proposed Group Ranch, District Range Office, Kapenguria, November 1971. 
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conditions in the area, particularly through settling the population to 
some extent in so-called residential areas with adequate water supplies, 
and to promote the expansion of cultivation; but. these proposals are 
still vague. 
The Extent of Overstocking and its Causes 
3 
A 1971 population/stock census in Kongelai revealed 412 
potential scheme participants, including 334 resident family units or stock 
owners, amounting to a human population of some 2,000 people. Together 4 
they owned cattle amounting to 5,200 Kenya stock units and sheep and 
goats equal to 1,600 stock units (assuming 10 'shoats' equal 1 K.s.u.), 
a total of 6,800 units. The low productivity of the land was considered 
to yield a carrying capacity of one stock unit to over 10 acres, and thus 
a total capacity of around 5,000 stock units. Excess stock was therefore 
estimated at around 1,800 to 2,000 units in 1971. In fact the Range 
Management Division more often calculates 6 goats per stock unit: this 
would increase the total for 1971 By- 1,060 to 7,860 stock units, o©f which 
sheep and goats would comprise 2„660<, 
In order to be in a position to take appropriate measures to 
control overstocking, it is necessary to appreciate how it arises. Both 
social or cultural and economic factors appear to be involved. The 
sociological explanation is based on the so-called 'cattle complex' 
of pastoral peoples by ! which cattle are kept for various social 
purposes, or even for their own sake, rather than for subsistence food 
supply or commercial cash benefit. This explanation is not necessary 
to explain overstocking, however, since this could be explained by the 
economist as arising out of a divergence between private and social 
(group) interests from the holding of cattle. So long as land is 
owned communally it pays an individual to maximise his own holding of 
cattle. He has no interest in restricting this holding in order to 
3. S.K. Chesang, Kapenguria SRDP Group Ranch Project (During 
Financial Year 1974/75 and 1975/76), District Range Office, Kapenguria, 
June 1974. 
4. One Kenya stock unit comprises the equivalent of 600 lbs of live 
weight bovine. The actual numbers obtained were 7,373 cattle and 15,964 
sheep and goats. 
10-
preserve grass since, if the rest of the community does nc•.: follow his 
example, there will be no significant effect on the total numbers of 
cattle being grazed on the land and he will end up the loser. This is 
true even if all members of the community would gain in the longer 
run from a reduced aggregate herd and improved pasture^and indeed even if 
failure to restrict numbers posed a threat to the continued existence of 
the animal and ultimately the human population. So long as this is true, 
exhortations to the people "to change their way cf thinking" may be a waste 
of time. At the same time enquiries made by the evaluators3 reported 
below, suggest that the sociological factor is also important. 
5 Historical Background: The Grazing Schemes of the 19 50s and 19 60s 
The buoyantly optimistic view of Government officials regarding 
the prospects for the group ranches are based in part on their previous 
experience of rotational grazing: 
the population do know what rotational grazing can do 
to improve the grass growth, as they have good experiences 
with the grazing schemes of the old days. Promising is the 
fact £hat it is their idea to revive the conditions of those 
days. 
The area was originally part of the 19 54 ALDEV Grazing Schemes, Kongelai, 
at that time constituting the Riwa Grazing Scheme- Considerable success 
was achieved over an area of 68,000 acres by compulsory or strongly 
persuasive methods. A four-paddock rotational scheme was employed, 
and each paddock was rested for four months every year. Grazing guards 
were employed, and arrests made for 'grass poaching' offences. There was 
also a stock tax based on the livestockfeoldings of each individual, the 
amount of tax paid depending on the use made of the common pasture. Towards 
the time of elections in 1963, local politicians were able to exploit 
the reluctance of the people to pursue such schemes. Scheme members 
were unhappy about the disciplinary measures involved, and non-members 
about being excluded from what had become good grazing. This contributed to 
the schemes' temporary abandonment about this time. Although the schemes 
5. For a full account, see H.J. York, West Pokot Grazing Schemes, 
a Survey of the Community Grazing Schemes of West Pokot District^ 
conducted January-March 1967, Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, 1967. 
6. S-K. Chesang, op. cit 
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were revived from 1966 up to the present, much of the considerably 
improved grazing which had been secured was wiped out during the interval 
by the large numbers of cattle which descended upon it. The success of 
the technical results obtained (whatever the other consequences) is 
measured by the fact that graziers were attracted from as far afield 
as Uganda to utilise the grass; and secondly from the fact that up to now 
they are remembered and acknowledged by a great many of the present 
population. Of the currently proposed ranches Kongelai and Chesera have 
7 previous experience of grazing schemes. 
The Agricultural Economics of the Pokot System 
In the course of a sweeping condemnation of grazing schemes 
and group ranches in the area, Professor Carl Widstrand has argued that 
the ranching proposals ignore the agricultural economy of the area and 
are therefore not economically sound. In particular, they ignore the 
use r-:e by the Pokot of six different ecological zones within the area:-
Through ownership and use of land in several zones, the 
Pokot have made a successful relationship to the land. 
The meticulous management of multiple environments is a 
necessary condition for the successful subsistence of the 
Pokot. Thus for example grazing schemes organized in only 
or any one of these environment zones are bound to fail. 
Unfortunately this Is presented in the form of an assertion, and Is 
supported by no detailed agricultural economic data or case studies of 
individual family economy: certainly not by evidence of 'meticulous' 
economic management. 
The vast area of pastoral movement, including the 'high cold 
forest' of the Cherangani Hills, which Widstrand assumes, appears to be 
more of historical importance than present reality. What does appear 
important however is a system of 'transhumance' between the hot 
plains and the hill slopes (kamass). Here there are contrary explanations 
of the lateral movement by Widstrand and by York, a District Officer 
7. See H.J. York, op. cit. 
8. C.G. Widstrand, Pastoral Peoples and Rural Development -
A Case Study, Annales Academiae Regiae Uppsaliensis,17/1973, Uppsala, 
1973, p. 41. 
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who played a major role in organising some of the earlier grazing schemes. 
While the latter asserts that the graziers, having 'destroyed their own 
habitat', now want to encroach on the agricultural areas of the higher 
regions, Widstrand describes this movement as a long-established system 
of transhumance, that is, as the traditional grazing system. Widstrand 
produces a sketch map showing the distribution of cattle in Riwa and 
Kipkomo, and concludes that:-
There is not enough grazing in the proposed Riwa ranch. 
Today (late April 1972, before the rains) there Is hardly 
a blade of grass in any of the grazing blocks and there are 
virtually no cattle at all inside the proposed ranch towards 
the end of a normal dry season. The cattle are all today in 
the kamass on the slopes beyond Serewa. (p. 52) 
Although Widstrand is extremely vague about the geographical movement 
necessary for the Pokot, and apparently ignores the fact that the case for 
reserving and improving the lowland habitat through planned rotation of 
grazing is largely independent of such movement, this movement between 
plain and hill slopes would appear to be a very important element which 
has been neglected in drawing up the boundaries of the proposed group 
ranches. Unfortunately plans have advanced to a stage where modification 
may be difficult; given the likely importance to the success of the ranches, 
however, a close re-examination of group ranch boundaries in relation 
to the distribution of hill slopes and customary cattle movements (and 
to the distribution of cultivated areas) is called for. It is a pity in 
this regard that more attention was not given to the implications of 
Widstrand's paper: a copy of this paper (or even discussion of it) was 
not to be found either in Kapenguria or in Nairobi, and it had to be 
obtained from Sweden for the purposes of this evaluation. 
Present Pokot Attitudes Towards the Scheme 
In order to assess the chances of success of the scheme, 
which depend primarily on the cooperation of the people involved, present 
attitudes were investigated through the medium of a well attended three-
hour baraza (meeting). The object was to assess the extent to which 
the boundaries of the Kongelai ranch were being respected, the extent 
of interest in rotational grazing withing the ranch, present attitudes 
towards destocking and related matters, and a number of factors relating 
to the practical administration and organisational structure. 
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Ranch boundaries appeared to be quite well respected by 
pastoralists from other areas (and well defended by Kongelai members), -
with only occasional trespassing by Karopokot: this does not appear, 
therefore, to be a major problem at the moment (perhaps only so long as 
the pasture remains unimproved). At the same time not enough' is known 
about customary cattle movements within and between the six proposed 
ranches, or of pastoralists from outside the area. As in the case of 
other ranching schemes, little or no analysis has been made of the potential 
impact of the schemes on pastoralists outside the demarcated area, or 
in general on people excluded from the project. 
Three areas, Kongelai, Chesera and Kipkomo, have accepted 
rotational grazing. In Kongelai the District Range Officer produces the 
grazing schedule. There is a grazing committee of elders elected through 
a baraza. A rule is followed whereby a member whose cows are found 
trespassing on fallow land must forfeit one steer for the committee 
members to eat, a useful incentive for the latter to enforce the grazing 
rules. All members are said to report 'poachers' on fallow land, while 
youths collect cattle they find grazing there. In general it can be 
said that a definite attempt is being made to adhere to the rules, except 
where shortage of water elsewhere forces'members to utilise the rest areas. 
An issue to consider is whether a two-or four-paddock system 
should be operated. The present two-paddock system, with each paddock 
being rested for six months each year, may well be relatively ineffective, 
not giving vegetation sufficient time to regenerate. The difficulty is that 
once the grass has deteriorated to a certain level, the lack of spare grass 
makes it difficult to resist the immediate pressing needs for grazing. 
There is thus a problem of reconciling short-term needs and long-term 
objectives and of effecting a successful transition towards the optimum 
grazing pattern, which is likely to become more problematic the longer 
it is delayed. It is said that half the total area of Kongelai is 
at present capable of rapid recovery, while the other half might require 
several years of intensive management to reach its true potential. The 
reconciliation of short-term needs and long-term tendencies is a • 
difficult one, which first of all requires very careful assessment and 
continuous monitoring of the grazing position. This is a major task which 
should not be left to one District Range Officer operating on his own and 
with little outside advice. Our discussion so far has already indicated 
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how much work and analysis is required. In general we can say that the 
problems of maintaining and improving a standard of living within a 
subsistence economy are just as important and in need of attention as those 
of a cash economy. An effort to remove the existing bias towards commercialised 
activities by Government agencies is needed. 
The most crucial questions, however, are whether there is any 
increase in the extent of 'ccmmercial-mindedness' among the Pokot 
(which would certainly seem to be a prerequisite for loans to be given, 
as in other areas, if only because such loans must be repaid in cash); 
and whether there is any change in their attitude towards destocking. 
Participants in the baraza made strong statements to the effect 
that, for example, they "were here to accumulate wealth" (equating wealth 
with animals owned) and "animals are life". Suggestions that a smaller 
number of good animals might be more useful than a larger number of poor 
beasts were strenuously rejected.9 Similarly it was said that they "had 
no need for money, unless their children were starving". Cattle were 
sold only because of "calamity", i.e. drought, when there was a fear that 
they might in any case die. They agreed that cows sold were old ones, due 
for culling. These statements tend to confirm the recent statement made 
by Government officials that "at present animals that come from auction 
sales are nearly always the old and sickly type".10 Finally it was 
strongly asserted that their only problems:: were disease and lack of rain: 
the poor condition of animals was due to +"setse, not lack of grass. When 
they were asked to state the benefits which they expected to receive from 
the operation of the ranch, moreover, none mentioned improved 
organisation of grazing and collective control of excess stock Cthe main 
benefits in the eyes of Government): the b e n e ! : w e r e the finance for 
9-- We asked if they would not prefer two or three beautiful wives 
to a largei number of unattractive ones. The response was yes, but this 
applied only to wives, not animals. 
10. 
1974. 
District Animal Husbandry Officers' Conference, Nakuru, September 
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water development and dipping facilities which the Government was to 
provide. 
Information derived from a 3-hour baraza, even if attended by 
about 100 members, can hardly be described as systematic. That the 
information was not inaccurate, however, is suggested by the enthusiasm 
with which the most 'conservative' remarks were applauded, and the 
democratic way in which the meeting was conducted (committee members who 
tried to speak more than once were told to sit down in no uncertain terms). 
It was suggested above that a fundamental reason for overstocking 
was the divergence between social and private interests. Since there is 
considerable inequality in ownership of cattle among members, this 
suggests that the best method of effecting a reduction in stock numbers would 
be to impose a ceiling on numbers to be owned by individual family units. 
This would permit, a given redu.ci^n to be effected with minimum hardship; 
and it might be possible t: enlist the support of the poorer members of 
the group in putting pressure on members who were, after all, using up a 
dispr-c.-pDrtior.6tc share of the communal grass. 
The intention, on the official side, is to carry out destocking 
on a percentage basis, with the D.R.O. advising on the absolute size of the 
reduction. It is not clear why the approach through the imposition of 
ceilings is not being pushed, unless it is simply that officials have so 
far not dared to mention openly any approach to destocking. Evident hostility 
towards the very idea of destocking made it impossible to even ask the 
question as to how the members themselves would wish to have any necessary 
destocking carried out. 
There was no interest in the imposition of ceilings on 
holdings, and no apparent jealousy over numbers owned. Any such 
inequality was "God's will". The suggestion that, since the grass 
belongs to all, it might not be equitable for some members to use up a 
disproportionate share was rejected: the analogy was made by members 
between sending one's children to school and sending one's cattle to 
graze, the implication being that each cattle-owner should be entitled to 
use the common land for whatever cattle he possessed. The main practical 
significance of inequality was therefore only that the poorer members 
would resist destocking much more vehemently. 
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An interesting question, which had not been investigated by the 
Range Management Division, is whether, if the 'cattle complex' of the 
Pokot (or more economic reasons for maintaining cattle numbers) is very 
strong, the desired reduction in stock units could not be achieved partly 
or even largely by a reduction in the numbers of sheep and goats. The 
figures indicate that such a reduction, say, from 16,000 to 6,000 sheep 
and goats^would produce half of the required overall reduction, assuming 
11 
10 goats equals one stock unit (600 lbs liveweight bovine), a very 
significant proportion. Beyond this, it appears that when a paddock is 
rested, the goats are left behind to graze. Given their numbers, this 
could have a major impact on the effectiveness of the rotation. This is 
a feature which might be investigated by the District Range Officer. 
Given the resistance to destocking, an attempt was made to 
elucidate 'preference functions' as between cattle and goats by asking 
members whether they would prefer a reduction of, say, 10 goats or 1 
cow. No answers were forthcoming to this question, and the hostility 
engendered by it, causing the meeting to be terminated soon afterwards, 
provides further evidence of the obstacle to destocking. The officials' 
explanation for keeping large numbers of goats tends to be that goats 
form "the small change of the system" whereby stock is used as "legal 
tender": but of course this would only justify keeping a small proportion 
of goats, not 16,000. Thus keeping goats appears to have primarily the 
11. As already mentioned, the R.M.D. sometimes calculates six 
goats as one stock unit in estimating carrying capacity. Clearly the 
ratio should depend on the relative consumption of grass by the two 
kinds of animal, rather than relative weight. This would indicate the 
number of goats which would displace one cow by eating the equivalent 
amount of food. If goats ate only from thorn bushes, rather than eating 
grass, they would not be substitutes in this sense at all, and the ratio 
would not be meaningful: separate figures of carrying capacity based on 
the two types of food available would need to be calculated for the two 
types of animal. There appears to be some uncertainty among D.R.0,s about 
this, and about the amount of grass consumed by goats: the ratio used is 
accepted as «'given by headquarters and applied mechanistically. It is 
also applied equally to goats or sheep, whereas the latter clearly eat 
more grass. In part goats and cattle appear as complements, since goats 
keep down scrub, which if excessive reduces the amount of grass. 
12. This was a bad tactical error: they should have been asked 
whether they would prefer an increase of one cow or six, eight or ten 
goats, etc. 
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economic function of use-value. One important social factor, however, 
apart from bridewealth, is the special position of goats within the 
household economy: wives are apparently empowered to sell goats in the 
absence of the husband, and thus without his specific authority, to obtain 
cash for the purchase of food. The division in the family economy 
therefore results in a separate reason for maintaining goats as such. 
We may conclude that there is a fairly solid wall of opposition 
to the idea of destocking. The fact that committee members, who would 
be responsible for implementing whatever rules were applied in destocking, 
appeared equally opposed to the idea (or at least were not prepared to 
defend it in public) should offer further cause for pessimism. 
Marketing Arrangements in Support of Destocking 
The livestock marketing programme, comprising a system of sales 
yards, holding grounds and fenced stock routes (as originally planned), is 
an SRDP project which has already absorbed considerable funds. A major 
holding ground of 8,000 acres is still planned for Kacheliba, covering 
the approach from the north, through Kongelai to Makutano. Whatever their 
rationale in terms of large-scale movement of cattle through the area, 
such marketing arrangements have had no impact as yet in terms of local 
development within Kongelai. An empty auction ring stands in the 
prospective holding ground as evidence of inappropriateness from the 
locality's point of view. If there is overgrazing, and the development 
of the area depends on protecting and improving the available grass, then, 
rather than cater for a basically non-existent commercialism, marketing 
arrangements should attempt simultaneously to foster commercialism and 
aid destocking by making the most of any opportunities for offtake. 
These arrangements should be flexible, so that cattle may be bought as and 
when their owners want to sell and not merely at large-scale auctions, 
despite the obvious scale economies of the latter. 
In this regard there is at present some discussion as to 
whether it should be the responsibility of the Range Management Division 
(the D.R.O.) or the Livestock Marketing Division (through the manager 
at Mwisho Farm, the main holding ground) to make such purchases. There 
is clearly need for some sort of intervention. Because of the low level 
of sales, traders come only infrequently and in small numbers to the 
area, while the nearest active salesyards may be thirty or even fifty 
miles away: scarcely an inducement to reluctant sellers. The L.M.D. is 
resisting any direct involvement, and argues that Range Management should 
take the responsibility of making direct purchases from pastoralists for 
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resale to L.M.D. at the holding grounds. 
There are understandable reasons for such reluctance: such 
trade is clearly not likely to be very profitable; and also it is likely 
to be somewhat risky, given the uncertainty of resale prices. However 
it would seem to be much less appropriate, if any Government division 
is to enter this field, for the R.M.D. to do so, specialising as it does 
13 
in the technical production side, than for the L.M.D.s already involved 
in the purchase, movement and holding of animals in such areas. This should 
be seen as a development function of the L.M.D. as much as a commercial 
one. If it were too costly for L.M.D. to maintain close contact with the 
area for this purpose, an alternative would be to appoint the D.R.O. as 
a buying agent with the authority to make purchases on its behalf: this 
would seem preferable to making the D.R.O. buy and sell animals, with 
uncertainty as to the willingness of L.M.D. to purchase, and the possibility 
of incurring losses. Any sewswrHal and marketing role for the D.R.O, will 
be a major diversion from his management and advisory role and should be 
avoided. 
While the Provincial Livestock Marketing Division in Nakuru 
have stated that they would give priority to transporting cattle from 
the area, the Division also state that they can come to the area only 
about three times a years implying a very different function from the 
one suggested here. In addition9 the L.M.D. was supposed to carry out 
campaigns whichs it is reported„ it did not do.1"4 While campaigns and 
other forms of exhortation are frequently ineffective, the failure to 
pursue this intention is perhaps indicative of the need for L.M.D, to 
take more seriously its development role In pastoral areas, and to pursue 
a much mere aggressive buying policy. 
This may well be made more difficult by the nature of relations 
between L.M.D. and the K.M.C., which has also been criticised for pursuing 
narrow financial goals In its purchasing policy at the expense of social 
and developmental ones, particularly In respect of the more remote areas. 
13. It is also awkward for the D.R.O, and his assistant, already 
directly involved in the management of the group ranch, to simultaneously 
act m a ba^ iip ©f the Sttfeputb 
14. Review Re-plan Report, 1973-76, October 1973. 
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One would clearly hesitate to recommend a large bureaucratic organisation 
with monopolistic powers covering both livestock marketing and the production 
and sale of meat, along the lines of, say, the Maize and Produce Board. 
At the same time., like IT13.2.ZS y livestock is a staple commodity and 
practically the sole means of livelihood for large sections of the 
population , even if only fractionally on a commercial basis. Hence it 
is important to ensure that the system as a whole, comprising Government 
agencies, statutory bodies, and private traders, does not neglect the 
broader and longer-run development objectives. The suggestion made by 
Widstrand that the K,M„C. emulate Tanganyika Packers in establishing a 
meat canning industrys using the lean meat of traditional Maasai cattle, 
might be taken up -
The Detailed Ranching Proposals 
Detailed technical and financial proposals for the ranch 
15 project: were given in a document issued locally in June 1974. 
In addition to the main proposals for livestock development, 
there are two subsidiary economic activities, namely cultivation of maize 
on individual plots and the development of modern beekeeping, which it 
will be convenient to consider first. 
In the case of maize cultivation, acreage is to be increased from 
an estimated 162 hectares to about 320. More surprisingly, this is to yield 
a significant cash income estimated at Shs 233 per family (Shs 96,000 
altogether, or Shs 300 per hectare). Presumably this is in addition to 
subsistence output. Yet the present output is on relatively low productivity 
land, largely for purposes of subsistence. No data are presented to 
show that yields would be sufficient to support commercial maize production 
as well as satisfying subsistence needs. Nor is it indicated where the 
market for maize would be; clearly not outside the lowlands, this area 
being the least suitable for maize in the region. Unless the proposal 
is to foster some degree of specialisation among members of the group 
between cultivators and larger stock-owners, market opportunities must 
be considered dubious. In any case the objective should be increased 
15. District Range Officer, West Pokot, Group Ranch Project 
(During Financial Years 1974/75 and 1975/1976)t Kapenguria SRDP, June 
1974. 
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food output for domestic consumption rather than cash, which can more 
easily be obtained from livestock. Finally, it is not indicated how the 
increased acreage is to be obtained. 
The plan for beekeeping within the group farm is to have some 
5,000 'modern' beehives, yielding 75,000 kg. of honey and Shs 225,000 per 
annum. This is a very substantial revenue, and in fact would equal about 
half of the eventual revenue derived from sales of livestock. Unfortunately 
this turns out to be only-the Range Officer's estimate of the potential 
of the area: no details are offered of actual progress made in establishing 
'modern' beekeeping among the pastoral Pokot which might give us 
confidence regarding the actual realisation of this potential. 
The main proposals for livestock involve an investment of 
Shs 1,060,000 over three years as detailed in Table 1. There is to be 
a substantial destocking of cattle and small stock over the first two 
years, the sales from which are to yield Shs 1,076,000-(at Shs 400 each 
for cattle), apart from the benefit of removing the excess stock. 
Subsequently, when the system is in equilibrium, a 10 per cent annual 
offtake of cattle and 24 per cent offtake for sheep and goats is assumed 
Table 1. Financial Proposals for the Kongelai Group Ranch. 
Activity 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 
(Shs'000s ) (Shs'000s) (Shs'000s) 
100.0 
30.0 
34.0 
30.0 
5.0 
TOTAL 260.0 Aft 600.0 ft* 200.0*" 
^Revolving fund. 
** Total as given in source» 
Source":" Group Ranch Project (During Financial Year 1974/75 and 1975/76). 
1. Grazing management 33.0 -
2. Grazing improvement 22.0 -
3. Bush control 9.3 390 .0 
4. Water supply (cattle) 77.7 77 .7 
5. Water supply (human) 150.0 -
6. Destocking programme 43 .0* 
7. Livestock upgrading - 27 .4 
8. Disease control - 30 .0 
9. Evaluation _ 
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to yield a regular annual revenue of Shs 430,000, supplemented by that 
from honey and crops up to a total of Shs 608,000 per annum. This would 
give each family on average an income of Shs 1,480 (presumably excluding 
subsistence). Finally, it is anticipated that improved management /-':; 
practices might raise this figure by 30 per cent to Shs 1,920 per'family. 
It has already been stated that expectations regarding revenue 
from crops and honey should not be placed too high except perhaps in the 
long run. Given the solid wall of resistance to destocking which has 
been observed in respect of 1 'cattle, . sheep and goats, the same 
must apply to livestock revenue. The figures depend on destocking 2,400 
head of cattle over the first two years, out of an estimated (1971) total 
of 7,400 head (including immatures). This is equivalent to approximately 
33 per cent over two years. Since sales should presumably be of mature 
cattle (Shs 400 per head is estimated), the percentage of mature cattle 
to be destocked would need to be- something like 40 or 50 per cent.' It is 
clearly impossible for any degree of persuasion short of force to yield 
a figure remotely like this. Subsequently the annual offtake of cattle 
is to be 10 per cent, and that of goats 30 per cent. The difficulty 
(or impossibility) of achieving such targets is completely covered up 
in the paper which under 'Programming of Activities' for the first year 
of the project states simply: "7. Arrange destocking and purchase weigh-
bridge." (p.10) 
It is worth speculating how such a discrepancy between the 
projected figures (especially those relating to destocking) and any 
realistic figure could occur. A minor element is perhaps the pressure 
felt by officers to produce an impressive figure of realisable income, 
as an indication that the scheme proposed is a good one. Certainly the 
figure of Shs 1,920 per family is a marvellous one, even if it were 
not, as appears, completely supplementary to subsistence output, 
which at the moment is sufficient to provide families with 95 per 
cent or so of their livelihood. The figures appear to be the result 
of a fairly standardised calculation made by Range Officers of 'optimal' 
culling rates, given natural rates of increase and sales in and out of 
the ranch, for a commercialised herd. Thus hypothetical or 'ideal' 
rates are transferred to real situations without Cognisance of social 
factors or adjustment to the realities of organisation and management. 
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Finallya we may look at sub-proposals reflected in three 
specific items of expenditure in Table 1. The 30 per cent increase in 
family revenue from Shs 1,480 to Shs 1,920 hypothesised depends on the 
adoption of improved management (item 1, Grazing management, Shs 33,000). 
This depends on leaving a substantial area fallow for a twelve-month 
period. It is questionable whether this would be accepted by the members, 
while the revenue (30 per cent is a rather hypothetical figure) depends 
also on the stated amount of destocking being carried out. 
Item 2 (Grazing improvement, Shs 22,000) relates to a programme 
of grass reseeding with the objective of providing more nutritious grass 
by direct methods. It turns out that because "sowing grass...is an 
expensive affair..., the idea is to start on a small scale, more or less 
as practical field trials, to gain experience. Advice and cooperation 
of experts will be asked to maximize the possible results." (p.7) Thus 
this sub-project is at a very early experimental stage. It appears 
certain, in fact, that grass reseeding would be prohibitively expensive 
and risky, if the vast size of Kongelai (52,000 acres) and the uncertain 
rainfall are considered, unless its provision of a small controlled paddock 
is intended, as a stop-gap measure, to facilitate transition to an 
improved rotational system. In addition, however, the probability is 
that this expensive grass, given the degree of overstocking likely to 
continue, would go the way of the relatively good grass remaining after 
the termination of the Aldev scheme. This item must therefore be 
considered a very risky sub-investment. 
Item 7 (Livestock upgrading, Shs 61,400 In years 2 and 3) 
depends on successful destocking and improved graz'ng management yielding 
the better grazing conditions which "more productive animals do need": 
to that extent therefore, this is also subject to uncertainty. There is 
no mention of prior experimentation with livestock improvement in the 
area as a mems of testing probable response. 
Apart from these substantive questions regarding x^e technical, 
economic and social aspects of the project, criticism may be made 
regarding its detailed formulation. A major cost item, water supply 
for human consumption, amounting to about 60 per cent of total expenditure 
in the first year, is in fact an item of pure social consumption expenditure, 
the justification for which lies entirely outside the project (except 
to the extent that it may act as an incentive to participate and destock). 
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The internal rate of return on investment which would be derived from 
the figures put forward is actually infinity, since in all years net 
proceeds are positive, including year Q. Arithmetic errors abound in the 
proposal. The most serious relates to the assertion that better grass 
management and animal improvement will increase revenue per family by 
30 per cent from Shs 1,480 to Shs 1,920. These measures would, of course, 
only affect revenue from stock, not that from bees^ yet the 30 per cent 
addition is applied uniformly to the Shs 225,000 obtained from honey sales. 
The correct estimate per family should therefore be at most Shs 1,760 rather 
than Shs 1,920 (itself erroneously given as Shs 2,020). 
These comments are not made in order to indulge in petty fault-
findings or to criticise the author of the project proposal. Rather, we 
may draw two conclusions. First, it seems hardly reasonable to expect 
technical officers to prepare single-handedly projects of this type 
covering so many dimensions outside their specialised training.16 The 
R.M.D. as a whole must consider how to provide an input of economic analysis 
into its project appraisal and ranching schemes. Secondly, considering 
that the Kongelai ranching scheme is easily the biggest single development 
project within the Kapenguria SRDP, the failure to amend some of the 
more suspect elements in the proposal, or to correct ordinary arithmetic 
errors in a major discussion document does not say much fof the level of 
teamwork which it was hoped would be an important element in project 
planning under the SRDP system. 
Comments on a Development Policy for a Pastoral Area 
We may conclude that there is a considerable lack of realism 
in the detailed proposals as they stand, mainly due to an exaggeration 
of the extent to which the local people will accept destocking. Change in 
this direction will not come quickly, even though the voluntary maintenance 
and policing of rotational grazing represents an important advance in 
the right direction. If the rotation is rigorously adhered to^it will 
16. The most important qualifications for a D.R.0. would appear 
to be technical expertise in animal husbandry and range management and 
some sociological insight and rapport with the people with whom he is 
dealing. In these areas the D.R.0. concerned here was easily the most 
impressive we encountered. 
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In itself help to bring home the nature of the overstocking problem 
by limiting all the group ranch livestock to a quarter of the total 
land for the specified period. 
Another sign which appears promising Is m e additional 
solidarity undoubtedly felt by the people as a result of obtaining 
their communal land titles. One example of its manifestation is the 
resentment felt by members regarding the excavation of sand in the area 
by a local contractor: even though this activity is unlikely to affect 
significantly he amount of grazing. Certainly the land title will help 
to terminate movement across the area by non-members, already substantially 
eliminated. At the same time it is worth at least posing a serious 
question regarding communal land titles. Despite the solid wall of 
resistance to modernisation which exists, there is a minority of individuals 
more directly involved in the sale of cattle and other forms of commercial 
production and trade. Since social change might come especially through 
the influence of such individuals, it is possible that formalisation of 
communalism will inhibit such a develpment. 
A more important implication of the above, however, is that the 
development of the area should ti®t be neglected pending the transformation 
of traditional pastoralism into modern commercialised ranching. The 
Importance of commercial production relative to so-called 'subsistence' 
production should not be exaggerated (though monetary transactions are 
easier to tax): subsistence production is effectively supplying the 
people with their basic food supply. Secondly, economic welfare has 
several components besides consumption of food or manufactured consumer 
goods: it involves, for instance, access to medical facilities and to 
schools, and access to water for consumption. Welfare improvement in 
these areas should not depend entirely on expansion of local commercial 
production based on an implicit policy of regional self-financing. Nor 
does local appreciation of these items depend on acquisition of the taste 
for manufactured goods. Widstrand's criticism of policy towards such 
areas, if outspoken, is not without an element of truth:-
The attitude of the Kenyan administration, whether colonial 
or independent, towards pastoral peoples has been either 
repressive - for example the constant infringement on the 
rights of the Maasai - or one of benign paternalistic neglect -
for example keeping of the Pokot and the Turkana in 'closed 
areas' cut off from the rest of the country and left with a 
minimum of administrative support, (p.37) 
10-19 IS IDS/OP 12 
Unfortunately the Kapenguria SRDP has done little to change this, nor 
could it have done so with its limited funds. It has certainly been 
very far from representing a development programme for the area. After 
four years, scarcely any funds had actually been disbursed in the lowland 
area. The provision water supply for human and livestock consumption 
was still an Item in the estimates, and group members were still awaiting 
concrete evidence that they were in an area marked for special development. 
There is no SRDP provision for health or education. Even the plans for 
livestock development do not imply any substantial net investment into the 
area. The size of SRDP funds do not, as just mentioned, permit the 
funding of an integrated development programme for the area: what needs 
to be underlined, however, is that the operation of this limited experimental 
programme, with only an overlap into the lowland region, should not pre-
empt the case for a more comprehensive social development effort in the 
area. 
RANCHING IN KWALE DISTRICT 
In this section we consider in detail the history of the Mwereni 
Ranch Project which has operated under the SRDP and been the main focus 
of attention in terms of ranching development in the area over a long 
period. Subsequently brief notes on other ranching developments are 
added. 
The Proposed Mwereni Ranching Project 
The proposal is for a group ranch located in South Kwale which 
would operate a cooperative central herd on a commercial basis. This 
SRDP area has been divided for planning purposes into four ecological 
zones, roughly parallel with the coast, comprising (1) the coastal 
croplands, which would have mainly tree crops and some mixed farming; 
(2) the Kikoneni croplands, for mixed farming; (3) the marginal lands, 
comprising dry crops and cattle; and finally (4) the ranching lands. 
The group ranch is to cover the last of these and part of the marginal 
lands. Covering the whole of Mwereni Location, it comprises 113,467 
acres (46,343 ha.). 
Registration of group ranch members has already been carried 
out. Under the group ranch formula all residents of the ranching area 
are registered. The population of the location has been estimated 
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at 12,839. In late 1974 the livestock were given as 7,001 cattle, 
2,904 sheep and 4,624 goats (although a previous figure quoted in 1972 
was 7,500 cattle; and one given by Pratt in 1974 was 6,700). Whatever 
the exact figure, the main point is that the main problem of the area 
is not overstocking, as in West Pokot: in April 1974 an estimate of the 
carrying capacity of the land put this at 20 acres per stock unit, which 
would give a 'full capacity' of 5,500 stock units. With improved grazing. 
arrangements, the carrying capacity could go up to 15 acres per stock unit, 
it was thought, and thus the total capacity to 7,333 stock units. The same 
statement estimated the current animal population at 5,200 stock units, 
implying a rough balance with carrying capacity at present and scope 
for considerable expansion with improved management practices. 
The unique feature of the group ranch, however (although 
official discussions do no more than make occasional reference to it), 
is that the vast majority of people in the area who have been registered 
as group ranch members are not livestock owners at all. The 200 or so 
livestock owners (one estimate is 170) constitute only a fraction of 
the total population and group ranch members of some 3,000 families. 
Even within the group of 200, livestock ownership appears to be highly 
unequal, with half the livestock apparently held by less than 30 families. 
Hence it is likely that the proportion of actively participating livestock 
owners, i.e. those contributing to the central herd, would be even less: 
it could easily turn out to be no more than 2 per cent of group ranch 
members. In addition a proportion of livestock owners are 'absentee owners'. 
We shall examine the diverse issues raised by this ownership structure 
presently. 
The project centres on the formation of a central herd run 
with improved management practices on a commercialised basis. The 
initial herd would be formed by contributions of cattle, while an 
International Development Association (I.D.A.) loan, raised on the 
security of the collective land title, would be used to buy in cattle 
for fattening or breeding purposes, expanding the size and especially 
improving the quality of the herd. The April 1974 statement says that 
.the central herd should be formed by contributions amounting to a 
minimum of 15 per cent of stock units and a maximum of 20 per cent, 
which would equal between 800 and 1,000 stock units in terms of 
present numbers. With improved grazing, increasing the carryin
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capacity of the total ranch areas, the size of the central-herd could 
be increased to something in the range 1,100 to 1,500 stock units. 
The changes to be introduced to ensure the economic viability 
and advantages of the project are first of all investment, particularly 
in water supply^ upgrading of the animals; and a system of rotation to 
preserve and improve pasture. The proposed capital investments are: 
Item £ 
Water 14,000 
Dips 2,800 
Firebreaks 3,870 
Roads 251 
Bomas 1,580 
Mineral troughs 90 
Housing 2,640 
Machinery, equipment and tools 
(including a Land Rover) 1,947 
Total £ 27,178 
Together with the cost of bulls for breeding, the capital investment in 
the ranch can be taken to be around £30,000. It is intended that the 
cost of this infrastructural investment will be covered by sales of 
cattle from the central herd. A 25 per annual offtake is planned 
(amounting to a quarter of the herd each year), which is expected to yield 
around £7,500 Initially, going up to £26,000 per year as the numbers 
and quality of the herd increase. A large number of question marks can 
be raised in relation to the scheme, of which two stand out: the 
problem of tse-tse fly, and the question of precisely how the ranch is 
to be organised and managed from the legal and social points of view. 
The Problem of Tse-tse: Although the Mwereni Ranch Project was 
originated in discussion seven years ago, in 1968, it was only in 
June 1974 that anything like a thorough investigation of the tse-tse 
situation was carried out by a senior veterinary officer from Nairobi. 
His findings were quite startling in view of the effort and investment 
that had already gone into the scheme:-
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The whole of the Kwale SRDP is highly infested with 
three species of tse-tse, Glossina pallipides, G. brevipalpis 
and G. austeni. The coastal strip is less infested, and so is 
the western part of the Mwereni area (but this latter has 
little water and grazing). There are so many flies in the 
central area of the SRDP that six Glossina entered a 
stationary motor car within three minutes of the windows 
being opened. The future of any ranching scheme is therefore 
very problematical and I would not advise any further 
development in this, save the completion of the water 
points and the cattle dip.17 
According to this expert, eradication of the tse-tse is not feasible 
either: -
The question of eradicating tse-tse is one which, because 
of its complexity and enormous cost, must lie outside any 
S.R.D.P. effort. Hand clearing of bush will not avail of 
itself; to eradicate the fly at least 20-30% of the bush 
would have to be cleared, and removal of even 10-15% of 
bush might cause an irreversible trend towards erosion. 
Tnseetieidal treatment of bush is not likely to be 
effective by itself and in any case in this area there 
would be a danger of pollution of rivers. 
On the basis of this statement there is no solution, but only a choice 
between the fly and serious soil erosion. The questions to ask now 
might be, first, whether reduction, of bush by just 10 per cent could 
reduce tse-tse to a tolerable level, and how much this would cost; and 
secondly, whether a partial escape from this apparent vicious circle is 
possible by concentrating the scheme in specific more manageable areas 
within Mwereni Location, and how this would affect its viability. 
A more general question which needs answering, however, is 
how serious any problem of tse-tse is in economic terms. It should be 
pointed out that, whether or not a scheme is launched, there are already 
12,000 people in the Mwereni location, and 7,000 head of cattle, all 
apparently surviving, and without expenditures on inoculation. Tse-tse 
exists throughout the Province, yet ranching is a major activity. The 
local veterinary officer does not consider the incidence of tse-tse a 
1 7 - F'B- Halpin, E.A.D.D. Report on a Visit to Kwale S.R.D.P., 
17th-24th June, 1974-. Why he nevertheless recommends the expenditure 
of K£17,000 on water and dip is not clear. 
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decisive matter, pointing out that there have been no major epidemics, ' 
and that occasional cases, as they are reported, can be treated. With 
efficient reporting, deaths can be avoided; such as occur may be fewer 
than, for example, the regular loss through lions at Kiu cooperative 
ranch in Machakos. Certainly it can be assumed that reporting cases 
within the central herd would be efficient. Halpin says that "the 
efficient treatment of animals every two months would cost some 18 Kshs. 
per head and the local people show no desire, in their non-monetised 
economy, to spend so much." This however is regular preventive treatment 
and implies a programme covering all cattle in the area rather than simply 
the central herd. The position is r.c: so clear, therefore, that any 
scheme can be ruled out, and the need is to discover which scheme, if any, 
would best suit the geographical dimensions of the problem, and how far 
protection against tse-tse would raise costs. 
The Form of Organisation and its Problems: The institutional arrangements 
proposed for the group ranch and central herd have from the outset been 
left extremely vague. At the same time the implications of these arrangements, 
which involve a number of difficulties, have not been fully explored. 
The difficulties probably hold generally for this group ranch 'model* and 
are worth investigating. 
The Mwereni proposal incorporates the basic elements of a group 
ranch in that the land will be owned collectively under a group title 
and the cattle contributed to the central herd will continue to be owned 
individually, although herded, grazed and corralled together; members 
will also still own their own cattle outside the central herd. Once there 
is a central herd, however, the proposal begins to look very much like 
the cooperative model, and it is in fact referred to in occasional 
statements as a 'communal cooperative ranch', suggesting the combination 
of group and cooperative ranch elements. Despite the nominal ownership 
by individuals of the central herd stock, these holdings will be 
considered as 'shares', as in a cooperative; decision-making affecting 
these (including their sale) will be independent of the individuals, but 
determined by a committee; and the contributed cattle will be merged with, 
even cross-bred with, the bought-in cattle. 
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Unlike the cooperative form, it is completely unclear how 
the proceeds from the enterprise will be or ought to be distributed. 
The general intention here is to distribute the net proceeds among the 
participants. There are, however, two kinds of participation, associated with 
two different inputs: the provision of cattle, to establish the initial 
herd, and the provision of land. If participants are defined as all 
members of the group ranch, owning the collective title to the land, 
and if dividends are distributed among these, it becomes unclear what 
recompense Is to be had for contributing cattle to the central herd 
or how the interest of livestock owners In running the central herd is 
supposed to be maintained. If, on the other hand, dividends are distributed 
among those who contribute cattle, it is not clear what recompense the 
mass of landowners will obtain. The situation is further confused if the 
collective land title is used to provide security for a loan for the 
purchase of cattle: for then the land-owners are Indirectly also contributing 
cattle which, as just pointed out, will in tajse be merged with the initial 
herd. Moreover bought-in cattle are usually the most important portion 
commercially. Mwereni Ranch provides the most graphic illustration of 
this dilemma, since livestock owners constitute only a fraction of the 
total group ran ah members and since the vast majority of members possess 
no cattle at all: hence the two groups are very distinct. If all group 
ranch members were livestock owners, and all contributed a similar number 
of livestock, of course, the problem would lose significance: but in fact 
since holdings of cattle will generally be unequal, and contributions 
variable, the problem is a quite general one merely presented here in an 
extreme form. 
The proposal for Mwereni appears to be that "the non-livestock 
owners of the group would receive no direct financial benefits until such 
time as the cooperative brought in additional animals, profits from which 
i Pi 
would be available for general distribution." This appears to suggest 
either that profits will initially be distributed to the smaller group 
of cattle contributors, switching later to the larger group of ranch 
members, which would clearly be an awkward change; or that somehow the 
18-. Kwale Special Rural Development Area: Mwereni Ranch, Report of 
a Visit by D.J. Pratt, Ministry of Agriculture, August 1974. 
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contributed cattle and their descendants can be kept distinct, for accounting 
purposes at least, from subsequently acquired cattle. It also ignores 
an important practical point which could apply in many other ranches of 
this type: if dividends are shared among the larger group of resident 
members, each may obtain only a negligible amount. Thus it seems that 
the most optimistic figure for net proceeds, after the ranch is in full 
operation, would be K£15,000 which, among 3,000 families would yield only 
iCShs 100/- per family per year, or around KShs 20/- per head. 
Apart from land and cattle, sound management (in the longer 
term applied, for instance, to improvement through breeding, but continuously 
involved in decisions to buy and sell and in the organisation of labour) 
is also a crucial input, and one to which the majority of non-livestock-
owning members will contribute little or nothing. Again the problem is 
clearer here, where most members have no livestock at all? but there is 
a general problem of relating recompense to those who have contributed at 
least in some measure to ensuring that the enterprise is well run. This 
is related to another question or questions: what size of ranch, group or 
cooperative, is compatible with a satisfactory degree of participation by 
members, and what degree of participation is necessary to ensure efficient 
management of the enterprise? This we examine later. 
The Pratt report says that "a better arrangement might be for 
the group at large to let the livestock owners have exclusive use for a 
specified term of one section of the group land, upon payment of a nominal 
rent or percentage of the profits". This would separate land ownership 
by the group (rewarded by a rent) from herd ownership (rewarded by profits 
accruing to the cooperative society): and would in fact be the cooperative 
ranch model. This is at least a clear arrangement, except of course for 
determining what the level of rent payable should be (to which we return 
presently). The report concludes however that it is too late to switch 
to this form of organisation: "if the people are already primed to accept 
one arrangement, it may not be easy to introduce changes at this stage". 
Since the institutional arrangements for the other model appear to us 
quite unworkable, however, there appears in fact no alternative to 
switching to the cooperative form. 
In view of this conclusion, it may also be stated here that 
there are in any case two major difficulties ' xti identifying the 
contribution of the land-owners, one specific to Mwereni and a general 
one„ It is in the first place unclear how far it was necessary to 
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acknowledge ownership through a group title for what was formerly trust 
land to the entire population of Mwereni Location, The scheme is mainly 
for commercial beef production in the largely unutilised western part 
of the Location. The non-livestock-owning majority of members will not 
be sacrificing output or income in agreeing to the use of the range area 
required, which might be considered to have a zero opportunity cost as 
far as they are concerned. And the economic value of the scheme derives 
largely from Investments in infrastructure and bought-in cattle. It 
should have been possible to negotiate the use of the relatively unused 
range area for participating stock owners, who would be using land 
away from the cultivated segments (which could have been adjudicated 
separately on an individual basis) in line with the standard cooperative 
model. Even now it should be possible in principle to negotiate with 
the group ranch members for use of land by the cooperative. 
The general question is whether land is in fact an effective 
security against a loan, and therefore whether the tenuous form of land 
ownership here constitutes a genuine contribution. Clearly it would not 
be feasible in practice in the event of default to seize the land on which 
nearly 13,000 people depend for sustenance. In any case, as we shall see 
later in Mbere, a cooperative which does not own land itself, as is quite 
possible, has to use its commercial herd as security for loans. Although 
in this case the plan is to obtain a land-secured I.D.A. loan to purchase 
cattle, it is by no means clear whether creditors see the land or the 
herd as offering most security. Since the livestock owners carry the much 
more real liability of losing their cattle in the event of default, it is 
debatable how far the 'supply' of land as security should carry entitlement 
, 19 to proceeds. 
This question applies also, of course, to the fixing of appropriate 
rents for the use of land by a cooperative. The advantage of this model 
is more that It focusses on what should be determined, rather than how it 
should be determined. In any case since the payment per head would be so 
small, no matter how generous the rent figure agreed, it would seem better 
19. Particularly if the land is in itself useless without considerable 
infrastructural investments to which the 'owners' of the land contribute 
nothing, which applies to a substantial segment here. 
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(and administratively convenient) to use the amount to finance social 
services (a share in water supply, to be uSad for their<®vn domestic 
consumption, or medical services) rather than to pay a <ca'Sh rental. 
Although the arrangements have already been taken to an advanced 
stage, the practical and legal implications do not in fact appear 
completely clear 3van in the minds of those responsible for the project. 
Thus in late 1974 it was nevertheless said that "it will not be a practical 
rr-position to absorb everybody in the marginal area proposed for the 
establishment of the ranch"* that "it will be for the people or families 
who are normally and traditionally resident near the area"; and finally 
that it is "not reasonable for the cattle owners to pay rent, grazing fees, 
20 
etc., to people who are not contributing". This shows awareness of the 
questions just discussed, but is in conflict with the legal status 
accorded already to the population of the location who as group ranch 
members now own the land which the livestock owners would like to use. 
Another apparently inconsistent suggestion in a major statement of the 
proposal in April 1974 is that stock-owners should continue to herd 
their own cattle within the central herd. There hardly seems to be an 
incentive for them to do this (or to contribute cattle in the first 
place) if the proceeds accrue in large part to non-livestock-owners. 
An apparent reason for the lack of clarity regarding the 
unconstitutional arrangements is that the central herd is seen especially 
as the means whereby the infrastructure to be put in is financed. 
Despite the optimistic paper calculations, there did not appear to be 
high expectation that there would be net proceeds to distribute after 
such costs were covered. The rationale for the central herd thus becomes 
its effectiveness as a tax device, a means' of raising money in a poor 
and non-monetised area to pay for social investments. Even so, it would 
still be necessary for the project to yield revenues (or social benefits) 
over and above costs: and hence necessary to be clear as to how such 
revenues would be distributed. 
20, Correspondence between the Provincial Range Officer and 
the Area Coordinator, October 1974. 
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In summary9 we may say that whatever the general validity of 
the arguments raised in relation to group and cooperative ranching, it would 
seem to have been a mistake to attempt to transplant the group ranch model 
from Maasailand to this particular area where only a minority of residents 
are livestock owners. 
Income Distribution Issues in the Ranching Scheme: The investment proposed 
of K£30,000 is substantial. Of this amount £8,000 has already been spent 
on water supplies, using SRDP funds. In 1973-4 and the estimates for 1974-5 
included a further £10,000 for this purpose. Clearly it is important to 
know In advance who this is Intended to benefit and whether this is 
justified. Is it Intended as a loan to a specific cooperative group 
or a more general subsidy to residents of the area or for social infrastructure 
Spread over 3,000 families, the £30,000 represents £10 per family; and 
over livestock owners alone £150 per family. If half-the- livestock 
belong to 30 families, and half the investment is in effect for their 
livestock, this would be £500 per family, who, owning on average 120 
head of cattle, may not be the most deserving of assistance. Moreover 
a considerable number of livestock owners are 'absentee owners', not 
resident in the area, the size of whose holdings are not knovr:. 
The amounts invested are substantial, though not as great as in 
the case of many ranching schemes. And the amounts Invested per family 
have to be compared with the amounts Invested per family In settled 
agricultural areas in other parts of Kenya. Even between pastoral areas 
invidious comparisons might be made: for example, ten dams already exist 
in the area, but five new ones are proposed, with eight to be renovated, 
making a total of fifteen available for human and livestock consumption. 
The intention is to have a watering-point every three miles. Likewise 
dipping facilities are to be provided every 5 miles, while 32 bomas each 
capable of holding 500 head are to be built. This is an interesting 
contrast with the Kongelai ranch in West Pokot where no expenditure has 
yet taken place. The plans here appear to be for a luxury level of 
provision considering the fact that fully-worked out institutional 
arrangements for the ranch do not exist, the central herd has not yet 
been set up or a commercial loan negotiated. Whatever the intention, 
the amounts Invested so far must end up as subsidies; since no formal 
or legal agreement has been made for repayment, they do not have loan 
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The Position of Livestock Outside the Central Herd: If the central herd 
is to be formed through contributions so as to comprise some 15 to 20 
per cent of stock units in the area, the question arises of what happens 
to the remaining 80 to 85 per cent. Fencing seems to be impossible both 
because of the cost and because of spoiling by elephantss so that it is 
unclear how the mass of livestock could be kept separate from the central 
herd. This might also be difficult legally, since the group land belongs 
to all members. This raises a number of questions. First there is the 
matter of equity if watering facilities are paid for from sales from the 
central herd, but all have equal access (including non-livestock owners, 
for human consumption). Secondly there is the question of whether stock 
outside the central herd will also follow the proposed rotation, without 
which the rotation might be ineffective. There is little or no discussion 
of this point. Finally there is the disease problem which arises if there 
is contact between the two groups of animals. This also affects the 
programme for upgrading the stock. 
The problems would be solved if, as is sometimes suggested, 
the central herd were to use mainly the presently unused western part of 
the location. This however raises the question of why all water investments 
to date have been made in the populated eastern area, used by the 
other livestock, and none in the west. Such a proposal would also seem 
to affect the proposed rotation. 
Issues Relating to Water Supply: The present location of water supplies 
is described as follows: "Most of the dams are in the more 'settled 
area of the location. To have an even distribution of grazing and 
utilization of the forage, the western part which has poor water 
21 
distribution needs attention this time." A proposal for three new dams 
is then made. But apart from the points first raised, it makes a crucial 
difference to the desirable institutional arrangements (group ranch 
vs. cooperative ranch) where the central herd is to be located. Thus 
it could be that either the proper location for ranching activities 
has not been determined or that water supply investments already made 
are wrongly located. A second issue already mentioned is whether such 
investments should have been made ahead of a clear commitment by members 
21. District Range Officer, August 1974. 
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to form a central herd, and how this affects the objective of a self-
financed enterprise. Finally there is the crucial issue of what the 
returns are from investment in water alone without the certainty of the 
central herd being established, the rotation being implemented, and most important 
of all, tse-tse being eradicated or substantially reduced. 
A Crucial Issue, the Rate of Return on the Investment: The April 1974 
statement referred to puts anticipated revenue at K£7,500 initially, 
increasing to £26,000 at 'full capacity' and recurrent costs at £5,000 
initially, going up to £15,000. Thus net proceeds are expected to 
start at £2,500 and increase to £11,000 which would recoup an investment 
of £30,000 in perhaps 5 years. This is an extremely good return, which 
would compare very favourably, for instance, with any Investment in 
manufacturing enterprise in Western Europe. It is, unfortunately, based 
on the same very hypothetical calculation as that in West Pokot, 
representing more what the District Range Officer thinks "it should be 
possible to achieve"jprobable actual achievement under cooperative 
organisation is better indicated by experience in Machakos District, 
which is examined in I.D - b Working Paper No. 220. 
Realisable rates of return depend in the first place on the 
quality of management. Interest in ti't scheme does not appear to have 
been very high, despite demonstration of Government intent in the form of 
water supplies (in contrast with Pokot). Less than 200 animals have so 
far been pledged out of the 800 or more :.~eded for the initial herd 
(though for reasons ind i C3."t6C j h is is r-o i together irrational). Self-
help effort in the building an:. maintenance of dips has been very poor. 
Interest in forming the group ;anch appears t_. have been fostered rather 
than spontaneous. It is stated, for instance-, that "many barazas 
have been held in the a rea anu it seams that cha majority of the 
22 
local people have acc•=[.•. si the ^sa :f smarting a grc-_p ranch". 
Arrangements for providing tne actua^ xanagei input are not far 
advanced, and if it is the intention that initially (for how long it is 
not stated, but some q-itc long period appeai'5 to be envisaged' 
individual owners will graze their own animals within the central 
herd, it is not obvious whether the strict control necessary to achieve 
22. SRDP Progress Report., x973. 
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the objectives envisaged by the District Range Officer will be possible. 
This includes the required rate of offtake, calculated by 
the D.R.0. as 25 per cent per annum. A rough estimate by the P.R.O. 
of offtake for the hinterland ranch lands of Kwale District as a whole, 
based on auction sales, is 6,000 per annum out of around 100,000 animals. 
This gives a figure of 6 per cent in 1974, yielding a total estimated 
figure of 12 per cent including consumption (estimated primarily from data 
on sales of hides). There is therefore a question as to whether the figure 
of 6 per. cent can be raised to 25 per cent to yield the revenue figures 
• . 23 anticipated for the scheme. 
There is something inherently suspicious about the high rate 
of return posited. One may ask, if such a high rate of return in ranching 
is obtainable, why have the relatively poor people in the area not 
been able to obtain at least a much higher income than they have? 
Alternatively if these revenues are attainable only as a result of 
infrastructural investments by Government, and with the managerial 
input provided especially by a Government range assistant (.advised by 
the D.R.0. and other officials) - considerable responsibility appears to 
be attached to the range assistant in this case as in others - why not 
establish the ranch as a state enter-prise, organised by a ranching 
corporation? This would at least reduce the lengthy planning period 
for the project, for which delays in obtaining local support and finalising 
institutional arrangements are partly responsible. p-.=ra the land is unused 
trust land or state land, as is partially the case here, this seems to be 
a possibility. 
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Ranching: The Range Management Division 
appears to be strongly predisposed towards the establishment of very large 
ranches, in this case 113,000 acres, based on the implicit or explicit 
23. Since the cattle are sti_l owned individually, it is not 
obvious that there is any new willingness to raise the rate of offtake. 
While there may be a willingness in respect of contributed cattle, 
there may be an offsetting decrease in offtake in residual cattle, 
leaving the overall offtake for commercial purposes at 6 per cent 
or at least yielding a net rate of commercial offtake bexow the 
central herd rate. 
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assumption that substantial economies of scale exist in ranching. Economies 
of scale depend on the existence of indivisibilities, i.e. the impossibility 
of reproducing the enterprise on a reduced scale without loss of efficiency. 
How real these economies are in ranching, however, needs investigation 
rather than assumption. 
In this case technical indivisibilities in infrastructural 
provision do not obviously exist if 15 dams are to be provided, offering 
watering points at every 3 miles, together with dipping facilities every 5 
ft»f!«!S and 25 bomas. The need to rotate grazing might constitute such an 
indivisibility, of course. The proposal involves 9 paddocks as follows: 
Paddock Period of Use 
3 - 4 April 15 - June 30, rainy season 
1 - 2 July 1 - September 36, between rains 
8 - 9 During short rainy season 
5 - 6 - 7 January 1 - April 14, dry season 
This rotation will be altered annually. It is not obvious that this could 
not be divided into three groups of paddocks, or two groups, each to form 
the basis of a cooperative ranch. Each group would need to include a 
combination of the drier and wetter land, which would not appear to be 
difficult. 
There is, however, one major economy of scatle. The location ©£ g^ aainF,.* 
and to a lesser extent water supply, follows the most recent incidence of 
rain over the total land area, particularly here where rainfall and water 
supply are so uncertain. The larger the ranch, the lower the risk that 
at any time grazing will be unavailable anywhere within the ranch boundaries. 
Thus the more people involved, geographically, in the enterprise, the 
greater the possibilities of 'sharing around' the currently available 
grazing and water. This economy of scale is in fact that which has 
always been appreciated by pastoral peoples in Africa whose nomadic 
existence has depended on free movement to areas where grass and water 
are available at the moment. Where water rather than grazing is 
critical, this point is reduced in importance if fairly reliable water 
supplies are provided as a result of investment in dams or boreholes. 
The scale economies will vary according to the local rainfall position 
and according to the effectiveness of the introduced water supply in 
relation to potential grazing areas and need investigation in each 
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individual case. In some areas even the largest acreages allocated for 
group ranching may be too small. 
The second element which needs investigation is the extent of 
diseconomies of scale arising out of the difficulties of managing such a 
large enterprise, spread over such a large geographical area and involving 
theoretically about 3,000 household heads. The technical and financial 
problems in managing a vast enterprise of the kind described above are 
considerable. For this reason smaller cooperative groups may succeed 
where larger ones will fail. The Range Management Division appears to have 
given little thought to the feasible or most effective size of unit. In 
this particular case where the majority of group ranch members are non-
livestock owners and livestock owners are presumably located in 
different parts of the extensive ranch area, the case for smaller more 
cohesive groups is very strong. The argument is not limited to this case, 
however, and in fact constitutes a general advantage of the cooperative over 
group ranch form of organisation. 
Milk versus Beef Production: One question which needs investigation and 
decision is what the importance of milk production, as opposed to beef, 
should be. It is stated that at present "the orientation of the Mwereni 
herds is clearly towards the sale of milk to the Mariakani milk scheme", 
and that "most of the livestock is kept along the Lungalunga - Mariakani 
milk route". At the same time it is said that "more emphasis is needed on 
beef, to stop the spread of the milk economy into the drier areas", while 
in the central herd "no milking will be allowed whatsoever". 
While clearly the central herd must be considered a beef 
enterprise -the economics of the scheme depend upon this - attention should 
be given to the profitability of milk production outside this herd as a 
supplementary benefit of the scheme, particularly as the livestock 
infrastructure established will in practice be utilised by other cattle, 
and be cause the SRDP road investments may also have helped to increase 
the viability of commerical milk production in the area. 
The History of the Range Management Project: Considering the uncertainty 
which still exists regarding so many aspects of the scheme, it comes as a 
surprise to find that the project has such a long history. The project 
was actually prepared first in 1968 by a Mr. Travis Voelkel, a Provincial 
Range Advisor. It had thus been discussed for some time before financing 
became available under SRDP in 1970, at which time a more definite start 
10-34 IS IDS/OP 12 
was made as surveys were carried out and a budget prepared (for £14,000). 
The Annual Implementation Review of 19 71-2 noted that eight dams had been 
sited and surveyed by an official team from Nairobi during the year. 
Barazas had also Indicated a degree of local interest, the decision 
made for group ownership of the land, and a committee of elders selected 
to work together' with officials, K£8.000 was spent on dams in 1973-4 and 
an additional ii03000 estimated for 1974--5. 
Yet it was six years after the initial formulation of the 
project before anything like a close examination of the tse-tse situation 
was made, this to apparently reveal that the project is ruled out. The 
institutional arrangements and membership were still not clear and were 
problematic. In late 1974 it was still stated that "a policy decision has 
to be made as between the Masai model or the Central Herd model" (a detailed 
paper was said to be coming), and that "it is hoped that the families 
or individuals who participate in the project will be physically identified 
during the enumeration exercise". The investment required was.still uncertain, 
the District Range Officer being asked "to calculate the cost of water 
development, firebreaks or roads, bush clearing, fattening steers, breeding 
stock, and working capital". At the same time "information was needed on 
the extent of present cultivation", as well as "data on the milk output 
of Mwereni". About the same time the Area Coordinator wrote that "the 
schane is incomplete in detail as no mention is made of the tse-tse fly 
problem or the economic viability and only scanty reference is made to 
management". Just previously, in June of 1974, a meeting of the District 
Development Committee decided on a formal request to the Ministries of 
Finance and Planning and of Agriculture for a reappraisal and economic 
feasibility study to be carried out. Subsequently5 further Investment 
was frozen pending a full-scale survey by a Range Management Planning 
Team, assisted by U.S.A.I.D. To make matters worse, in addition to what 
could be called a tactical error in installing water supplies ahead of 
other arrangements, the construction of the dams was poorly executed 
with disastrous results. 
This provides therefore another case study in the apparent 
timelessness of ranch project planning and execution. There is a clear 
danger in this of loss of interest by the potential participants and of 
officialdom ceasing to be taken seriously. As it is stated in this case"... 
the follov-up of the agreement has been very slow on the part of the 
field staff... These long delays on the part of the agricultural staffs 
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may force the local people to change their mind a g a i n 2 ^ 
The time taken has much to do with the piecemeal approach to the 
project design adopted, and there may be a general point to be made here. 
The most important experimental element in the SRDP concerns development 
administration: it is aimed at finding out if a more 'development 
oriented' form of administration and organisation is possible than the 
conventional one operating through the vertical hierarchy of Ministry, 
Provincial and District administrative officers, organised from top to 
bottom on separate ministerial lines. One of the features of this system 
appears to be that administrative procedures for bringing a project to 
fruition and implementation operate through spasmodic and periodic corres-
pondence, spread over a long period, between officers up and down the 
hierarchy. Clearly in the course of this the 'thread' of the argument 
underlying a proposal can easily be lost, or the rationale and detailed 
form never spelled out. Connected with this is the tendency to attempt to 
do by correspondence what needs to be done by visits - and not visits of 
one or two days as seemed to be the case here - to the sites. Only in 
1974 did experts from Nairobi begin to get to grips with the project as a 
result of direct visits. If Mwereni can be considered as a case study 
in agricultural planning, the lesson must be that the Agricultural Planning 
Division in Nairobi must be capable of operating in the field and should 
be able to send project teams combining a cross-section of relevant 
expertise,on whose findings the necessary decisions would be based. 
Related to this, there would seem to be a need for what one 
could call a more 'academic' approach (not academic in the derogatory 
sense of impractical) in which a systematic account or report of the 
proposal is initially produced and maintained up-to-date through the 
incorporation of any agreed changes. Such a document would throwup gaps 
in information which need to be filled and pinpoint issues which need to be 
resolved, and it would be more readily available for discussion and criticism. 
It seems unlikely that a project such as the Mwereni one could be dragged 
out over a period of seven years (so far) with such minimal progress towards 
project implementation were this to be a standard procedure. 
24. South SRDP Progress Report, January - March 1973. 
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Indeed the insistence on the preparation of proper and 
comprehensive project documents could be' more valuable (and less time-
consuming) than adherence to the complicated P.I.M. system of SRDP which, 
however useful, does not itself guarantee that the proposed actions 
are soundly based or fully discussed, but only that they are carried out 
according to schedule. 
Mwereni in the Context of Kwale Ranching Development: Mwereni is located 
within, extensive ranchlands which stretch northwards ina belt parallel 
to the coast covering about two-thirds of Kwale District. These ranchlands 
were estimated in 1970 to hold about 112,000 cattle, in addition to sheep 
and goats. It is not possible here to review all ranch developments within 
this belt, but it is possible to give some indication of whether the experience 
of Mwereni and the issues we have raised in relation to it have wider 
application. 
It is worth going back to a description of the ranchlands made 
in late 1970, which points out that water is a "big problem, with no 
permanent streams except the Umba River". There were at that time 21 
dams, mainly silted and in need of renovation, and 9 boreholes, at which 
the machinery "was often rusty". Most of the livestock were kept (as now 
in Mwereni) along the Lungalunga -Mariakani milk routes in a belt five 
to twenty miles wide, in which there .tended to be overgrazing, with cattle 
losses due to starvation. The plan then was to shift grazing over to the 
west by providing water in the empty areas of trust land and state land, 
easing pressure in the stocked area. Ten ranching units were to be formed 
for this purpose. 
The nature of the investment in ranching here can thus be seen 
quite clearly. Ranching, laid out in its most simple terms, consists of 
two basic and complementary inputs (leaving aside the disease problem), grass 
and water, yielding an output of livestock. The provision of water.supplies 
more than in proportion to the available grass in an area will be a 
mis investment: while it may in the short run keep more cattle alive in 
a drought, this will only contribute to overgrazing in the long term, 
and problems of grass loss and soil erosion. At the same time grasslands 
without water availability are of no value whatsoever. There is within 
the Ministry of Agriculture a tendency to classify any lands which are 
not cultivable as 'ranchlands': they become ranchlands by default. 
The assumption then becomes that the Range Management Division should 
attempt to develop the areas for commercial•ranching. In fact grasslands 
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(or scrublands) do not become ranchlands except through the addition of 
water supplies, where these do not already exist. Whether they should be 
developed as ranchlands or not depends in the first place on the cost of 
the required water investments (and on how these can be distributed to 
increase the available grazing, the complementary input). The R.M.D. 
approach should therefore be, as a first stage in ranch development planning 
to assess the value of grazing created as a result of a basic investment 
in water supplies, and to set this against the cost of these supplies. 
A comprehensive approach is needed to determine the optimum location 
for such investment within an area of potential ranchlands. It is not 
evident that this was the approach followed in relation to the ranching 
potential of Kwale District (or in other parts of Kenya, such as Mbere, 
as we shall see). 
A progress report in March 1973 listed the following ranch 
developments with acreages. 
T--?M e 2. Ranching Development in Kwale District, 1973. 
1. South Samburu Group Ranch 125,000 7. Salalom Group Ranch 68 ,000 
2. Mwereni Group Ranch 114,000 8. Kunange Ranch 57 ,000 
3. Hwavumbe/Kilibele Group 
Ranch 99,000 -9. Taru Ranchers Ltd. 52 ,000 
Taru Group Ranch 93,000 10. Chenze Cooperative 
Ranch 46 ,000 
5. Ndavaya Ranch 74,000 11. Mackenzie Road 
Ranching 28 ,000 
6. Puma Ranch 68,000 ' 12. Balakweni Group 
Ranch 13 ,000 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Kwale, Progress Report, March 1973. 
Most of the acreages are vast. The acreage required will be greater the 
lower the productivity of the area in terms of grass available, as in the 
case of South Samburu, and it is just these ranches where economies of scale 
will exist in terms of ensuring water supply from year to year. From 
this point of view the ranches may even be too small. At the same time 
it would be worth investigating the importance of diseconomies of scale 
arising out of the attempt to organise ranching on this scale. 
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This is related to the degree of interest in ranching^ since it 
may be easier to stimulate interest in more modest, manageable enterprises 
where this is not inconsistent with scale economies. Two of the ranches 
were actually registered as cooperative societies as long ago as 1968, 
the same year Mwereni was first proposed, Chenze was reported in mid-1971 as 
having remained virtually dormant since its formation. The undesirability 
of the 'timeless' planning of such projects has already been mentioned. 
Efforts to have the members increase their shares have met with little 
success: only 41 cattle had been contributed by the end of 1972, when the 
society had 60 members. Drought is a major problem. Another was apparently 
that settlements existed within the ranch boundaries in which people 
owned considerable numbers of livestock. This seems to be a general hazard, 
as in the case of Mwereni, associated with delimiting vast acreages as 
group or cooperative ranches. The position might be even more unbalanced 
at Chenze if there are only 60 members within the cooperative and large 
numbers outside. 
Little development took place in Busho Ranching Society until 
late 1969 when.it" was re-registered as Tara Ranchers Ltd., a private 
limited company. Settlement problems brought a halt to boundary demarcation 
in the original scheme. Where non-members are not actually regarded as a 
nuisance, there seems to be some lack of realism towards them. Thus in 
late 1970 it was suggested that "the approach should be to encourage every 
local person in the district to become a member of one or several ranches, 
although some will have to contribute cash (not having livestock of their 
own)". The problem of management and of finding cohesive manageable units 
is given little attention. 
In our discussion of Mwereni we stressed the importance of 
determining who will gain from the investments made with public funds. We 
have noted above that the entire value of the grazing may be created by 
investment in water. If we examine some proposed investments in other 
ranching developments in Kwale, we can see that this fact ought to be given 
serious consideration. Despite the low level of interest apparent within 
Chenze Cooperative Society, a statement of June 197 3 refers to a proposal 
to invest K£14,000 in development capital during the Plan period and an 
allocation of another K£6 3,000 for 'working' capital covering the purchase 
of stock and recurrent cost (presumably a loan). Out of this, only some 
K£14,400 was to be the ranch contribution in cash and kind. Yet the member-
ship (at the start of 1973) was only 60, implying public investment (whether 
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on a loan basis or not) of more than K£1,000 per member: and the local 
contribution at the time was only 41 cattle! 
The Samburu South Group Ranch involves some 300 families. Here 
it was stated that the total money required during the Plan would be £31,000, 
an investment of £100 per family (this was to include 3 new dams costing 
£7,500, reticulation of water costing £16,000, firebreaks £2,500, and 
the purchase of bulls (£5,000). 
Company Ranches and Directed Agricultural Companies 
The question of equity in the use of public funds applies even 
more to private company ranches. Tara Ranchers Ltd, adjoining Chenze and 
formed in the area previously covered by the defunct Busho Cooperative 
Ranch, has an allocation of 52,000 acres of land, but only about 20 members 
(at the end of 1972). The relation between the 20 members and residents of 
settlements within the ranch boundaries would be worth investigating. An 
expenditure of £80,000 was planned during the Plan period, of which £15,640 
was to be contributed by the company itself in cash and kind. Thus more 
than double the level of public expenditure was planned for this company of 
20 members than for Mwereni ranch, where it was intended that 13,000 members 
would benefit. 
Another company ranch, Kwale Ranches, is referred to at the end of 
1972. This was to have 10 directors, of whom "five would be Kenya citizens 
and five wananchi" (an interesting distinction). Here it was stated that 
"dips would have to be built" (implying public funds might be used) and that 
"the envisaged investment put by us (Range Management) will be in the region 
of Shs one hundred thousand which by itself will be insufficient but as 
explained, due assistance will be given by your (Range Management) department". 
No reference is made to this being a loan. 
Some awareness of the problem is shown when it is stated in one 
place that "we do not want to dish chunks of ranching land out to individuals. 
This is undesirable socially and the Range Management Division discourages 
it..."Accordingly a preference is indicated for directed agricultural 
companies. These differ from the private company, which has a maximum 
membership of 50, and come between this and a cooperative society. While it has 
directors, the number of members can exceed 50. Unlike a private company, it 
has shares, though these are not open for purchase by the public. The sale 
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of shares is more or less restricted to local people, who might be recruited 
through barazas, and members have the right to refuse to accept particular 
people's subscriptions. What advantages a directed agricultural company 
has over a straightforward cooperative is uncertain. An example in Kwale 
District was Kurabeja Ranching Directed Agricultural'Companywhich"1 Was 
registered in 1972 with some 100,000 acres of state land. No reference is 
made to it in a 1973 progress report on the District. 
GROUP RANCHING IN MBERE 
Plans for the development of ranching in the Mbere area started a 
few years before being brought under the Mbere SRDP in 1970. Since that 
time the provision of water supply and the development of ranching have 
been perhaps the focal points of the SRDP for the area. During the 
1970-74 Plan period 24,000 acres were to be brought under development, with 
an emphasis on group ranching. 
Some Early Schemes • 
From the beginning, local people in Embu District appear to have 
shown very great resistance to any form of cooperative or group ranching, 
despite the persistent efforts of the Range Management Division in this 
direction. Two of the earliest schemes were in Evurori Location, in the north-
east of the District. Discussion of the Karuruno Ranching Scheme started at 
the beginning of 1966 or before. Here many people held individual land 
title deeds, and the proposal was to transfer these titles to a cooperative 
society in order to form a ranch which "should not be less than 10,000 
acres" . Efforts to organise this seem to have lasted not more than a year. 
The fact that individual holdings ranged from 200 acres down to 2.5 acres would 
have something to do with this, apart from a general reluctance to relinquish 
land titles, since an Individual could scarcely be expected to contribute 
his small subsistence holding to such a venture. Plans for a ranching 
scheme at Kieniri proposed by Embu County Council at the end of 1967 
lasted only a few months, when it was found that, apart from feeling that 
they had not been properly consulted by the Council, people "were not 
interested in changing their mode of life". 
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The Fate of the SRDP Group Ranching Programme 
Two ranch projects which were started in Embu District before 1970 
have endured during the whole period: the Ngaru-Mihirige Cooperative Ranch 
in Mbeti location in the centre-west of the District, which we discuss later, 
and the Embu-Mwea ranch project in Mwea location in the south-west which 
is outside the SRDP area. Musonoke Group Ranch was a long-standing 
proposal and with the launching of SRDP in 1970, 13 new group ranches were 
proposed. The form of the projects sometimes changed subsequently and 
the revised projects for a particular place were given new titles. What happened 
to these various projects is summarised in Table 3. Land adjudication providing 
individual land titles was already going on in the District before 1970 
but, to the consternation of the Range Management Division, this accelerated 
after that year until about 1973. 
Table 3. Time-sequence for ranching proposals in Mbere. 
Active ranching Schemes proposed 
schemes before soon after start 
1970 of SRDP 
Schemes Active ranch 
subsequently schemes in 
started or early 1975 
re-cast 
Schemes given 
as priority 
under Phase II 
of Kwsto&k 
Development 
Programme in 
1974 
1. Ngaru-Mihirige 
2. Emhu/Mwea 
I Ngaru-Mihirige 
II Embu/Mwea 
3. Kiambere 
4. Kiangungi 
5. Riacina 
6. Kilununa 
7. Gichiche . 
8. Kianjiru/ 
Rugongwe • 
9. Muchonoke 
10. Machanga 
11. Rivitia 
12. Siakago 
13. Riandu 
14. Gachuriri 
15. Thira 
16. Mbita 
^Gacavari 
_ \ Kanganga 
III Gacavari 
IV Kanganga 
Gacavari 
V Gichiche — > 1 1 Gichiche 
Mbegiri ^VI Mbegiri 
Schemes 
affected 
by land 
adjudication 
17. Kerie—> VII 
18. Iruma-"—)VIII 
(godbs) 
19. Iriatune/-)IX 
Kathera 
Kerie 
Iruma• III Iruma 
Iriatune/Kathera 
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Immediately an area was issued with individual land titles the 
interest of the Range Management Division in the area ceased, but even where 
titles had not been issued, the prospect of obtaining these was sufficient to 
persuade the local residents to hold off as regards group land titles and 
make it impossible for R.M.D. to make progress. While it is possible to 
criticise the lack of cooperation which occurred between two groups of 
Government officials, particularly within an SRDP area in which the agreed 
thrust of development was to be group ranching, it cannot be doubted that the 
Land Adjudication Department met with a very good and enthusiastic response 
which they would have found difficult to ignore. Even Range Management 
officials admit that the Wabere have a "Kikuyu mentality" in the extent of 
their interest in individual ownership. 
The effects on the programme, however, can be seen in Table 3. 
Seven proposals did not come off the ground at all, and the land adjudication 
factor was important in the slow death of the Muchonoke Ranch project which 
we describe more fully in a moment. The schemes which survived, apart from 
Ngaru Mihirige (already in the south) are located along the dry south-to-
south-west perimeter of Mbere, mostly in Mavuria location. This is 
illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows a line of ranch proposals east of 
Ngaru comprising Mbegiri, Gichiche, Iruma, Kanganga and Kerie. These are 
all away from the grassier and more populated central part of Mbere towards 
Embu Town. As we shall see, these are dry areas of bush and scrub more suitable 
for goats than for cattle. They are heavily tse-tse fly infested. There is 
a problem of predators and wild animals and there are areas in which the Game 
Department was (and possibly still .ir) interested. Also they lack water 
supplies. The considerable investment in expanding water supplies in 
Mbere, which was in part intended to support the major ranching developments 
planned, reaches just short of the 'new' ranching areas and it will not be 
economic, it seems, to extend these supplies. It is likely that these 
residual ranching developments will concentrate on goats, so that the focus 
of the Range Management Division has shifted within a few years from cattle 
to goat ranching. 
The Muchonoke Group Ranch Project 
Early interest in ranching in Mbere District focussed on the 
Muchonoke Group Ranch, located some ten miles south-east of Embu. Muchonoke 
was to be the prototype ranching scheme for the area under SRDP, on which 
others might be modelled. Muchonoke Ranch provides another example of a 
ranching scheme which has gone through a lengthy period of preliminary 
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planning and discussion: first surveyed as a potential group ranch at the 
beginning of 1966, efforts to launch the scheme continued until the early 
part of 1973, when it was finally given up after a period of seven years. 
Already in August 1966, seven clans had agreed to participate (out of nine) 
and had offered cattle as follows:-
Clan No. of participants No. of cattle offered 
Ikandi 9 36 
Mbanji 12 38 
Kare 43 224 
Mboya 26 62 
Kiragua 5 5 
Mururi 4 5 
Nditi . 3 11 
Total 102 381 
A major explanation of the slow progress made in the first two years was that 
this proposal for a group ranch came up some two and a half years before 
the Group Representatives Act was passed. Both sides, members and 
promoters, had therefore to mark time. Despite this, a baraza in August 
1969 showed there was still 'real interest' in group ranching, just as 
in 1966. In February 1969 eight clans had elected office-bearers for the ranch, 
and external boundaries were marked out during the year. Three years later 
this interest appeared to have evaporated, and in April 1972 it was reported 
that "progress is almost nil to date because of lack of initiative by 
members and leaders. It seems as if we are trying to force them to start 
the ranch." 
A major factor was undoubtedly the fact that land in the 
area was rapidly being adjudicated on an individualbasis4 as discussed 
above. The people alleged that in 19 68 when they expressed interest in 
group ranching they had not known about land registration. The preference 
for individual titles, in fact, had lain behind the reluctance of two of the 
nine clans to participate in the first place. Efforts in May 1972 to persuade 
the clans to sacrifice their individual titles and to combine their plots 
failed, turnout at a baraza for this purpose being very low. Subsequent 
efforts through "futile and wasteful barazas" came to nothing, arid early 
in 1973, when it was found also that some individuals had actually sold 
the ir plots to people from outside the area, it was finally recognised 
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that the scheme had to be abandoned. 
But while land adjudication activities did have decisive effect 
on the establishment of Muchonoke Ranch, this was by no means the only factor. 
A major element is the sociological one: the existence of a large number 
of small but strong clans in the area. Already in 195 6 some parts of the 
proposed ranch were under severe dispute among the different clans, and 
there had been a number of court cases. There were in fact nine separate 
clan lands. As we shall see this clannishness has been an important 
element in other attempts to form ranching groups in Mbere, and this was 
only a preview of subsequent experience. Had this been recognised from the 
beginning, an appropriate form of ranch development for the area accommodating 
this factor might have been worked out. A modification that was proposed was 
that there should be nine paddocks within the ranch, each corresponding to 
the territorial claims of One clan? but the implications of this do not appear 
to have been worked through. 
A second factor was the way in which the water question was 
handled. An investigation of water in late 1966 appears to have indicated 
only that water "is likely to be expensive", whereas at the end of 1968 it 
was stated that there is "unavailability of water anywhere in the scheme". 
Rivers in the area were only seasonal. In January 1969, it was decided 
that the Provincial Range Officer should approach the Water Development 
Department again, once the management details were finalised. Whether 
this was done, or brought results, is not clear. However, an official 
progress report on group ranching states four years later in April 1973 
that "water is a major problem" and that in the absence of permanent rivers> 
water from the Ena River should be piped to the area or a survey made of 
possible boreholes. As mentioned already, water was eventually piped through 
the area, financed under the SRDP water project; but even before April, 
when the progress report was issued, the Muchonoke ranch was to all intents 
and purposes a dead project. 
Given the crucial importance of water to the project, this 
uncertainty throughout the entire period from the birth to the death of 
the project was obviously unfortunate. It meant in effect that the 
project to which the potential participants were being asked to subscribe 
could not be defined, and also that to the extent that public 
investment was envisaged, social as well as private returns could not be 
determined. Indeed the prevarication by potential members, about which 
10-46 IS IDS/OP 12 
range management staff have complained here and elsewhere in Mbere, 
probably stems in some part from the desire by them to know precisely what 
the Government is offering before making a final commitment. 
The third problem, related to this, is the failure to spell 
out the technical and economic content of the project which will yield 
the benefits sought. What new elements in the situation will create 
improved economic opportunities? The introduction of water is just one; 
the sharing of new infrastructural facilities is another (which as we 
suggest later need not necessarily require the formation of either a 
group ranch or a cooperative society); the setting up of a central or 
cooperative herd with improved husbandry and commercial offtake may be 
the main element. In this case there appears to'have been very little 
discussion of the economic package being proposed, of how the contributed 
cattle were to be deployed?of how the 3 50 to 400 cattle offered compared 
to what was needed, of whether the viability of the enterprise depended 
on the use of the group land title to obtain loan finance for buying 
additional cattle of of how the group ranching activities would relate 
to present farm activities, particularly cultivation. Only in mid-1971 
is it mentioned that the general poverty in the area (as well as non-
livestock farm activities) would not permit farmers to transfer more 
the-: a few cattle each to the project9 so that a loan for the purchase 
of fattening stock would be necessary. Moreover, though the area is 
suitable for cattle, a considerable amount of cultivation for subsistence 
takes place: it does not appear ever to have been discussed how this 
agricultural production was to fit into the ranching scheme. Subsistence 
cultivation was probably a major factor in the preference clearly expressed 
for holding individual land titles. At a baraza held in June 1972, it is 
reported that a good proportion of participants expressed a preference for 
individual plots and "for settling for cultivation purposes rather than 
rearing cattle^. A large proportion of plots bought up in the west by 
outsiders, mainly from Kirinyaga and Kiambu, appear to have been for 
purposes of cultivation. 
It seems likely that if full discussions with the potential 
participants had taken place earlier, their particular needs could have been 
taken into account: in contrast, the inclination of the R.M.D. appears 
to have been to attempt to 'sell' a particular predetermined ranching 
model, which had to be accepted or rejected only in that form. In spite of 
the need for discussion, the District Range Officer in the area in 1973 
admitted to not having made any field visits for an entire six-month 
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period, though this may have been somewhat unusual. 
Ranching Proposals In the Perimeter Areas 
During 1973, when hopes were abandoned of developing 
Muchonoke and the higher areas for group ranching, attention shifted 
towards the perimeter areas in the south of Mbere, and was focussed on 
a number of proposals already made there. Various proposals had been 
discussed for the area extending beyond Kiambere. A meeting of 300 people 
at Kiambere in July 1973 declared itself interested in group ranching, and 
elected a chairman. Later (in September) it was decided to form a single 
cooperative society, to be called the Kiambere Cooperative Ranches, to cover 
three sites at Kiambere, Reacina and Gacavari. These would have covered a 
total acreage of 50,000. The participants were told subsequently to clear 
boundaries and have the land adjudicated before any financial allocation 
could be made. Almost immediately, however, in October it was found that 
a single committee was unworkable (no doubt for geographical reasons as 
well as that of getting proper and agreed representation from all the areas), 
and separate committees were established. Schemes emerged from this at 
Gichiche, Kanganga (covering an area close to Kiambere and Reacina) and 
Gacavari. The acreages involved in the proposal were drastically reduced, 
Gichiche going down from 7,000 acres to around 3,000 or 4,000-, and Gacavaritu 
8,640 acres, as demarcated in January 1974, and still further later on. 
At the same time the groups engaged in each scheme were more cohesive, 
each involving a small number of clans. 
The main problems affecting these schemes arise from the physical 
environment. They lie between the edge of the populated area in the belt 
sloping down towards the Tana River. Access is difficult in the case of 
Gacavari, and a tortuous Land Rover ride can take the visitor only as far as 
a vantage point from which the proposed ranch site can be indicated in the 
middle distance some four or five miles away through the scrub, v^i F.A.O. bush 
control expert reporting in April 1969, described the area as "uniformly 
dense thorn bufeh with a few open glades". Heavy tse-tse infestation would 
make the area unsuitable for cattle without extensive bush clearing: "if at 
a later stage tne area can be freed of tse-tse, and it is decided to 
introduce cattle, further consideration may have to foe given to the 
eradication of bush". Hence the only option initially is to introduce goats, 
and even here intensive utilisation is considered necessary, requiring a start 
to be made in a relatively small area only, An F.A.O. sheep and goat 
specialist pointed simultaneously to the problem of predators, suggesting 
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that a start be made at the edge of the settled areas, working progressively 
downwards (unfortunately this appears inconsistent with such proposals 
as exist for water provision) and operating within cut lines 75 yards 
apart (which would be expensive if these were to be four or five miles 
long.) As mentioned earlier, the Game Department has been interested 
in these areas: at Gichiche it was said that "there has been overgrazing 
by wildlife, especially buffaloes". 
The water supply position in all the proposed ranches is 
problematic. At Gacavari there is a dam at the site, but the main 
water supply would need to be pumped 2.5 miles up from the Tana River. 
However the costs of this have yet to be worked out, let alone how 
these would compare with the revenue from an initially small-scale goat 
ranch. The group of clans involved already own many more goats than 
cattle and would be interested, certainly in an initial phase, in farming 
goats. 
The present Kanganga scheme covers some of the area of the 
former proposed Kiambere Goat Scheme. As far back as May 1968 clans in 
the area had decided to go ahead in establishing a goat ranch on an area 
of about 10,000 acres. In 1969 there were 43 potential participants 
offering about 300 goats and 50 sheep. From 1970 onwards there does not 
appear to have been much active discussion until the present proposal, 
which is for cattle. The area, however, is one of dense thorn bush much 
more suitable for goats, particularly as the water supply position is 
dub ious. The idea that goats could be used to reduce the scrub, thus 
preparing the way for cattle to be introduced, may be feasible technically 
but, given the delay implied in obtaining returns from cattle, does not 
recommend itself in discounted cash flow terms. 
The proposal for a ranch at Kerie is not yet far advanced. 
A meeting of 500 people in June 1973 expressed a strong interest in 
either a group or cooperative ranch.It lies to the north of Gacavari, 
and its location is similar. 
The area proposed for Gichiche is mostly bush, suitable for 
goats. Thirty-three people from eleven families are waiting to be 
registered. The farmers in the area and those directly concerned are 
relatively poor, cultivating for subsistence, with a little cotton 
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25 and not many stock. Animals offered at the moment are about 100 goats 
and 100 cattle; but in any case the plan would be to start with goats 
for at least three years. As in the case of the other schemes in the 
perimeter, members would continue to reside and cultivate in the 
higher areas, with a cooperative society herd maintained as a completely 
supplementary activity on separate and unpopulated group-owned land 
some distance away. What needs to be stressed, therefore, is that 
Gichiche and the other schemes are, in commercial terms and compared 
to group and cooperative ranches elsewhere in the country, comparatively 
small-scale schemes. As at Gacavari, the question at Gichiche is whether 
the proceeds obtaining would suffice to offset the cost of water 
investments, since at Gichiche there is an even greater water problem. 
There is no water at present, except for the Tana River, which would 
offer grazing only in a limited strip parallel to and within reach of 
the Tana. Even this is in doubt because of the proposed hydroelectric 
scheme which may redirect the river; in this case four kilometres of 
piping would be needed to bring water down from the Gitaru Dam. 
Similarly, two other schemes which were started from the 
beginning as goat ranches are quite small-scale. Iruma Goat Ranch 
is fully demarcated and roughly estimated at 1,000 acres. Five 
members of the same Iruma clan are involved. The proposal for the 
r^5._a_tune/Kathera Goat Ranching Scheme was made early in 1974, when a 
committee was established. The acreage proposed is not yet known. 
The rapid abandonment of group ranching plans in the populated 
segment of Mbere, associated with land adjudication, no doubt saved 
the R.M.D. from having to deal with what would undoubtedly have been 
an important factor affecting group ranching schemes: the strength 
of the clan system in Mbere. Even in these perimeter schemes, where 
the cooperative herds are to utilise unused and inhospitable lands, the 
clans have been involved. At Gacavari five clans, Ngai A, Ngai B 
(two different groups of Ngai) Hdhara, rCamuvea and Ngugi are involved. 
The last two were not participants until after the names of prospective 
ranchland-owners were issued in November 1974, when they claimed ownership 
of land right inside the proposed ranch. Such claims to unused land 
are based on fairly tenuous ancestral links, the legality of which 
must be uncertain. The three first clans do not recognise these 
claims, which are to be adjudicated. 
25. An inventory of holdings owned by an earlier group of 70 potential 
members in April 1974 showed average holdings of nine to ten cattle, eleven 
goats and four sheep. 
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The Kamuvea clan also had an interest in the Kiambare/Reacina 
(now Kanganga) proposal, together with the Nyonga, Mwita and Nditi, the 
last of which were not recognised by the others as having property rights 
in the area. Land adjudication became necessary. In the present 
Kanganga scheme the first three are again potential participants together 
with the Ciina clan, but there are problems of defining a suitable ranch 
lay-out consistent with the distribution of clan holdings which can 
give all access to water at the river. At Gichiche-Ruthari there seems 
to be harmony between the two clans involved, Ngui and Ikandi, claims 
from the Mugue clan having apparently been disposed of. 
The original Kianjiru/Rugogwe scheme further to the 
west failed because of land disputes, which are apparently endemic 
in the area. In the present Mbegeri scheme seventeen clans are involved. 
The aim, in additionto the ranching activity, is to take over an Indian-
owned sisal plantation. 
What must be stressed, therefore, is that any cooperative 
development within Mbere must take realistic account of this very 
strong clan structure. 
Water Supply Issues 
As has already been pointed out, it is unfortunate that the 
major water development scheme for the area (Ena/Ishiara Water Scheme) 
will not reach these new ranching areas, partly as a result of 
economies in the scheme caused by shortage of funds. However water 
plans appear never to have been closely coordinated - or perhaps 
coordinated at all - with livestock development schemes. Thus the 
Muchonoke Ranch proposal, which was the focal ranching scheme for the 
first three years of SRDP and predated SRDP in any case, did not include 
specification of water investments, although water was a major problem. 
In the perimeter ranches there has not yet been systematic or conclusive 
discussion of the water position in relation to the schemes; specifically 
for example, the cost of pumping water from the Tana River at Gacavari or 
Kerie. There has been some' cost estimation for boreholes. 
In our discussion of Kwale we made the point that grassland 
or scrub does not become ranchland until a complementary input of water 
is provided and that water investments should await a credible management 
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system and organisation. A ranch project must in these circumstances be 
viewed first as balancing additional grazing created against the cost 
of water investments made (including investments in distributing water). 
In contrast, actual practice seems to be to delay involvement of the 
Water Development Department until everything else except water has been 
cleared - local participation, boundary demarcation, land titles 
and so on. As pointed out already, however, local participation is 
likely to depend on the economic package, including water, being offered. 
It is difficult to see why this procedure should be followed. 
Rough estimates of alternative costs by the Water Development Department 
would not be very difficult to make. Against this, endless forays are made 
over the years by Range Management and senior administrative officials, 
false hopes are raised among potential participants, and confidence 
in the soundness of Government advice reduced as schemes are stretched over 
seven years or more before being abandoned. Secondly, it would seem to be 
a better approach to first of all determine the viability of creating 
grazing in an area and then to consider the best way of utilising this: 
which may or may not be a cooperative ranch. In remote areas it might 
be a state ranch or a ranching company; in populated areas it may be 
individual ownership with communal use of water. Thus in these perimeter 
areas it may be less appropriate to provide new water down on the Tana 
Plains than to improve water supply in the higher populated areas, where 
cattle are already kept in significant numbers, using simple intermediate 
technology methods such as weirs (apparently used in Machakos and Kitui) 
to retain and draw out water from 'dry' river basins. Planning procedures 
for livestock schemes therefore need to be reversed, with water issues 
coming first rather than last. 
The Possibility of Intermediate Ranching Models 
The effect of land adjudication was to move the field of 
operations of the R.M.D. to the perimeter areas. The possibility of 
some kind of intermediate solution within the populated areas of Mbere 
does not appear to have been considered. In fact it is not certain that 
land adjudication should preclude any form of cooperative development: 
a minimum degree of cooperation is involved for instance when individual 
farmers share communal water or dipping facilities. 
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A possibility which might be investigated is the formation 
of small or medium-sized cooperative herds for which grazing rights could 
be rented on plots owned by individuals or clans. Where there had previously 
been interest in group ranch formation such, as at Muchonoke, a group of 
clans or individuals could nevertheless agree to form a cooperative society 
to operate a cooperative herd. Here the society would be renting grazing 
rights from its own members, so that actual cash transfers might be 
minimised, each member offering certain grazing rights on his own plot 
as his member s contribution. At a lower level of cooperation, this could 
be simply a group or communal herd, with livestock only grazed communally 
for the sake of obtaining the advantages of rotational grazing. Rather 
than considering only the standard group ranch or cooperative ranch models, 
the approach should be to consider which are the most important economies 
of scale attainable in particular circumstances. 
The suggestion above is not unlike the original proposal for fiuchonoke, 
which recognised the existence of clans by providing for nine paddocks, 
each corresponding to clan." ands but contributed to an agreed scheme for 
rotational grazing. The aim would be to incorporate contiguous plots 
into the agreement, but at the same time to retain the flexibility to 
permit individual plot owners to opt out (since it would in most cases 
be possible for the cooperative herd to by-pass such plots) and to allow 
for the renting of grazing rights on plots owned by absentee landlords. 
The agreement could be flexible enough ':o allow an owner to continue 
shifting cultivation on his own plot and to keep his cattle for subsistence 
purposes (an owner would not have an incentive under group herding to graze 
cattle on his own land rather than on somebody else's). 
This arrangement could be built around infrastructural 
investments already made in dips and water supply. And the advantages 
claimed by officials for the group ranching solution, which often 
boil down to more effective extension, disease control and livestock 
improvement, could also be obtained. In addition, important economies of 
marketing, particularly in finding regular outlets at better prices both 
locally and (especially with a more development-oriented purchasing policy 
by the K.M.C.) outside the area, might be obtained. 
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Elsewhere we have mentioned the need to take into account 
diseconomies of scale in ranching, arising out of the problems of 
organising huge units. These are important in Mbere, given the strength 
of the clan system, The advantage of the suggestion made here is that 
it might be possible to build up from smaller units to larger ones, on 
both the production and marketing side. Thus groups could in time be 
affiliated to a medium-sized cooperative union for the sale of cattle. 
On the production side, groups could be brought together to extend rotational 
arrangements, or within groups favourable experience might persuade members 
eventually to merge their individual land titles in favour of a communal 
one for the sake of obtaining a development loan. The obtaining of loans 
may be the one economy of scale not obtainable short of a group land tftlt; 
at the same time loans should be obtainable on the basis of the cooperative 
herd (if not, institutional arrangements should be modified to facilitate 
this) „ 
This new focus would bring attention back to areas where 
plentiful grazing exists, where investment has already taken place in a 
major network of water supply, where a comprehensive system of cattle 
dips has been established and where the population is resident. Attention 
would also revert from goats to cattle. 
It could be said that Mbere was not suited to the compartmentalised 
approach of the R.M.D., which requires that an area be either mixed farming 
land (where it has no interest) or ranchland, where either the group ranch 
or cooperative ranch model may be applied, both requiring the absence of 
individual land tenure. In fact Mbere is an intermediate area, basically 
suitable for livestock but capable of supporting some subsistence cultivation, 
of foodcrops. In this situation (unlike Pokot, where a much greater 
proportion of subsistence is based on livestock) it is understandable 
that residents would be reluctant to sacrifice their customary plots in 
favour of a collective land title. 
This need not mean, of course, that they are thereby not 
interested in cooperation in livestock activities, as R.M,D, officials 
concluded, Thus when the district Range Officer of the area referred 
in 1973 to the fact that people might be prepared to surrender their 
individual land titles as they were still "eager to start group ranches", 
the reply was that he was expected;-
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to know the procedures to be followed when organizing group 
ranches... If you have clearly explained to the people how 
group ranches are formed, and they have chosen to have their 
land adjudicated on an individual basis, this means that 
they are not interested in group ranches, and therefore 
your statement that the local people are 'eager to start 
group ranches' is contradictory. 
This statement in October 1973 effectively marked the termination of efforts 
to foster group ranching within the populated areas. 
Further evidence of compartmentalised thinking in terms of the 
two models occurs for instance when it was said in 1970 in relation to 
the R.M.D. Eastern Province Development Plan for 1970-1974 that "since 
cooperative ranch development has received a negative response, group 
enterprise will be the main objective". In fact, if people are reluctant 
to accept cooperative ranching, the same is likely to hold in respect 
of group ranching, if the latter is to be organised in a commercial fashion 
with a central herd, organised management and a commercial rate of offtake. 
Without this element, there would still be advantages in pooling communal 
facilities, such as water supply, but how such facilities would be financed 
is questionable. The 'tremendous welcome' which group ranching was said 
to have received was due to the fact that livestock are owned individually 
under this system; out this implies a preference for a limited degree of 
cooperation. Rather than switching directly to the alternative model, 
discussion might have started right away on the socio-economics of a 
system which could bring tangible benefits without assuming more than a 
realisable form of cooperation. Another example of the same thing 
occurred in respect of the Kianjiru/Rugogwe Ranch (later called Mbegeri). 
When members themselves took the initiative in June 1972 to approach the 
R.M.D. with a proposal for the formation of a stock farming cooperative 
society, they were advised to form a group ranch "as appropriate for their 
area". However, this merely represented the official policy for the 
area at one point in time, emanating from what was considered earlier 
to have been a lack of local interest in cooperative societies. Yet the 
present perimeter area proposals for goat ranching are all for cooperative 
ranches. 
The Ngaru Mihiriga Ranching Cooperative Society 
The only active cooperative cattle ranching enterprise within 
the Mbere SRDP area at the present time is the Ngaru Mihiriga Ranch. 
Since it has been in operation since 1969, it is worth examining its 
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experience as an indication of possible success elsewhere. 
The decision to launch a cooperative ranch appears to have 
been taken as early as 1966, although the cooperative society was formally 
registered in August 1969, with 91 members in an area of 5,315 acres. 
Agreement regarding the use of land has been informal, and the title 
deeds are still awaited. The length of time this has taken is in marked 
contrast with the speed of land adjudication elsewhere in Mbere. 
Five clans have property rights in the ranch area, but a 
significant proportion of society members do not belong to these clans. 
Out of about 150 possible clan members in the society, only 38 joined in 
1969 and bought shares (at Shs 500 each). Members had therefore to be 
brought in from outside the clans to render the scheme viable. Even clan 
members, however, also own plots outside the ranch. The treasurer and some 
other committee members are in fact from outside the clans. 
Particularly since a question has been raised regarding the 
activities of the treasurer, there is pressure to close the society except 
to clan members. At the same time there is a proposal that when the title 
deeds to the land are obtained^this should be leased by the clans to the 
society. There is considerable uncertainty regarding cohesiveness of the 
enterprise in the future, even apart from the financial problem. 
A major advantage of the ranch has been the availability of 
water. The ranch lies between the river, 1.5 miles from the grazing areas, 
and a stream on the other side, while investment in a system of two tanks 
(one already working) and two troughs will supply water to the centre of 
all four rotational paddocks. There appears to be a major tse-tse problem, 
however, as measured by the 205 animals treated during 1974- and an expenditure 
on drugs of Sh 10,960, one of the major cost items during the year. This is 
very pertinent to the prospects for introducing cattle ranching in the 
lower areas of Mbere. 
The main ranch activity is the fattening of bought-in steers 
for resale. For this purpose, loans were obtained of Shs -50,000 
from the Agricultural Finance Corporation '.and Shs 30,000 from the Government 
of Kenya. However, the carrying capacity of the ranch, estimated as 
530 stock units, was only about 50 per cent utilised in January 1975 when 
there were 262 stock units on the ranch. Absence of a land title deed 
may have handicapped the society in obtaining loans, for its repayment 
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record is good so far. 
Goats are not kept at present, but a goat breeding programme 
was proposed during 1974. This would be launched by the purchase of 
100 Boran goats, at a cost of around Shs 10,000j calculations of 
revenue potential put this at Shs 20,000 over the four years 1976-
1979. 
Despite the numerous difficulties, a progressive 
attitude has been taken towards animal husbandry. Improvement of water 
supply, application of a rotation system and dipping and treatment against 
disease have all been carried out. Attempts at systematic upgrading of 
animals are presently going on, with two separate herds of about 100 cows 
each, one served by two bulls, and the other by artificial insemination, 
using Sahiwal bull semen. No special efforts have been made yet on the 
marketing side, and stock are merely sold locally to traders visiting 
the site. 
Unfortunately a rough calculation of average net proceeds, 
over the five years 1970 to 1974, does not leave room for too much 
optimism. Running costs are probably around Shs 40,000 in a normal 
26 
year. Revenue from cattle sales during 1970 to 1974 were about 
Shs 180,000, against purchasing costs of Shs 154,000, yielding average 
annual net proceeds from cattle of about Shs 25,000, well below 
recurrent running costs. Not surprisingly, no dividends have been paid 
to members since 1970-71 when Shs 13,800 were paid out, averaging Shs 150 
per member, equivalent to only Shs 30 each per year. This is, moreover, 
despite considerable official assistance, apart from managerial 
assistance, for instance in respect of pumping installations and 
firebreaks. 
26. In 1974, Shs 17,500 were spent on staff wages, Shs. 2,800 on 
acaraeides, Shs 700 on fuel, Shs 11,000 on drugs and about Shs on 
transport. Adding in other items such as interest charges would raise 
the total to around Shs 40,000. 
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From the beginning there have been managerial problems; the 
first two managers resigned. More seriously, doubts have recently arisen 
regarding the state of the account, as the treasurer has been unable to 
account for one item of Shs 27,000. A figure for administrative expenditures 
of Shs 8,000 in 1974 ought also to be scrutinised. This is, of course, 
an occupational hazard of cooperative societies, which may well in this 
case lead to the break-up of the enterprise. The main lesson from the 
experience of the Ngaru Mihiriga Ranch, which certainly has positive 
elements, seems to be that the managerial and organisational problems of 
cooperatives must not be underestimated in the ranching field as elsewhere. 
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON GROUP AND COOPERATIVE RANCHING 
Our review of ranching schemes in three different SRDP areas 
reveaJs a considerable diversity of conditions and experience and throws 
up a host of economic, sociological, legal and administrative issues. 
At the same time some general problems emerge facing the development of 
the ranchlands and semi-arid areas of Kenya. 
The Management and Husbandry of Range Resources 
The fundamental task of ranching is that of managing, preserving 
and appropriately utilising the grazing resources of a particular area. 
Such management requires the appropriate restriction of the numbers of 
livestock at any given time, so that the productivity of the grazing 
resources is maximised over time. The fragility of the dry range areas 
in the face of overstocking is now well understood. Overstocking results 
in the eating out of the more desirable species of grasses and the 
destruction of the soil cover. The end result of the cycle is soil erosion 
and degradation, and the artificial stimulation of the least desirable and 
least palatable species of bush and scrub. The productivity and the 
carrying capacity of land that has been subjected to overstocking is 
greatly impaired and, without a determined regeneration effort, this 
impairment can be permanent. The result is that land that could have been 
the source of very considerable livestock production and wealth is 
instead the site of increasing poverty, misery and degradation. 
Our case study of the Kongelai indicates that social factors 
partly underlie the extent of overstocking and are still very strong 
despite their shortsightedness and irrationality in achieving the social 
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objectives involved. At the same time, where land is owned communally 
and cattle and other livestock are owned individually, there is a strong 
economic motivation for the individual operator to maximise the 
number of livestock units he personally owns. In This way the individual 
can transform as much of the grazing into personal wea_i_tn as possible. 
If an individual restricts the numbers of his livestock, the only 
consequence is that some other livestock owner will use the grazing, and 
the individual who restricted his stock ends up relatively worse off. There 
is no individual incentive whatsoever in this system for the husbanding 
and management of the grazing resources. Without some form of control of 
numbers, investments in water supplies and disease measures may only result 
in higher concentrations of livestock on the land in the short run, and 
acceleration of the deterioration of grazing resources in the longer term. 
Group Ranching 
The group ranch movement has largely been an attempt to solve 
the basic problem of the absence of a focus responsibility for the 
preservation of the land by giving land rights to a group. It is clearly 
in the group's interests to husband their land for the sake of future years. 
The problem of the group ranch is basically one of how to impose the group's 
interest on the individual livestock owners. This is an unresolved 
problem so long as maximisation of stock numbers is clearly in the 
individual stock-owner's interest. In a group that might consist of 
several hundred members who jointly own the land, the battle for the 
individual family's wealth and survival is still the battle to maximise 
its personal herds. Under these circumstances, the individual's 
'cultural' resistance to destocking is likely to persist. 
In this regard it is worth pointing out that^in contrast to 
cooperative society ranching, the essential element of group ranching 
is individual ownership of livestock, and it is promoted in areas where 
the more advanced form of cooperation is not deemed feasible. Accordingly 
there is an inherent problem in group ranching, as compared to cooperative 
ranching, of reconciling individual and group interests. 
Given the rather gloomy outlook for group ranching development, 
if the Kongelai situation is a general one, an alternative approach, the 
suitability of which in particular areas merits further investigation, is 
the classic solution to the 'common property' problem, that of enclosure. 
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Once a livestock owner knows that he is dependent upon a piece of land, 
and can exclude from it all livestock other than his own, his economic 
incentives change radically. He is then motivated to husband and improve 
his grazing and restrict his livestock holding to that number that will 
maximise farm output over the long period. The experience with enclosure 
in South Baringo referred to by Von Kaufman is intriguing:-
...There has been remarkable development of individual 
ranching operations. Individual plots of 30 to 50 hectares 
have been planned with good access ways left to common facilities 
such as water, dips and markets. When these plots were demarcated, 
all were composed of poor land, some absolutely bare eroded earth. 
Many of these plots have been reseeded with improved or 
indigenous grasses. Cattle numbers have been reduced......Grass 
poaching on neighbouring plots, and failure to practice 
regular dipping, have been stopped by successful prosecutions. 
In drought, farmers have apparently learned to sell, or at least 
remove their stock in time and re-stock after the drought. 
Assistance has been limited to some excellent Range Management 
Division re-seeding trials, a few small-scale loans for 
pasture development and the purchase of quality cattle, and 
normal routine extension services.^ 
This appears clearly to be an important development which needs to be 
examined more closely, with a view to possible replication in other suitable 
areas, and as part of a more flexible approach to ranch promotion. 
It also raises a question regarding the extent to which 
huge ranches are necessitated by the existence of economies of scale. The 
above small scale ranch system with common access to water and dips 
appears very suitable for the situation in Mbere District described above. 
In any case, as has already been mentioned, because of uneven rainfall patterns 
in the pastoral areas even the very largest of group ranches can, In 
some years, have virtually no grazing on them. Under these circumstances 
it is essential for the livestock owners to move their cattle completely 
off their group ranch and seek other grazing. This is the basis for 
the cultural institution of reciprocity, whereby cattle from one area 
are permitted access to grazing in another area, in the knowledge that 
27. Ralph von Kaufman, "The Development of the Range Land Areas", 
in J. Heyer et al, ed., Agricultural Development in Kenya, Nairobi, 
Oxford University Press, 1976. 
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in a subsequent year permission may have to be sought in the other 
2 8 
direction. In the somewhat extreme case of West Pokot, the group 
ranch boundaries appear to separate off the most arid area from other areas 
that are ecologically complementary to it. Thus on the one hand group 
ranches are no guarantee that advantage can be taken of all important 
economies of scale, and on the other the tendency by the R.M.D. to 
establish the largest possible size of group or cooperative ranch may 
not be justified by economies of scale and may involve important diseconomies 
of scale on the managerial and organisational side. 
As the example of Mwereni ranch shows, far too little attention 
has been given to the internal structure and working of group ranch 
OtK^ui-ati^i. I n "this case the problem is to find a structure which will 
solve the problem of conflict between individual and group interests. 
The managerial problems of cooperative ranching are different in kind, but 
if group ranching is intended either immediately or eventually to 
represent a commercialised ranching system, then the experience of 
cooperative ranching societies in Kenya is very relevant to an assessment 
of the potential for group ranching. In Mbere District, as we have shown, 
group ranching proposals have been transformed over time into proposals 
for cooperative ranches. We have also suggested, on the basis of the 
Mbere experience, the need for some 'intermediate' ranching models. 
Since the main cooperative ranching developments in Kenya do not lie 
within the SRDP areas, we shall not discuss these in detail here. 
Developments in Machakos District are examined fully in the separate 
I.D.S. Working Paper mentioned.29 
Within the ranchland areas for which group ranching is proposedn 
overstocking is not invariably a problem, as for instance in Kwale and 
Mbere. However extensive areas within Kenya are similar to the situation 
in West Pokot^with serious overgrazing. Here the fundamental problem 
of managing the range resource remains that of achieving and maintaining 
28- See J.K". Haldermais, An Analysis o^ Continue: Semi-Nomadism on 
the Kaputiei Maasai Group Ranches, Discussion Daper No. 152, Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1972. 
29. I. Livingstone, op. cit. 
